Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism

HISTORIES OF RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES

Robert Conquest, series editor

Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq
Anthony Arnold

Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism:

Parcham and Khalq

Anthony Arnold



HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS
Stanford University, Stanford, California

Hoover Press Publication 279

First printing, 1983
Manufactured in the United States of America
87 86 85 84 83 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Arnold, Anthony.
Afghanistan's two-party communism.

(Histories of ruling Communist parties)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.
2. Communism—Afghanistan. 3. Afghanistan—Politics and government—1973– . 4. Afghanistan—History—Soviet Occupation, 1979– . I. Title. II. Series.
JQ1769.A8P462 1983 324.258'1075 83-4363
ISBN 0-8179-7792-9

Design by P. Kelley Baker

To this book's silent coauthor,
Ruth Lowry Arnold,
for whose toils in its preparation
this recognition is wholly inadequate.

Contents

Editor's Foreword / ix

Preface / xi

Acknowledgments / xvii

Chapters

1
Perspectives / 1

2
Two Biographies / 15

3
The PDPA's Formative Years / 23

4
Fission, 1967–1977 / 37

5
Temporary Fusion / 52

6
And Again Fission / 64

7
The Rise and Fall of Hafizullah Amin / 79
8
Soviet Occupation / 99
9
The Changing Face of the PDPA / 115
10
Epilogue / 127

Appendixes

A Platform of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan / 137
B Constitution of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan / 149
C The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party in Afghanistan / 160
D Selected Biographic Sketches / 178
E PDPA Central Committee Members / 188
F Cabinets of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 1978–1982 / 198

Notes / 207
Bibliography / 231
Index / 237

Editor's Foreword

Anthony Arnold's account of the Afghan communist movement is the ninth in the Histories of Ruling Communist Parties series, published by the Hoover Institution under the general editorship first of Richard Staar and now of myself. It appears at a time when general interest in the situation in Afghanistan is as high as ever and the Soviet imposition of the puppet regime in Kabul is as far from success as ever.

On the face of it, Afghan communism represents a unique case. While there are five communist regimes of various flavors in the Far East and eight in Eastern Europe, this is the first expansion of communism over the Soviet borders into the Islamic Middle East since the failure to set up communist regimes in northwestern Iran in 1946 (for the communist-style regimes in Ethiopia and the South Yemen of course represent a more roundabout aspect of Soviet expansionism, both geographically and ideologically).

It is thus appropriate to recall that the Middle East has been one of the traditional targets of Russian expansion since Peter the Great's expedition against Iran in 1722–1723; "the direction of the Persian Gulf" was specifically claimed as a Soviet sphere in negotiations with Hitler in 1940.

But if we consider the Afghan case in this wide perspective, we should perhaps make it wider still. Historically and culturally the Soviet lands to the

north are equally part of the Muslim Middle East, and the Russian irruption into them is only a century old; while the extinction of the Amirate of Bokhara and the Khanate of Khiva and the long guerrilla war against the nationalist Basmachi that followed were completed no more than fifty years ago. What happens in Afghanistan is relevant to the future not only of Iran and Pakistan, but also of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

The difficulties met with by the Soviet intervention are partly inherent, in the rejection of communism in any form by the bulk of the Afghan people. But they are partly due to the profound division within Afghan communism to which Arnold draws most emphatic attention in his title.

It is usual for factions to arise in communist parties, especially when (as with the Polish Communist Party in the 1920s and 1930s) they represent the merger of two or more established political groups or tendencies. But in the case of the Afghan Communists all this has been carried to an unprecedented extreme by the Parcham and Khalq groupings, with a cycle over the years of murders, coups d'etat, and so forth unmatched elsewhere—only faintly echoed even in Outer Mongolia in the 1930s and 1940s and in Albania today.

A congeries of fanatics and ideologues drawn from a small stratum of intellectuals, or rather a lumpenintelligentsia, has thus acted in such a way as to repel still further the Afghan people by their factiousness and ruthlessness, and at the same time to compromise their own tenuous grip on power. For this was inevitably shaken, even riven, by these internecine acts, until large-scale Soviet intervention was the only way in which their rule could be preserved in any form whatever. But it should be added that on the Soviet side, indecision and tergiversation on which group, and which individuals within a group, the USSR should support certainly aggravated the problem.

The phenomenon of Afghan communism, in fact, is to a large degree a novel one to the Western observer. Anthony Arnold here presents the whole story, in its ideological, its factional, and its personal aspects. At the same time, he places it in the context of international communism and of the demands of Soviet power. The importance of this study at this time needs no stressing.

Robert Conquest

Hoover Institution
Stanford University

Preface

If the reader of a book learned as much from the reading as the author learned from its writing, we would all be much wiser. Words and concepts pulled from a cluttered head like reluctant teeth and forced into position on paper are not so easily forgotten as those already on view, tamely chained to the page.

This book started out to be merely a chronicle of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), and that indeed is what it is. But there are a number of lessons to be drawn from that history, and rather than take the chance of their being overlooked, I will try to list them here. Before starting on this book and in the course of writing it, I had only a few general concepts in mind and had to discard some preconceived notions about the PDPA that did not stand up to careful scrutiny.

This work assumes that readers will accept as axiomatic the premise that the USSR attempts to exploit Marxist-Leninist parties for its own ends. Granted, Moscow is not always successful in controlling its foreign allies, but the conscious effort to exert direction over any party whose ideological aims parallel those of the USSR is always there, a natural outgrowth of the "democratic centralism" mentality. This direction is far more explicit and authoritarian than comparable Western relationships between parties,

ideologically akin more to the thought patterns of an international hierarchical church than the largely unstructured fraternal attitudes within, say, the Socialist International.

In the case of the PDPA, Soviet backing was probably necessary before the party was formally founded, on New Year's Day, 1965. It was certainly necessary after 1967, when the party had split into its Parcham and Khalq wings, each of which had to contend with more popular leftist movements as well as with each other.* Moscow's good official relations with Kabul, however, dictated that Soviet material and ideological support for its Afghan antiregime affiliates be downplayed and that the Afghan Marxist-Leninists conceal their revolutionary intentions. The Afghan population's own conservative religious beliefs and hypersensitivity to foreign meddling in domestic affairs were additional incentives to obfuscate the true aims and ideology of the party. Accordingly, the PDPA's public platform (see Appendix A) was a bland document espousing nationalist democratic reforms, whereas its secret constitution (see Appendix B), adopted at the same time but revealed only to party members, showed a rigidly Marxist-Leninist approach to organization, discipline, and goals, including dedication to proletarian internationalism.

Inasmuch as the PDPA platform (the overt document) was almost surely influenced and approved by Moscow, it now perhaps may serve as a key for detecting the pro-Soviet orientation of other parties that have such concealed connections. The professed progressive and democratic concepts themselves are not incriminating, but specific turns of phrase might be quite revealing; the Soviets display little imagination when it comes to ideological formulations, and a high correlation between the phraseology of the PDPA platform and that found in manifestos of other ostensibly noncommunist parties could help to pinpoint those with hidden Soviet links. At the very least, the Afghan example can serve as a pointed reminder that individuals and movements devoted to Marxism-Leninism often find it expedient to conceal their true colors.

Some analysts have questioned the degree of pro-Moscow sentiment among PDPA leaders and the party as a whole. Several prominent Afghan figures (for example, Gen. Abdul Qader) have been described as Islamic nationalists at heart, rather than Marxist-Leninists. Whether or not that portrayal is accurate (I, for one, doubt it), it is clear that nationalism will not

*Throughout the text the designation of Parcham or Khalq as a "faction" or a "party" depends on whether the two were formally united at the time under discussion. When the party was split, each of the two was indeed a complete party, with its own organization, recruiting program, and apparat; when united, despite their mutual exclusiveness and antagonism, they were factions of a larger whole. When referring to the two outside a particular time frame, terms like "group" or "branch" are used.

be a feature of Afghan communism for the foreseeable future. It may be tempting to postulate that an Afghan Enver Hoxha is lurking in the wings, waiting for the opportunity to turn his country into an Afghan Albania, but the picture is unrealistic. Although Albania is the closest of all East European states to Afghanistan in religion, mountain traditions, economic backwardness, political violence, and ingrained suspicion of Great Powers, its communist party seized and held power on its own, without the aid of foreign occupation forces. The Albanian people may not enjoy any basic human rights, but their oppressors are (if one ignores tribal nuances) their own people, not foreigners. In Afghanistan, by contrast, the overwhelming majority of the population views communism as an alien ideology imposed by Afghan traitors and their Russian masters. As a result, no communist party can survive in Afghanistan without a Soviet military occupation, and no Afghan Hoxha can reveal his nationalist colors while that occupation remains. The lesson is that the potential for the development of independence in a party or its leaders is in inverse proportion to the degree of that party's reliance on direct Soviet support for survival. When the reliance is total, so is subservience to Moscow. Nationalism is not an issue.

The lesson for any alien power seeking to change Afghan ways is that foreign philosophies can take root only with difficulty in Afghanistan's flinty social soil, and then only when these values are compatible with the existing environment. The use of foreign troops to sow a new philosophy there almost guarantees its long-term rejection by the Afghans. (Not only is the PDPA itself doomed to permanent dependence on the Soviet occupation for its survival but no other Marxist party is likely to take independent root in the country for generations to come.) No matter how much sympathy the United States, for example, might feel for a particular political trend in the resistance, it should maintain a proper distance from all resistance politics. American aspirations for Afghanistan's future should be confined to the country's international orientation and conform to the Afghans' own desires: a return to a truly neutral, nonaligned, self-determining status. Within these parameters, however, the country's political system should be the Afghans' choice and theirs alone.

The PDPA's recruiting patterns in the 1960s and 1970s may also be instructive. Initially the party focused its greatest attention on the staffs of teachers' colleges, individuals who could influence future teachers, who in turn could influence students, who one day might influence political trends. The party also recruited more direct opinion molders like university professors, secondary school teachers, and media figures, but the plan clearly was long-range. This changed in 1973, when the Khalqi branch of the party began recruiting aggressively among the Afghan military, signaling abandonment of the long-term approach in favor of more immediate action. At

the time, the party tried to disguise the intent of its drive by calling it defensive (to protect the government if President Daoud were overthrown by a right-wing coup), but it later admitted that the intent all along had been to seize power by force. No matter how explained, any change of recruiting emphasis by a communist party—and particularly a sudden attention to the armed forces—deserves careful study of its possible implications.

For Marxist-Leninists in other Third World countries, the lesson should be starkly apparent: to throw one's lot in completely with the USSR, as Babrak did, in order to win an intraparty battle is to court disaster for oneself, one's party, and one's ideology. Babrak probably thought he would return to Afghanistan as a hero, the more welcome because he was replacing the ruthless and hated tyrant Amin. Instead, it is Amin who has at least the grudging respect of his countrymen for having resisted the Soviet invasion, whereas Babrak's name will go down in Afghan history as synonymous with treason in his country as Quisling's is in Norway.

For the USSR the lesson may take some time to sink in, but eventually the conclusion will become inescapable: the occupation was a mistake. One hopes, for the sake of Soviet occupation personnel and their families, of Afghan conscripts, of the *mujahideen* ("holy warriors," as freedom fighters are called), and of the refugee millions in Pakistan, that this realization will come sooner rather than later.

And finally there is the question for the political theoretician: Can two pro-Soviet communist parties coexist in the same country, and if so what are the causes, benefits, drawbacks, and prospects of such a phenomenon? The cause in Afghanistan was the existence of two basic constituencies within the narrow fringe of pro-Soviet Marxists: those belonging to well-connected circles of the urban rich and those who sprang from the relatively poor rural intelligentsia. Each constituency had a leader to whom it turned and who commanded its loyalty. Each leader was personally and implacably opposed to the other, and the followers of each dutifully assumed the leader's prejudice in accordance with ancient Afghan traditions of feuding. The only benefits that accrued were to outsiders: to the USSR, which was able to use one PDPA party (Parcham) as a sort of loyal opposition or even collaborator with the Afghan government and the other (Khalq) as a revolutionary underground, thus appealing to two different groups of recruits; and to the Afghan government, which in the short term was able to deal effectively with a split opposition. The penalties were all to the PDPA, which gained nothing from the split (and indeed continued to lose some of its members to assassination by party rivals at least into 1982), yet could do nothing to heal the breach as long as the blood feud tradition remained in force.

For the future, the existence of two distinct communist parties (should Parcham and Khalq again emerge from their unnatural unity) might lead the

idealist into postulating the evolution of a two-party communist democracy, with each taking power alternately and accepting the other as a loyal opposition, regularly submitting their programs to the public for its electoral judgment. The concepts of *loyal* opposition and popular sovereignty, however, are as alien to Parcham and Khalq as they are to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and no such evolution seems possible. Instead, the most likely development will be an unabated continuation of the feud, regardless of changes in leadership, until the USSR removes its forces from the country. At that point reconciliation or continued hostility between Parcham and Khalq will become irrelevant, even as the PDPA as a whole will become irrelevant, to the future of Afghanistan. There will be too few communist survivors left in the country to matter.

Acknowledgments

In compiling material for this book, I have imposed shamelessly on many people, Afghans and Americans alike. Some of the former did not wish to be cited by name, and to them a blanket thanks is extended. Others, like former Minister of Health Dr. Abdullah Omar and Ghulam Ali Ayeen, now a research assistant at the University of Nebraska's Center for Afghan Studies, have given permission to use their names, and it is a pleasure to give them recognition. Their contributions far outstripped this meager mention.

Ms. Eliza van Hollen at the Department of State was particularly helpful in unearthing half-remembered official correspondence from Kabul dating from my tour of duty there and in providing other hitherto unpublished material such as the document reproduced in Appendix C. In addition, her series of reports on Afghan developments has been an invaluable source in its own right.

To my brother-in-law, Dr. William F. Whitmore, goes a special vote of thanks for the culling, reproduction, and mailing of timely materials on Afghanistan from the vast spectrum of periodicals to which he subscribes. Similarly, Ms. Margit Grigory of the Hoover Institution took time away from her own demanding work to send materials that otherwise would have been missed.

My wife, Ruth, kept and updated voluminous biographic files, wrote the biographic appendix, compiled the Central Committee chart, and diplomatically induced me to make needed changes in the text, yet refused to let her name go down as coauthor. Her relentless pursuit and capture of scrap after scrap of escaping source data and her painstaking repeated reviews of the manuscript were drudgeries cheerfully assumed and successfully accomplished.

The two individuals who contributed more expertise than anyone to this book, however, and without whose careful critique it would be a far poorer effort, are Dr. R. V. Burks of Wayne State University and Thomas Gouttierre of the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Burks, whose *Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton University Press, 1961; Greenwood Press, 1976) is a classic and should be required reading for any student of communism or Eastern Europe, spent days going through the manuscript literally word by word, offering suggestions, pointing out parallels with East European communist developments, demanding clarification of murky passages, and challenging occasional conclusions. His encyclopedic knowledge of communist politics in other parts of the world provided a fresh and much needed perspective.

Thomas Gouttierre's contribution, equally painstaking, was the perfect complement: a Fulbright scholar in Kabul in the 1960s and a frequent visitor to Afghanistan since that time, he is fluent in Afghan Persian (Dari) and witnessed many of the developments described in this book. He is also personally acquainted with most of the contemporary Afghans mentioned in it. His Center for Afghan Studies at the University of Nebraska has proved to be a magnet for Afghan émigrés in this country, many of whom also contributed materials during my visits to Omaha in 1981–1982.

My gratitude also goes to the Hoover Institution for its trust in an untried author, a faith expressed in grants for this and a preceding volume.

Thanks to the efforts of all these contributors, the final manuscript was far fuller and more accurate than it otherwise would have been. Any remaining errors are, of course, mine alone.

Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism


0 200 MILES
0 200 KM.
U. S. S. R.
AMU DARYA R.
Bukhara
To Tashkent
FERGANA VALLEY
To Tehran
N
CHINA
Termez
Kushka
Mazar-e-Sharif
BADAKHSHAN
WAKHAN CORRIDOR
IRAN
Herat
Pul-e-Khumri
SALANG P.
H I N D U K U S H
PANJSHIR VALLEY
LAGHMAN
Shindand
AFGHANISTAN
Charikar
Bagram
KUNAR
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE
Paghman
Kabul
Kwaja Rawash
Chigha Serai
HAZARAJAT MTS.
Jalalabad
KHYBER P.
LOGAR
Ghazni
Peshawar
Mukur
CEASE-FIRE LINE
Lashkargah
KASHMIR
Kandahar
HELMAND R.
PUSHTUNISTAN
Islamabad
Quetta
BALUCHISTAN
PAKISTAN
INDIA

1

Perspectives

Afghan Disunity and Minorities

Abdur Rahman Khan, the "Iron Amir" who ruled Afghanistan from 1880 until his death in 1901, was a man of firm and unmistakable convictions. Travelers along his country's roads occasionally came upon wretches perched in cages on top of long poles, for Abdur Rahman Khan disapproved of highwaymen and conveyed his feelings by placing transgressors in roadside cages and leaving them there to die of starvation. More egregious offenders (usually political) were strapped across the muzzle of a large cannon, which was then touched off in the presence of onlookers whom the amir felt might benefit psychologically from the spectacle. He was not a subtle man when it came to setting examples.

His goal was national unity, and unity—in our time as in his—has never been a natural Afghan condition. It could be achieved only by demonstrations of force and swift retribution that left no doubt in his subjects' minds as to the penalties of disobedience. His tyranny evoked if not the love of his people then at least a measure of respectful, fear-induced compliance. He needed all of it to weld the disparate tribes and nationalities that made up his land into a state that could survive the relentless pressures of two neighboring nineteenth-century superpowers: Imperial Britain and Imperial Russia.

What Abdur Rahman Khan had to deal with internally was what his royal predecessors and (to a lesser extent, because of the legacy of his rule), his royal, republican, and communist successors also have had to face: a land whose vertical topography impedes communication; whose multiethnic population spills over into neighboring countries; whose tribes, communities, families, and even individual citizens have an independence, natural pride, and fierce local loyalties (nourished and protected by their mountains) that defy central control; whose inhabitants' generosity and hospitality are extended as a matter of course to strangers, yet whose blood feuds endure across generations. To deal with all this was a challenge of no mean proportions, and regardless of what one may think of his methods, Abdur Rahman Khan met it more successfully than any subsequent Afghan ruler.

When he died of natural causes in 1901, Abdur Rahman Khan bequeathed to his son Habibullah a realm he had done much to solidify but one whose continued volatility is illustrated by the fate of his successors. A gentle man compared with his father, Habibullah was murdered in 1919. His son and heir (and possible murderer), Amanullah, abdicated in the midst of tribal uprisings; the next ruler, a Tajik insurgent, was overthrown and executed; his royal replacement was assassinated; and the last Afghan king (still alive in exile in 1982) was deposed by a coup. After the end of the monarchy, Afghanistan's leaders, in order, were killed in action resisting a coup, suffocated and strangled on the orders of the successor, and killed by invading Soviet troops. The incumbent's chances of meeting a violent end are considered excellent. It is ironic that of these leaders only the tyrannical Abdur Rahman Khan left power without gunfire and violence, peacefully and in bed. (Having consolidated his rule internally, his final advice to Habibullah is supposed to have dealt with foreign affairs: "My last words to you, my son and successor, are: Never trust the Russians.")[1]

Even today, the underlying problems for any Afghan ruler, regardless of ideology, are formidable. Fortunately, the country is fairly homogeneous linguistically. Although there are a score of languages, Afghan Persian (Dari) is spoken or understood in all but the remotest settlements. It shares with Pashtu, the native tongue of about 55 percent of the population, the honor of being the official colanguage of the land. Both languages are Iranian in origin, but mutually incomprehensible. Oddly, although Pashtuns comprise over half the population, their language is not the dominant one; relatively few non-Pashtuns know it, whereas most Pashtuns and other Afghans of all nationalities know Dari.

The majority Pashtuns, six to eight million strong, are concentrated mostly along the mountainous northeast-southwest border with Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and extend in a broad belt toward the west; they are also found in towns and settlements throughout the country. About

a quarter of the Pashtuns are nomadic; the bulk of the remainder is settled in towns and mountain valleys. They are divided into two basic tribal confederations, the Ghilzais and the Durranis. Each of these is divided in turn into multiple tribal and family subdivisions, all of which have their own proud traditions and not a few of which are locked in hereditary rivalry. With the exception of the briefest of interludes in 1929, Durrani Pashtuns ruled Afghanistan from the time the country was first unified in the eighteenth century under Ahmad Shah Durrani until President Mohammed Daoud was overthrown by a communist coup in 1978. Pashtuns have continued to provide most of the country's leadership since the Communists took over, but the representation of Ghilzais has increased. The very term "Afghan," coined by early Iranian historians, originally applied only to Pashtuns; even today most non-Pashtun Afghans refer to themselves by their individual nationalities (Tajik, Uzbek, etc.) but to the Pashtuns as "Afghans," a practice often followed by the Pashtuns themselves.

Fierce individualists, traditionally warlike, beset by intra- and inter-tribal quarrels and blood feuds, the Pashtuns are nonetheless bound together by a common code of conduct (the *Pashtunwali*) and have a sense of common identity, based in part on most individual Pashtuns' claims to direct lineal descent from one of a few legendary heroic Pashtun ancestors. To this extent they are all cousins, although kinship does not necessarily bespeak affection. (The Pashtun says of his worst enemy, "I hate him like a cousin!")

The Tajiks are the second most populous nationality, numbering some three to four million. Their tribal organization is much weaker than the Pashtuns'. Though concentrated in the northern part of the country, they also make up a significant portion of what little urban population exists. Traditionally they have been traders, farmers, and administrators and have not shared the Pashtuns' reputation as warriors. (The remarkable feats of the Tajiks inhabiting the Panjshir Valley in repeatedly defeating Soviet and regular Afghan army assaults in 1981–1982, however, shows how wrong generalizations about a nationality's fighting abilities can be.)

The other Afghan nationalities range from the million-strong Uzbeks (mostly merchants, artisans, and cultivators in the northern part of the country) down to micro-nationalities in the eastern mountain valleys who have their own language and culture but whose population may number in the hundreds. The main minority nationalities include the Hazaras, of Mongolian stock and supposedly descended from Genghis Khan's horde, who inhabit the central highlands; the Aimaqs and Farsiwans in the west; Turkomans in the north; and even some Kirghiz in the high valleys of the Wakhan Corridor in the far northeast. Of these only the Hazaras and Farsiwans belong to the Shia branch of Islam; the rest (about 80 percent of

the population) are Sunnis.[2] Of a political significance out of proportion to their small numbers (probably less than 100,000) are the Baluch tribesmen of southern Afghanistan, near the junction of the Iranian, Pakistani, and Afghan borders. A small minority in each of the three countries, the nomadic Baluch have successfully resisted all efforts to tame them.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Afghanistan's multiethnic population is the kinship of the majority (probably more than three-quarters) with minorities in neighboring countries. Of the major Afghan nationalities, only the Aimaqs and the Hazaras are self-contained in Afghanistan. Compared with their numbers within Afghanistan, there are as many Pashtuns in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, more Baluch in Iran and Pakistan, and vastly more Turkomans, Tajiks, Kirghiz, and Uzbeks in the USSR. It is a situation not unlike that of Switzerland, with its Italian, Austro-German, and French components related to the more numerous populations of its national neighbors. The important difference is that each of the Afghan-related nationalities is an ethnic minority in the neighboring country; each has grievances against the ruling majority; and each until comparatively recently maintained contact with its Afghan relatives across arbitrary political borders whose location and very existence were often unrecognized by those who regularly crossed them in search of trade and pasturage. Granted, the USSR began sealing its border in the 1920s and had probably succeeded in shutting off most intercourse by the end of World War II, but a generation or two does not count for much in the Central Asian view of time; in the long term old patterns of trade into lands now administered by Moscow will probably reassert themselves. Pakistan's sporadic efforts to seal its Afghan border have been neither lasting nor effective. The Iranians have not even tried. (Afghanistan and China share only a 40-kilometer stretch of common border, which does not divide a common nationality or interrupt a traditional migration/trade route.)

Although there are some racial tensions among the Afghan nationalities (Pashtuns and Hazaras tend to view one another with some contempt, for example), the country's stability has never in recent times been seriously affected by them. There has probably been more organized intra-Pashtun violence than violence between any two nationalities. Nomadic migration and trade have helped to overcome geographic communications barriers, and ethnic coexistence doubtless has been made easier by a relatively low population density.

One factor unifying Afghans of all nationalities is a common attitude toward political authority. Underlying this attitude is the belief that impersonal codes and rules are more important than the commands of individual leaders. There are three basic sources of rules: the Islamic code (*shariat*); tribal custom; and decisions taken by the community *jirgah*, or tribal assem-

bly. The first two of these can vary only within narrow limits of interpretation; they are the keys to the basic rules of conduct. Only the jirgah, whose decisions are reached by open vote of the entire eligible electorate within any community, and to whose deliberations all may contribute their opinions, is an effective vehicle for instituting change. Without confirmation by a jirgah or *loya jirgah* (grand assembly of tribal representatives), decrees or instruction by political leaders are judged on their merits; if an individual feels that an order from above violates the Islamic code or tribal rules or an earlier jirgah decision, it is not only his right but his duty to disobey it. On the other hand, once a vote had been taken by a jirgah, it becomes absolutely binding on all members of the community, regardless of how each may personally have voted.[3] The jirgah, like the American town meeting, is the rough and ready democratic base on which Afghanistan's political pyramid is constructed, but with much stricter demands for obedience to decisions taken by the group—and obligatory disobedience of non-jirgah-approved edicts considered wrong. Although Afghanistan has had more than its share of despots and has never been ruled by a democratic system at the state level, Afghan leaders ignore the jirgah tradition only at their peril.

All of these factors contribute to a basic Afghan egalitarianism that seems to dampen the natural antagonism of class and nationality. Afghans characteristically display more individual pride and innate self-respect (even, occasionally, arrogance) than do their neighbors. Where Afghans show deference, they do so with dignity, not self-abasement. They place great store on individual responsibility within the impersonal laws laid down by religion and custom. (No mullah supervises the mandatory five daily prayers for the lonely shepherd, miles from his settlement and the nearest other human being; he is expected to—and does—perform these rites on his own.) There is relatively little resentment of the rich by the poor, and the ancient Afghan values rate self-reliance and performance above wealth and titles.[4]

Early Soviet Intrigues

These characteristics may be among the more important reasons that, alone among the states bordering the USSR, Afghanistan had no organized communist movement worthy of the name until well into the post–World War II era. The formation of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) on January 1, 1965, was preceded by less than a decade of organizational work.[5] As late as 1963 an analysis of the USSR's relations with its southern neighbors commented that there were no communist pamphlets or newspapers in Afghanistan and that although the few primitive bookstores in Kabul occasionally had Russian-language texts, publications dealing with

communist theory were as rare as books on democratic political theory. "There is," it concluded, "no such thing [as a communist movement] . . . in Afghanistan."[6]

This lengthy Afghan ideological immunity contrasts sharply with the USSR's other neighbors today, whose communist parties date almost to the October Revolution: Korea (1925), China (1921), Mongolia (1921), Iran (1920), Turkey (1920), Romania (1921), Czechoslovakia (1921), Poland (1918), Finland (1918), and Norway (1923).[7] This is not to say that during the first four decades of Soviet rule the USSR ignored Afghanistan's strategic potential, either as a staging area for thrusts south and west into British India or as a target in its own right. In the years immediately following the October Revolution, plans for basing Indian propaganda centers, subversives, and even insurgent forces in Afghanistan were introduced at meetings of a number of Soviet front groups, including the Association for the Liberation of the East (Moscow, October 31, 1918), the Second Comintern Congress (Moscow, July 23 to August 7, 1920), and the First Congress of Eastern Peoples (Baku, September 1, 1920). None of these plans received adequate practical support because of the immense drain of the civil war on Soviet energies and British threats of an economic boycott; the preamble to the British-Soviet trade agreement of March 16, 1921, obligated the Soviets to refrain from any propaganda or military moves against British interests in India or Afghanistan.[8]

Afghanistan was not, however, merely a stepping-stone in Soviet eyes. There are indications of Soviet involvement in the intrigues that led to the assassination of the Afghan ruler Habibullah in 1919.[9] At about this time, an abortive effort to form an Afghan communist party allegedly was under way.[10] If so, the withdrawal of Soviet support in deference to the trade agreement with the British effectively killed the plan; without outside support there would have been little native Afghan political motivation to sustain such a movement. (By contrast, despite the agreement, the Communist Party of India [CPI] was formed in 1928.)

In the middle of the 1920s, the Soviets established fairly good relations with Afghan King Amanullah, which reached a high point with the dispatch in 1925 of Soviet technicians and pilots to help the king cope with recalcitrant tribesmen. Amanullah could not hold his country together, however. His efforts to modernize Afghanistan provided an ideological catalyst that precipitated revolt among restive tribal leaders, who traditionally had resisted Kabul's control and found in the king's reforms a convenient excuse for rebellion.[11] In early 1929 Amanullah fell victim to uprisings, which, though sufficiently disruptive to force his abdication, were uncoordinated and produced no unifying leader. For about nine months the country was ruled by a nonliterate Tajik insurgent, Bacha-e-Saqao, although in fact most regions were governed (if at all) by local authorities.[12]

Both the British and Soviets attempted to take advantage of the political vacuum. Under a former Afghan ambassador to Moscow, Ghulam Nabi Charkhi, the USSR put together an expeditionary force of Red Army Central Asian troops, augmented by a few Afghan students and military cadets, including some who had been studying in Turkey. (Charkhi's brother was ambassador to Turkey at the time.)[13] This force crossed into Afghanistan from Soviet Central Asia and initially enjoyed success, but within a few months drew back across the border. Amanullah had formally abdicated, and Soviet preoccupation with industrialization and collectivization at home may have forced abandonment of a project that by then was becoming too complex and unpredictable. In any case, with tacit British concurrence a new Afghan leader, Nader Shah, was able to unite the tribes, overcome and execute Bacha-e-Saqao, and place himself on the throne in late 1929.[14]

Generally benign but no less autocratic than his predecessors, Nader Shah promulgated a new constitution for his country in 1931. This document paid lip service to many democratic ideals, but in reality did little to weaken the sovereign's power. For example, the lower house of parliament (National Assembly) formally was to run in three-year terms, meet frequently, and pass judgment on all royal decrees issued when the assembly was not in session. In fact, the term of each consecutive National Assembly was at the king's discretion, its meetings were sporadic, and under no circumstances would it have dared to oppose a royal decree.

Nader Shah's absolute personal power was nowhere more clearly illustrated than in his disposal of Charkhi. Pledging his allegiance to the new king, Charkhi had returned from his Central Asian exile in 1931, leaving behind some of his student supporters, who later carved careers for themselves in the Red Army.[15] Within a short time, however, reports began reaching Nader Shah that Charkhi was stirring up trouble among his own fellow tribesmen, who were traditionally unfriendly toward Nader Shah's family. Called before the king in November 1932 to account for his actions and to repeat his promise of fealty, Charkhi compounded his difficulties by impudently pledging loyalty to the deposed Amanullah. Enraged, Nader Shah seized a rifle from a guard, beat Charkhi with it, and then had him killed out of hand.[16]

Nationalist Revolutionary Groups

This move did not endear Nader Shah to the Soviets, who probably looked on Charkhi as their protégé, even though his personal motives were independent of ideology. A violence-prone nationalistic student group, the Young Afghans, may have afforded the Soviets a channel for venting their displeasure. The group drew much of its strength from righteous Afghan

indignation over the British annexation (in the nineteenth century) of Pashtun borderlands to the east and south, the North West Frontier Province of British India. The Young Afghans group, which was centered in the German School (Nejat) in Kabul, demanded that these lands be returned to Afghanistan and accused the British (probably wrongly) of manipulating the Afghan state through Nader Shah. (Nader Shah was doubtless grateful to the British for having permitted him to cross Indian territory en route to vanquish Bacha-e-Saqao, but there is no evidence that he was controlled by London. Unlike Charkhi's army of Soviet troops in Afghan disguise, Nader Shah had no British troops in his forces.)

The Young Afghans' antagonism to Nader Shah led them to proclaim as their goal the "subversion of the existing government and of its basis, the Islamic code" and to attempt during the early 1930s to achieve their objectives by a series of assassinations. The last of these, in November 1933, was a successful attempt against the king himself. Whether the Soviets were directly involved in the regicide is unknown, but it seems likely that they were at least informed of it beforehand; a coffee shop set up with Soviet assistance near the Nejat School became, in the words of a later communist journalist, Abdullah Bashir Shore, "the underground centre of the patriots."[17] The Sikh proprietor, whose wife was German, was personally acquainted with Nader Shah's assassin,[18] who for his part, however, may have been motivated less by politics than by considerations of personal vengeance. He reputedly had been adopted into the family of Ghulam Nabi Charkhi and was avenging the latter's death as well as carrying out a political act for the Young Afghans.

Despite their revolutionary doctrine and Soviet connection, the Young Afghans gave no indication of a Marxist orientation. They were fervent nationalists out to avenge what they perceived as a historical wrong and to reclaim lost territories. In the process they struck out at the basic religious underpinnings of their government and society, whose modernization they felt was being impeded by outmoded doctrines. Most of their views paralleled those of Moscow's Marxist-Leninists, but the movement never fell under Soviet domination.

At this time of worldwide economic depression, the Nejat School, with its German connections, was a logical center for such anglophobe, extremist philosophies, the same kind of thinking that permitted Nazism to succeed in Germany itself at about the same time. During a later period of German trauma, immediately after World War II, the school counted among its students a future communist ruler of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, whose political activism dates from the years immediately following his graduation from Nejat.

After Nader Shah's death, however, the Young Afghans fell into ob-

scurity. Pashtun interests were promoted by a more peaceful, India-based group led by Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan that advocated tribal independence of Britain and called itself Khudai Khidmatgaran (Servants of God). (It also earned the nickname Red Shirts, after the distinctive garments worn by its members.) Unlike the Young Afghans, the group preached loyalty to God, to community, and to fatherland, while calling for Pashtun autonomy to be achieved by nonviolent means.[19] It was alternately in and out of overt favor with the Soviets, but on a number of issues made common cause with the CPI, which among other positions shared its desire to remove the British from the subcontinent.

From 1933 to 1941 there seems to have been little in the way of organized opposition to the Afghan monarchy, now presided over by a new king, Zahir Shah (1933–1973), and there is little indication of Soviet political meddling in the country. With the outbreak of World War II (especially after the German attack on the USSR in June 1941), Afghanistan came under pressure from the Allies to expel all nondiplomatic Axis residents.[20] At about this time a pro-Soviet underground movement reportedly came into being.[21] If so, it remained remarkably discreet. The first communist ruler of Afghanistan, Nur Mohammed Taraki, was to say in 1978 that "in one way we have struggled for it [the revolution] through 35 years," but he was probably dating his own personal declaration of war on the Afghan system rather than the founding of a subversive group.[22] There is no known evidence of communist activity or propaganda during the war years or for some time thereafter, although one observer reports a largely unsuccessful Soviet effort to infiltrate agitators across the border in the late 1940s.[23]

Meanwhile, during the preceding two decades, the Afghan merchant class had achieved ever greater economic and political power vis-à-vis major landowners, formerly the dominant group. In the 1920s a young man named Abdul Majid Zabuli built on the lively trade in cotton started by his father with tsarist Russia and by 1934 had accumulated enough capital to open an investment bank.[24] Zabuli allegedly prospered personally from trade in the USSR that skirted official Soviet regulations. At the same time, he secured monopolies over some important branches of the Afghan economy, including foreign trade in oil and sugar, Afghan state transportation, and even the printing of money. "The only Afghan economic genius," he was a dynamic innovator, whose interests were political as well as economic.[25]

For the first 30 years of his reign, Zahir Shah was a figurehead monarch, and his uncles ran the country in his name. In 1946 the first of these, autocratic Prime Minister Mohammed Hashim Khan, who had held the office since 1931, was replaced by his more liberal brother, Shah Mahmoud. Shah Mahmoud released most political prisoners and relaxed political control. As a result, in 1946 or early 1947 a loose political-literary movement

called Wikh-e-Zalmayan (Awakened Youth), a spiritual heir to the Young Afghans, was formed. One of its early supporters (and reputedly the author of its manifesto) was Zabuli. Another was a young army officer and member of the royal family, Mohammed Daoud.[26]

The manifesto, published by Abdur Rauf Benawa in his newspaper *Kabul* in 1947, pledged members of Awakened Youth to work for the good of the country and its people; to lead them out of the murk of ignorance; to root out obsolete customs; to set juvenile wastrels to work; to think freely, without foreign influence, and to reach their own decisions on what was acceptable and unacceptable for Afghan society; to give women their legal rights; to support the sovereign Afghan government; to annihilate those aspects of society that gave rise to bribery, disloyalty, and oppression; to promote development of native industries and handicrafts; to use national treasures for the good of the people; to provide for progress on a broad front and for a new life for the Afghan people.[27]

In foreign affairs the Awakened Youth, like its predecessor, the Young Afghans, promoted as its major plank the liberation of Pashtun lands from foreign control, a single-issue approach that probably attracted more members than the manifesto's unfocused platitudes on domestic affairs. By 1947 the British were departing the Indian subcontinent, but were leaving behind a bitter legacy with the Afghans by refusing to negotiate a settlement of the Pashtun issue with Kabul. The border was to remain the Durand Line, an arbitrary demarcation of the 1890s that ran through tribal territories and left nearly half the Pashtun population outside Afghanistan's jurisdiction. With the formation of the state of West Pakistan in August 1947, the Afghans saw the disputed territories come under the authority of the Pakistani government in Rawalpindi, which they knew would be even more difficult to deal with on the territorial issue than the British had been.[28] The Awakened Youth struck a popular responsive chord when it promoted the concept of Pashtunistan ("land of the Pashtuns"), a name that was to prove far more durable than that of the organization that first coined it.

Probably foreseeing the impending government reaction against liberalization, Zabuli resigned from Awakened Youth in 1950. Without his sponsorship and without a more concrete program, the organization's membership and activities dropped off sharply. Meanwhile, however, Zabuli quietly set up in its place the Enterprise Group, under whose auspices some of the more active members of Awakened Youth continued to promote their ideas but in less open fashion.[29] What remained of Awakened Youth became more radicalized and began attacking the royal family as well as the Muslim clergy.[30]

These attacks and other aspects of popular opposition, which had been growing steadily since 1946, alarmed more conservative Afghan leaders. In

April 1950 some twenty to thirty students of the law and political science faculty of Kabul University formed a student union, which was banned by the government in November of the same year, following a congress at which radical ideas had been espoused. Early in 1951 a liberalized press law permitted the publication of opposition newspapers, and five new journals—*Watan*, *Angar*, *Wolus*, *Nida-e-Khalq*, and *Payam-e-Afghan*—immediately sprang up. Although Marxist rhetoric was largely absent from their pages, some of these papers were so unbridled in their attacks on the government and clergy that they were shut down after only a few issues. Others were more cautious, but in 1952, with the expiration of the liberal Seventh National Assembly under Shah Mahmoud, official patience ran out. All opposition newspapers were closed, and the more outspoken journalists were either jailed or exiled to official Afghan missions abroad.[31]

In general those who were jailed seem to have been the ones calling loudest for domestic reform, whereas those exiled abroad, though also holding reformist views, had concentrated mainly on the Pashtunistan issue. Of equal or perhaps greater importance were family, clan, and tribal ties. Whatever the decisive factor, the difference in punishment was considerable: overseas diplomatic living was a step above the best that Kabul had to offer; by contrast, even a brief stay in an Afghan jail, where both sanitary conditions and the attitude of the wardens were medieval, could swiftly become in effect a death sentence.

In 1953 Mohammed Daoud became prime minister. Although he himself had been a supporter of Awakened Youth, he did not hasten to release those in jail. If anything, he appears to have swelled their numbers, at least at the start of his term.[32]

Postwar Afghan-Soviet Relations

New forces were at work on Afghanistan, however, and within three years the political pendulum was to swing back again. As early as 1954, official Afghan coverage of international events crossed a watershed; for the first time the number of articles critical of the West outnumbered those critical of the USSR.[33] From that time until Daoud's resignation as prime minister in 1963, Afghanistan's official posture was to tilt more and more in favor of the USSR.

The reasons behind this change in policy involved an intricate interplay of regional politics, as well as Afghanistan's own internal problems. The Pashtunistan issue (one that Daoud consistently used to his own political benefit) had become prominent in 1950, when Afghan irregulars disguised as tribesmen began making cross-border forays into Pakistan. Daoud, as minister of war at the time, was undoubtedly involved in supporting the

raids. By 1953 the incursions and the resultant tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan had subsided, but in 1954 the United States began funneling arms aid into Pakistan. This was part of an agreement whereby Pakistan, as a member of both the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Oganization) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, became a linchpin of the U.S. containment policy aimed at thwarting Soviet and Chinese expansion.[34]

Seen from Kabul, U.S. aid to Pakistan was an unfriendly act, the more so because since 1944 Afghanistan's own repeated requests for U.S. arms had consistently met with rebuffs or responses hedged with provisions unacceptable to Kabul. For the United States, the inaccessibility of Afghanistan, the distress of its ally Pakistan over Afghan Pashtunistan policies, and the personal antipathy between Daoud and American Ambassador Angus Ward all played a part in damping any enthusiasm for satisfying the Afghan requests. Shortly after coming to power in 1953, Daoud made one final effort to secure U.S. arms, but the new attempt, like its forerunners, met with failure. The United States not only rejected the Afghan request as likely to create more problems than it would solve, but included a gratuitous suggestion that the Afghans settle the Pashtunistan dispute. Worse, Washington openly gave a copy of the reply to the Pakistanis, an insulting breach of confidence in Afghan eyes. Daoud, furious, made the fateful decision to turn to the USSR for weapons.[35] He never forgave the United States.

Daoud's request for U.S. arms while simultaneously provoking Pakistan with the Pashtunistan issue seemed the height of folly—or political gamesmanship. Some interpreted the move as a cynical ploy, designed not to procure U.S. weapons (the request was bound to be denied), but only to justify Daoud's preplanned turn to the USSR for help. There may be some justification in this explanation, for Daoud's conservative opposition at home would not have accepted any rapprochement with the USSR without demonstrative proof that the United States had failed them. From Daoud's own parochial standpoint, however, the question of U.S. versus Soviet arms was very likely immaterial. Like all Afghan rulers since 1901, Daoud aspired to emulate Abdur Rahman Khan and unify his country. For this, he needed two things: a popular cause that would submerge tribal differences (Pashtunistan) and a modern, mobile, well-equipped army to subdue those for whom the cause was not quite that popular.[36] (Once he had succeeded in unifying the country, would Daoud have pursued Pashtunistan to the point of conflict with Pakistan? It is impossible to say, but two decades later, when it became politically expedient to abandon the issue, he did so with no apparent qualms.)

Abdur Rahman Khan had preserved Afghanistan's independence by deliberately pursuing a policy of economic and political isolation from the rest of the world. Mohammed Daoud hoped to preserve that independence

and at the same time achieve progress by pitting the USSR against the United States in aid projects, exploiting the two superpowers' rivalry to enrich his country. In the long run it proved to be a fatally dangerous maneuver.

When Daoud decided to turn to the USSR, there were no halfway measures. In 1955 the Afghans accepted a long-term Soviet loan package totaling $100 million and in 1956 concluded an ancillary agreement under which the USSR would re-equip the Afghan armed forces.[37] Over the next several years, there was an unprecedented proliferation of agreements with the USSR covering such fields as air communications (March 1956), border controls (1958), telecommunications (February 1959), road building (May 1959), bridge building (July 1959), hydroelectric power (August 1959), cultural exchange (March 1960), river port construction (May 1960), press service exchange (December 1960), housing construction in Kabul (April 1962), and many more.[38] A myriad of Soviet advisers funneled through Kabul to the countryside, while hundreds of Afghan trainees traveled to the USSR during this time. The temporary removal of Daoud from the political scene in 1963 slowed but did not stop the spread of new agreements.

Meanwhile U.S. aid, which was mostly in the form of grants—as opposed to the long-term, low-interest Soviet loans—consisted of such projects as road building, agricultural reclamation, school textbooks, and Peace Corps volunteer work. It never reached the level of Soviet aid, but did serve as a counterweight.

On balance, however, for the USSR the effort to penetrate and dominate Afghanistan economically, a strategy made possible by Daoud's policies, appeared to be succeeding. Thus, the Kremlin had no reason to support any *revolutionary* pro-Soviet activity at this time. Of course, the purpose of the economic drive was scarcely altruistic; the USSR was hoping for a political return on its economic investment and was laying the groundwork for the eventual payoff by enlisting supporters from among the newly accessible Afghans, especially military officers training in the use of their new equipment under Soviet supervision.[39] It also was logical for Soviet representatives to seek out and cultivate civilians sympathetic to Marxism-Leninism who might play a supporting role at some future date. Finally, during the late 1950s and early 1960s the USSR undertook a significant expansion of its own domestic training program on Afghan affairs.[40] In conjunction with this came an explosion of Soviet studies on Afghan history, culture, linguistics, and other salient features of the country and its peoples.[41]

The improved relations with the USSR obligated Daoud to behave less harshly toward the leftist opposition leaders whom he had banished or imprisoned. Starting in 1956, the year of the Soviet military aid agreement,

he released certain activists from prison and allowed others to return from exile abroad.[42] If some of these had been closet Marxist-Leninists before 1952, many had been merely reformers, but persecution had meantime embittered them, turning most into potential revolutionaries.[43]

Two of these figures—one a diplomatic exile and the other a prisoner at home—were to become rulers of the country: Nur Mohammed Taraki and Babrak Karmal.

2

Two Biographies

Nur Mohammed Taraki

Nur Mohammed Taraki, a Ghilzai Pashtun from the Mukur district in Ghazni province and the first communist leader of Afghanistan, was born on July 14, 1917. His father was a poor, seminomadic livestock dealer and small-time smuggler who traveled regularly between Afghanistan and India. The first member of his family to become literate, Taraki attended elementary school in the 1920s in Mukur, a small village midway on the lonely 300-mile road that leads southwest from Kabul to the provincial capital of Kandahar. In 1929, when Amanullah was being forced into exile from Kandahar, Taraki was a high school student there. Although the Ghilzai Pashtuns were opposed to virtually all branches of the ruling Durrani tribe, they appear to have been particularly hostile to "British lackey" Nader Shah, whose troops in consolidating his rule in 1930 fought some of their fiercest battles near Mukur.[1]

Three years later, when Nader Shah was killed by an activist of the Young Afghan movement, Taraki was an impressionable sixteen-year-old, the same age as the schoolboy assassin himself. A social idealist, as revealed by his subsequent poetry and short stories, Taraki must have been im-

pressed by this deed, which by all accounts was carried out with studied calm in the best Pashtun heroic tradition.

From 1934 or 1935 to 1937 Taraki was in Bombay, India, as a clerk for the Pashtun Trading Company, a Zabuli concern for exporting Afghan dried fruits. Here he continued his education with night school courses in English and Urdu and encountered Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan (head of the Red Shirt movement and an admirer of Lenin), as well as important members of the CPI.[2] On his return to Afghanistan in 1937, he worked as a private secretary to Zabuli and very likely was introduced to Soviet officials by him. Taraki also studied at a Kabul college for government employees at this time (1938–1941), obtaining a degree in law and political science. Capitalizing on this and his connection with Zabuli, he obtained a position on graduation with the Ministry of Economics.

Taraki's relations with Zabuli began to sour during World War II, however, when it was found that Taraki was misappropriating funds from a government cooperative managed by Zabuli. Zabuli protected Taraki from prosecution but finally lost all patience when Taraki expropriated materials procured for Zabuli's mansion in Darulaman (outside Kabul) to build his own, more modest dwelling in Kabul's Karte Char district.[3]

Fired from the Economics Ministry, Taraki obtained a position at the government's Press Department, but stealing from Zabuli had been a serious error. According to his official biography, he was "hounded by corrupt and reactionary bureaucrats, who exerted pressure on him here and there."[4] It was also at about this time that he was posted for two years to far-off Badakhshan, in the northeast corner of Afghanistan, possibly as a result of that falling out. On his return to Kabul, he worked his way up the bureaucratic ladder to become deputy chief of the official Afghan news agency (Bakhtar) by the end of the 1940s.

After moving to the Press Department, Taraki began writing short stories and poetry in his spare time. Eventually he established a reputation among Afghans as a writer, although as late as 1978 a Czech communist scholar's detailed account of contemporary progressive Afghan writers made no mention of him.[5] On the other hand, Taraki appears to have enjoyed at least a limited reputation in specialized Soviet books dealing with Afghanistan, and the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* mentions him as a writer and translator who "popularized in Afghanistan the works of Russian classical and Soviet literature."[6]

When and why Taraki became a convert to communism is unclear. It may have been during the war years or even before. As a Ghilzai Pashtun, he would have had an innate prejudice against the Durrani rulers. Certainly Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan and the CPI influenced him in the mid-1930s (to

the extent that he is even said to have joined the CPI and put up party posters as an initiation duty); Zabuli provided the possibility of a direct contact with Soviet officials in 1937–1938; and the ultimate insult of banishment to Badakhshan by unfeeling superiors in the early 1940s could well have consolidated his dedication to a communist overthrow of the Afghan government. Even his official biography is vague on the date of his conversion, but in the elliptical phraseology of communism, at least by 1949 he had "attained the desired maturity as far as class consciousness was concerned."[7] Thus, by the time he began writing for the opposition paper *Angar* (Burning Embers)—a radical sheet that was banned after only a few issues in 1951—his leftist ideological beliefs were probably well fixed. Even so, Afghans who were participants in or close observers of Awakened Youth and its supporting press (including *Angar*) are adamant that there was no Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, written or voiced publicly, in the movement. *Angar* declared itself in favor of the creation of political parties, their participation in elections, and a democratic constitutional monarchy.[8]

These views appear to have been among *Angar*'s more temperate ones and were undoubtedly milder than Taraki's own. Interestingly, a Soviet source later scorned exactly such reformism, contrasting it with views of "revolutionary democratic circles of the country, decisively demanding democratization of social life"; it went on to associate such views with *Angar* and two other opposition newspapers.[9]

When the government moved against the opposition in 1952, Taraki was one of the lucky ones. In early 1953 he was banished to Washington as press and cultural attaché in the Afghan embassy. He remained there only a short time, however. One of Mohammed Daoud's first moves as prime minister was to recall him, allegedly for having written an article opposing the monarchy for a Washington newspaper.[10] Taraki did not obey the order, but instead tried to claim political asylum in the United States. When this was denied him, he held a press conference in which he declared his opposition to Daoud, his fear of execution if he returned to Afghanistan, and his intent to leave for England that same day. Five weeks later, in Karachi, he disavowed his press conference and said he was returning to Afghanistan immediately.[11] His whereabouts for the next three years is open to some question: some aver that he dropped from sight; others state that he did return through Pakistan and worked in various unspecified translation jobs with private companies from which he would be fired periodically at the suggestion of Daoud's police.[12] During this period he reportedly took a lengthy trip through the USSR and Eastern Europe.[13]

In any case, Taraki was hired in 1956 by the U.S. aid mission in Kabul as an English translator. Two years later he opened a private firm, the Nur

Translation Agency, which operated until 1962. He then returned to work for the Americans, this time as a translator in the embassy. In 1963 he dropped these activities in order to begin the full-time organizational work that would lead to the formation of the PDPA in 1965.[14]

No biography of Taraki would be complete without examining whether and to what extent he might have been controlled by Soviet intelligence organs. In addition to his known pattern of regular contacts with the Soviet embassy,[15] there are three main features of his biography that would point to such an association.

American employment. Any convinced communist who seeks employment with official U.S. installations must be suspected of ulterior motives. Taraki went to work not once but twice for U.S. offices in Kabul. This preceded the founding of the PDPA and hence could not have been a party assignment. It was, however, after his conversion to communism and is most logically attributable to KGB efforts to penetrate the official U.S. community, a primary target for Soviet intelligence worldwide.

Translation work. Translating is one of the hoariest covers for intelligence activities. As a private enterprise Taraki's Nur Translation Agency filled occasional needs of the foreign community but was of questionable economic viability as an unsubsidized endeavor. The translations of classic and Soviet Russian works into Pashtu produced in Taraki's name also look suspiciously like a cover activity: with a literacy rate of less than 5 percent, Afghan Pashtuns (the only market for such literature) provide an extremely limited reading public. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, the Soviet journal with perhaps the closest links of any to the KGB, claimed in its biography of Taraki that his schooling in Bombay had consisted of "courses to translate English into Pashtu and Dari."[16] This assertion is also mentioned briefly in one German account (which perhaps drew on *Literaturnaya gazeta*), but does not appear in any of the many biographic sketches of Taraki, including those written in the USSR and Afghanistan. Nor is it at all probable: given the obscurity of Dari and Pashtu as languages, such a course of study would be most unlikely in Bombay or anywhere else outside Afghanistan. If Taraki had been a Soviet agent, however, some explanation for the professional caliber of the translations attributed to him would have had to be invented. The *Literaturnaya gazeta* claim appears to be a somewhat tardy and clumsy effort to this end.

Financial independence. Most descriptions of Taraki emphasize his humble origins. His income as a civil servant was certainly modest and in a country with single-digit literacy his writings could scarcely have enriched him. As acknowledged by a Soviet source, Afghan writers' honoraria "are miserly [and] cannot even provide for the living expenses of a writer and his

family."[17] Nevertheless, Taraki was able to resign his gainful employment with the U.S. embassy in order to begin organizing the PDPA in 1963.

If Taraki was in fact a paid agent, it appears likely that he became one sometime after his quixotic attack in 1953 on Daoud and the monarchy, scarcely recommended activities for a long-term Soviet collaborator. His subsequent long trip though Eastern Europe provided an ideal opportunity for recruitment, but the whole question is perhaps academic: whether or not a paid agent, Taraki's ideological fealty to the Soviet interpretation of Marxism-Leninism during the years before he came to power in 1978 appears to have been total.

Babrak Karmal

Babrak Karmal (he gave himself the double entendre surname, which not only means "friend of labor" but also could be a rendition of "Kremlin" in Dari) came from a different Afghan world. He was born January 6, 1929, in Kamari, near Kabul, the second of five children (four boys and a girl) in the family of an army officer, Mohammed Hussain. As a member of the officer corps and a scion of one of the wealthier families, Mohammed Hussain had an assured career, retiring in 1965 as a general after giving his children the best education available in Afghanistan. Babrak's mother died when he was very young, and he was reared by his father's second wife, who was also mother of the last two children in the family. Babrak is reported to have resented the favoritism shown by his father and stepmother to his younger siblings. In 1948 Babrak graduated from the Nejat School (also called the Amani Lycée at various times), the German-language high school in Kabul.[18] Here he may well have come under the influence of German-speaking Afghan teachers formerly associated with the Young Afghan movement, which had been centered in that school, and have been affected by the despair that pro-German teachers felt at Hitler's defeat.

He was only a mediocre student; in spite of his expensive preparatory schooling, he failed his first entrance examinations to Kabul University's faculty of law and political science. By 1951 he managed to qualify for entrance, but by this time he had become a radical political activist. Though not yet formally enrolled, Babrak somehow became a member of the student union formed at the university in 1950. He was a gifted speaker, and his voice soon became one of the best known raised on behalf of the new union.

Babrak had no talent as a writer and failed to find work with oppositionist editors like Dr. Abdur Rahman Mahmudi and Mir Ghulam Mohammed Ghubar. The latter had founded the newspaper *Watan* (Home-

land), organ of an embryonic political party of the same name.[19] The life of *Watan*, like that of *Angar* (Taraki's employer), was stormy and brief; reaction to the liberal movement was setting in, and the paper was shut down.

Babrak was less fortunate than Taraki when the regime began taking action against the opposition; along with publishers like Mahmudi and Ghubar, he went to jail. Unlike them, however, he stayed there for only three years and was released in 1956, the same year Taraki went to work for the U.S. aid mission. Also unlike Mahmudi, who was to die of the effects of this imprisonment immediately after his release in 1963, Babrak was apparently well treated; his "cell," according to one witness who saw it later, was a comfortably furnished room.[20]

Like Taraki, Babrak also became a translator, but of German, not English. His employer was probably the Afghan government, although this is not clear from available biographic material. In any case, this employment lasted for only one year, and in 1957 he was drafted for the standard two-year tour of military duty. Released in 1959, he returned to Kabul University, where in 1960 he finally obtained a degree in law and political science. The following year he found employment with the translation and compilation section of the Ministry of Education, and he also worked for the Ministry of Planning in an unspecified capacity. He quit his government positions in 1964 to go into full-time politics.[21]

Babrak's independent wealth removed one possible lever the Soviets might have used to secure his collaboration in these years. On the other hand, he seems to have been more ideologically attuned to Moscow and more disciplined than Taraki, whose Pashtun individualism could crop up unpredictably. Both men were regular visitors to the Soviet embassy in Kabul from the late 1950s onward.[22] Babrak, in particular, made use of official Soviet medical facilities in Kabul, both to augment his own popularity and to put potentially interesting Afghans in touch with Soviet officialdom. The large, Soviet-built housing area (Mikrorayon) where he lived was also home to many Afghan army officers and employees of the government bureaucracy. When children from their families fell ill, Babrak in certain cases would provide a letter of introduction for the parents to take to the Soviet embassy to secure free medical treatment.[23] Taraki is not known to have exploited his Soviet connections in such ways.

In addition to their work as translators and their studies in law and political science, the careers of Babrak and Taraki had another feature in common. Between 1956 and 1963 both refrained completely from opposition activities. This is not to say that they ceased being political animals; on the contrary, starting in 1956 both began holding regular political discussion

groups for students, civil servants, and military officers. The discussions at these meetings, in fact, provide the first unmistakable evidence of Soviet-style Marxist rhetoric at work on the Afghan body politic.[24]

Nevertheless, the thrust of the discussions was not directed against Daoud's dictatorial government, which was certainly not very progressive in Marxist terms; quite the reverse, the discussions supported Daoud's policies (as well, of course, as all things Soviet). As already noted, Daoud's first stewardship of the Afghan state facilitated Soviet efforts to dominate the country by economic means, and that alone was evidently sufficient to deter any serious opposition activities by either Babrak or Taraki. It would not have been in Soviet interests for the two avowed leftists to oppose Daoud in these circumstances.

Although their careers possess various features in common, Babrak and Taraki each represented a fundamentally different Afghan constituency, and it is in this difference that the origins of Afghanistan's unique two-party communism are to be found.

Taraki's background was that of a poor, rural, self-made Pashtun intellectual, conditioned from youth to scorn the dictates of Kabul (whenever Kabul was rash enough to attempt dictation) and particularly opposed to the ruling Mohammedzai family, of which both King Zahir and Mohammed Daoud were members. Taraki also believed that women belonged in the home; he counted none among his followers. As a native Pashtun, Taraki was representative of about 55 percent of the Afghan population; as a rural inhabitant, of about 90 percent; as a male chauvinist, of probably close to 100 percent (of the male population). His Khalq ("masses") faction was in this sense appropriately named, even though it never attracted a mass following. In a different political context, Khalq might have become a nationalist agrarian party.

Babrak, on the other hand, though claiming Pashtun nationality, speaks Afghan Persian (Dari) as his first language. (There is some question whether his Pashtun nationality is genuine or merely the legacy of a Tajik grandfather who found it advantageous to pose as a Pashtun.) His upbringing and education, the best that money could buy, were centered in and around Kabul, the nearest thing to an urban environment that Afghanistan can provide. His family was loyal to the Mohammedzai dynasty and, when the dynasty fell in 1973, to the successor republic, also run by a Mohammedzai—Mohammed Daoud. Moreover, that loyalty was to some extent reciprocated; when Daoud released the jailed leftists in 1956, more of the future followers of Babrak received government positions than did those of Taraki.[25] In a word, Babrak was Establishment, representing the modishly far left wing of the wealthiest and most powerful Afghan families. He was "progressive" and counted his reputed mistress, Anahita Ratebzad, among

his closest advisers; women were welcome in his councils. His constituency was very small but very influential. Given the word's connotation of leadership, his Parcham ("banner") faction was also appropriately named.

Thus, regardless of the essential identity of their ideological views, Babrak and Taraki and the following that each attracted were poles apart from the very outset of the Afghan communist movement.[26] The adherence of both to the Soviet ideological line might provide a screen behind which differences could on occasion be concealed, but their fundamental antagonism was foreordained.

3

The PDPA's Formative Years

Organizing the PDPA

Until 1963 mild-mannered King Zahir had been little more than a figurehead monarch. For the first twenty years of his reign, Afghan policies had been set by three paternal uncles (Mohammed Hashim, Shah Wali, and Shah Mahmoud), and during the next ten (1953–1963) by the king's dynamic and fiery first cousin, Mohammed Daoud. Daoud's policies, internal as well as external, had been revolutionary: under his orders women appeared in public without a veil (a reform unsuccessfully attempted by King Amanullah in the 1920s); a central bureaucracy controlled more and more of the economy; foreign aid projects from both East and West proliferated; Soviet arms and trainers appeared among Afghan troops; and the Pashtunistan issue became a rallying point for nationalist sentiment.

All of these moves exacted a political price in conservative Afghanistan, but none more than the last. Pakistan's response in 1955 to Afghan saber rattling on Pashtunistan had been to close its border with Afghanistan to all commerce, thus pushing Kabul into dependence on the USSR for transporting virtually all its foreign trade (there were no suitable Afghan-Iranian road links at the time). When the same sequence of events reoccurred in 1961, the economic dislocations that developed wrought hardship on the people, and

the ever closer bonds with the Soviet Union were a source of discomfort to Afghans mistrustful of Soviet motives. The country seemed in imminent danger of losing its traditional independence, nonalignment, and neutrality in Great Power conflicts.[1]

Thus it is unsurprising that by 1963 dissatisfaction with Daoud's rule was spreading. What was a surprise to many was that the diffident king, in March, firmly requested that Daoud step down. Even more surprising, in view of the prime minister's loyal following in the military (and consequently his apparent capability to depose his monarch by a coup), Daoud complied without resistance. In fact, however, the king had proven himself no mean politician in his own right. Not only had he secured the trust and cooperation of influential royal cousins, but he had traveled widely in outlying districts, conferring with tribal leaders and intellectuals and making politically important friends wherever he went. Little wonder that he became more popular than his autocratic first cousin, Prime Minister Daoud.[2]

As a result, ten years of Daoud's one-man rule came to an end with remarkable calm. According to one observer, only three groups were upset by Daoud's resignation: the more dedicated advocates of Pashtunistan, members of the royal family who might be deprived of sinecures under reforms planned by King Zahir, and "those few army officers and intellectuals committed to the Soviet line."[3]

Daoud's dictatorial regime had been a reaction against the seeming anarchy that former Prime Minister Shah Mahmoud's democratic policies and the Seventh National Assembly had brought to the country. What followed was another swing of the political pendulum, this time away from autocracy. His authority greatly enhanced by the dismissal of Daoud, King Zahir vowed his intent to turn the country into a constitutional monarchy and convened a constitutional drafting commission. It was his specific desire that no member of the royal family be allowed to be politically active or to serve in any of the leading positions of the state, including those of cabinet minister, member of parliament, or justice of the supreme court. This stipulation was included as Article 24 in the new constitution, promulgated on October 1, 1964. Significantly it automatically ruled out any legal return to power by Daoud, a first cousin of the king.

Although the constitution granted Afghans the right to form political parties, the king never signed into law parliamentary legislation setting out precise rules for the formation and activities of such bodies.[4] Most students of Afghan history believe that it was the inability of the king, the royal family, and parliament to agree on such basic nuts and bolts of democracy that led to the failure of the democratic experiment, which lasted from 1963 to 1973. Since parties were supposed to be formed only after rules had been laid down, there was an incentive for the law-abiding to postpone organizational work.

No such scruples constrained the future communist rulers of the country, however. Starting in mid-1963, about three months after Daoud's resignation and over a year before promulgation of the new constitution, Taraki, Babrak, and others began to conduct organizational activity among the thin but growing class of literate Afghans. This activity took the form primarily of changing the emphasis of their discussion groups, which had been meeting regularly since 1956, from theoretical issues to practical politics.[5] Although the official founding of the PDPA took place on January 1, 1965, in fact it had been organized and had held a number of leadership meetings in the preceding year.[6] Some ranking figures were later to date their membership in the party to a time before its official foundation, including Nur Ahmad Nur (1963), Abdul Wakil (1964), Abdur Rashid Arian (1964), and Mohammed Salem Masoodi (1964).[7]

The official PDPA birthdate, however, was New Year's Day, 1965. The site was Taraki's home, an appropriate location inasmuch as he built it from materials he had expropriated from Afghanistan's leading capitalist, Abdul Majid Zabuli. The house was located in Kabul's Karte Char district, an area populated in the mid-1960s by civil servants, teachers, accountants, and other members of the country's emerging literate middle class.

Twenty-seven men gathered there for the founding congress, which saw Taraki chosen as secretary general of the Central Committee and Babrak as deputy secretary general.[8] Five others were also elected to the Central Committee, and four more became alternate members. It is significant that at this early stage of the party's development the military seems not to have been represented at all. (For a partial list of those believed to have attended, see Appendix E.) The party program, which was published the following year in Taraki's newspaper, *Khalq*, was also adopted at the first congress. As characterized by one Western observer, it was "an orthodox one for the period, reflecting analyses of the Third World conventionally associated with Khrushchev or Brezhnev."[9] Noteworthy, however, is the absence of all mention in it of Marx and Lenin, religion, or the specifics of socialism as practiced in the Soviet empire. Instead, the program recommended formation of a "national democratic front" for the purpose of carrying out progressive reforms. This subterfuge was a necessary piece of protective coloration in a society that would have reacted harshly against any overt manifestation of clearly identifiable Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideas. The program also served to beguile some Western analysts who continued to insist, even after the 1978 coup, that the PDPA was a leftist-nationalist and not just a pro-Soviet party. Meanwhile the party's true colors were most accurately depicted in its constitution, which was also approved at the founding congress but kept secret by the leadership until it leaked in 1978 (see Appendix B).

The very name of the party and its translation into various foreign

languages provide some interesting ideological insights, foreshadowing later Soviet efforts to portray the 1978 coup as a democratic, and not a socialist, revolution. In Dari the name is Jamiyat-e-demokratiqi-khalq-e-Afghanistan, literally the Party of the Democratic People of Afghanistan. The English and Russian versions are consistent: People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and Narodno-demokraticheskaya partiya Afganistana. In French and German, however, there seems to be a difference between communist and noncommunist treatment, with communist media emphasizing the democratic aspect (Parti democratique populaire and Demokratische Volkspartei), whereas the noncommunist press often uses Parti populaire democratique and Volksdemokratische Partei.

At the outset there were no formal Parchami and Khalqi factions in the party. They were not to be named and identified as separate entities until 1967, when the first rift became apparent. Nevertheless, the constituencies from which each eventually would draw its strength had been distinct long before the PDPA itself was conceived, and an examination of the party even as it was emerging in apparent unity reveals the seeds of the future schism. Interestingly, among the party's first leaders there is an almost precise numerical equality between future Khalqis and Parchamis, possibly indicating an early awareness of the coming rivalry and an agreement to balance their respective forces.

The first task of the party was to expand its membership and to acquire a supportive coterie of fellow travelers. It was a propitious time for encouraging intellectual ferment. As a result of economic aid from both the USSR and the United States, the Afghan economy had grown and become more diversified. Because this was particularly true of the public sector, the Afghan bureaucracy ballooned, creating openings at all levels for the ambitious young graduates being turned out in ever greater numbers by an expanded educational system. Whereas previously the bureaucracy had been almost the exclusive province of the wealthy (the only ones who could get the requisite education), in the 1960s education had become available to bright students from all economic levels. Almost all university or trade school graduates had jobs waiting for them,[10] and among them were about as many with typically Khalqi as typically Parchami backgrounds. Promotions came swiftly, and some young men soon rose to positions of considerable responsibility.

Sources of Discontent

At the same time, they perceived the real levers of power as remaining in the hands of the ruling Mohammedzai family. Despite the constitution's Article 24, the new intelligentsia was convinced (to a large extent correctly)

that the family ran the country from behind the scenes. They took the absence of a law governing the establishment of political parties as a sign that the royal family intended to retain its undeclared dominant position. As long as the *nouveaux intelligents* could not band together, the family need have no fear of "upstarts."[11] It was considered especially ironic that members of the royal family were specifically prohibited from membership in political parties; the prohibition had no meaning as long as political parties themselves remained unsanctioned.

Another feature of royal rule resented by nonestablishment achievers was the inequality of nepotism as practiced under the constitution. Whereas the large Mohammedzai family could—and did—protect and promote the careers of its members, those outside the clan usually managed to succeed only as individuals. A man could, for example, become a ranking civil servant on the strength of merit alone, but his chances of ensuring lucrative employment for any but a limited number of close relatives was circumscribed. Indiscriminate nepotism was a privilege of the establishment alone.[12] In a society where family ties lie at the root of the whole social system, inequality in possibilities for helping relatives is bound to be unpopular.

All of these factors might have proven tolerable if foreign aid (and with it the Afghan bureaucracy) had gone on expanding at a rate sufficient to absorb and provide good career opportunities to all trade school and university graduates. In the mid-1960s, however, foreign aid from both East and West first leveled off and then, as the decade entered its closing years, began to decline. Between 1967–68 and 1970–71 foreign loans and grants fell by over 50 percent, from roughly $62 million a year at the official rate of exchange to about $27.5 million.[13] No longer were there openings for all who qualified for government service, nor were the careers of those who were hired guaranteed to be swift and successful. Year by year employment fell until there were virtually no openings for the newly graduated.[14] Recruitment into conspiratorial leftist revolutionary cells offered an outlet for frustrated job seekers, and PDPA membership began to swell.

At the same time party leaders moved cautiously, especially those who were to become Parchamis after the PDPA split. They were neither antigovernment (their parents, after all, were members of the establishment), nor even necessarily antireligious. Most of their anger was directed against the United States and the opulent life-style of U.S. foreign aid specialists posted to Afghanistan.[15] Even the future Khalqis, though avowedly more revolutionary, pushed hard for a united national front designed to establish a national democratic government and to promote "noncapitalist growth." Nevertheless, even while struggling for these goals, the PDPA was "not losing sight of its ultimate objective . . . the building of a socialist society in

Afghanistan based on scientific socialism."[16] This frank exposition of the ultimate goal may stem from Soviet disenchantment with the concept of the "noncapitalist path of development" in the wake of political disasters to its adherents in Ghana (1966), Indonesia (1965), and Mali (1968).[17] (The concept had been invented and promoted in the early 1960s to avoid the stigma of a communist label for the USSR's Third World supporters.) The noncapitalist path was acceptable to the USSR only if it was unequivocally pro-Soviet, and the PDPA may have been called upon to ensure that all understood what the true objective was supposed to be.

For Taraki and those who would become his Khalqi supporters, the economic argument (unemployment of the educated) was probably the single most effective issue for attracting new adherents. On the other hand, Babrak and his future Parchamis, many if not most of whom came from wealthy families, had to play on different recruiting themes: intellectual curiosity, the adventure of joining an "illegal" organization, the drawing power of friendship with those already in the PDPA, perhaps gratitude to the USSR for a pleasant tourist trip there, or even unvarnished idealism. Before long it became chic to be a member of the PDPA. After the 1967 Parcham-Khalq split, even students who were members of neither group would side with one or the other and defend it against detractors from the other side; such supporters, however, could be likened more to fans of a particular sports team than seriously committed political activists.[18] It was probably the existence of such casual sympathizers and Babrak's ability to call them out to demonstrate that later led to inflated estimates of PDPA strength. No reliable figures exist, but in 1973 a realistic U.S. embassy estimate placed real Khalqi and Parchami strength at several hundred each.[19]

Among those who joined the PDPA were also embittered losers in family or career competitions and political opportunists, who perceived in the party a potential for realizing their own ambitions. For such individuals doctrine and ideology were of secondary importance. Babrak, for example, had been an unsuccessful student before turning to revolutionary politics. Another opportunistic underachiever was Hafizullah Amin, in 1979 to become the country's second communist leader, whose discovery of revolutionary politics in the United States was certainly connected with his failure to complete his doctorate, although it is uncertain which came first, academic failure or political activism.[20] Others in this general category included stepsons or sons of less favored wives, doomed from birth to less preferential treatment than their half-brothers. Afghanistan is technically a polygamous society, and even though most marriages are monogamous, poor maternity care results in a high mortality among women. Second or third wives, contemporaneous or sequential, are thus normal, and the "wicked stepmother" syndrome is not uncommon among offspring. Chil-

dren who had suffered real or imagined parental discrimination made good recruitment material for a revolutionary organization like the PDPA.[21]

Focus on Educators, Media, Military

The PDPA concentrated its attention on the narrow class of literate Afghans, less than 5 percent of the population. It was from this limited pool of talent that the country's eventual leaders would be chosen, and looking to the future, the party focused its recruitment program on students. The best access to students, of course, was through teachers, and in the short term teachers constituted the PDPA's major target group. By the time Taraki came to power in 1978, he was able to claim that most of the members of Khalq were teachers by profession.[22] In March 1979, eight of the eighteen ministers in the Khalq cabinet of Amin were former high school teachers.[23] This concentration on educators, who wield little direct political or economic power, bespeaks the patient, long-term nature of the PDPA's planning at this stage of its development.

In its drive to recruit teachers, the PDPA focused first on those who themselves taught teachers, who majored in education, or who had some degree of administrative control over teaching staffs. This effort became clear after the party came to power in 1978, when many from this group were rewarded with ambassadorships and other high government posts. Of fourteen former teachers so honored, nine had backgrounds in teacher education or management. Six of the nine had received training at Columbia University during the early 1960s.[24] (See Appendixes D and F.)

True to their respective sources of support, the future Parcham and Khalq factions appealed to different groups. Thanks to Taraki's charisma, Khalq already had a considerable following among the older intellectuals. In addition, the energetic Hafizullah Amin went after the relatively poor: rural educators, the less wealthy members of Kabul University's teaching staff, and both teachers and students at the Pashtun-oriented boarding schools in Kabul for brighter rural high school children. The schools were Avesina, Rahman Babar, and Khushal Khan, and their students came from Pashtun and Baluch areas where nationalist sentiments ran high—the southwest, Lashkargah, Kandahar, Paktia, Jalalabad, Charikar, and Paghman.[25]

The Parchamis, on the other hand, concentrated on teachers and students at such day schools for the offspring of influential Kabul residents as Habibia, Nejat, Ghazi, Istiqlal, and Naderia, as well as Kabul University's student body, which in the 1960s was still largely the province of the wealthy. Parcham also drew some support from other urban areas and from the northern part of the country, home of many of its non-Pashtun members.[26]

Once PDPA members had occupied key positions in the educational

establishment, the techniques of influence and recruitment were straightforward. Hafizullah Amin, for example, as rector of the Avesina boarding school, held regular seminars for twenty to thirty students to discuss Marxist interpretations of domestic and foreign politics. He encouraged the students to pass the pamphlets distributed at these sessions along to friends after reading and using them in the seminars.[27]

Inducements to support the PDPA were not always merely intellectual. According to one former Kabul University professor, the chief of the tests and measurements section at the university, Ataullah Rauf, was a PDPA member who suggested to applicants that the best way to ensure entrance into college was to join the party. Less affluent students were sometimes paid to join and work for the party.[28]

From the outset of the party's formal existence, its program among students was action-oriented. A few months after the January 1965 founding congress, the expulsion of some students from the Polytechnic Institute in Kabul for protesting living conditions resulted in distribution of a pamphlet at the university that stated, "No one will give you your rights—you must seize them!"[29] No immediate action followed this appeal (presumed to have been inspired by the PDPA), but it was a harbinger of the violence that was to follow.

The winning of adherents among the intellectual elite was a first priority for the party, but it also tried to appeal to a wider audience through the mass media. Among the leading PDPA figures in the first year of its existence, six were active journalists, editors, or radio programmers, or served in all three capacities.[30] After the PDPA seized power in 1978, at least five other individuals with notable careers in media work were revealed as hitherto undeclared party members and promoted to important government posts.

Formal recruitment into the party during the years before it seized power (1965–1978) often took place in the homes of the leaders. For Khalq it was usually Taraki's home in Kabul's Karte Char district, where the founding congress had met. For Parcham it was the homes of Suleiman Layeq and Mir Akbar Khyber in the more affluent Karte Parwan district, as well as the house of Ghulam Jailani Bakhtari, Babrak's brother-in-law. Because of their wealth, the Parchamis generally offered more impressive recruitment surroundings than did the Khalqis. This permitted them to approach more important targets, such as higher-level civil servants. Important meetings among middle- and upper-level party officials took place in one of two four-room apartments reserved for that purpose in the center of the Soviet-built Mikrorayon housing district on the outskirts of the capital.[31]

The military also appears to have been on the target list of both Khalq and Parcham, with the latter perhaps more successful in such recruiting in the early days of the PDPA.[32] Compared to students, teachers, and media

representatives, however, the military seems to have been of secondary importance; certainly it did not figure in any of the initial overt activities of the PDPA, which sensibly kept any such military recruits under wraps. The PDPA's apparent relegation of the military to a lower priority can be taken as another indication that at this stage the party was thinking in long-range terms and not anticipating an immediate seizure of power. (In the mid-1970s Khalqi recruiting efforts were to focus almost exclusively on the military, a development whose significance was not entirely appreciated at the time.)

According to a Soviet source, however, the formation of underground PDPA cells in the military dates back to the early 1960s, "as the army was being modernized," a euphemism for the Soviet military aid program.[33] One Afghan has asserted that the USSR vetted Afghan officers in training in the USSR in order to pass them along to Parchami or Khalqi contacts on their return.[34] Although this may have been true in some cases, Soviet intelligence doctrine would have dictated that the USSR make every effort to recruit such individuals directly as reporting agents. There is some indirect evidence that this was the case.[35]

Competing for the loyalty of such officers (and for that of many civilian leftists as well) was the dominating personality of Mohammed Daoud. It had been during his recent tour as prime minister (1953–1963) that the country had been opened to Soviet influence as never before, and many of the men receptive to such influence owed their careers to him personally. As a member of the royal family, Daoud's upbringing brought him closer to Parcham than to Khalq, and there grew up around him a group of perhaps fifty elite reformers, who eventually came to be known as the "Daoud Parchamis."[36] For Daoud himself, ideology was a secondary consideration, and he believed that for "his" Parchamis personal loyalty outweighed any other consideration. (Years later, in 1978, this somewhat arrogant assumption was to lie at the root of his undoing.)

Exploiting the "Experiment in Democracy"

Between the time of the PDPA's formal founding and the first Afghan elections under the 1964 constitution, there were less than ten months; elections to the upper house (Meshrano Jirgah) lasted from August 26 to September 9, 1965, and to the lower house (Wolesi Jirgah) from September 12 to 24. For the PDPA it represented something of an accomplishment to field at least eight candidates and to see four of them come home winners in the Wolesi Jirgah. Naturally these candidates did not label themselves as PDPA members at the time because political parties were still unsanctioned, but all save one were later to achieve prominence in the PDPA.

The four winners were all future Parchamis: Babrak Karmal; his con-

fidante and reputed mistress, Anahita Ratebzad (one of four women elected to the Wolesi Jirgah); Nur Ahmad Nur; and Fezanul Haq Fezan (or Fezan Alhaq), a shadowy figure who, in spite of his electoral victory in 1965 and loyalty to Babrak (he appears to have been read out of the PDPA together with his mentor in 1967), never again featured in Afghan politics. The losers included Taraki (Khalq), Sultan Ali Kishtmand (Parcham), Hafizullah Amin (Khalq), and Abdul Hakim Sharayee Jauzjani (Khalq). The closest losing race appears to have been that of Amin, who came within fifty votes of victory. The Parchami success was probably due in no small part to the financial reserves and especially the high-level connections that came with membership in the Afghan establishment; campaign costs generally limited successful candidacies to the affluent.[37]

Another aspect of PDPA activity in the mid-1960s centered on propaganda. As in 1951, a liberalizing press law in late 1965 legalized opposition newspapers. Also as in 1951, the opposition immediately carried its newfound freedom too far, resulting in the reimposition of stringent controls and the closure of more extreme papers. Among the first to rise—and fall—was Taraki's *Khalq*. Only six issues appeared before it was shut down on May 22, 1966. For some time thereafter Taraki's supporters sporadically published illegal papers called *Jonbesh* (Movement) and *Rahnema* (Signpost).[38]

What was surprising was not that the Afghan government reacted against *Khalq* and other, less radical papers, but that it let them begin publishing. All of the recruiting, electoral, and propaganda activities discussed so far in this chapter are legitimate functions of any political group. Before passage of the new press law, however, the true purpose of the PDPA's activities, especially in running candidates for office, was beginning to emerge. The aim was not to win a large following that might lead to eventual majority control of parliament, but merely to exploit and disrupt that body as one step along the path to eventual totalitarian control of the country. The party's attitude was best expressed in its own words a decade later:

> Since the very beginning of its establishment, the PDPA has had a Leninist attitude toward Parliament and parliamentary campaigns. While it rejects bourgeois parliamentarianism, it supports the revolutionary use of parliament's tribunal and parliamentary campaigns on behalf of advancing party goals, and it has organized this form of campaign for non-parliamentary problems.[39]

What this meant in practical terms became apparent immediately after the 1965 elections. At the opening session of parliament in October 1965, a

number of opposition factions, representing all shades of the political spectrum, gloried in their newfound freedom to criticize the government. When the head of the caretaker cabinet, Dr. Mohammed Yussuf, was proposed as prime minister, he and his fellow ministers were subjected to several days of unbridled vituperation by the newly elected deputies. Yussuf finally appeared before the Wolesi Jirgah and demanded that the charges of corruption and nepotism against his government either be lodged formally as a criminal indictment or be dropped. This bold move appears to have dampened the furor, but a critical three-day delay in voting on the government permitted Babrak and his colleagues to mobilize their student supporters for antigovernment demonstrations. These so disrupted parliamentary proceedings (the students occupied many of the deputies' seats in the Wolesi Jirgah) that troops were called out to quell the disturbances, and in a confrontation on October 25 they killed two students and an innocent bystander. The resulting massive protests led to the withdrawal of the Yussuf candidacy; in his place Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal was appointed by the king and confirmed by the Wolesi Jirgah.[40]

In the months that followed, the PDPA continued to foment unrest among students, leading to renewed confrontations with the authorities. Some of the issues, like the clearly unacceptable demand for a virtual takeover of Kabul University by the students, appear to have been trouble-making for its own sake, designed merely to disrupt the academic establishment. Others, such as a protest against West German exchange educators, probably had some Soviet backing, but also capitalized on student resentment of the strictness of German teachers.[41] Germans traditionally have been respected in Afghanistan, however, and the protest found very little support outside student circles.

The important difference, however, was that the PDPA had crossed over from legitimate (if only quasi-legal) political activity within a democratic framework to calls for violence against the established order and disruption of the democratic process. Given the unquestioning subservience of the PDPA to Moscow's line and the regular contacts between PDPA leaders and the Soviet embassy in Kabul, there is little doubt that this change took place with Soviet consent if not, indeed, at Soviet instigation. At the time, many students and teachers attributed the initial step (the call for students to "seize their rights" in the spring of 1965) to the machinations of the Soviet embassy.[42]

Whatever the measure of Soviet involvement, two lessons emerged from the student agitation. The first was that the students themselves had become a political force worth reckoning with. Shortly after taking office, Maiwandwal felt obliged to go to Kabul University to assure them that their interests would be protected in the future, a momentous and perhaps

unnecessary step for the Afghan prime minister to have taken. Because of it the students felt an even greater sense of power than may have been warranted. A corollary to this was the surprising prestige gained by Babrak among high school and university students, which showed that there was political capital to be made in pandering to student instincts for violence. The lesson was not lost on Hafizullah Amin, whose activities in the Pashtun boarding schools paralleled those of Babrak at the university.[43]

Although the unrest continued in the country until 1969, two factors appear to have limited the PDPA's effectiveness. The first was the Afghan government's measured yet firm response. While giving way on some legitimate student requests (for example, establishment of a student union), it drew the line at such demands as lowering the passing grade to 50 percent, a fourth chance at passing a previously thrice-flunked examination, and elimination of the requirement for mandatory class attendance. It also expelled (and sometimes arrested) clearly indentifiable agitators and demonstrated its ability to wait out student strikes until the strikers lost their enthusiasm. In fact, the number of students taking part in demonstrations represented only a fraction of the student population, perhaps 10–20 percent at most. Of that group an even smaller percentage was committed to the PDPA line; most took to the streets at a friend's invitation or simply out of curiosity.[44]

First Parcham-Khalq Split

The second factor limiting PDPA effectiveness was to prove much more important in the long run: the fissioning of the PDPA into its Parchami and Khalqi factions. Seen in retrospect, the split seems inevitable. As has been noted, there were signs that more than one Marxist group had taken part in the founding congress, and the balance between future Parchamis and future Khalqis on the first Central Committee (to be repeated when the PDPA came to power in 1978) seems almost too neat to be natural. At this late date it is impossible to say whether their matching strengths were in fact a coincidence or the product of pre-congress negotiation; of the two the latter seems more likely.

Whatever its origins, this balance of forces and the mutual hostility of the two factions were to be demonstrated before the PDPA had reached its second birthday. Following the closure of the newspaper *Khalq* by the government in May 1966, Babrak criticized the publication within the party for having been too openly communist and suggested that a better tactic would have been to conceal its Marxist orientation.[45] In this he could well have been acting on advice from the Soviets, who had witnessed the annihilation of the Indonesian Communist Party the year before by an enraged Muslim population and may have feared that too frankly communist a

program might lead to similar destruction in Afghanistan of the PDPA. Babrak also had an incentive to soft-pedal Marxist-Leninist revolutionary fervor because of the challenge that Daoud was mounting in his drive for the loyalty of elite leftist reformers. Too alien a PDPA ideology would drive many potential Parchami supporters to Daoud, leaving Babrak isolated.

However that may be, a "majority of the PDPA's Central Committee plenum" rejected Babrak's criticism.[46] The vote was probably close, however. Taraki immediately mobilized his Central Committee forces to expand that body, attempting to pack it with his own people.[47] In pursuing this tactic, he was following in the footsteps of an illustrious communist forebear, Joseph Stalin, who used such expansions to purge his own Central Committee of various opposition groups during the 1930s. For Taraki the attempt apparently did not succeed entirely: three of the eight new appointees became waverers and one ended up as a firm Parchami. Furthermore, those added were appointed as alternate, not full members, and the outcome of the confrontation with Babrak remained in doubt.

The details of the maneuvering that followed are best revealed in a Khalqi document written for Marxist-Leninist readers in 1976 (see Appendix C). Even though it presents only the Khalqi side of the controversy, it provides an interesting insight into intraparty resolution of disputes. Among the more intriguing aspects was the failure of Babrak's apparent effort to force the issue by threatening to resign from the Central Committee. Although the Central Committee plenum divided evenly on accepting the resignation, Babrak himself unintentionally provided the tie-breaking vote: by the very gesture of submitting his resignation he was counted as having voted for it. This, one might assume, had not at all been his intention.

In the spring of 1967 the break became formal, and Babrak took with him about half of the PDPA Central Committee. The split was never acknowledged publicly, but it became instantly apparent to student onlookers that it had occurred. Erstwhile PDPA colleagues began clustering in separate, antagonistic groups, each accusing the other of heinous ideological deviations.

Both groups, however, retained the PDPA label, followed identical party regulations, and demonstrated absolute fealty to Moscow's line. In organizational terms the split could not be regarded as the development of two factions within one party but the fission of one party into two: each had its own secretary general and Central Committee, and each proceeded to recruit specifically into its own ranks. Although there were opportunists and waverers among the leaders of each branch, the rank and file appeared to remain loyal to one or the other.

The Soviets have traced the split to a set of hazy Marxist tenets that, if taken seriously, should have ruled out formation of the party at all:

> Difficult conditions of semilegal activity, attacks by reactionary circles and ultra-left groups, repression on the part of the authorities, the small numbers and weak organization of the working class, the low level of class and political consciousness of the workers, the incomplete process of class formation—all these complicated the institution and formation of the PDPA. For that reason it did not escape "growing pains."[48]

In fact, however, more than anything else it was the Afghan penchant for feuding, the conflicting personal ambitions of Taraki and Babrak, and the differences in the constituencies from which each drew his political strength that made the break inevitable.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the split was that it did not lead to the excommunication of either side by the other or by the Soviet Union. Loyalty to Moscow was a unifying factor that has since permitted two uneasy reconciliations. Pro-Sovietism has not, however, been as strong a force as those that divide the groups. It may on occasion provide a means for papering over their differences but is incapable of reconciling their fundamental antagonism and intolerance of one another.

4

Fission, 1967–1977

Leftist Political Splinters

With the break in relations between Parcham and Khalq and in the absence of other organized antigovernment activity, Afghanistan enjoyed a brief respite from domestic turmoil. During 1967 most students appeared to support the government, and the small group of leftists among them who favored a quicker pace of reforms lacked influence. The government was able, briefly, to convince the young intelligentsia to stick to its books and forget politics.[1] The hiatus in agitation was not, however, to last for long.

Political authority in the country was undefined in the wake of the 1965 disturbances. For the next eight years the constitution remained on the books as the ruling document of the land, but the king "in effect reserved authority and initiative to himself" in many fields; at the same time he was hesitant to exercise his authority unless in his eyes it was absolutely necessary.[2] The result was that no one in the cabinet or the legislature dared to take any initiative, for no one was sure just who had responsibility. A succession of prime ministers and their cabinets, all of whom came from educated, urban families, shuttled in and out of office. They were usually hamstrung on the one hand by a sovereign who was unpredictable in his exercise of power and on the other by a parliament that was hostile, rural,

and up to one-third illiterate.[3] (In a strange way this urban-rural conflict within the government paralleled the Parcham-Khalq split within the PDPA.) In one of the few instances in which the cabinet proposed legislation subsequently enacted by the parliament—the political parties act of 1967 mentioned earlier—the king never signed it into law. The government was aimlessly adrift. Fortunately for the country, the PDPA was in even worse disarray.

At the time of the Parcham-Khalq fission in 1967, Parcham probably had the larger membership.[4] Certainly over the course of the next years, it capitalized on its connections with the Afghan establishment to attract more influential adherents, including some important military officers, than did Khalq.[5] On the other hand, Parcham's emphasis on a "common front" approach, although it appealed to a wider spectrum of political support than did Khalq, alienated the more militant revolutionaries and automatically led to a looser organization with reduced unity and discipline. By contrast, Khalq maintained tight control over its members, adhering to a more rigid, "purer" form of Marxism-Leninism and priding itself on intellectualism and maturity. It paid a price for this in lower popular appeal. Both factions retained their respective rich-urban and middle-class–rural orientation.[6]

The PDPA was not only split into two roughly equal groups, but also had to compete for leftist support with the pro-Maoist Sholay-e-Jaweid group and with some additional splinters from its own ranks.

Sholay-e-Jaweid (Eternal Flame, nicknamed Shola by Afghan students) had been formed about 1964 by the surviving relatives of an uncompromising and popular Afghan opposition politician, Dr. Abdur Rahman Mahmudi, a leftist democratic socialist and newspaper editor. Elected to parliament from Kabul in 1952, he was soon jailed along with other opposition figures but, unlike many of them (including Babrak), refused to recant in order to gain his freedom. He was released by the king in 1963, shortly after Daoud's resignation, but died within a short time from the mistreatment he had suffered at the hands of his prison guards.[7] His brother, Dr. Rahim Mahmudi, and nephew, Dr. Hadi Mahmudi (all three were physicians), then founded the new party, which hewed to the Chinese communist line of the day.

If Parcham appealed to the urban rich and Khalq to the rural Pashtun middle class, Sholay-e-Jaweid drew its support from an outwardly unusual mixture of Afghans who were dissatisfied with the status quo for a seemingly wide variety of reasons: professional people (doctors, lawyers, engineers) who resented and disdained the mismanagement of the country by functional illiterates; Shia Muslims, who felt discrimination at the hands of the majority Sunnis; and members of the Hazara nationality, who occupied the lowest rung on the Afghan sociological ladder and were in permanent sullen

rebellion against domination by other nationalities, especially the Pashtuns. In fact, there were threads joining all three groups with each other and with Maoism. Virtually all Hazaras are Shias, as are many other ethnic groups, including Tajiks and the urban-dwelling Qizilbash. The Qizilbash provided many court scribes, bureaucrats, and even military officers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and this tradition of scholarship and government service has persisted among them down to the present.[8] Religion binds these upper-class intellectuals to the lowly Hazaras, who in turn are alleged to have an attraction to Maoism. They are the most mongoloid of Afghan ethnic groups, reputedly a genetic influence introduced by Genghis Khan's troops, and they have reason to see in China a potential liberator from Aryan (Pashtun) domination.

Sholay-e-Jaweid gained a larger measure of popularity during the late 1960s than is generally realized. Even Soviet sources, which scorn the group for its lack of "scientific socialism," concede that it increased its influence in urban areas and among the capital's students at this time.[9] Part of its popularity may have stemmed from its anti-Soviet bias, which struck a responsive chord among those leftists who shared traditional Afghan suspicions of their northern neighbor. There was also the indisputable romantic attraction of Maoism that infected more than just Afghans during this period.[10] One knowledgeable Afghan who was a student in those days believes that Sholay-e-Jaweid commanded more respect and influence among Afghans in general during the 1960s and 1970s than did either Parcham or Khalq until their formal reconciliation in 1977.[11]

Another leftist splinter group, Settam-e-Melli, was formed around 1968 under the leadership of Taher Badakhshi, a member of the original PDPA Central Committee. In 1966 Badakhshi had originally sided with Babrak by voting against accepting the latter's resignation, but the following year, after Babrak's definitive split with Khalq, Badakhshi returned to the Khalqi fold and even appears to have retained his PDPA Central Committee status, if only briefly. Soon, however, he left the party to form his own group. Information on Settam-e-Melli is vague and contradictory, but it appears to have been an anti-Pashtun leftist mutation. One analyst places its formation in 1966 (clearly an error) and declares that it was pro-Chinese as well as Marxist-Leninist in outlook, in which case it would scarcely have differed from Sholay-e-Jaweid. He also believes that it received support from Pakistan's leader Ali Bhutto and was responsible for a brief anti-Daoud uprising in the Panjshir Valley in 1975.[12] These conclusions are all open to question, especially the last. The Panjshir uprising, although sparked by anti-Pashtun frustrations similar to those that gave rise to Settam-e-Melli, was probably not connected with that movement. If not spontaneous, the mini-rebellion may have been ignited by the international fundamentalist and militant

Muslim group Ikhwan-al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood).[13] It is noteworthy that in the period 1980–1982 the Panjshir has offered some of the stoutest resistance to Soviet occupation forces.

During the height of the 1960s leftist factionalism, even that chronic PDPA fence sitter Dastagir Panjsheri attempted to form his own splinter group, Khalq Kargah. It attracted very little support, however, and Panjsheri returned to his customary uneasy vacillation between Parcham and Khalq. As recording secretary and bookkeeper for the PDPA, he had perhaps the best idea of the relative strength of each group.[14] His inability to pick a winner and stick with it is perhaps the best indication of how evenly matched the two sides were.

Publications and Tactics

Although *Khalq* had been shut down in May 1966, Sholay-e-Jaweid and Parcham received permission to publish journals in late 1967 or early 1968. The Khalqis took this as evidence that both were in collusion with the government, especially because all of Khalq's applications for publishing licenses at that time were rejected. In fact, however, both *Sholay-e-Jaweid* and *Parcham*, like their antecedents in the 1950s, were eventually shut down by the government. As might be expected, the more revolutionary Maoist publication was the first to go, lasting only about three months after its opening issue of April 4, 1968. Its impassioned rhetoric against its revisionist Parchami rivals, Pashtun nationalists, and U.S. imperialists was tolerable, but when it took on the king and his intimate advisers, it overstepped permissible bounds. In June the founding Mahmudis, uncle and nephew, were imprisoned for their part in fomenting a strike at an automotive repair works at Jangalak, and the paper was closed.[15]

Parcham opened on March 14, 1968, and continued legal publication into 1969. It owed its continued survival to an initially milder approach and what appeared to be a tacit agreement with the left-leaning government of Nur Ahmad Etemadi, who had been appointed prime minister in late 1967, to abstain from disruptive appeals. It called for a democratic united front and for evolutionary change within the framework of the constitutional system. In promoting this line, Babrak succeeded in beguiling not only the Afghan authorities but some foreigners as well; he projected himself as a reformist "economic socialist."[16]

No account of Afghan periodicals would be complete without mention of the various publications that traditionally have been produced and distributed illegally by those opposed to the country's leaders. At one end of the spectrum are the crudely hand-lettered *shabnamah* ("night letters"), simple, single-issue handbills distributed at night to protest injustices. Very

often these are surreptitiously printed on government-owned mimeograph machines by clerks with the proper access. The phenomenon has been no less common under PDPA rule since 1978 than it was under the king or Daoud.[17]

At the other end of the spectrum are books and materials published outside Afghanistan and smuggled in to enlighten the population. These are often produced by Afghan students abroad, especially those in Germany and (before political anarchy shut Lebanese schools) Beirut. In between are some printed in limited numbers abroad and then laboriously copied by hand inside Afghanistan. An example of the latter is Mir Ghulam Mohammed Ghubar's *Afghanistan Through History*, a weighty tome from a socialist viewpoint that was handcopied by Afghan political discussion groups around 1970. It had been banned because of unflattering references to various influential members of the Mohammedzai family.[18]

The later Khalqi claim that it produced and distributed "hundreds of thousands of books, periodicals, secret papers, and so on" during the monarchy is patently an exaggeration.[19] Nevertheless, its literature distribution program was an active one and very likely enjoyed the support of the Soviet embassy.

Despite the disarray of the Afghan left, it took a leading role in ushering in an era of violence that lasted from 1968 into the 1970s. In mid-1968, the country was beset by an unprecedented explosion of worker and student unrest. One observer counted nineteen labor stoppages and nine student strikes and demonstrations during May and June alone.[20] At the time, an effort was made to portray these as merely an infection carrried into Afghanistan from restive students in Europe and the United States, but in recent years both the PDPA and Soviet sources have stated that credit for instigating and leading the demonstrations belongs to the PDPA.[21] This claim is backed by post-1978 Afghan exiles who had close connections with the left at the time or whose official position gave them access to information on the subject.[22] It is also supported by analysis of the groups involved.

Both Khalq and Sholay-e-Jaweid took an active and identifiable role in these activities and later were to accuse Parcham of dragging its feet and cooperating with the monarchy.[23] Although Parcham had previously made an effort to appear moderate (so much so that its rivals dubbed it the "royal Afghan communist party"), these accusations are probably inflated. According to Babrak, the party "viewed the national democratic stage of the social revolution not as a period of consecutive reforms but as the legitimate material and political preparation for the socialist revolution."[24]

Nor do the Parchamis seem to have confined themselves to words. In one of the few incidents that involved bloodshed, students at the Afghan Institute of Technology, the Technicum, the School of Nursing (Anahita

Ratebzad's province), and the Teachers' Training School all demonstrated simultaneously on May 21, 1968. These schools were centers of Parchami strength, as well as having some Khalqi and Sholay-e-Jaweid representation. One student was killed in a melee with government forces, and the students then paraded with a number of bloodstained shirts in an apparent effort (unsuccessful) to provoke further violence.[25]

It appears from these acts that Parcham may have decided about this time that the penalties for tacit cooperation with the Etemadi government outweighed the benefits. Instead, the party availed itself of a different kind of high-level protection. Marching students sometimes found they had a silent escort service—immediately behind them followed the private car of Mohammed Daoud, a nonparticipant in their activities but by his very presence a powerful deterrent to police violence against the demonstrators.[26]

Eventually the government responded to Parcham's militance by closing its paper in June 1969, shortly before the parliamentary elections.[27] The closure may also have been connected with a massive student strike in May to which the government responded by the simple expedient of locking out the students. Although the lockout spread some unrest to the countryside when students arrived home from Kabul, in the end it was effective; by November, when school reopened, the strike had dissipated.[28] Meanwhile, Afghanistan's last free elections were held in August 1969. Somewhat to their surprise, tribal leaders had learned from the previous session that membership in parliament brought with it true political power and attendant financial benefits, including a say in high-level government appointments (usually a salable commodity). Armed with this knowledge, they took a greater interest in the elections than they had in 1965 and this time stood for parliament themselves, instead of nominating stand-ins. The result was a parliament more representative of Afghan opinion than its predecessor—that is, a far more conservative one.[29]

The PDPA's modest representation was cut by two seats. Of the identified Parchamis only Babrak was re-elected. For its part, Khalq finally seated a member, Hafizullah Amin, who won the race in Paghman, near Kabul. Taraki and Jauzjani, however, again lost, Anahita Ratebzad (Parcham) did not run, and Nur lost his seat.

This poor Parchami showing and the closure of its newspaper together probably constituted a turning point for Babrak and his followers. Whereas Khalq and Sholay-e-Jaweid continued their efforts to inspire the Afghan population to political activity (Khalq was to claim credit for instigating and leading "approximately 2000 meetings and street demonstrations" during the last two years of the monarchy), Parcham appeared to be largely quiescent.[30]

Parcham and Daoud

This dormancy was only apparent, however. Overt political activity had been replaced by clandestine collaboration with Mohammed Daoud, who had begun meeting with confidants to determine what had gone wrong with his earlier administration of the country and how previous errors might be avoided under a new government. Present at these discussion groups were not only civilian Parchamis but young military officers trained in the USSR. It is estimated that about fifty took part in the discussions at various times. Daoud believed that the personal loyalty they expressed for him outweighed any ideological loyalty they might also profess.[31]

For Daoud the only way back to power was a coup, given the prohibition against members of the royal family taking leading government roles. His plan for a forcible takeover won Parcham's hearty approval, for this would permit the party to share power without the awkward necessity of first proving its popularity at the ballot box, a political process at which it had proven itself singularly inept. It would also provide (or so Parcham calculated) a figurehead leader with impeccable noncommunist credentials who could be retained or jettisoned after the left had consolidated its power. All that would be necessary would be to close ranks around Daoud, alienating him from other members of the royal family and keeping him apart from noncommunist liberals who might dilute Parchami influence.[32] Included in the intended quarantine were, of course, all Khalqis as well as those politically to the right.

Daoud's own association with the Afghan left dated back to the Awakened Youth movement of the early 1950s. He had noted and approved of efforts by its members to set up a single-party, authoritarian Afghan state and had listened with close attention as the theoretical details had been thrashed out. Later, of course, he had been prime minister when the future founders of the PDPA were jailed or exiled, but it was also Daoud who let them back into Afghan society in 1956, after the Soviet economic and military assistance programs had been signed. Only those who refused to pledge themselves to refrain from opposition continued to be punished.[33]

In the winter of 1971–72 famine struck Afghanistan in the wake of a disastrous, prolonged drought. The government, already discredited by its inability to run the country effectively, failed to cope decisively with the emergency. Although the United States made available 200,000 tons of wheat, delivery of about a quarter of it was delayed by the Indo-Pakistani war, and the rest was slowed by Afghan road conditions and corruption among the food distributors.[34] It was probably about this time that Daoud and those around him began serious plotting.

By early 1973, the left had reason to push Daoud into accelerating his

plans for a takeover. Not only were Western powers laying the groundwork for funding an Afghan development bank (which would have weakened Soviet influence), but other, noncommunist coup plots were hatching at the same time. One was under the leadership of Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal and another was allegedly planned by the king's uncle, Shah Wali, and former Prime Minister Mohammed Yussuf.[35]

Daoud's coup took place on July 17, 1973, while the king was in Europe. It was nearly bloodless, the only casualties being accidental. It succeeded because of the support of key military officers, the minister of interior (a closet Parchami, Nehmatullah Pazhwak), and Parcham's rank and file. Students with red armbands suddenly appeared on the streets to direct traffic on the day of the coup, and there was no organized resistance. Although the constitution was abolished, parliament dissolved, and political activity suspended, Parcham immediately set up an overt headquarters in Kabul's Spinzar Hotel.[36] It was the only political group known to have dared operate so openly, its boldness doubtless stemming from Babrak's belief that Daoud would be forced to rely on Parcham to run the country.

Later, the Khalqis were to say that they had supported Daoud's proclaimed revolutionary program but, unlike Parcham, had been careful to keep organizationally aloof—and underground. Whereas Parcham had collaborated wholeheartedly with the Daoud government, the Khalqis (it was claimed) had been prepared to offer support only if Daoud kept his revolutionary promises. (See Appendix C.) Such statements are probably less representative of Khalqi political acumen at the time than of hindsight when Daoud became unpopular: the real reason Khalqis did not join Daoud's government was that Parcham successfully froze them out. The immediate effect of the coup on the factional struggle was the reported desertion of some Khalqis to the Parchami cause. Later, Khalqi willingness to collaborate with Daoud was documented in a letter sent to him at the end of 1974 in which he was called on to fire his inefficient, corrupt Parchami ministers and replace them with Khalqis.[37]

Immediately after the 1973 coup, however, Parcham clearly held the upper hand politically. Half of Daoud's ministers were closely associated with Parcham, as was the chief of his bodyguard, Zia Mohammedzai Zia. Pazhwak had facilitated penetration of the Ministry of Interior by a number of Parchami students, and the military officers who had brought Daoud to power were mostly Parchamis as well. There even were reports that a Parchami triumvirate of Mir Akbar Khyber, Anahita Ratebzad, and Babrak Karmal had formed within Daoud's Central Committee an unofficial subcommittee that passed on all senior appointments.[38] Suleiman Layeq and First Deputy Prime Minister Hassan Sharq were also said to pass on new appointments.[39] (Sharq, the Parchami with the highest rank in Daoud's

government, is not known to have figured in intra-PDPA politics. Exiled by Daoud into the diplomatic corps in 1977, he returned to Kabul in 1978 but remained in obscurity. In May 1980 he became ambassador to India.)

Daoud's initial foreign policies reflected this leftist strength. Shortly after coming to power, he publicly voiced approval of Moscow's Asian collective security plan, aimed at isolating and containing China. He was hostile to Iran and Pakistan, supporting freedom and independence for their Pashtun and Baluch minorities in the proposed states of Pashtunistan and Baluchistan, to be carved from his neighbors' territory.

Domestically, the president also pursued policies that won PDPA approval. He abrogated the constitution and dissolved parliament. All nongovernment publishing was abolished, and state control was tightened over industry and commerce. Maiwandwal, who had returned exultant from a foreign tour and was prepared to collaborate with Daoud, was thrown in jail on what appeared to be trumped-up charges of renewed coup plotting. There he was strangled, almost surely at the behest of Babrak and Parcham, who feared him as a potential rival.[40]

From the outset, however, Daoud appeared to understand the danger that the organized left posed to his personal rule, and he set about the piecemeal destruction of Parchami strength in his cabinet. As he succeeded, his position emerged as ever more nationalist. At home he made up his differences with the estranged traditionalist branches of the royal family, and his foreign policies became ever more distant from the Soviet line.

Nowhere was this as evident as in the evolution of the Pashtunistan-Baluchistan controversy. Soviet encouragement of Pashtun and Baluch separatism had begun in the 1920s.[41] By 1973 a self-proclaimed Marxist organization, the Baluch People's Liberation Army, had joined forces with another pro-Soviet group, the Popular Front for Armed Resistance.[42] Both groups operated in remote desert areas along Afghanistan's borders with Iran and Pakistan. Meanwhile Pakistan's pro-Soviet National Awami Party was promoting Pashtun nationalism. At the outset Daoud's policies were fully in line with those of the two separatist movements; on August 30, 1973, he celebrated Pashtunistan Day in Kabul with a strident display of support for "our Pashtun and Baluch brethren." Kabul's main square, named Pashtunistan Square during Daoud's earlier administration, was the scene of demonstrations, and a Pashtunistan flag (suspiciously similar to the Afghan flag) was always flown there. For its part, Islamabad accused the Afghan president of training up to 15,000 Baluch and Pashtun guerrillas for a "people's war."[43] It appeared that the history of soured relations with Pakistan during Daoud's previous administration was about to be repeated. By 1975, however, Pashtunistan rhetoric had paled noticeably, and in 1976 celebration of the holiday was very muted. Contrary to previous practice,

the presence of civil servants was not mandatory, and although several officials of ministerial rank attended, Daoud himself did not. Earlier that year he had held two brief but cordial meetings with Pakistan's Prime Minister Bhutto, and relations were as warm as at any point in the history of the two states.[44]

To Khalq and Parcham alike this shift in foreign policy was tantamount to treason. Both for their own political purposes and because it suited Soviet foreign policy, they were deeply committed to the Pashtunistan issue. Even here, however, there were differences in the policies of the two parties: Khalq believed in an autonomous Pashtunistan within Pakistan, whereas Parcham wanted it to be part of Aghanistan.[45] Of the two, Parcham (in spite of its broader ethnic representation) was more dedicated to the Pashtunistan issue than was the almost purely Pashtun Khalq,[46] possibly perceiving in it a nationalist cause that would help to unify the party's disparate elements.

Daoud's apparent hostility toward Iran, another position favorable to Soviet interests and enthusiastically supported by Parcham and Khalq, evaporated even more swiftly. Only a year after the coup, he accepted an Iranian offer of $1 billion in aid, soon increased to $2 billion. This would have been more assistance than Afghanistan had received from all donors since the end of World War II. Possibly due to sabotage by Daoud's own pro-Parchami ministers, however, the Iranian aid never materialized.[47]

For the remaining years of his presidency, Daoud tried to diversify the sources of foreign aid by soliciting support from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, India, and other medium and small powers. In September 1975 he is said to have dismissed 40 Soviet-trained officers from the armed services. At the urging of close advisers, he moved to reduce dependence on the USSR by starting military training programs in India and Egypt for Afghan troops.[48] In 1978, five years after he seized power and shortly before his overthrow, Daoud stated that "Cuba only pretends to be nonaligned." Afghanistan, he said, sought true nonalignment.[49]

From the standpoint of Soviet foreign policy, none of these developments was favorable. On the other hand, nothing in Afghanistan's international behavior suggested that it intended moving away from its traditional policy of neutrality and nonalignment. Daoud had no intention of joining any bloc or adopting anti-Soviet policies; he wished merely to diversify his foreign support as widely as possible. In seeking to outmaneuver the leftists who had helped bring him to power, he was only trying to ensure the consolidation of his own position and the continued independence of his country.[50]

His political maneuvers succeeded admirably with Parcham, but he failed to deal adequately with Khalq. In the first few months of his rule,

Parcham had launched an intensive recruitment drive, but by the end of 1973 this had died away.[51] Daoud did not look with favor on such activities, and he let it be understood that if Parchami advisers were to remain in his good graces, the party would have to be more discreet in its activities.

From that point on, Parcham lost strength both in absolute terms and in relation to Khalq. It had to share responsibility for all regime mistakes (thus lending credence to renewed Khalqi claims that it was a "royal communist party"), yet found itself outmaneuvered by the canny Daoud.

For example, some pro-Parchami military officers like Faiz Mohammed, Pacha Gul Wafadar, and Abdul Hamid Mohtat had given up their military careers in order to become civilian ministers in Daoud's cabinet. Daoud soon dismissed Mohtat in disgrace and eventually neutralized the other two by posting them abroad as ambassadors. Parcham thus lost three influential voices in both the military and political establishments. The head of the air force, Col. Abdul Qader, was sent off in disgrace to be chief of Kabul's slaughterhouses for having dared to criticize the president's slow pace toward socialism. More dismissals and transfers were to follow. By late 1974 Babrak himself was under virtual house arrest. Daoud's ruthless dismissals, humiliations, and transfers of all those whose loyalty he suspected led even his "own" Parchamis to fear for their future.[52] Still, as late as 1976 there were still enough Parchamis left in Daoud's entourage that the party apparently did not dare resume recruitment for fear of jeopardizing the positions of those who remained.

Khalq and the Military

No such restraints bound Khalq, which from 1973 onward pursued a very active recruitment campaign throughout the country, especially in the army and air force. This drive was made more effective by Taraki's 1973 transfer of responsibility for military recruitment from himself to his most active and efficient lieutenant, Hafizullah Amin. Amin is reported to have briefed Taraki weekly on the progress of the recruitment campaign and in addition presented his chief with semiannual written reports, on January 1 and May 1. Each of these reports allegedly showed a consistent 100 percent increase in military recruitments over its predecessor. In propagandizing the armed forces, Amin used between a quarter and a half of the total revolutionary literature available to the Khalqi PDPA.[53] By the time of the communist coup, in April 1978, Khalq outnumbered Parcham by a factor of two or three to one.

The Khalqi goal, as Taraki later admitted, was the seizure of power by force:

> Comrade Taraki had appraised the Afghan society on a scientific basis and had intimated [to] the party since the 1973 coup that it was possible in Afghanistan to wrest . . . political power through a shortcut [, inasmuch] as the classical way in which the productive forces undergo different stages to build a society based on scientific socialism would take a long time. This shortcut could be utilized by working extensively in the armed forces. Previously the army was considered as the tool of dictatorship and despotism of the ruling class and it was not imaginable to use it before toppling its employer. However, Comrade Taraki suggested this too should be wrested in order to topple the ruling class.[54]

The Afghan armed forces were not only the most effective tool for seizing power but also proved to be the most fertile field for Khalqi cultivation of new adherents.

One obvious advantage for Khalq was the fact that by 1977, 3,700 Afghan officers and noncommissioned officers had been trained in the Soviet Union in using the $600 million worth of military hardware provided the country by the USSR.[55] While in training, the Afghans had come under the scrutiny of Soviet intelligence organs. Those sympathetic to Soviet aims who were not directly recruited as KGB or GRU agents (and very likely some who were) made attractive candidates for Khalq, and at least one former Afghan official believes that the Soviets passed along such promising leads to Khalq through their embassy in Kabul.[56]

(Several factors might have prompted the Soviets to funnel recruits to Khalq rather than Parcham at this stage. Parcham, having been warned by Daoud to be less aggressive, might well have lost its remaining footholds in the government if its efforts to recruit in the military had been uncovered; Khalq, by contrast, was already in opposition and had nothing to lose. It is also possible that Soviet military intelligence—the GRU—which had the best access to Afghan military officers, had a closer, more proprietary interest in Khalq than in the more KGB-oriented Parcham.)

In fact, there are some aspects of the Khalqi recruitment campaign that themselves smack of Soviet intelligence involvement. The use of communist literature on an extensive scale is one; there is no indication in Afghan coverage of this topic where the literature originated, a silence that itself may imply Soviet origin. Also, Amin was required to present Taraki with *written* reports on the progress of his campaign. Some kind of records, disguised and encoded, would of course be needed to keep track of recruits, but periodic comprehensive reports would be both unnecessary and extremely dangerous for use by a local leader. They would, however, be a standing requirement for a Soviet intelligence officer in the field to levy on his contact (in this case Taraki) in order to report accurately to Moscow.

The vulnerability of Afghan officers to Khalqi blandishments did not derive solely from their experience as Soviet trainees. In building up a military corps loyal to himself in the 1950s, Daoud had deliberately promoted officers who had no independent power base of their own, such as small landowners and members of minority nationalities. He had avoided, insofar as possible, royal family members or close kin of tribal leaders. His goal had been to make the officer corps totally committed to him personally, and he let it be known that nepotism would not be tolerated in the military.[57] He frequently shifted provincial military governors for the same purpose: to deny them the opportunity of creating a political base among the troops under their command.

Daoud was a remote figure, however, and the officers no doubt resented his obvious mistrust of any independent association on their part. Furthermore, as he made his peace with estranged members of the former royal family, the officers found themselves again subordinated socially (and sometimes also militarily) to people who had inherited, not earned, their rank. The Khalqi advocacy of a promotion system based only on ability (Daoud's own line when originally appointing these officers) fell on receptive ears.[58]

This advocacy also gave Khalq a psychological advantage over establishment-oriented Parcham. Although many of Daoud's most senior officers were leftists whose upper-class background attracted them to Parcham, most of the middle-grade officers came from rural poor or middle-class families, not the Kabul elite. According to the Khalqi view, the nature of military service attracted workers and peasants but alienated upper-class representatives, who "hated discipline."[59]

What is truly significant and instructive in the Khalqi effort to recruit among the military, however, is not the vulnerability of the target. Many other branches of Afghan society were just as vulnerable, such as the student, teacher, and media targets of the 1960s. The goal in the 1970s, however, was no longer a slow buildup of leftist sympathy throughout Afghan society but the outright seizure of power. Khalq tried to put a defensive coloration on the recruitment drive (it told those approached that they would be called on to act only if there were a right-wing putsch), but the intent, as shown by the PDPA's own literature, was never anything but offensive.[60]

Daoud Abandons Parcham

Daoud recognized the vulnerability that his one-man rule had brought to the Afghan state. In the long run, he envisioned a slow but steady evolution from autocracy to democracy. His personal dictatorship was to give way first to the rule of a single party and eventually to a pluralistic

political system encompassing one or more opposition parties. He foresaw the development of a mixture of state-owned and private enterprises, some of them monopolies like those developed by Zabuli many years before.[61]

The Kremlin could not have greeted this vision with enthusiasm. Until about 1975 the USSR could still, perhaps, look on the political situation in Afghanistan with a certain degree of equanimity. The Parcham-Khalq split, though counter to proper Marxist-Leninist political philosophy, had had its practical advantages. Before Daoud's 1973 return to power, the two groups had vied enthusiastically in fomenting civil unrest, probably generating more activity through such socialist competition than they would have done as a unified party. After Daoud's return, the USSR reaped the benefits of having supporters both within the power structure (Parcham) and in opposition (Khalq). Parcham's relative acceptability to the establishment was based on its apparent advocacy of a relatively soft, evolutionary socialism, whereas Khalq's action-oriented, revolutionary approach appealed especially to youth and the less favored. If two parties, both pro-Soviet, could appeal to different constituencies, so much the better.

As long as the Parchamis retained some important positions in the government and Daoud remained isolated from other potential political forces, the USSR could anticipate a favorable outcome in almost any eventuality. Ideally, Parcham would manipulate Daoud, using him as a figurehead. Failing that, even if he succeeded in pursuing his own policies, Parcham would still be in a position to inherit the mantle of power in the relatively near future: Daoud was in his sixties, had but one lung, and suffered from wintertime bronchial disorders. Alternatively, if Daoud failed and popular resentment against his policies became unmanageable, Khalq could use its adherents in the military to secure power for the left as long as no other political force existed to counter it. But Daoud's successful completion of his salami tactics against his Parchami supporters cut off one Soviet option, while his reconciliation with estranged members of the former royal family and his plans for slow democratization threatened to consolidate noncommunist political sentiments.

During 1974 and 1975, rumors flew in Kabul that a new constitution was in the making. For Western observers, pessimistic that a leftist takeover would follow Daoud's death or incapacitation, there was at last a glimmer of hope. The potential for a leftist seizure of power had been obvious since 1973, but now it appeared possible that Daoud might succeed in bequeathing his realm to noncommunists. Everything depended on his ability in the time left to him to devise a political system that would survive its creator.[62]

That perception seemed to be shared by others who hoped for a different outcome. In July and August 1975 Parcham and Khalq, almost surely at Soviet instigation, held their first reconciliation talks since the 1967 rupture

in relations. While they were still in progress, Parcham apparently published a self-serving version of them, violating a prior agreement to keep the negotiations confidential until their conclusion. Infuriated, Khalq broke off the talks, giving Daoud another brief respite.[63]

By 1976 a special commission appointed by Daoud had prepared a draft constitution. In January 1977 he convened a loya jirgah, with representatives from all over the country, to sit in judgment on it. Significantly there was little or no leftist participation in this body; Parcham's estrangement from the Daoud government was becoming more and more obvious.[64]

After two weeks of debate, which resulted in 34 amendments and six new articles, the constitution became the basic law of the land. It provided for a unicameral parliament (Meli Jirgah), which would be elected every four years and handle routine legislation. The new constitution enshrined the loya jirgah, traditionally Afghanistan's ultimate decision-making body, as the "paramount power of the will of the people" and spelled out rules for its size, composition, election of members, and other details. It would meet only on an ad hoc basis, to decide especially important questions of policy. At the end of the debate, the assembly elected Daoud president for the next six years, itself a minor step in a democratic trend; it had been anticipated that he would be appointed for life.[65]

Immediately after adoption of the constitution, Parcham's break with Daoud became final. It rejected both the document itself and Daoud's call for all political groups to join together in his National Revolutionary Party.[66] That party in any case roused little enthusiasm among the individualistic Afghan people, who saw in it merely a device for regimenting and perpetuating support for a none too popular government. Daoud's proclaimed intentions for eventual democratization were neither well understood nor generally trusted.

Khalq, meanwhile, had already decided to boycott the party, but in a curiously hesitant way, as if to leave the door open for joining later if that seemed expedient.[67] Of most significance, however, was the removal of one of the basic contentions between Parcham and Khalq, the question of collaboration with Daoud's government; both had now found common ground in opposition, a vindication for what Khalq later claimed had been its position all along.

5

Temporary Fusion

Healing the Breach

With the promulgation of the 1977 constitution, the stage appeared to be set for a Parcham-Khalq reconciliation. Both groups were united in their opposition to Daoud and their allegiance to Moscow. Their leaders met regularly, if separately, with the second in command at the Soviet embassy, Alexander A. Novokreshchnikov.[1] Their ideologies and political platforms—now that Parcham was also in opposition—were virtually identical, differing perhaps only on questions of tactics.

Nevertheless, even a cosmetic healing of the breach between them was no easy task. The personal and organizational animosities that had grown up over a decade between the two, starting with Babrak and Taraki at the top and working down to the newest recruit, were not a tradition to be set aside lightly.

As already noted, Parcham and Khalq were both full-fledged, if miniature, parties, with separate secretaries general, central committees, and recruiting programs. Until the reconciliation the adherents of both parties, even at the lowest level, continued to denounce each other. (In fact it was only the sudden cessation of such personal attacks in the summer of 1977 that gave noncommunist observers an indication that a Parcham-Khalq

truce was in effect.)[2] Numerically Khalq commanded two to three times the membership of Parcham (their combined strength was probably at most a few thousand), but Parcham could accept nothing less than parity in the membership of a combined central committee; to settle for less would mean being consistently outvoted and eventually destroyed.[3] That a reconciliation, however temporary, was effected at all under these circumstances is a tribute to the time, effort, and pressure committed to the task.

Healing the break was not a purely Afghan undertaking; in fact Parcham and Khalq themselves were decidedly unhelpful in the process. During the year that preceded their formal reconciliation (officially dated July 3, 1977),[4] each side intensified efforts to line up support for itself among leaders of foreign parties. These efforts, which had been continuing intermittently since the 1967 split, now often took the form of long position papers containing impassioned defenses of one party's policies and vituperative denunciations of the other's.[5] (For an example of one such document, see Appendix C.)

Although before 1976 there was no known public response by foreign parties to these importunings, each faction had lined up support in different countries. Khalq had gained the sympathy of the Iraqi Communist Party and Iran's Tudeh Party; Parcham appeared to succeed with the Socialist Party of Australia, Pakistan's National Awami Party, and India's CPI, for example.[6]

In May 1976 the CPI published an article in an official journal describing, for the first time, the Afghan party split and calling for a healing of the breach.[7] A month later the Iraqi party published a similar description and appeal.[8] Not long after, the Australian party followed suit.[9] These articles gain added significance because in 1976 relatively few people outside Afghanistan (including Communists) were aware that the country had even one pro-Soviet party, let alone two. The PDPA had never been represented at international party conferences, its leaders' congratulatory telegrams (if any) to Soviet leaders remained unpublished, and its very existence had not been acknowledged in either Soviet party journals or Western compendiums of communist parties and fronts.[10] Nevertheless, these far-flung party journals variously identified the PDPA as fraternal, Marxist-Leninist, and ideologically committed to scientific socialism. In the arcane world of communist semantics, each of these terms unmistakably indicates an established pro-Moscow party.

That three such geographically separated journals should exhibit almost simultaneous and identical concern for factionalism in the PDPA—a tiny, hitherto unknown, out-of-power party in a remote country—is probably a tribute both to Parchami and Khalqi efforts to line up foreign support and to Moscow's orchestration of the response.

Although there is a general consensus that the initiative behind the

temporary healing of the Parcham-Khalq breach came from Moscow, opinion on the site, duration, and possible foreign intermediaries involved in the discussions that led to the July agreement diverges widely. The dates range from May to August, the sites from Iran to India to Kabul, and the intermediaries from the CPI to the Tudeh Party to Ajmal Khattak (a leader of the National Awami Party in exile in Kabul at that time) to merely the rank and file of the PDPA itself, which supposedly prevailed on the leadership to unite.[11] No less an authority than Babrak himself attests that the last view is in error and that foreign mediation was involved: "With the help of international friends and brothers the PDPA restored its unity."[12] On balance it seems most likely that the CPI was involved, but that Ajmal Khattak, with Soviet advisers hovering in the immediate background, refereed the discussions in Kabul in June.[13]

An intriguing and significant question is why the CPSU went to all this trouble. Granted that Daoud's policies were not to Moscow's liking, the Kremlin could scarcely have had any illusions that Daoud intended changing Afghanistan's traditional neutrality or historical role as a buffer state between Central and South Asia. If the USSR had had no immediate desire to alter that role, the most effective way to handle the Parcham-Khalq split would have been to throw support to one and withdraw it from the other. Very soon the winner would have excommunicated the loser, a certain number of defectors would have crossed to the winning side, and a more disciplined (if smaller) party would have continued to represent Moscow's interests.

Moscow's decision not to follow this course but instead to try to heal the irreconcilable differences between Parcham and Khalq implies that it was actively promoting the Great Saur (April) Revolution, as it came to be known, the armed coup that resulted in Daoud's overthrow and murder less than a year later, in April 1978. To succeed, that coup would need the full strength and complementary capabilities of Parcham and Khalq.

As noted in Chapter 4, Khalq's consistent intent had been to stage a military coup. In fact Hafizullah Amin reportedly informed Taraki some two years before the coup that it was a practical possibility:

> So in 1976, Comrade Amin presented to the great leader his written views to the effect that the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan could, with a certain number of casualties on the part of the armed forces, topple the Daoud government and wrest the political power. However, Comrade Taraki, with his profound far-sightedness asked Comrade Amin to wait till the objective and subjective conditions in the country were ripe enough and the party grew still stronger.[14]

Now as events were soon to prove beyond any doubt, "profound farsightedness" was not one of Nur Mohammed Taraki's strong points. The political common sense displayed in not moving prematurely probably originated not with him but with his Soviet mentors. They would have grasped better than he that it is not enough to seize power by military means; retaining power requires a network of loyal civilians who are also experienced functionaries. In this regard Khalq had the guns, but Parcham had more bureaucrats at the administrative level; only by combining their forces could a radical, lasting change in Afghanistan's political structure be secured. And only if that change were an immediate Soviet foreign policy goal did it make sense for the USSR to press for reconciliation between two such implacable opponents.

Aside from the incentive to forge a common Parcham-Khalq front, did the USSR have a preference between the two?

Most observers agree that Parcham enjoyed the closer relationship and attribute this to the greater willingness of Parchami leaders to submit to Soviet direction. Their reputation for obedience to Moscow's rule (which hurt Parcham's popularity in Afghanistan) may well have been based more on the open nature of the party's connections with the Soviet embassy than on closer ties. Parchamis visited the embassy more frequently and openly than Khalqis and were known to receive Soviet aid. The party as a whole was said to be receiving Soviet financial assistance via Suleiman Layeq, who used his position as director of the Pul-e-Khumri textile plant, with which the Soviets had open business contracts, to funnel funds into its coffers.[15]

Khalq, as an outspoken opposition force under both royal and republican regimes, had to be more discreet about its Soviet connections and thus was able to reap the benefits of appearing to be more independent. Still, it never took issue with any of Moscow's policies, contriving only to appear more revolutionary than its Parchami rivals. In the last year before the overthrow of the monarchy, the parliamentary speeches of Babrak and Amin were virtually identical.[16]

Perhaps it was not so much a question of which Afghan group was more subservient to the USSR in general as it was which Soviet instrument had the greatest influence over which Afghans. Here, one can make a case that the intensified Khalqi focus on the Afghan military starting in 1973 may be related to a similar focus of Soviet military intelligence (GRU) on the same target. For its part, Parcham, with its civilian orientation and somewhat more sophisticated political platform, would be a more natural ally of the KGB. If such was the case, the Parcham-Khalq rivalry takes on a new and titillating aspect, that of an indirect reflection of the long, bitter, but rarely visible struggle between the KGB and GRU.

Whether or not the KGB-GRU and Parcham-Khalq conflicts are related, the ultimate arbiter for the Afghans (as for Soviet intelligence over the years) was the CPSU. The common point of contact for both Babrak and Taraki in the Soviet embassy was Novokreshchnikov, who may have been neither a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer nor (as rumor often had it) the local KGB chief, but possibly a representative of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department. The best Soviet efforts, however, were not enough to do more than paper over the differences between the rival Afghan parties.

Unfortunately, no copy of the Parcham-Khalq agreement of July 3, 1977, has yet surfaced. Part of its contents can be deduced from later public documents that reveal (with somewhat startling candor) that each side intended to circumvent the agreement and dominate the other:

> This unity [between Parcham and Khalq] consisted of two parts. First the unity in connection with civilians, secondly, the unity among the armed forces. In the case of the former, unity was achieved in all organizations belonging to Khalqis and Parchamis with equal rights for each group while both were creating new organizations . . . Comrade Taraki wished that this unity be accomplished honestly but later incidents showed that this was not the case and facts brought to light recently indicated that Babrak Karmal had secretly kept an organized group of Parchamis for himself.
>
> In the military field, since the number of Parchami officers was much smaller than that of their Khalqi colleagues, the latter were told that after Daoud, political power should be wrested by the Khalqis and should Daoud be toppled by someone else, this power ought to be transferred to the Khalqis notwithstanding . . .
>
> Comrade Taraki believed that unity in the military field between Khalqis and Parchamis should not be on an equal footing but should be somewhat delayed.[17]

In other words, Parcham cheated by keeping secret one group of its civilian adherents. For its part, Khalq intended keeping its military supporters compartmented from Parcham's and available for seizing power unilaterally if Daoud were deposed by any outside force, including, one must presume, Parcham itself.

The 1978 Coup

In preparing for the coup, Khalq claims to have held no fewer than ten rehearsals in the months preceding April 1978. These were camouflaged as contingency defenses against any possible unprovoked arrest of Taraki or right-wing coup against Daoud. The cover story was designed to familiarize

Khalqi officers with their duties without alerting Daoud's security agents to the imminence of hostilities: "The armed forces leading cadres were trained under Comrade Amin on making preparations for the revolution in such a manner that they themselves did not feel that the time for action was fast approaching."[18] By this time, Khalqi strength in the military was, according to its own later count, about two thousand officers, or about 20 to 25 percent of the officer corps.[19] Although this figure is almost surely an exaggeration (an inflation factor of ten is usually a safe minimum assumption for such statistics), Khalqi penetration of the Afghan armed forces clearly had reached impressive proportions.

Planning for the coup was not, however, purely a Khalqi operation. Parcham also took part, but it was under the impression that the coup would be launched several months later. Even Taraki later acknowledged that the PDPA would have taken action in the Afghan month of Assad (August) if events in April had not precipitated the coup.[20] In January 1980 Babrak, in his first press conference after taking power, was to complain, "Why was our plan [that is, the coup] immediately predated . . . and why was it accelerated?"[21]

Neither Taraki nor Babrak mentions when the August date was set. If one can accept the story of Amin's readiness in theory to overthrow Daoud in 1976, then the detailed plotting probably got under way not long after the July 1977 reconciliation. From the Soviet standpoint, the need for action may have appeared somewhat more urgent in early March 1978, when, as a result of Daoud's frank declarations to Indian Foreign Office officials, they became aware of his intention to distance himself more from the USSR.[22]

Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the Soviets (or at least the CPSU) had a direct hand in the event that precipitated the April coup, the murder of Mir Akbar Khyber. Khyber, although not listed as a PDPA founding father, was one of the oldest and most prominent Parchami theoreticians and ideologues (see Appendix D). On the night of April 17, 1978, two men came to Khyber's home, called him out on the street, and shot him dead. His funeral in Kabul, two days later, was the occasion for a mass anti-American demonstration by ten to fifteen thousand people, actively encouraged by the PDPA on the grounds that he had been assassinated by the CIA. The following week Daoud's security police made a midnight raid that netted seven ranking PDPA Central Committee members: Taraki, Babrak, Amin, Dr. Akbar Shah Wali, Dastagir Panjsheri, Abdul Hakim Sharayee Jauzjani, and Dr. Zamir Safi.[23] All but Amin were jailed immediately. With fateful consequences for themselves, Afghanistan, and the world, the police merely held Amin under very loose house arrest for a critical eleven-hour period, during which he was able to set in motion the coup plan that had been so assiduously rehearsed. By the time the police jailed him, his orders were

already being carried to key Khalqi officers. Four days later Daoud was dead, and the PDPA had taken power.

Who killed Khyber? From available evidence it appears that Amin himself probably masterminded the assassination. According to one source with previous Khalqi connections, he used as hit men two young Khalqi colleagues, the brothers Mohammed Siddiq Alemyar and Mohammed Aref Alemyar.[24] (The Daoud regime identified at least one of the brothers as the killer but mistakenly termed him a "Muslim Brotherhood fanatic.")[25] Both brothers, though later enjoying successful careers under Amin (Siddiq was minister of planning, Aref in charge of land transportation), were executed by the Parchamis in June 1980 for "having supported Amin."[26]

In January 1980, during remarks delivered on the occasion of the PDPA's fifteenth anniversary, Dr. Anahita Ratebzad also alleged that Amin had had Khyber killed. After correctly blaming Amin for Taraki's murder in October 1979, she added, "Similarly there are evidences that Mir Akbar Khayber . . . had also been martyred by his [Amin's] savage band of murderers and terrorists."[27]

The allegation gains further credence from the fact that Khyber swiftly became an "unperson" after the coup and remained in obscurity until Parcham gained power in 1980. In all of the Khalqi literature on Daoud's ouster, there is only one brief, passing reference to Khyber's assassination, and even it does not portray the assassination as connected directly with the April events.[28] There is no mention, there or elsewhere, of the funeral demonstrations, and the arrest of PDPA leaders is pictured as an arbitrary, unprovoked move by Daoud.[29]

If Amin was in fact responsible for Khyber's death, the motives are not hard to deduce. In the first place Khyber, as a member of the reunited PDPA's Central Committee, would have occupied a very important position in any post-coup PDPA government, possibly outranking Amin himself. With his authority as an elder statesman, Khyber posed a political threat to Khalq overall and to Amin personally. His antagonism to Khalq, especially after the circulation of the document reproduced in Appendix C, can be imagined. Amin had good reason to rid himself and his party of a most dangerous rival.

Second, Khyber's assassination and the PDPA's successful incitement to riot brought about exactly the circumstances that Taraki had designated as a coup trigger: his own arrest. At the very time when a principal Parchami competitor had been removed and Parcham itself was least prepared to exploit a fast-breaking situation, Khalq was able to activate its independent military members as previously rehearsed. As the initiator of the action, Amin, of course, had a big advantage over his surprised rivals. (Later, Babrak was alleged to have complained bitterly over Amin's unilateral

order to launch the coup.)[30] Amin may not have had the actual swift sequence of events in mind when arranging for Khyber's elimination, but he was not slow to exploit it.

Amin had another advantage. A high-ranking officer of Daoud's military counterintelligence, Lt. Col. Pacha Sarbaz, was a Khalqi (and possibly a Soviet) agent.[31] Sarbaz was in a position not only to warn Amin of the government's intended moves but was probably influential enough to delay, at least, Amin's own arrest. This delay was of critical importance, permitting Amin to write and dispatch his orders to military colleagues, using Sayed Mohammed Gulabzoy as a courier. Gulabzoy himself, who had studied military courses in the USSR in 1970 and who in 1979 would receive asylum in the Soviet Embassy in Kabul when Amin sought to arrest him, delivered the orders to their addressees in photocopy form. Inasmuch as the orders were written and distributed between midnight and dawn on April 26, the suspicion is that the photocopying was done at the Soviet Embassy, one of the few places in Kabul likely to have such machines available for such a task in the small hours.[32]

Given the extreme Soviet sensitivity to charges that they export revolution, it is not surprising that available evidence of their involvement in deposing Daoud is only circumstantial. From the outset, many observers refused to believe that the Soviets were involved; even some who acknowledged probable Soviet roles in Daoud's 1973 coup and the Parcham-Khalq reconciliation felt that in this case the USSR was not guilty.[33] Others, however, put all the blame on the Soviets, even asserting that it was not Amin but Gulabzoy himself, acting on Soviet orders, who launched the coup.[34] There were reports of Soviet pilots participating in key attacks on the presidential palace, but such allegations apparently were based on the assumption that the planes' unusually accurate rocket fire was beyond the capabilities of Afghan pilots and on reports that they communicated with their bases in Russian.[35]

Active Soviet military participation in the coup must remain a matter for speculation and considerable doubt. That they were informed of the coup plans as scheduled for August, however, seems a near certainty. In view of the indications of their involvement in the Parcham-Khalq rapprochement, their many lines of communication into the Afghan military, and their unusually fast recognition of the new regime (on a Sunday, in the middle of their big May Day holiday weekend), the case for their having been caught completely by surprise is very weak. No less an authority than Babrak Karmal himself confirmed where Soviet interests lay. Responding to an Indian writer's question whether the Soviets wanted Daoud overthrown, he answered bluntly, "Russia wanted that there should be revolution here."[36]

The military details of how the PDPA seized power are beyond the

scope of this work and are described adequately elsewhere.[37] Unlike Daoud's coup in 1973, there was considerable bloodshed, with units loyal to the president actively resisting the takeover. On the morning of April 30, as the cannonading and explosions in Kabul were dying away to sporadic bursts of small-arms fire, Daoud himself and the surviving members of his immediate family were gathered in a single room of the presidential palace. When soldiers burst in to demand their surrender, Daoud, true to character to the end, drew his pistol and opened fire. In the succeeding shootout eighteen family members were killed, including five children, the youngest of them three years old. The rule of the Durranis, almost uninterrupted for over two centuries in spite of chronic tribal insurrection, was broken.

The Khalqis made it look easy. Shortly after the coup they named 23 military supporters delegated to seize command of twenty key armed forces units when the order was given. Presumably most if not all of these individuals had been serving in the units they took over, and most had enough accomplices to assure their success. In the end, of the units that resisted the coup, only the Republican Guards, Daoud's elite 2,000-man bodyguard, fought to the end. It suffered accordingly; those few taken prisoner (about 200 out of 2,000) were executed over the next few months.

Once the coup was actually under way, the Soviets may have taken some steps to minimize PDPA losses in case of failure. According to one report, party leaders were placed aboard a Soviet military transport at Kabul airport immediately after being freed from jail, ready to flee to the USSR if need be.[38] Subsequent Khalqi denunciations of Parcham offered some possible indirect support for this assertion. They alleged that Babrak, fearful that Daoud would win, prevailed on Taraki to flee Kabul and go to nearby Khwaja Rawash air base until the outcome of the fight was assured.[39]

A Radio Kabul broadcast announced Daoud's overthrow and proclaimed a new government in power on April 27, but only after the deposed president and his family were safely dead on April 30 did Taraki take formal control of the state. In the interim, Lt. Col. Abdul Qader, who had led the revolt in the air force, was titular head of state in his role as "chief of the Military Revolutionary Council."[40] That body was renamed the Revolutionary Council and Taraki proclaimed chief of state on May 1. The same Kabul broadcast that proclaimed this also announced Soviet recognition of the new regime.[41] The delay in acknowledging the PDPA's responsibility for the coup was probably a deliberate, preplanned precaution; if the coup had failed, it could have been portrayed as merely an unsuccessful putsch by disgruntled military officers rather than an attempt at a communist takeover.

The Noncommunist Camouflage

From the very first news accounts of the coup, there was a visible Soviet and PDPA effort to conceal its pro-Soviet orientation. Qader's first announcement spoke of Kabul's intention of pursuing a policy of nonalignment, and even Western media used phrases like "left-wing nationalist" to describe the new regime.[42] With the announcement of Taraki's ascendancy to the leadership came a better appreciation of the probable future of Afghan politics, and some Western media began to identify the regime as communist.[43] (On the left, only the CPI, in apparent ignorance of the PDPA's intentions to conceal its Marxist-Leninist orientation, announced that the PDPA was "the unified party of Afghan Communists.")[44]

On May 4, Taraki, in his first news conference, vigorously denied that the new regime was either pro-Moscow or communist. He emphasized that the word "communist" was not part of the PDPA's name and there was no party with such a name in Afghanistan.[45] Daily news coverage of the regime in the *New York Times* during the first week of May reflected the PDPA's strong efforts to deny any Soviet connections: the regime was avoiding use of the terms "socialist" or "communist"; Taraki decried as "poison" foreign reports that Afghanistan had become aligned, and, stating that he was neither Marxist nor communist, denied that he intended bringing his country into the Soviet orbit; soldiers were reported distributing leaflets asserting that the government would not become a Soviet satellite; the new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was referring to Iran and Pakistan as brother Islamic states; and the Carter administration, unruffled by the coup, noted that Afghanistan had become more pro-Soviet but was "unlikely to become a puppet."[46] Two weeks later Louis Dupree, a U.S. authority on Afghanistan, published a letter on the editorial page of the *New York Times* entitled "A Communist Label Is Unjustified," which denied the Soviet orientation of the new leaders.[47] Terms for the PDPA regime such as "democratic," "Islamic," "reformist," and "nonaligned" were common in the news. More left-leaning Western reporters went even further: those who did not believe Afghan denials of communist affiliation were "Neanderthals"; the aims of the DRA were "genuine nonalignment"; the opinion that Taraki and his followers were "mere agrarian reformers" was "wholly correct."[48]

In trying to maintain a noncommunist image, the PDPA seemed to be resurrecting a Parchami policy of the 1960s, one cited by Khalq only two years before as an example of Parchami factionalism and deviation. At that time the Parchamis not only had criticized the Khalqis for being too out-

spokenly communist but also had tried to conceal their own ideological commitments by cooperating as much as possible with the monarchy.[49]

The regime also tried to minimize the number of casualties. Western reporters conceded that the regime's figures of roughly 70–100 dead were somewhat low, but on the basis of three wounded for each battle death (a statistic that was unsourced but became suddenly fashionable), the true casualties were judged to be an order of magnitude below the 10,000 deaths originally reported: 30,000 wounded, went the reasoning, could not be concealed in a country with only 4,000 hospital beds.[50] (In fact, battle deaths among Daoud's bodyguard alone were over 1,800, and there were no surviving wounded.)[51]

PDPA attempts to downplay the ideological significance of the coup (as well as its price in blood) flew in the face of the evidence. In the first month of its existence the DRA signed and publicized more than twenty agreements with the USSR, and the number of Soviet advisers in the country trebled.[52] Afghan media quickly became virtual clones of Soviet Central Asian outlets, long familiar to Afghan audiences and generally mistrusted by them. The country was run by a PDPA Central Committee that appointed a Revolutionary Council analogous to the USSR's Supreme Soviet. Just as in the USSR, within the party's Central Committee an elite Secretariat and Politburo made all key decisions, and within the Revolutionary Council a Presidium took care of routine state management. Before the year was out, the Afghan flag lost its bands of black and Islamic green to become blood red with a gold emblem, indistinguishable from the Soviet flag at a distance. At about this time Hafizullah Amin proclaimed the PDPA goal to be "a fully socialist society with collectivized agriculture and the elimination of the private retail sector."[53] Yet through it all Afghan leaders stoutly proclaimed their independence of the USSR, adamantly refused to admit openly that they were Marxist-Leninists, and insisted that they were pursuing a policy of nonalignment and "positive neutrality." With few exceptions abroad and probably even fewer at home, these professions fooled nobody.

Why then did they persist so long? In part the answer may lie in ideological semantics: Afghanistan as a feudal society could scarcely be described as suddenly catapulted into socialism.[54] At the same time, from the Soviet standpoint it could not be allowed to backslide into any anti-Soviet ideology, no matter what the natural inclinations of the Afghan people. The country had to be preserved as a staunch Soviet ally but without a communist label.

A second consideration involved international economics and politics. Taraki frankly counted on the continuation of foreign aid from such conservative donors as Saudi Arabia and Iran. The only hope for such ongoing generosity lay in concealing the Marxist essence of the regime. Further-

more, for the USSR it was advantageous to promote an Afghanistan that could continue to call itself a member of the nonaligned movement, yet behave in a manner entirely compliant with Soviet foreign policy desires. (In fact, as we have seen, Daoud's desire for Afghanistan to become truly nonaligned may have been one of the triggers that launched the coup that toppled him.)

Probably the most important reason, however, was the Communists' vain hope that by repeating the denial long and loudly enough, they could fool the Afghan people into believing it. This was especially important immediately after the coup, when the regime was consolidating its hold on the country, but continued to be a consideration long after it appeared to be securely in power. Taraki doubtless realized that the PDPA could not possibly rule the country without at least the tacit consent of the devoutly Muslim, overwhelmingly conservative population. Whatever its penetration of the military (estimated at six hundred of the Afghan officer corps at the time of the coup) and of the bureaucracy, the PDPA was only a tiny sliver of the population.[55]

The PDPA sliver became abruptly thinner within a few weeks of the party's coming to power as the fragile alliance within the PDPA ruptured. In a bitter political fight the Parchamis lost out to the Khalqis and for the time being left the Afghan political stage. Some were sent into diplomatic exile, some were fired from the bureaucracy, some were under virtual house arrest, some were jailed, and some eventually received death sentences. The penalty for being a Parchami depended on a number of factors, including one's prominence in the movement, the strength of one's allegiance to Babrak and willingness to work specifically for him, and (perhaps most important) how badly one had offended which Khalqis in the past.

6

And Again Fission

DRA's Parcham-Khalq Balance

Under democratic conditions the 1978 Parcham-Khalq coalition might have worked. The Khalqis were first among equals, to be sure, but that was understandable. Even before the coup Taraki had been acknowledged as titular head of the PDPA, and it had been mainly Khalqi military officers who had physically disposed of the Daoud regime. Still, in the first days of the DRA it appeared that political power had been carefully divided, with the advantage going if anything to the Parchamis. If Khyber had been alive at that time, the uneasy balance might have sustained itself somewhat longer or Parcham might conceivably have won the victory that instead soon went to Khalq.

The leaders whose pictures appeared on the front page of the first post-coup issue of the *Kabul Times* were, for the most part, well known to those familiar with the Afghan left. Judging from their past activities and new responsibilities, the first six persons listed appeared to hold the key positions in the new government.[1] (See Appendix F.)

Taraki's primacy was clear: as secretary general of the PDPA, chairman of the Revolutionary Council, and prime minister of the DRA, he held the reins of state and party power. His first deputy in all three positions was

Babrak, the leader of Parcham. Third place in the state apparatus according to traditional prestige in Afghan politics belonged to the foreign minister, in this case the Khalqi Hafizullah Amin, who, in addition, was a deputy prime minister.

The fourth position listed was that of minister of communications, a somewhat mundane position in many Western governments but an absolutely vital post in any totalitarian state. (Its importance was to be demonstrated in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion in December 1979 and again in Poland in December 1981; in both cases a swift takeover by the military of all communications emasculated potentially dangerous oppositions.) The post went to Maj. Mohammed Aslam Watanjar, a Soviet-trained tank forces commander who had the reputation of leaning toward Khalq. His importance in the government was highlighted by his concurrent rank of deputy prime minister, coequal with Amin. The fifth position was minister of defense, held by another young Soviet-trained officer, Lt. Col. Abdul Qader, like Watanjar a former Daoud supporter who had turned on his mentor. Unlike Watanjar he was reputed to be politically inclined toward Parcham. Finally, Nur Ahmad Nur, one of the earliest known PDPA members, a member of parliament under the monarchy, and a staunch Parchami, held the post of minister of interior.

It is likely that the listing of these six appointments in the order given was designed to provide a tacit ranking both of the individuals and of their posts. The fifteen appointments that followed, however, seemed to be random, following no logical order of precedence. The minister of public health was seventh, for example, ahead of such prestigious ministeries as finance and justice. In the cabinet as a whole, the Khalqis appeared to have a probable advantage in numbers: a 1976 Khalqi document (Appendix C) mentioned 10 out of the 21 favorably, whereas only six appeared in that same document as pro-Parchami. The affiliations of the remaining five—all three military officers (Watanjar, Qader, and Mohammed Rafiee), plus the civilians Nezamuddin Tahzib and Abdul Quddud Ghorbandi—were evident only indirectly if at all. In the long run all but Ghorbandi opted for Parcham, but in May 1978 Taraki's group appeared numerically stronger. According to Dupree, the Khalqis had a narrow eleven to ten advantage over the Parchamis in the first cabinet.[2]

Khalq's probable capability of mustering a majority in the cabinet as a whole, however, was relatively immaterial. Political power rested mainly with the six top leaders. Here, two totally committed civilian Khalqis (Taraki and Amin) and a military sympathizer (Watanjar) were pitted against two totally committed Parchamis (Babrak and Nur) with their own military supporter (Qader). An even balance, it would seem, had been established at the top of the DRA's political pyramid. Within the party (see

Appendix E), Parcham seemed to have a clear majority in the Politburo and Khalq a narrow edge in the Secretariat.

Such an analysis ignores the fairly basic nature of Afghan politics: what counts is not so much the number of votes as the number of guns at the command of those who cast them. In this respect Parcham, with its supporters holding the key ministries of Defense and Interior, appeared to be in an overwhelmingly superior position vis-à-vis Khalq, which had no comparably armed power base. With Nur controlling the police and Qader in nominal charge of the army, Khalq appeared to be at a politically fatal disadvantage.

Qader, however, was the Inspector Clouseau of Afghan politics, a man whose penchant for blundering in word and deed had blighted his career under Daoud and would very nearly cost him his life under Taraki. (His contingency role as sacrificial goat if the PDPA coup had failed and his prompt removal from power when it succeeded had both been entirely in character.) The leader with the most extensive contacts in the military was the Khalqi Hafizullah Amin, who was also one of the most adept political infighters in the PDPA. It was he who introduced the PDPA military officers to the PDPA Central Committee on April 27, indicating that until that time the identity of the Khalqi military supporters probably had been kept secret from the Central Committee as well as from their Parchami colleagues.[3] Khalq, not Parcham, had the greater influence in the armed forces and hence the greater political power where it counted.

Political hostilities between Taraki and Babrak appear to have reopened almost before the gunsmoke of the coup had cleared. A keen observer might have noted with some surprise that the official account of the coup, published on May 22, 1978, less than a month after the PDPA took power, made no mention of Khyber, Babrak, or any other political leader committed to Parcham at that time. Fulsome praise for Taraki and Amin (and to a lesser extent for Qader and Watanjar) sprinkled its pages. It named many other army officers and Khalqi civilians, but totally ignored known Parchamis. Furthermore, there were obscure references to "political competitors" and "opportunists," with whom Khalq had had to deal in earlier years; to officers who "previously called themselves progressive" but had tried to defend Daoud against the coup; and to voices of cowardice and defeat that had advocated flight to the countryside by Khalqi leaders even as the coup was succeeding.[4] These accusations became explicitly anti-Parcham in later publications, but in May they were only straws in the wind.

On the other hand, as Afghan newspapers began publishing again, photographic and news coverage of Parchami and Khalqi leaders appeared to be very evenhanded. The *Kabul Times* resumed publication on May 4, with the front page being given over largely to photographs of the new

leaders. Thereafter, even though Taraki's was the most common front-page face, Babrak ran him a close second throughout May and seemed to upstage him in terms of contact with influential foreign communist diplomats and officials.

Meanwhile, during May and June, Amin took two brief trips abroad in his capacity as foreign minister: to Havana for a nonaligned nations' Coordinating Bureau conference of foreign ministers and to New York for disarmament talks. In both cases he was photographed at the airport being seen off and welcomed back by Babrak, who, however, must have been disconcerted by the rapidity of the turnarounds. No sooner was Amin off for Havana on May 17 (with a stopover in Moscow to deliver a message from Taraki to Brezhnev) than he was back on May 22; the New York trip was just as fast, with departure on June 3 and arrival home on June 8. Clearly, Amin was cutting his foreign excursions as short as he decently could. The first post-coup showdown between Parcham and Khalq was coming to a head, and his presence was needed in Kabul. (Later accounts were to hold him personally responsible for having cut the ground from under Babrak and Parcham during June.)[5]

The *Kabul Times* photograph of Babrak welcoming Amin back on June 8 was the next to last picture of the Parchami chief to appear in that newspaper. By the end of May the absence of publicity about Parchami officials in general (though not of Babrak in particular) was becoming noticeable. In June Khalqi figures dominated completely. Taraki himself went into partial eclipse during the first week of the month (which may have been when the decisive political battles were fought out), but lesser Khalqis appeared regularly on the front pages. Some Khalqi ministers who were to have important positions under the Parchamis in 1980 were also given front-page exposure during June.

Parchami Defeat and Renewed Plotting

The coup de grace for Parcham was a typically Afghan one: diplomatic exile. Starting on June 27, the first of a number of biographic sketches of new DRA ambassadors appeared in the *Kabul Times*, and as these were published the extent of the Parchami defeat emerged ever more clearly.

The first victim was a little-known figure, Mahmoud Baryalai, whose appointment to Pakistan might have appeared more like nepotism (he was Babrak's stepbrother) than exile. On June 28, however, Dr. Najib (also called Dr. Najibullah) was named ambassador to Tehran. A keen analyst might have noticed certain similarities between him and Baryalai, including authorship of articles for *Parcham* a decade earlier. The posting abroad of two members of the 1977 Central Committee with prior connections to

Parcham was a clear signal that an upheaval was in progress; unless two Khalqi members of that exclusive group had been fired without publicity, the presumed balance of forces in the PDPA had been upset.

Indeed it had. On July 5, Babrak himself and Nur Ahmad Nur were named ambassadors to Prague and Washington, respectively. The following day Abdul Wakil, junior to Baryalai by three years but his classmate at both Habibia High School and Kabul University's faculty of economics, was posted to London. On July 10, the final ambassadorial appointment in this series went to that remarkable Parchami Dr. Nahid Anahita Ratebzad (known most commonly among Afghans by her middle name alone), the only ranking PDPA woman, who was posted to Belgrade.

These appointments later figured in Khalqi literature as a deliberate attempt to remove leading Parchamis from the country and thus avoid an "early party conflict."[6] Four other ambassadorial assignments at about the same time may have served the same purpose but were never defined officially as moves against Parcham: Pacha Gul Wafadar to New Delhi, Faiz Mohammed to Baghdad, Raz Mohammed Pakteen to Moscow, and Eng. Nazar Mohammed to Bonn. All were Parchamis and all but Wafadar were to become cabinet ministers under Babrak. Another set of four envoys named during this general period did not seem to bear any relation, direct or indirect, to the Parcham-Khalq feud. What was perhaps most significant about all these assignments (plus the ministerial appointments made to fill the slots vacated by the departing Parchamis) was the claim that Taraki made them "on the basis of his legal authority" but "in the absence of the Revolutionary Council." He then reported them "on time" to the PDPA Politburo and the Central Committee.[7] The implication is that he took into his own hands the responsibility for high-level personnel assignments that should have been exercised by the Revolutionary Council.

For the time being Parcham appeared to be routed, its leaders dispersed in Afghan embassies around the world. That its leaders did not suffer a more drastic fate was perhaps due to Soviet insistence.[8] With the canny and efficient Hafizullah Amin serving as foreign minister, it is also quite probable that other personnel were assigned simultaneously to these same countries, personnel whose allegiance was to Khalq and whose main duty would be to keep a vigilant eye on the activities of the new ambassadors.

The victory at home needed only to be consolidated by mopping up the remaining pockets of Parchami resistance in the party, a task made easier by Khalq's approximate three-to-one advantage among the rank and file.

In early July there were other announcements indicative of a rearrangement of the power structure. The Politburo voted to enlarge the Central Committee and made other, unspecified, "decisions on the reorganization of the PDPA." Watanjar was moved from the Ministry of Communications

to head the Ministry of Interior and Maj. Sayed Mohammed Gulabzoy took his place. Amin became a secretary of the Central Committee, enhancing his political power.[9] All mass organizations were renamed to include "people's" (*khalqi*) in their titles; for example, the Democratic Organization of Afghan Youth was now to be known as the People's Organization of Afghan Youth.[10] Although the Central Committee inexplicably failed to announce its thirteen new regular and two new alternate members (even in October there was doubt whether it had approved specific names, and the new membership was never made public), the government and party appeared to be running smoothly.[11]

The Khalqis, it seemed, had consolidated their victory; yet by summer's end the government was again in turmoil as leading Parchamis both inside and outside Afghanistan stood accused of nurturing plans for a new coup. In August the story began to break in a fragmentary, confusing fashion; not until late November did a coherent account appear, despite the reams of newsprint already expended on the misdeeds, defections, and confessions of the various alleged conspirators. Implicated in the plot were the six leading Parchami ambassadors (all of whom by then had vanished from their posts and three of whom stood accused of having emptied their embassy's till before departing), the minister of defense (Abdul Qader), the army chief of staff (Gen. Shahpur Khan Ahmadzai), the minister of planning (Sultan Ali Kishtmand), the minister of public works (Mohammed Rafiee), and the director of Kabul's Jamuriat Hospital (Dr. Mir Ali Akbar). Lesser degrees of complicity were ascribed to Central Committee members Abdul Majid Sarbiland, Feda Mohammed Dehnishin, Ghulam Sarwar Yuresh, and Nezamuddin Tahzib. Mohammed Hassan Bareq Shafiee and Suleiman Layeq, though not directly implicated, were deemed partly guilty by virtue of their known Parchami associations.[12]

The plot was an elaborate one. It was scheduled for the Muslim religious holiday of Eid (the end of the Ramadan fast), which in 1978 came in early September, a time when official security presumably would be at its loosest.[13] (To protect their own security, the Parchamis gave no advance word to Dr. Anahita's Democratic Organization of Afghan Women, which also was supposed to play a role in the coup, on the grounds that its members would be unable to keep the secret.)[14] At the appropriate moment, country-wide civilian demonstrations would give Parchamis an opportunity to disarm and detain their Khalqi counterparts; Parchami officers would seize control of key military regiments; a new cabinet would be chosen from among Dr. Akbar's medical colleagues; and the six ambassadors would return from abroad in triumph. All of this was to be carried out simultaneously, according to plans laid in late June just before Babrak was sent abroad. Once the key levers of power were in Parchami hands, the disarmed

Khalqis at all levels would be faced with an ultimatum: cooperate in a new *People's* Democratic Republic of Afghanistan or suffer the consequences. The new regime apparently was prepared to call for support on a broad scale: "The objective was to get together all the dissidents in society . . . This association could be called . . . the United National Front."[15] It was supposed to include such non-PDPA figures as Abdul Walid Hoquqi, a supreme court justice under Daoud, as minister of justice, and even Taher Badakhshi, the leader of Settam-e-Melli.[16]

When the plot finally lay exposed, the Khalqi response was severe: secret death sentences for Qader, Kishtmand, Ahmadzai, and Dr. Akbar; imprisonment for Rafiee; expulsion from the PDPA of these five and the six exiled ambassadors; demotion of the four Parchami Central Committee members to candidate party status; and expulsion of Shafiee and Layeq from the Politburo.[17] No punishment was given other known Parchami ambassadors. They even were allowed to keep their posts, perhaps on the theory that Khalqi security would be best served by having them remain abroad. (If Amin had not previously assigned watchdogs over these diplomatic exiles, he surely would have done so at this time.)

It is in the nature of totalitarian (and particularly communist) regimes to utilize real or imagined conspiracies to rid themselves of opponents of all stripes, including many who may have had nothing to do with the plot in question. The Stalinist show trials of the 1930s set the stage for such postwar East European tragicomedies as the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia and Moscow's own infamous "doctors' plot" purge in 1953, which probably would have claimed as victims Stalin's successors if his own death had not intervened so opportunely.[18] Once an alleged plot has been publicized in a controlled society, all actual and potential opponents of the group in power are fair game, and many have found themselves sharing cells with dissidents of different or even opposing persuasions. One must ask, therefore, whether the conspiracy uncovered by Taraki's security organs in 1978 was really as cohesive as he made it appear or whether he embellished on it merely as a convenient way of getting rid of a broad spectrum of disorganized opposition and discrediting essentially innocent Parchamis. Was his November exposé a reflection of the DRA's real conclusions, based on accumulated hard evidence, or an imaginative effort to stamp a common Parchami brand on all who opposed him? The question is of some importance because it bears not only on the fundamental loyalties of Afghans who may one day inherit leadership roles, but also on the possible complicity of the USSR in Parcham's plotting.

Some early analyses supported the thesis that one or several oppositions were involved. One writer went so far as to allege that in 1978 Qader and

Babrak were "at daggers drawn" and the former was really a "left-wing nationalist" who did not want Afghanistan tied too closely to the USSR.[19] Another was to conclude, sometime later, that in arresting Qader, Akbar, Rafiee, and Kishtmand, Taraki had merely moved against "powerful nationalist Muslim factions both inside and outside the cabinet."[20] These interpretations, while giving occasional lip service to the ministers' Parchami connections, obscure their unswerving dedication to the Soviet Union, especially in the case of Qader, "the top military representative of Parcham at the time of the 1973 coup, and . . . a guarantee of Parcham's influence in the new [Daoud] regime."[21] The three ministers' ideological persuasions should have been quite obvious beforehand, but any lingering doubts were dispelled in 1980 when these so-called nationalists joined the Babrak government. Qader, for example, took over party and government posts in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan that would never be given to anyone remotely tinged with true nationalism: chairman of the Defense and Judicial Commission of the PDPA Central Committee, member of the Revolutionary Council Presidium, and (in 1981) a vice-president of that Presidium.[22] He was also promoted to lieutenant general as soon as Babrak took power. The undeniable Soviet concern about a spillover of nationalism into Central Asia would rule out such honors to any man whose loyalties were in any doubt.

Although Qader's was probably the most dramatic career recovery under Babrak (at one time he was under sentence of death in a Taraki prison), it was by no means the only one. All nine of those ultimately named as primary plotters took over important party and government posts under Babrak's regime. So did the four with secondary and the two with tertiary responsibility. Missing from Babrak's government were General Ahmadzai and Dr. Akbar, both executed. (The latter had little political significance, and his demise received no publicity.) Oddly, neither was named in the final official summary of the plot.

In short, what was first described in the Khalqi press as a kind of Afghan doctors' plot no less fantastic than its Soviet precursor turned out in the end to be a real and far-reaching conspiracy. If the first reports were confused and conflicting, this may have been simply a reflection of a Khalqi quandary on how to handle suspected Soviet involvement in Parchami plans without causing acute embarrassment for all concerned. No mention of Parcham as a faction was made in the Khalqi indictments; until the Khalqis felt they had no other recourse, they may have believed that publicity of the Parchami dimension would do more harm than good and therefore downplayed that aspect. Certainly the sporadic nature of early publicity for what was obviously a crisis of major proportions seems to indicate some irresolution on how to handle the exposé. That the regime felt obliged to reveal more

than it originally wished may be indicated by the complaint in the full indictment of Parcham in November that "these anti-regime and anti-revolutionary activities are still continuing."[23]

Was the USSR involved in the Parchami plot? Certainly it was quick to pick up the pieces when Parcham failed; all six dismissed ambassadors appear to have received asylum first in Eastern Europe and then in the USSR, returning to Kabul in 1980 in the train of the invading Soviet army. There are also some indirect indicators of Soviet complicity with Parcham before the fact. It must be recalled that the intended operation was a highly complex one, involving mobilization of Parchami forces throughout Afghanistan as well as coordination among the Parchami ambassadors in posts that were whole continents apart. Despite preliminary arrangements made as early as June, when all were still in Afghanistan, ongoing coordination would have been needed right up until the time when all were supposed to return simultaneously to Kabul. Would a Parchami ambassador in Prague (Babrak) dare to communicate with his coconspirator in Washington (Nur)? Even if he could trust his own code clerk in Prague, could he be sure that the code clerk in Washington was not Amin's man? Only a secure communications link through some third party could have permitted the necessary pre-coup consultation. (Note that the plot was detected and foiled because of security lapses by Parchamis inside Afghanistan, probably first and foremost by Qader; it took some time for the foreign connection to be established.)

A second indicator of possible Soviet involvement is the rather un-Afghan charity and willingness to cooperate displayed by Parcham. Instead of going for the jugular of their Khalqi opponents, according to the Khalqi indictment they intended only to revert to the status quo ante of comradely cooperation. The use of the term "United National Front" and the apparent intent to enlist the support of Settam-e-Melli and other political forces in the country were both hallmarks of Babrak's political efforts just after his return to power in 1980. That these later efforts had prior Soviet approval—if indeed they were not at Soviet dictation—goes without saying. It is probable that Parchami plans were at least coordinated with Moscow on the earlier occasion as well.

When the plot fell apart, the Soviets concealed whatever chagrin they may have felt. In the immediate aftermath of the September revelations, messages of goodwill from Moscow appeared in the *Kabul Times*, reciprocated in full by the Khalqi PDPA.[24] Two days after the November indictment of Parcham, Soviet Ambassador Alexander M. Puzanov left for Moscow, followed in a few days by Taraki himself and an impressive delegation of Khalqi officials, including Amin and six other ministers. On December 5

official talks were concluded and a far-reaching Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty was signed.[25]

It is only a guess, but the timing of Taraki's detailed list of charges against Parcham in late November may not have been accidental. With the top Khalqi leaders all shortly due to be in Moscow simultaneously, there was a strong incentive for the party to deter any possible pro-Parchami activity in Afghanistan during its absence and also to ensure that the USSR not put undue pressure on the delegation to resolve its differences with Parcham. By specifically identifying each of the Parchami leaders as traitors, Taraki may have hoped to evade both possibilities. If so, he succeeded; the delegation returned on December 7 to a "tumultuous welcome" and resumed its state duties with no indication that Parcham had emerged from its eclipse.[26] As 1978 drew to a close, Khalq had consolidated its power within the PDPA, had cemented its relations with the USSR (until then an uncertain ally at best because of its Parchami connection), and appeared to be in control of Afghanistan's destiny.

Khalq's Unpopular Program

It was a false impression. Even without the internecine struggle with Parcham, the PDPA would have had a difficult time halting the deteriorating political situation in the country. The combined party had constituted only a tiny sliver of the population; with the excommunication of Parchamis at all levels, the remaining Khalqis were neither qualitatively nor quantitatively capable of administering the country. They also failed to exploit an initially favorable political atmosphere. During the last years of his reign, Daoud had become estranged from the majority of his countrymen, and on taking power the PDPA had the opportunity of capitalizing on his unpopularity. The initial relief that much of the population seemed to feel when he was deposed, however, swiftly gave way to resentment, resistance, and then to rebellion when his successors tried to upset traditional Afghan institutions. Furthermore, despite the regime's vigorous efforts to deny its communist affiliations, the rhetoric spouted from the radio and press from the outset was unmistakably communist in its phraseology and was perceived as such by the vast majority of Afghans.

Under the best of circumstances, reform is something that must be approached with extreme care and patience in Afghanistan. Daoud came to appreciate this. Right after seizing power in 1973, he was committed to land reform and many other progressive measures, not the least of which was rooting out bribery and corruption in Afghan society. He soon realized, however, that such fundamental changes could not be achieved by him

single-handedly, or even with the aid of his Parchami friends, without such serious dislocations of society's traditional workings that if he persevered neither he nor his reforms could survive. He sensibly backed off, hoping that the same goals might be achieved over a longer period extending well beyond his own lifetime. His aspirations in this regard were well reflected in the 1977 constitution.[27]

Khalqi leaders also seemed to understand the resentment that reforms would inspire. As Taraki had indicated when describing the Khalqi penetration of the military and the role that penetration had played in the coup, the party did not enjoy a very broad following. To build mass support "might take 30 years, so they decided to take power first and then build their base."[28] Unlike Daoud, however, he seemed to feel that he could bulldoze his reforms through and achieve a kind of post hoc popularity when the people realized how beneficial the program was. In order to get it launched, however, the Khalqis had to avoid the traditional Afghan approval process, acceptance by a loya jirgah, and operate by fiat. Accordingly, during the first seven months of the DRA, the regime issued a series of progressively more disruptive and less popular decrees that eventually left the PDPA an embattled minority confronting an ever more sullen and resentful population.

Decree Number 1, dated April 30, proclaimed Taraki president.[29] This probably would have been accepted by the population, inasmuch as he had the army behind him and hence political power. Besides, Daoud had set a precedent by not calling a loya jirgah to confirm his own takeover of power.

Decree Number 2, dated May 1, named Babrak as vice-president and listed the members of the cabinet.[30] As already noted, it was soon a dated list. Again there probably would have been no serious objection, especially since top-level personnel shifts soon indicated that no post was likely to be held by the same person indefinitely.

Decree Number 3, dated May 14, abolished Daoud's constitution, set up new civil and military courts, and permitted more rapid promotion of civil servants and teachers.[31] The provision for promotions might well have encountered stiff opposition in the tribal areas where there would be few local beneficiaries and where such imported representatives of central power are traditionally mistrusted. Kabul, of course, wished to consolidate its support among just such state employees, through whom it hoped to work its reforms. The inclusion of teachers was an interesting echo of the party's efforts in recruiting support in that profession in earlier years (see Chapter 3).

Decree Number 4, dated June 12, established the new emblem and Soviet-style flag of the DRA and proclaimed equal all ethno-linguistic groups in the country.[32] This was the first decree to omit the initial religious invocation, marking the start of a stiffening government attitude toward the

clergy. On these grounds alone it would not have been accepted in any kind of free vote. The new flag was not unveiled until October. When it finally appeared, its atheistic red and absence of Islamic green produced a mammoth ground swell of popular resentment.

Decree Number 5, published June 14, stripped citizenship from 23 leading members of the Mohammedzai family lucky enough to have survived the slaughter of the clan.[33] Some of the population resented the Mohammedzais, but most Afghans would not have considered deprivation of citizenship an appropriate punishment.

Decree Number 6, dated July 12, 1978, reduced or canceled debts and mortgages owed by smallholders or landless peasants.[34] On the face of it a highly progressive reform, it completely upset the rural economy by failing to provide a substitute for the now-abolished function of the landlord in providing loans to the rural poor. Far from rousing poor peasants to support the government and produce more, it contributed to a swift drop in agricultural production. As a percentage of gross national product, agriculture also declined, from 65 percent in 1976 to 58 percent in 1978–79.[35] The figure fell even more precipitously in subsequent years, when ill-conceived land reform and a general flight from the countryside crippled Afghan agriculture. This reform almost surely would not have been accepted by a majority of rural Afghans.

Decree Number 7, dated October 17, 1978, gave equal rights to women and abolished the bride price, whereby prospective grooms paid a negotiated sum to the bride's parents for the right to marry their daughter.[36] Women were certainly underprivileged in Afghan society (though Dr. Anahita was not alone in achieving success), and the bride price lent more a commercial than a romantic aura to matrimony. Nevertheless, meddling with either aspect flew in the face of Afghan culture, and the decree was deeply resented. Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the feminist reform is that the decree was promulgated after the relatively liberal Parchamis had been banished and the more male chauvinist Khalqis were in power. In any case, the reform was largely ignored by the population at large, and even the party seemed to consider it window dressing; there were no women in the upper levels of the DRA or PDPA at that time.

Decree Number 8, published November 28, 1978, was issued on the same day as Taraki's blast against Babrak, just before Taraki went to Moscow to sign the friendship treaty.[37] It dealt with land reform and was accompanied by a major propaganda campaign that also promoted the formation of agricultural cooperatives. Unlike previous land reform efforts (Daoud had proclaimed one in July 1976 that would have limited a family to 20–40 hectares, the remainder to be bought by the government and distributed to landless peasants by the state), the Taraki decree permitted confisca-

tion without compensation. This flew in the face of Islamic teaching regarding acceptance of stolen property, and many peasants refused to take land proffered to them. (In this they again were emulating the Central Asians of the 1920s, many of whom followed their mullahs' advice to spurn such sacrilegious offerings.)[38] By the time of the Soviet invasion, established farmers (even those with little land) had ceased serious cultivation for fear of dispossession, and investment for future cultivation was coming to an end. Even the new owners were dissatisfied; with a scarcity of seed, fertilizer, and machinery (which big landowners had supplied before the reform), they would be unable to produce enough to pay the taxes on their new property. Violent clashes took place between the army and the rural population.[39] In some cases dead resistance fighters were found with newly issued land grants from the government on their bodies.[40] Land reform was not a success.

The extent to which the Soviets were responsible for these missteps is unknown. They later let it be known that they considered the reforms too rapid and sweeping, but it is hard for them to avoid all responsibility for internal Afghan developments after April 1978. From the very first days of the DRA, an influx of Soviet citizens penetrated all walks of Afghan life. By August there were more than 2,500 military advisers in the country, and Soviet officers reputedly had assumed command positions to the brigade level; by the end of the year Soviet personnel was being attached down to the platoon level.[41] The military contingent was augmented by civilian experts intended to replace technically qualified but ideologically unreliable Afghans. The party itself was apparently under direct Soviet guidance as it shifted from the role of illegal opposition to that of ruling force.[42]

An Afghan émigré noted in early 1979 that "a large number of well-educated Central Asians, mostly Tajiks . . . are playing leading roles in almost all Afghan ministries."[43] This should not have been surprising; the solution had been the same when the USSR was recolonizing Central Asia after that region had achieved temporary independence in the wake of the October Revolution. As an American leftist noted in the 1930s, the very fact that the first Bolsheviks in the area were Russians aroused a good deal of bad feeling and led the Soviets to import "generally tried revolutionists" who were also Volga Tatars, Baku Turkomans, or other non-Slavs more ethnically, culturally, and linguistically akin to the local population. These then administered the new territories from "unostentatious but highly strategic positions, [which] had the desired effect."[44] A half-century later the same technique was being used in Afghanistan.

The Central Asians of the 1920s were not taken in by the subterfuge and launched an armed resistance (the Basmachi movement) that endured well into the 1930s. In 1978 the Afghans reacted similarly, with the first reports of firefights between tribesmen and Afghan army units coming scarcely a

month after the coup.[45] Before two months were out, the first formal resistance group, the National Rescue Front, was formed in bordering Pakistan.[46] As the DRA alienated more and more Afghans, the resistance grew proportionately, branching out into many independent (and often mutually antagonistic) groups. Later, after the 1979 Soviet invasion, the resistance would become almost total, but even in the early stages it had a pronounced effect on Afghan policies, internal as well as external.

In foreign policy, the DRA began with an aggressive posture toward its noncommunist neighbors, reviving first the Pashtunistan conflict with Pakistan. In the campaigns of the 1950s, the Afghans had produced and distributed maps that showed Pashtunistan detached from Pakistan but not part of Afghanistan. Under Taraki, the official wall maps apparently involved "new frontiers" for Afghanistan that included all of the North West Frontier Province as well as Baluchistan.[47] Clearly, the exacerbation of the boundary issue was an intended cornerstone of Afghan foreign policy, an issue that served not only the needs of Afghan internal politics but Soviet foreign aspirations as well.[48]

At the same time, the DRA reopened another international sore. In early July Amin made statements intimating that Afghanistan would not be bound by old treaties with Iran regarding the distribution of water from the Helmand River. Originating in Afghanistan, the river drains into Iran, and both countries use its water for irrigation. Amin's statements provoked a sharp response from Iran, which interpreted the Afghan position as indicative of Kabul's intention to use its Soviet backing to assert itself in the region.[49]

Whatever plans the DRA might have had along these lines were soon set aside as a matter of practical necessity. Far from being an exporter of unrest and revolution to Pakistani Pashtuns and Baluch, Afghanistan soon became a net importer as border tribes began supporting the anticommunist resistance inside the country.[50] By the end of October anticommunist revolts were frequent in the eastern provinces of Badakhshan, Kunar, Paktia, Logar, and Laghman.[51]

The initial DRA response to the resistance was an interesting one that harked back to the days of the Basmachi movement in Central Asia. In the early 1920s, the USSR instituted "permanent conferences" (*postoyannyye soveshchaniya*) in Central Asia as a defense against Basmachi raids. The conferences consisted of an armed militia led by local executive committee chiefs and manned by the most reliable local officials: party secretaries, military commanders and commissars, local secret police chiefs, public prosecutors, chiefs of finance, and government inspectors.[52] On October 8, 1978, the PDPA Politburo announced the establishment of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, apparently the equivalent of the anti-

Basmachi conferences, which were to be made up of volunteer "toilers" throughout Afghanistan.[53] Over the next few months a good deal of publicity was given to the formation of such units in various parts of the country, and although the specific rights and duties of their members and the chain of command remained rather vague (the duties amounted in essence to defense of the revolution by whatever means were deemed appropriate), the implication was that membership in such a committee gave one the right to bear arms and to use them in self-defense.[54] Far from adding to local officials' security, however, government-issue weapons became prima facie evidence for the *mujahideen* (freedom fighters) that the possessor was committed to the DRA and hence deserved the death penalty.[55]

Under these circumstances—a weakened party apparatus, growing internal resistance, an aggressive foreign policy that was recoiling on its designers, and an increasingly insecure bureaucratic apparatus—the suitability of the somewhat otherworldly intellectual Taraki as chief of state was probably being called into question from several quarters. Both the Soviets and Taraki's own colleagues in the PDPA probably considered him less suited for the job than his deputy, Hafizullah Amin. This was a view unquestionably endorsed by Amin himself.

7

The Rise and Fall of Hafizullah Amin

Career to 1979

Kabul is more than a mile above sea level, but the town of Paghman, twelve miles to the west, is about a thousand feet higher. It is perched along the upper reaches of talus slopes that have rotted out of the Paghman mountains rising steeply at the town's back. The alluvial soil is rich by Afghan standards: carefully terraced fields irrigated by summer-long snowmelt from the mountains behind produce grain as well as superb fruits and vegetables. Oaks and Lombardy poplars shade its dirt roads, which are sprinkled with water to keep down the dust in the dry season, a somewhat ostentatious extravagance in arid Afghanistan. Paghman traditionally has been a retreat for Kabul's rich, a haven from the heat, dust, and strong smells of the capital in summer, a place for winter sports when the snows come. Here, many years ago, the royal family built a number of tall, Victorian mansions (in odd contrast to the low, solid, mud-walled native architecture around them). Even before the end of the monarchy these had begun to fall into magnificent decay, conspicuous consumption that somehow went bad.

If Paghman's architecture seems to provide examples of imported Western corruption, its history in the twentieth century is a monument to Afghanistan's national pride and stubborn independence. It was the birthplace

of King Amanullah, under whom the country achieved its final independence from Britain in 1919; a victory arch in the town square commemorates those who fought and died in the war that settled the issue. Some years before, in 1915, it was also the site of negotiations with a joint Turko-German delegation that tried to induce the Afghans to join the Central Powers in their conflict with Britain; the hosts refused, remaining true to their pledge to the British to remain neutral. Later it was the home in exile for the amir of Bukhara, granted asylum by Amanullah after the amir was deposed by the Soviets in 1920. His very presence on Afghan soil remained a sore point in relations with the USSR for many years, but the Afghans would not violate their code of hospitality and asylum by expelling him. Paghman thus symbolizes Afghanistan's traditional resistance to foreign domination.

Finally, Paghman can also reflect Afghan audacity and ferocity. In July 1981 resistance forces surrounded three hundred young army cadets near here and ordered them to join the resistance or face death. Two hundred obeyed the command; the others were killed on the spot. In an attempt to retake Paghman and the captured cadets, disspirited DRA army units, backed by Soviet armor and air power, then fought a pitched battle with the guerrillas, but after three days were forced to withdraw.[1] Skirmishes continued in the area at least through November, with aircraft and artillery being used in unsuccessful efforts to blast resistance forces out of their mountain strongholds. The rumble of artillery was clearly audible in Kabul.[2] The town continued to change hands through 1982, with the resistance in charge more often than the government forces.

It is altogether fitting that Paghman was the birthplace in 1929 (the year of Amanullah's abdication) of Hafizullah Amin, destined to become one of the most revolutionary, most uncompromising, and least loved Afghan rulers of recent history. His only claim on the affections of his countrymen was his refusal, in the best Paghman tradition, to yield to extreme Great Power pressure. In the long run Afghans may forgive him his other excesses for that one virtue. In 1979 it cost him his life.

Amin, a Ghilzai Pashtun like Taraki, was the second son of a minor government clerk, a medium-level civil servant who died when Amin was still very young. As a boy, Amin was able to attend primary school in Paghman thanks to the support of his older brother, Abdullah, a primary school teacher, and to go on to secondary and finally higher education in Kabul. He graduated from the Kabul University science faculty (mathematics and physics department) and became a teacher at the Darul Mualimeen Teachers College in Kabul, working his way up to vice-principal of the school. He then became principal of the prestigious Avesina High School and shortly thereafter, in 1957, earned a scholarship to Columbia University in New York, where he received an M.A. in education. Returning to Kabul,

he was first a teacher at Kabul University and then became principal of Avesina for the second time.

It was during this period that he met Taraki. In 1962, he left Avesina to become principal of Darul Mualimeen.[3] Although his conversion to communism must have been well under way, if not already completed at this time (his return to the teachers college in 1962 may be significant in this regard), he allegedly "became radicalized" only after his return to the United States in 1962, at work-study camps at the University of Wisconsin. He was officially enrolled in the Columbia University Teachers College doctoral program at the time, but he neglected his studies in favor of politics, becoming president of the Afghan students' association in 1963, a group that he endeavored to politicize.[4] One of his U.S. hostesses at the time noted that he took keen enjoyment in weekend target shooting, a skill that he later would find useful.

He returned to Afghanistan by way of Moscow, where he met his close friend Dr. Ali Ahmad Popal, then Afghan ambassador to the USSR but previously minister of education from 1957 to 1964. Amin emerged from this visit to the Soviet Union even more radicalized than before.[5] By the time he got home, the PDPA's first congress had been held and the first Central Committee chosen without him. That did not slow his interest in politics, however. He ran for parliament from Paghman in the 1965 elections, losing by fewer than fifty votes.[6]

In 1966, when Taraki was expanding the PDPA Central Committee and trying to pack it with his own supporters, Amin became an alternate member of that body, achieving full membership in the spring of 1967. In 1969 he won a seat in parliament from Paghman, the only Khalqi to succeed in that or any other such election. Many who knew him say that he adopted Marxism merely as the most effective way of gaining political power, for which he had a driving ambition. More questionable is the allegation that he was also deeply religious, a side of his personality that he never showed openly.

If his purported religious beliefs were well concealed, his ambition was not; twice during his early party career, once before the 1967 PDPA split and once afterwards, he allegedly was demoted from the leadership to rank and file status for "excessive personal ambition."[7] He made a good many enemies in his rise to power, especially among Parchamis. Before the refissioning of the PDPA in 1978, in one of the first DRA publications after the April coup, there is a thinly veiled reference to Parcham during the pre-coup stage as "political competitors . . . [who were] determined in the first place to cut the ground under Comrade Amin's feet in order to isolate him as far as his party work among the armed forces was concerned."[8]

Amin is believed to have had one wife and seven children, though he has

also been credited (probably falsely) with three wives and twenty offspring, one of whom he supposedly married off to Taraki.[9]

Although he was appointed deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs on the first day of the DRA's existence (April 30, 1978), he did not become a member of the Politburo until some time in May, possibly indicating considerable personal opposition to him from the Parchamis. (All other civilians in the first six DRA government positions had been Politburo members since the 1977 Parcham-Khalq reconciliation.) Once Parcham had been disposed of, he became Taraki's adviser on military affairs, and in October he was appointed a Central Committee secretary. In December he was accorded the honor of accompanying Taraki to Moscow to sign the friendship treaty, an important post that, ironically, would figure in his own undoing a year later. Thus, even if the country was in fairly dire straits, Amin himself could look back on 1978 with some personal satisfaction.

DRA Loses Control

The first months of 1979 saw no improvement in Afghanistan's internal stability. Indicative of the government's sense of insecurity were the continued curfew in Kabul (in effect since the April coup) and Taraki's constant military escort. In early January, five thousand tribesmen were reported massing with the intention of occupying Kunar province's capital, Chigha Serai, and the DRA moved in twelve thousand extra soldiers to deter them. Despite the reinforcements, the resistance overran one key provincial fort before the end of the month, and in the fighting five Soviet military officers, no longer just advisers but compelled by circumstance to take up arms, were reported killed.[10]

In February security deteriorated further. The U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs, was kidnapped on February 14, held hostage for a few hours, and then killed when Afghan police tried to force his release. It was a senseless slaying that has never been explained satisfactorily. The abductors' demands on the DRA (they made none on the U.S. embassy) have never been revealed in detail, and each of the various explanations offered by the DRA and the USSR for the crime and their own actions has been more absurd than the last.[11]

Whatever the motivations and identities of the murderers (none of whom survived—those taken prisoner were shot before sundown), the Dubs incident had several politically significant aspects. First, Soviet security officers directed the Afghan police responsible for making the ill-advised charge on the hotel room where the ambassador was being held and where he died. This action was taken over the protests of U.S. officials on the

scene, who tried to persuade the Afghans not to act precipitously—a definitive demonstration of Afghan subservience to Soviet direction.

Second, the Khalqi DRA did not make use of the incident to launch yet another attack on Parcham, which it apparently had every reason to believe was implicated. (A defecting Afghan police officer later revealed that one of the abductors was a Parchami.)[12] In view of the anti-Parchami polemics, which had continued as late as January, their forbearance remains a mystery.

A third factor was the effect that the murder had on U.S.-Afghan relations. Although there was no break, the U.S. presence shrank, aid projects were cut to less than half their previous levels, and the U.S. ambassador was not replaced, his duties being handled by a chargé d'affaires. Washington's influence on the DRA, already weakened seriously after the 1978 coup, dwindled still further, leaving the country open to complete Soviet domination. Afghan official remorse, through apparently sincere (government flags at half-mast and very sympathetic press coverage), could not undo the damage. Whoever was responsible for the assassination, the only apparent beneficiary was the USSR.

Finally, the kidnapping provided an embarrassing illustration of just how weak and ineffectual the Afghan government was. Granted, terrorist acts can occur in any country, but the DRA had been at some pains to convince the world that it was supported by the entire Afghan people. (A corollary embarrassment was the widely reported anti-Khalqi reaction of the Kabul populace when the shooting started: convinced that the gunfire signaled the overthrow of the DRA, ordinary citizens and even officials ripped red insignia from caps and uniforms and rushed to barbers to have their Khalqi-style mustaches shaven off.)[13]

The tragedy in February was followed by a Soviet disaster in March. In the western city of Herat, a sudden popular uprising claimed the lives of between 16 and 40 Soviet advisers and their dependents. The Afghans mutilated some of their victims and carried the heads around on pikes. Order was restored only after several days and the commitment of massive military forces, including air power, armor, and artillery units. Total Soviet casualties for the month in clashes with the resistance were estimated at about one hundred.[14]

At the end of March, with the violence spreading, Amin's career advanced again: he was appointed prime minister. Seven other cabinet shifts at the same time reflected both an increased military influence and a broadening of Amin's own power base (see Appendix F). Brutal but efficient, Amin was probably considered by Afghan officials and Soviets alike to be a better choice for the post than Taraki, whom he replaced. Although Taraki still

retained primacy in the party (the source of all political power), Amin's combination of party and state positions was becoming impressive. The Soviets appeared to want to demonstrate their support concretely: the day following Amin's appointment they sharply increased arms aid, delivering, among other goods, 25 large troop-carrying helicopters that were intended for use against the resistance and presumably would require Soviet pilots.[15]

For its part, the DRA hoped to improve security by concentrating counterinsurgency responsibilities in the hands of a Homeland High Defense Council (HHDC), authorized in March at an extraordinary meeting of the Revolutionary Council and designed to defend the country against "internal and external enemies."[16] The HHDC had nine members, including Taraki as chief; Amin as deputy; the ministers of defense and interior (Watanjar and Mazdooryar); and chief of the AGSA security service (Da Afghanistan da Gato da Satalo Adara, or Afghan Interests Protection Service), Assadullah Sarwari; and four military officers. The following month a tenth member, Sayed Daoud Taroon, chief of the Sarandoy security service, also became a member.[17] (AGSA was an independent security service, whereas Sarandoy was technically subordinate to the police. There was probably a military security service as well. Under pre-PDPA regimes there had also been multiple overlapping security services, military and civilian, keeping watch over the population and each other. They had routinely employed terror and torture, but their efficiency had been low, as indicated by the successive coups.)

Early Portents of Soviet Invasion

Neither the new Soviet military aid nor the establishment of the new council made much impression on the morale of the resistance, which continued to attract Afghan army deserters (soon in whole units, not just as individuals) and to attack government outposts at will. In early April Gen. Aleksey Alekseyevich Yepishev, chief of the Soviet army's Political Directorate, led a military advisory team to the country. Some interpreted this as a move to bolster morale among Soviet military advisers in the country, but others noted that Yepishev had paid a similar visit to Czechoslovakia shortly before the Warsaw Pact invasion there in 1968.

There were several other indicators that the USSR was considering an armed incursion in the spring of 1979. First, in late March the United States found it necessary to warn the USSR against any such move.[18] Second, in late April two Soviet divisions were positioned along the Afghan border.[19] Third, in late May the USSR identified Afghanistan as a "member of the socialist community," a designation that automatically placed the country in the Soviet orbit, potentially subject to occupation by Soviet troops under the

Brezhnev Doctrine.[20] Finally, on June 1 the Soviets announced that a war between Afghanistan and Pakistan appeared to be taking shape and warned that Moscow would not stand idly by in case of hostilities. Tension remained high for more than three weeks: "What is in question," declared an authoritative Soviet journal, "is virtual aggression against a state with which the USSR has a common frontier."[21]

What is especially intriguing about this series of indicators is their unilateral aspect: they are all Soviet, not Afghan, signals. True, Afghanistan at the same time was also warning of possible hostilities with Pakistan, but nothing in the Afghan line indicated that Kabul either expected or desired Soviet involvement. If anything, Afghan policies seemed designed to deter Soviet interference.

From the beginning of April through mid-June, there was an unprecedented series of propaganda declarations by Taraki and Amin. Of the 60 issues of the *Kabul Times* produced during this period, only three failed to carry front-page coverage of one or both of the leaders, whose interviews, speeches, and statements seemed designed only to whip up loyalty to themselves and to the DRA. Particularly from mid-May to mid-June, virtually every speech dealt with internal and external enemies and contained the assurance that regime opponents could never succeed against the monolithic unity of the DRA. Nowhere, however, was there a suggestion that the fraternal assistance of the USSR might be needed to aid in settling security problems.

On the contrary, there was an intimation that Afghan perceptions of the external threat included not only traditional imperialists as defined by the USSR (Americans, British, and Chinese), but specifically Caucasians. The most frequently used term in DRA propaganda to identify the external enemy was *farangi*, the Afghan Persian word for "Frenchman" that in years past had been most commonly associated with the British but had come to encompass all undesirable Caucasian foreigners. It was a catchall term that applied equally as well to Slavs as to Anglo-Saxons. Afghan xenophobia, never far below the surface, could be expected to react with enthusiasm to anti-farangi propaganda and not to be concerned with subtle distinctions between the capitalist and socialist models.

On May 25 Taraki made an especially strong statement that, though buried deep in an otherwise orthodox speech, seemed aimed at the USSR: "We will defend our non-aligned policy and independence with all valour. We will not give even an inch of soil to anyone and we will not be dictated in our foreign policy [nor] will we accept anybody's order in this regard."[22] Taraki did not name any one country as being guilty of pressuring Afghanistan along these lines, but of its neighbors only the USSR was in a position to do so.

Taraki's and Amin's diatribes may also have tied in with an unsuccessful Parchami effort to unseat Amin (and probably Taraki as well, although this was never admitted) in the spring of 1979. Parcham only acknowledged its attempt in an obscure article in the Indian communist press in 1980, although the apparent Khalqi reaction to it—sweeping purges of Parchamis (identified by some in the West as "moderate socialist intellectuals")—was reported widely in the world press at the time.[23] Any such Parchami effort almost surely would have involved the connivance of the USSR, as indeed was speculated at the time and was proven on two subsequent occasions, in September and December 1979, when the Parchamis clearly received direct Soviet aid in attempts to overthrow the Khalqi regime. The Parchami plotting and the concurrent Soviet military activity in all three cases were strikingly similar. The Khalqis themselves may have been nervous about Soviet intentions. In May Amin made a point of denying to Western newsmen that Afghanistan intended requesting Soviet troops, a possible indication of Afghan apprehensions that they might arrive uninvited.[24]

Taken in sum, these indicators, however insignificant individually, seem to show that the USSR was considering a politico-military intervention in May-June 1979 and that the Khalqis were bracing to resist it. Paradoxically, perhaps the best Khalqi tactic to deter Soviet intervention might have lain in a retreat from strictly orthodox Marxist-Leninist policies, in order to win real popularity in the country.[25] There were eventual indications that the Soviets were advising them to slow their reforms and broaden their base of popular support. The Soviet embassy's third-ranking diplomat, Vassiliy Safronchuk, who had moved into an office near Taraki's in order to advise him on a day-to-day basis, apparently urged him to adopt less doctrinaire policies.[26] The Khalqis did, in fact, make some gestures in this direction. In February they tried to mollify the mullahs by staging a huge demonstration to celebrate Mohammed's birthday; in July they backed off from land reform by the simple expedient of declaring it completed. But to retreat too far from socialism would have meant leaving themselves open to charges of deviation, the one unanswerable justification for the military invasion they wished to avoid. Given the hardening Soviet attitude in early 1979, this must have seemed a real possibility to the Khalqi leaders. As a result they tried to be more holy than the Kremlin pope—and their popularity in Afghanistan shrank accordingly.

As the summer wore on, security continued to deteriorate. In late June the DRA had to commit a whole army corps to the fighting around Jalalabad. In July the resistance overran a government outpost. On August 4, a mutiny broke out among troops quartered in Kabul's famous Bala Hissar fort. The revolt was put down only after four hours' fierce fighting that

involved the use of helicopter gunships, probably operated by Soviet pilots. A week later an entire Afghan armored brigade went over to the resistance after slaughtering its contingent of Soviet advisers and those few Afghan colleagues unwise enough to oppose the defection. Two days afterwards fifteen Soviet advisers touring an archeological site near Kandahar were wiped out. In early September the Salang road, Kabul's main land route north to the USSR, was cut.[27]

DRA efforts to control the population by issuing identity cards were cause for a number of serious articles in the press—and for hearty skepticism among those familiar with the country's floating population and variable names. (Afghan surnames are sometimes hereditary, sometimes not; alphabetical listings, a rarity, are usually by first name.) When the cards were issued, there had not even been a census, and when a census was finally taken, even the communist press would later claim that it was completely falsified.[28]

Less amusing were the mass arrests of intellectuals in Kabul in late June (perhaps an echo of the arrests of Parchamis somewhat earlier) and the executions of political prisoners. According to one estimate, some three hundred had died since the PDPA came to power in April 1978. DRA efforts to put the blame on "foreign interference" were not convincing.[29]

Again the instability seemed to have a favorable effect on Amin's career. In a July reorganization he replaced Watanjar as minister of defense (Watanjar reverting to minister of interior) and turned over his foreign office duties to Akbar Shah Wali. Taraki was supposed to take over all decision making on defense, whereas Amin would be responsible only for carrying out Taraki's orders.[30] In fact, however, Amin's power increased considerably. A cabinet shake-up, reported the day after the announcement of his new appointment, was described as being on Amin's initiative. It probably was: three ministers with close Soviet ties but without allegiance to Amin (Watanjar, Gulabzoy, and Zeary) were shifted to less important ministerial posts. Had this game of ministerial musical chairs been carried to its logical conclusion, an Amin supporter, Sahib Jan Sahrayee, would have been removed from the cabinet altogether, but he stayed on as the only Afghan minister without portfolio, an additional support to Amin.

In August a new and significant Soviet military delegation of some fifty officers made an unheralded appearance. Afghan media never acknowledged its presence, a remarkable omission since its chief was the Soviet deputy minister of defense and commander of all Soviet ground forces, Gen. Ivan G. Pavlovskiy.[31] Perhaps the reticence of the media was related to Pavlovskiy's command of Soviet troops in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The appearance in Afghanistan within just a few

months of two of the principal Soviet military figures connected with that event (Yepishev in April and now Pavlovskiy) would be bound to excite apprehensive comment in the West if made public.

The Afghan press seems to have given away the probable date of Pavlovskiy's visit unintentionally. Starting on August 6, Taraki and Amin virtually vanished from public view, only to reappear in their dual personality cult roles on August 15 and 16. This nine-day hiatus in publicity, broken only by two belated reports concerning a brief meeting on August 9 that Amin was supposed to have had with employees of the Finance Ministry, was unprecedented during the time that both leaders shared power. It may also be significant that on the eve of Pavlovskiy's probable arrival, August 4, the headline of the *Kabul Times* read, "We Are Fully in Control of the Situation: Amin," an unusually absurd boast even for that journal and especially for that time, but one that was designed, perhaps, to impress the Soviet visitors.

Given Pavlovskiy's rank and position, it is likely that preparations for the visit had begun well before Watanjar was replaced as minister of defense. Thus it is possible that Watanjar was formally responsible for rendering the invitation. In view of other indications of his collusion, there is reason to believe that the real initiative for the visit lay with Moscow rather than with Kabul. Had matters worked out as the Soviets seem to have planned, Pavlovskiy's presence in Afghanistan would have turned out to be most opportune during the following month.

About the time of Pavlovskiy's visit, the USSR is said to have tried again to induce the Khalqis to moderate their policies and to allow greater KGB involvement in running the secret police and militia. Not surprisingly, the Afghans resisted such suggestions.[32] On the other hand, about three hundred police officers, in three roughly equal groups, appear to have left Afghanistan in July, August, and September for six-month training courses in the USSR; their departure was not noted, but their return, in January, February, and March 1980, was duly publicized.[33]

The Anti-Amin Plot

On September 1 Taraki left Kabul by way of the USSR for a conference of nonaligned nations in Havana. His return route also lay via Moscow, and it was there, on September 10, that he met Babrak for the first time in fourteen months. What transpired between them and the degree to which the USSR was involved in their discussions are still unknown. According to some, Taraki on his own initiative approached Babrak to arrange a new reconciliation between Parcham and Khalq, one that would involve remov-

ing Amin by force and restoring Babrak and the other Parchamis to coequal power.[34]

This explanation, however, reduces the Soviet role to little more than that of a dating service between the two, and it completely overlooks the depth of hostility that had existed between them for so many years. It is far more likely that the Soviets interceded to force a hesitant Taraki into a new alliance with his patrician rival. Even though he by now surely detected in Amin the future usurper of the last bastions of his personal power, Taraki would not have been prepared to set aside his ingrained enmity with Parcham in general and Babrak in particular.

Not too much imagination is needed to reconstruct Moscow's position in any Parcham-Khalq negotiations. First, even with its numerical superiority over Parcham, Khalq by itself did not have the technical expertise, administrative experience in the bureaucracy, or even the simple numbers to administer the Afghan state. The disastrous experiences of the past year had proved this beyond all doubt. Second, Parchami help was essential to make up for these inadequacies. Babrak and Taraki would have to put aside their personal differences and collaborate again. Third, there would have to be a return to the old Parcham-Khalq collective leadership of the first days of the DRA, perhaps this time with some kind of Soviet arbitration mechanism available to settle disputes fairly. Fourth, a scapegoat would have to be found for all that had gone wrong in the country since the Great Saur Revolution, now over a year old. There could be only one candidate with sufficient importance to be a logical culprit for so many high-level misjudgments: Hafizullah Amin. Finally, Taraki would have to return to Kabul alone and, using persons of proven loyalty, arrest Amin for treason. Babrak could then go back to take part in a government of national reconciliation and, together with Taraki, correct all the mistakes of the previous year.

There was probably a military dimension to these discussions as well. The security situation in the country had deteriorated so badly that even after reconciliation there was little prospect that the Afghan army could cope with it. Only intervention by the USSR or other outside military forces could rout the guerrillas, and an appropriate invitation would have to be tendered to legalize this. The fact that a top-level official like Pavlovskiy was still in Afghanistan after a month (Yepishev's visit had lasted only a week) lends some weight to the hypothesis that the Soviets were anticipating such an invitation.

Furthermore, a unique and unusually prescient press article at this time, based on information from "Western and Asian diplomatic sources in Kabul," warned that Soviet military involvement was imminent. Predicting that the USSR was moving toward "direct, broad military intervention," the

article concluded, " 'If you accept the premise that the Russians cannot let Afghanistan go,' one foreign expert said, 'and if you also realize that Afghan institutions can no longer hope to contain the insurrections, the only possible conclusion is that the Soviets come in forcefully.' "[35]

(So accurate is this assessment that it almost appears to be a Soviet trial balloon, designed to elicit potential Western reaction to an invasion. If so, the effort appears to have failed. If diplomats in Kabul were indeed making such predictions, their governments were not listening, for both the Soviet invasion, when it came three months later, and the unusually strong Western response it provoked were as much a surprise, respectively, in Western capitals as in Moscow.)

In order for Taraki to succeed in unseating Amin, he would need the cooperation of loyal military and security officers. This ruled out many who owed their allegiance to Amin, but left available the politically ambidextrous ministers of interior (Watanjar), communications (Gulabzoy) and frontier and tribal affairs (Mazdooryar). All were military men; all had been instrumental in bringing Daoud to power in 1973 and then in deposing him in 1978; and all, though nominally Khalqis, had held aloof from the Parcham-Khalq dispute. This apparent absence of real commitment to either faction, taken in conjunction with the extensive military training that each had received in the USSR, gives grounds for suspecting that their primary allegiance lay with the Soviet Union and not with any Afghan political party. In this respect they would be ideal instruments to carry out a bipartisan (Parcham-Khalq) executive action to remove Hafizullah Amin, who otherwise was too well connected with the military and security forces to unseat. The three ministers were joined by a fourth conspirator, also strongly suspected of being a Soviet agent, whose activities under Daoud are unknown, but who became Taraki's first security chief—Assadullah Sarwari.

The operation was fine in theory, but was predicated on good security and the element of surprise: Amin would have to be caught off guard. For that reason the plan called for Sarwari's security police to assassinate him on his way to the airport to welcome Taraki home on September 11. Unbeknownst to the conspirators, however, Amin had his own man, Maj. Sayed Daoud Taroon, among them in Moscow as Taraki's personal aide in charge of security. Either Taroon or a local informant in Kabul somehow succeeded in warning Amin of the plot a few hours before Taraki's plane touched down, and Amin replaced the security police guards on the road to the airport with soldiers loyal to himself. Taraki's surprise at being greeted by a live and healthy Amin was obvious.[36]

It may be significant that on September 12 heavy publicity was given to a press interview in which Amin emphatically asserted Afghan independence and reiterated denials that Soviet combat troops had been or would be

invited in to deal with the resistance. The interview had been held three days before and provided a most interesting contrast to (and possibly deliberate contradiction of) another article in the same paper that reported on Taraki's meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow. Here the emphasis was on "continued consolidation of close friendly relations and all-sided cooperation" and a "resolute determination for the development of all-out relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in all fields . . . for the purpose of maintaining peace and achieving social progress," including Soviet "solidarity" with Afghanistan in its fight against "conspiracies and forces of imperialism and reaction."[37] The rhetoric went beyond that needed to signal Soviet support for Taraki in his forthcoming effort to destroy Amin. It seemed at the very least to reflect Soviet contingency planning for invasion, if not an actual immediate intention to march.

Amin's Pyrrhic Victory

In any case, Amin was able to foil the plans to remove him but was not adroit enough to capture Watanjar, Gulabzoy, Mazdooryar, or Sarwari, whom he had fired from their state positions on September 12. For the next few days, there was a secret but very tense standoff between the two leaders and their followers, which was finally broken when Amin survived an ambuscade arranged by Taraki with the connivance of Ambassador Puzanov on September 14. Taraki himself was taken prisoner, and on the following day the appointment of three new ministers and a new security chief was announced. No mention was made of the whereabouts—or even the names—of the former officials (who by then had taken refuge in the Soviet Embassy), nor was there any indication that the Great Leader himself (Taraki's standard sobriquet) was in custody.[38]

Ministers could come and go without exciting a great deal of comment, but dealing with Taraki presented Amin with a problem of a different dimension. This was no expendable bureaucrat but the father of the revolution, whose personality cult had reached Stalinist proportions. Disposing of him without serious political embarrassment would be no easy task. Amin solved his dilemma in the short run by having Taraki fall conveniently ill and allegedly ask to be relieved of his state and party functions on grounds of "bad health and nervous weakness." Amin assumed the former leader's duties, and Taraki fell into total political eclipse.[39]

Amin had won his victory, but his position was hardly enviable. There remained only about half of the army's normal officer corps strength of 8,000; the rest had been killed or had gone over to the resistance. Mutinies in DRA forces had become commonplace. The PDPA, which had lost a significant proportion of its membership with the ousting of the Parchamis,

was now riven again as Amin's followers persecuted pro-Taraki holdouts. Insurgency was everywhere; the government could control individual cities by dispatching its dwindling military forces to the most critical danger points, but not even Kabul was safe from insurgent attacks and military rebellions. Afghanistan's economy was in shambles. And looming over all other considerations was the all-too-evident military solution that the USSR might seek to impose if the Afghans failed to set their own house in order.[40]

The connivance of the USSR in the plot against Amin had been underscored by Puzanov's personal involvement. In addition, Amin had, in the person of the surviving Taraki, a political tiger by the tail. If the USSR persisted in its support of the old man, Amin could not very well execute him out of hand. Neither, if he himself wished to survive, could Amin release him. Taraki's death in the shoot-out was widely reported at the time, and Amin himself is supposed to have actively promoted such rumors. Certainly that outcome would have been more convenient politically than being left with Afghanistan's Stalin as a political prisoner.

Meanwhile, the four dismissed officials posed an additional potential threat. They were secure in their Soviet embassy sanctuary, and even semipublic complaints by Foreign Minister Akbar Shah Wali to assembled East European diplomats did not move the Soviets to expel them. (By Afghan standards this was understandable and even praiseworthy: the right of asylum is an integral part of the Pashtun honor code. Soviet denial of any knowledge of the fugitives' whereabouts was greeted with an Afghan disbelief that was both polite and respectful.) Nonetheless it must have been extremely disturbing to Amin to know that such implacable enemies were so close at hand yet untouchable.

Immediately after the September 14 shoot-out, Amin must have been on tenterhooks awaiting the Soviet reaction. To his relief, his appointment as Taraki's successor, announced on September 16, apparently impelled the Soviets to shelve their plans to oust him. On September 17 Ambassador Puzanov called on him and the following day (in an unmatched display of diplomatic hypocrisy) signed the condolence book for Taroon, who had been killed at Amin's side in the shoot-out. The first telegram congratulating him on his inherited leadership, signed by Brezhnev and Kosygin, came on September 19 and was followed by similar felicitations from all quarters of the socialist bloc. On September 18 Bareq Shafiee, the minister of transportation, met with Puzanov to discuss expansion of cooperation in his field. Dastagir Panjsheri, notorious for his opportunism and shifting loyalties, left at about this time for "medical treatment" in the USSR. If this disturbed Amin, he gave no sign. On September 21 he delivered a radio and television address in which he honored DRA friendship with the USSR and other

socialist states but reiterated that Afghanistan would hold to its policy of nonalignment.

This did not appear to antagonize the USSR, which signed new aid and trade agreements with Kabul later in the month and in early October. At about the same time, a U.N. speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko "on the impermissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations" received an understandably enthusiastic write-up and endorsement in the Afghan press.[41]

Perhaps best of all, Pavlovskiy's military delegation finally, after two months, packed its bags and went home in early October. Its departure, like its arrival and activities in Afghanistan, went unmarked in the *Kabul Times.*

Weighing all of these signs and finding that the Afghan people themselves scarcely seemed to miss the Great Leader, Amin quietly did away with him on the night of October 8–9. The announcement of his death, in a small paragraph on the back page of the *Kabul Times*, attributed it to "serious illness, which he had been suffering for some time." The illness, it was later revealed, was lack of oxygen, brought on by the application of fingers to the neck and pillows over the nose and mouth by three members of the presidential guards service ("guards of the people's house").[42] There was no outrage in the world press, East or West, over Taraki's demise.

Amin must have felt somewhat encouraged by this lack of reaction, as well as by other signs of continued Soviet acceptance of his rule: the signing of a natural gas accord with the USSR on October 29; wide-ranging celebrations (with Soviet participation) in honor of the sixty-first anniversary of the Komsomol and the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Society; the opening of a Soviet machine tool exhibit in Kabul; and even the goodwill that Ambassador Puzanov and his wife seemed to be trying to dispense before their departure, an exit hastened by Amin's displeasure over the continued safe haven that his opponents were enjoying in the Embassy. (He had officially requested Puzanov's removal shortly after the September violence; among the placating ambassadorial gestures were Puzanov's attendance at various anniversary celebrations and Mrs. Puzanov's charitable donation to a maternity hospital.)

For his part, Amin responded as best he could. He commuted the long-pending death sentences on Kishtmand and Gen. Abdul Qader to fifteen years' imprisonment and lowered the sentence on Rafiee, as well.[43] He had Afghans celebrate the October Revolution as their very own, which, his propaganda claimed, in a sense it was. In fact, Kabul added with some ideological impertinence, the Saur Revolution of April 1978 was a "creative continuation of the Great October Revolution," a boast that must have caused winces in the Kremlin.[44]

Despite his apparently successful relations with Moscow, his internal security problems continued to mount. Although the press rarely lost its forced optimism, Amin was under no illusions as to his regime's stability. Following up on plans laid in July under Taraki, Amin quickly moved to implement national management of the antiresistance Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, appointing a committee of close associates to oversee the work.

In addition to the ongoing grass-roots resistance, however, Amin was also confronted with organized plots from within and without his regime. In mid-October, nearly simultaneous attempts to topple him by a military unit loyal to Watanjar and remnants of a far-right, ultra-nationalist political group (Afghan Mellat) were put down with bloodshed. The Soviets posed a separate threat. On November 7, the Soviet national holiday, Amin was conspicuous by his absence at the Soviet embassy's party; Puzanov was still in place, and Amin had good reason to treat his invitations with circumspection. Later that month he allegedly turned down an invitation to visit the USSR, probably for the same reason. On December 11 there was another alleged military coup attempt, and rumors circulated that both Amin and his nephew, security chief Dr. Assadullah Amin, had been hit by gunfire. (Assadullah was in fact wounded and was taken off to a Soviet hospital in Tashkent, from which he was returned to face execution in June 1980.)

Afghan propaganda during October and November reflected regime problems without, of course, directly admitting them. One of Amin's first acts had been to rename the dreaded secret police, AGSA, whose chief Assadullah Sarwari he had replaced on September 15 with Aziz Ahmad Akbari. (Akbari was replaced in turn by Dr. Assadullah Amin in November.) The new organization was called the Workers' Intelligence Institute (Kargari Astekhbarati Muassessa; KAM), and Amin solemnly promised to ensure that it would not violate legality as its predecessor had. Along the same lines, he promised an end to "one-man rule" and deplored the evils of personality cults. Then he proceeded to use KAM as even more of a terror weapon than AGSA had been and built a cult around himself that rivaled Taraki's.

Reinvigorating older propaganda themes, Amin promoted party membership by publicizing the distribution of membership cards. Amnesty was offered to all Afghans who had fled abroad, and the papers soon carried articles about happy villagers returning to joyous welcomes after difficult times as refugees. Along the same lines, there was a steady diet of press releases on the freeing of prisoners from jails all over Afghanistan. A new constitution was promised, and a 65-member constitutional commission was named. In apparent contradiction to subsequent Parchami accusations about the narrow base of Amin's rule, the commission had members from all

walks of Afghan life. Also indicating a broader outlook, support for religious freedom and "profound respect" toward Islam were proclaimed. Agricultural progress was hailed, including the membership of 160,562 peasants in 1,080 cooperatives. (Naturally these claims were no more reliable than the supposed abolition of the personality cult or of secret police excesses; but then, neither were subsequent Parchami claims on the loyalties of a "broad base" of the Afghan population.) On the military front, a steady series of releases played up individual soldiers and whole units who were voluntarily extending their service so as to "defend the revolution" and "fight bandits." Clearly, the fight against the resistance was going poorly.

The Western press was beginning to take the resistance more and more seriously, as, apparently, were the Soviets. Journalists began to refer to "Russia's Vietnam," noting that for all the firepower the Soviets were supplying the DRA, antigovernment forces controlled 24 of the 28 provinces. The advent of winter made no difference in the government's fortunes. Probably for that reason, Amin launched a massive propaganda campaign in support of his Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, now unified in a National Organization for Defense of the Revolution (NODR), headed by himself. From December 1 on, there was a steady outpouring of feature articles on the NODR, with fillers reporting the formation of regional and local units throughout the country. These were accompanied by Amin's personal exhortations to his countrymen to support the government. Pictures of enthusiastic volunteers appeared in most newspaper issues.

Under the circumstances the campaign seemed straightforward enough at the time, but later an unusual aspect emerged. After the Soviet invasion in late December, not a single word appeared in the Afghan press about the committees or the NODR. It was as if they never had been. Several questions come to mind in connection with the swift blossoming and withering of the NODR. Was Amin trying to build a parallel political organization, separate from the PDPA and under his personal command, outside Soviet influence? It is certainly a possibility, although the Soviets never accused him of it, even when castigating him for all manner of crimes that he did not commit. Did he intend that the armed NODR units be a deterrent to a Soviet invasion? If so, it was a pathetic and futile gesture. Was the whole campaign built on words alone, with the real NODR only a skeletal organization? It seems unlikely that this alone would cause it to be abandoned; later front groups would have at least as long a prenatal propaganda existence.

In the light of available evidence, any or all of these could have had some bearing on the brevity of the NODR's existence, even if none supplied the full answer. On balance, it seems likely that Amin was trying desperately

to improve morale and popular faith in the DRA government, as well as putting on a show of resolve in fighting the resistance. For their part, the Soviets probably wanted no part of the NODR after the invasion because they surmised (correctly) that any weapons or munitions that were not under the tightest organized security would quickly fall into the hands of the resistance. It may be significant, however, that Amin and the entire staff that created the NODR either were executed or vanished without trace under the Babrak regime.[45]

The Soviet Invasion

Meanwhile, as autumn faded into winter there was an ominous buildup of Soviet military strength on the Afghan border. Western analysts were divided over whether this presaged a massive invasion or merely a Soviet intention to deploy some troops in support of Amin's demoralized forces. Later Soviet and Parchami allegations that Amin himself had invited Soviet troops to put down the resistance were greeted with some skepticism in the West, especially after the first of these troops had executed their alleged inviter, paving the way for a massive invasion and occupation.

Nevertheless, available evidence suggests that Amin *did* issue some kind of request for military assistance, though not, of course, for an invasion and occupation. What he wanted was a truly "limited contingent" of Soviet troops, which he envisaged as being used in small-scale engagements and detached from the Soviet army chain of command. As early as October he allegedly had approached Soviet authorities in this connection but had tried unsuccessfully to extract an agreement that such troops be put under Afghan command or, at the very least, under some joint Soviet-Afghan staff.[46] He is also said to have warned the Soviets specifically against any large-scale involvement of their troops, correctly predicting that this would unleash a massive nationalist backlash by the Afghan population.[47]

For their part, the Soviets are said to have come back with an offer to provide 5,000 troops if Amin would agree to let them build their own military bases. Amin refused.[48] As late as the morning of December 26, Amin is supposed to have told an Arab journalist that the Soviet Union respected the independence and integrity of Afghanistan and that it had decided not to press for permanent bases. "Soviet forces were coming to help him put down the rebellion."[49]

If these accounts are correct, Amin anticipated and welcomed the arrival in early December of the first battalion of Soviet combat troops at Bagram air force base, some forty miles north of Kabul. He would not have shared the consternation of Western observers who were upset by the unit's combat equipment, which was clearly heavier than that used by troops

stationed at the base since July 1979. He probably welcomed the arrival of a second combat battalion in the following weeks, although by now international reaction to these clear portents of direct Soviet armed involvement in the antiresistance struggle was beginning to be heard. Only after one of the two battalions flew into Kabul airport on Christmas Eve and secured it for the massive airlift of Soviet infantry and armor that followed did Amin probably begin to suspect what was happening. By late on December 26 he was probably certain: early the next morning the thousands of political prisoners at Pul-e-Charkhi jail were told to fall out for a special emergency message from Amin at 2:00 P.M. But when that time arrived, the prison loudspeakers broadcast only some music and an uninspiring party lecture by a minor official. The prisoners returned puzzled to their cells.[50]

Was the announcement arranged without Amin's foreknowledge by the Soviets in expectation that by that time they would have extracted a predated formal invitation from him for their troops' presence? Perhaps. It seems inconceivable that they would have undertaken the invasion without making every attempt to secure such an invitation, which would have legitimized the invasion under either the 1978 friendship treaty or Article 51 of the U.N. charter. There still would have been an international outcry, but it would have been limited largely to Western governments and soon would have faded. In the absence of an invitation, the Soviet military presence became nothing more nor less than an invasion and occupation of a small, backward nation by a superpower. If the distinction was fairly minor for Afghans who were under Soviet fire, it was enormous in the eyes of other nations, especially those of the Third World.

Or did Amin schedule the announcement in order to rally his countrymen, even including political prisoners, to resist the Soviet invasion? That, too, is a logical interpretation. By this time Amin was desperate and would not have hesitated to call on political enemies for help. (And, being Afghans, they probably would have responded positively, reserving the revenge they wished to take on Amin for a later date.)

On the evening of December 27, a large explosion at the Ministry of Communications provided the signal for Soviet troops all over Kabul to swing into action. By a combination of guile, surprise, and overwhelming force (and seizure of all communications facilities), they disposed of Afghan military resistance in the capital in short order,[51] though Afghan defenders offered spirited if brief opposition in such installations as Radio Kabul. (According to the radio's president at the time, Sayyed Fazl Akbar, who later defected, many of the employees at first assumed that the attackers were mujahideen, not Soviets. The following day scores of party cards were found behind radiators and clogging the toilets, thrown there by panic-stricken party members.)[52]

A special Soviet assault unit surrounded Tapi Tajbek Palace in the Darulaman complex, where Amin and his family had moved on December 22 apparently for security. His bodyguard put up a fierce resistance for several hours and died to a man, along with Amin and his immediate family, when Soviet forces finally overcame them. It is not unlikely that Amin was personally responsible for some of the Soviet casualties; he was, as his American hostess had observed many years before, an enthusiastic marksman.[53]

Amin died, and there were few who mourned his passing. He had been a ruthless dictator who had tried to impose his will on his countrymen by torture and the firing squad. In his methods he did not differ except in degree from some other Afghan autocrats, but there was a difference. Where precursors like Abdur Rahman Khan had accepted native Afghan values from the outset or like Mohammed Daoud had adapted themselves to the existing system, Amin remained committed to alien values. In this he was perhaps more akin to Amanullah, but in a far more brutal context. Having taken this course and used the only methods that could have imposed it on an unwilling populace, there was no turning back for him; retreat would have meant political suicide.

Amin was probably tempted (and perhaps intended) to take a Titoist route of national deviation, but that was closed to him; so massive was domestic resistance to his regime and all it stood for that his only chance of survival lay with Soviet assistance. Thus, in spite of the unmistakable Soviet effort to unseat him in September 1979, Amin knew he could not choose his own road. Like Daoud he may have thought he eventually could manipulate the Soviets to his own advantage, but in the short run he had few options.

Nevertheless, he rendered his country one final service, one that outweighed much of his evildoing: he denied the Soviets the invitation they so desperately needed to legalize their invasion. And he went down fighting. Afghans may eventually forgive him much for that. He was true to his Paghman heritage.

8

Soviet Occupation

Explanations and Justifications

As a history of a ruling communist party, this book properly should have ended at the conclusion of the last chapter, for by the close of 1979 the PDPA no longer ruled Afghanistan; the CPSU did.

Soviet control was said to be vested in a powerful CPSU Afghan task force formed as early as October 1979 and consisting the Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, KGB chief Yuriy Andropov, and CPSU Central Committee International Department secretary Boris Ponomarev. All were members of the CPSU Politburo except Ponomarev, who was a candidate member. Leonid Brezhnev, in poor health at the time, was not directly involved.[1]

In late autumn 1979 there were already three to four thousand Soviet civilian advisers in Afghanistan, and in the first month after the military takeover their numbers more than doubled, easily surpassing total PDPA membership.[2] Afghan bureaucrats, including those of ministerial rank, found that even the most routine of orders had to be approved and countersigned by the ubiquitous Soviets.[3] In fact the roles of adviser and advisee had been reversed; in 1980 it was the Afghans who advised (if tolerated to do even that) and the Soviets who decided. Typical was the new role of Vassiliy Safronchuk, now assisted by eight subordinates: no cable could be sent from

the Foreign Ministry without being approved (if not actually written) by one of this group.[4] The situation was essentially the same in other ministries.

Although far cruder and more domineering than necessary, Soviet participation in running the DRA was a necessity. In the wake of the invasion, they had placed Babrak Karmal and his fellow Parchami exiles in power. Although they tried to give the new government the appearance of a Parcham-Khalq coalition, it was clear to PDPA members that Babrak's faction was now dominant. Meanwhile, by December 1979 overall PDPA membership had fallen to about two to three thousand, of whom only about six to seven hundred were loyal to Babrak.[5] Parcham was a beleaguered fraction of an unpopular communist minority of a discredited intelligentsia in an overwhelmingly conservative, nonliterate, and increasingly hostile population. Its strength was hopelessly unequal to the task of running the country, especially because about 80 percent of the remaining military officer corps was committed to Khalq.[6] Even if there had been Parcham-Khalq harmony and a passive population, the PDPA could not on its own have governed twelve to fifteen million people without outside assistance. And the Afghan population was far from passive. It was a measure of both the depth of the Soviet involvement and the security needs it provoked that Babrak was assigned a Soviet cook, bodyguard, and driver.[7] In a land whose traditions include assassinating unpopular leaders by stealth as well as by more open means, these were sensible precautions.

The Soviet position was complicated further by the obvious absence of any prepared justification of their invasion and investiture of Babrak. This is perhaps another indirect indication that the Soviets had been unprepared for Amin's refusal to acquiesce to either action; with his approval, both would have been legal and Amin himself might have been allowed to disappear conveniently, perhaps into Libyan exile like his Ugandan namesake.

As it was, the various stories and justifications of Babrak's return were hopelessly at odds with each other and with logic.[8] As best his movements can be reconstructed, he was out of the country until late on January 1 or early the next day. His radio speech announcing his takeover of government and party functions was broadcast on Radio Kabul's frequency at 8:30 P.M. on December 27 from a Soviet transmitter in Tashkent. (Due to the resistance of Afghan security guards at Radio Kabul, Soviet forces were unable to silence the station until about 9:00 P.M. and for a time the two stations' broadcasts overlapped.) Some hours afterwards, the identical broadcast, apparently a tape recording, was played over Radio Kabul, but of Babrak himself there was no sign.[9]

Whether Babrak was in Afghanistan as early as October 1979, as he later asserted, is open to question. Some such claim had to be made in order

to justify his supposed rallying of Central Committee and Revolutionary Council support, an effort that, he said, resulted in both bodies' agreeing "almost unanimously" that Amin was a traitor who had to be replaced.[10] Both then allegedly chose Babrak as future chief of the party and state, and they also (like Taraki and indeed Amin himself before them) asked the Soviet Union for help in defeating the anticommunist resistance.[11] The virtually simultaneous occurrence of these two events—the internal upheaval that resulted in Amin's death and the external Soviet intervention—was pure coincidence according to the Soviet version; they had taken no part in the internal Afghan political struggle.[12]

The Parchami and Soviet accusations against Amin included both collusion with the CIA and a plan to establish a noncommunist government with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of an émigré group based in Pakistan. The Pakistani government would also collaborate in the plot.[13] None of these charges had any basis, but they made the most of the meager resources available to Soviet propagandists. The CIA is always a safe target, no matter how wildly improbable the tale; Hekmatyar, an unpopular, maverick émigré leader whose troops sometimes engaged in firefights with other resistance forces, was a man of whom other émigrés could believe the worst; and Amin's efforts to secure a visit by Pakistan's foreign minister (delayed by bad weather shortly before the invasion) had been well publicized.[14]

All this did not add up to a conspiracy, and the basic contradiction remained: Why declare that Amin had invited in even a limited Soviet force while insisting that he was about to destroy communism in Afghanistan? It made no sense, but the legality of the Soviet intervention hinged on an invitation to the USSR by the Afghan chief of state, who until his death on December 27 was indisputably Hafizullah Amin. In early 1980 the question of Amin's invitation was played now one way, now the other, in Soviet and DRA propaganda.[15]

To solve the contradiction, in 1981 Babrak gave what may become the ultimate official version. He had returned secretly in October 1979 and, with the aid of some four thousand workers who had received "training in arms," had overthrown the "illegal" Amin government, which had seized power from and slain Taraki. It was then Babrak's "legal leadership" of the country, not the pseudo-leader Amin and his gang, that had requested the Soviet intervention on about December 17.[16] (One is reminded of Ghulam Nabi Charki's 1929 expeditionary force, with its mixture of real Afghans and disguised Soviet troops; in fact, however, the 1979 overthrow of Amin was a purely Soviet military operation.)

The new version, however, still did not resolve the legal issue. Babrak's expulsion from the party and dismissal from the state apparatus took place under the still "legal" Taraki regime, in late 1978. The party constitution

(see Appendix B) would have required Babrak to pass through all stages of membership, including a minimum of four months as a probationer, merely to become a rank-and-file member; readmission to the Central Committee could only come thereafter at a party congress or by two-thirds approval by the other committee members, a clear impossibility in the Taraki Central Committee, much less the one dominated by Amin.

Party and State Purges

An examination of the changes in the PDPA and DRA apparats (see Appendixes E and F) when Amin's rule gave way to Babrak's illustrates the point. At least six Central Committee members who spanned Taraki's and Amin's administrations (Amin himself, Jauzjani, Hashemi, Katawazi, Misaq, Wali, and Waziri—over a third of the identified members of Taraki's Central Committee) give mute but convincing evidence of their opposition to Babrak—all died or disappeared when he took over. Earlier, when Amin seized power, he dismissed those whose loyalty he doubted and packed the expanded committee (now 31 members) with men he trusted, apparently erring in only two cases. (The personal commitment to Amin of Guldad and Noorzai, who survived to serve in Babrak's Central Committee, must be suspect). The political careers of no fewer than seventeen other identified Central Committee members under Amin terminated abruptly with the death of their leader. Together with the holdovers from Taraki's regime who also vanished, the committee's political casualty list came to over 75 percent.

The situation in the Revolutionary Council was similar, but is harder to judge because the total membership and the longevity of individual careers are more difficult to ascertain. It appears that under Taraki a vote might have run eleven for Amin, nine for Babrak, and three could have gone either way. Under Amin, the vote would have been a certain fifteen for him and possibly eight for Babrak. The change in ministerial assignments under the three leaders (see Appendix F) also illustrates the extent of the various turnovers and Babrak's lack of a power base under either Taraki or Amin. Babrak's appointment of some nineteen new Central Committee and 34 new Revolutionary Council members must have come as a shock to the surviving Khalqi members of those bodies. It must have been especially bitter to them that among the new cabinet members there were two who were resurrected from Daoud's "feudal" government (Jalalar and Faiz Mohammed), whereas only one (Danesh) survived the socialist transition from Amin to Babrak. These dusty statistics mask elements of human tragedy. Of Amin's Central Committee, six are known to have been executed and seventeen simply vanished. (In 1982 they were alleged by some

to be imprisoned in relative comfort in Kabul.) Only seven of Amin's Central Committee, however, are known for certain to have survived the political turnover.

When the makeup of Babrak's government became known, superficial analysis made it appear that the Soviets had dictated a restoration of the old Parcham-Khalq balance at the ruling levels of party and state administrations. If anything, it appeared that Khalq might have a slight numerical edge, although not nearly as much as its approximate three to one advantage in the party at large might have warranted. Soviet pressure there certainly must have been. How else could one explain the appointment as Babrak's first deputy of former security chief Assadullah Sarwari, the reputed torturer in 1978–1979 of Babrak's second deputy, Kishtmand?[17]

But neither Sarwari nor most of the other non-Parchami PDPA officials were as committed to Khalq as Babrak's clique was committed to Parcham. The backgrounds of those commonly labeled as Khalqis in the Babrak government (see Appendix D for selected biographies) bespeak political opportunism (Panjsheri), professional specialization and thus aloofness from the interparty squabble (Sarwari, Dost, Arian), and/or probable primary allegiance to the USSR rather than to any Afghan faction (Sarwari, Gulabzoy, Watanjar, Mazdooryar). The last four had received asylum in the Soviet Embassy when Amin overthrew Taraki and thus owed their lives to their protectors. If they had not been recruited as agents before, they likely achieved this status soon after. To their numbers might be added Zeary and Danesh, who, alone among the 1980 leaders, had been unwaveringly and outspokenly pro-Khalq throughout their long careers, and whose continued political survival when Parcham returned to power may have been due to quiet Soviet intervention.

By contrast, most of the Parchami members of the Babrak cabinet and Central Committee were active in the anti-Khalqi struggle. Six of the top-ranking government and party officials were former ambassadors indicted and punished for plotting against Taraki: Babrak, Dr. Anahita, Nur, Wakil, Baryalai, and Najib. Another three (Pakteen, F. Mohammed, and N. Mohammed) had been given ambassadorial posts at about the same time and, though not specifically implicated in the anti-Khalqi conspiracy, were probably suspect in Khalqi books (with good reason) of being Parchami sympathizers.[18] Faiz Mohammed had been known as a Parchami since his days in the Daoud cabinet.

The three nonparty ministers had held important positions under Daoud in the same ministries they now administered. How close they were to the PDPA is hard to say, but at least one, Mohammed Khan Jalalar (commerce), has long been suspected by Afghans and Westerners alike of being a Soviet agent.[19] The other two, Fazel Rahim Momand and Moham-

med Ibrahim Azim, were privileged members of the Kabul bureaucracy under Daoud, a socio-professional profile more typical of Parcham than of Khalq.

The effort to portray the Babrak regime as a moderate coalition that intended true independence as well as an even mix of Khalq and Parcham was obvious not only in the Afghan press but in foreign communist outlets as well.[20] Some of the new appointees who seemed to be noncommunists were persons with close prior affiliations with Parcham. The new adviser to the Ministry of Justice, Dr. Abdul Walid Hoquqi, was a name familiar from the Daoud era and for his brief appearance among those accused of anti-Khalqi plotting in 1978. Ghulam Jailani Bakhtari, minister of agriculture under Daoud, with no previously acknowledged PDPA connections, was appointed an adviser to the Prime Ministry; the 1976 Khalqi document (see Appendix C) identifies him as Babrak's first cousin and a loyal supporter whose house was used for Parchami meetings in the 1960s. Other newly appointed non-PDPA advisers had credentials dating back to the liberal experiments of the late 1940s, including Abdur Rauf Benawa, Mir Mohammed Siddiq Farhang, and Abdulhai Habibi.

In short, the Babrak state and party apparats were not the carefully balanced coalition that many outsiders perceived and that DRA propaganda tried so hard to pretend they were. The network of Parchami allegiances and organization remained intact, abetted by some crypto-Parchami independents, whereas Khalq had been decapitated organizationally first by Amin's purge of pro-Taraki elements and then by the Babrak-Soviet eliminations of leading Amin supporters. Those few Khalqis who retained top-level party or state positions were not organized and had to tread very softly, currying favor with personal and professional Soviet contacts and counting on Khalq's numerical superiority in the party to force some degree of Parchami accommodation. The new Parcham-Khalq reconciliation was no less fragile than its predecessors had been.

Soviet and DRA Politico-Ideological Dilemmas

As 1980 progressed, the Soviet intervention became as much of a political disaster within Afghanistan as outside it. Besides economic and strategic concerns, what politico-ideological considerations influenced the Soviets to invade? Oddly enough, they did not march in, as allegedly claimed by Babrak and Dr. Anahita in early 1980, to "spearhead the country's 'socialist revolution'";[21] if anything the Soviets wanted to blunt it. As previously noted, the Khalqis were far more orthodox than the Parchamis ("plus octobriste qu'Octobre" according to one French savant), but their very revolutionary zeal, in the Soviet view, was what had brought

Afghanistan to the verge of collapse. In 1979 mounting public opposition threatened to sweep away not only their immediate reform program but the entire PDPA and all it stood for.[22]

This fact, from the standpoint of ideology and doctrine, confronted the Soviets with a dilemma. As noted in the last chapter, they had referred to Afghanistan as a member of the socialist community in mid-1979, but since then had avoided the claim. Their reticence implied regret at avowing such close kinship so fast. To call Afghanistan socialist was not only a travesty of objective truth, but also, given the manifest unpopularity of socialism among Afghans, complicated the military pacification of the country. What the Soviets wanted was the benefit of a secure ally on their southern flank, ready for exploitation as a platform for further expansion, but without the provocative socialist label.

On the other hand, sending Soviet troops to secure a "national democratic revolution" implied a whole new definition of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Henceforth would the USSR intervene in support of national democratic as well as socialist regimes?

The question remained moot despite an unsuccessful effort to sidestep the issue. An unsigned article in the January 18, 1980, issue of Moscow's *New Times* listed support by foreign communist parties for the Soviet invasion. Although most other paragraphs were sourced to individual parties, one in particular was not. It concluded, "To deny [military] support to the Afghan revolution . . . would have been to doom it to defeat, which would have been a serious blow to the entire communist and national liberation movement."[23]

Some Western analysts interpreted this paragraph as an authoritative exposition of the CPSU position and as an extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine to encompass direct Soviet military participation in wars of national liberation.[24] That judgment may have been premature, for there has been no follow-up claim from the Soviet side. Time will tell whether and for how long the Soviets' painful experience in Afghanistan will daunt at least this aspect of their imperial aspirations.

The ideological underpinning for the ensuing retreat from socialism was to void the earlier description of the Saur Revolution as a socialist one ("continuation of the Great October Revolution"). "Afghanistan will not see socialism in my lifetime," said Dr. Anahita in 1981, contrary to her reported position the year before. "That will be for the younger generation of Afghans."[25] Not only was the Saur Revolution now identified as a national democratic revolution, but an effort was made to show that the USSR had never considered it anything but that. Many of the dislocations under Taraki and Amin (for example, in the field of land reform) were attributed to their desire to rush into socialism against Soviet advice.

Even in the West, Amin's falling out with the Kremlin (and by implication the invasion that unseated him) was occasionally ascribed to a quasi-theological argument on communist doctrine. "For the root of the disagreement between Amin and the Soviet Union was that the latter wanted the PDPA to admit that the Afghan revolution was a national democratic revolution and not a socialist revolution."[26] Amin, however, according to those who knew him, had little real concern with ideological niceties and was perfectly capable of putting any appropriate label on the revolution so long as it kept him in power; he certainly would not have committed suicide, in effect, over a matter of definitions. For its part, the Soviet Union would scarcely have launched its invasion, with all its enormous political, economic, and psychological costs, for the sake of semantics. On this trifling matter agreement would have posed few problems if it had been genuinely sought.

Another alleged area of contention between Amin and the Soviets was "broadening the base" of political support for the government. The Soviets are supposed to have wanted the PDPA "to form a broad national front in which *it would share power* with other groups; to drop its radical policies [emphasis added]."[27] Although, as discussed below, both Amin and Babrak gave some lip service to promoting nonparty front groups, no totalitarian regime can afford to share real political power with any group outside its own immediate control, a political axiom of which the Soviets are obviously and keenly aware. It is unlikely that they would have made any such recommendations to Amin. Only when rebellions against the DRA became too obvious and embarrassing to ignore was their alleged advice to Amin on this matter leaked to the Western press.[28]

Currying popular support by dropping the more radical reforms was another matter. This indeed appears to have been Moscow's advice, but Amin could not be expected to follow it; such behavior would not be in his country's tradition. Most modern Afghan leaders (and especially Amin) have tried unsuccessfully to emulate the autocrat Abdur Rahman Khan (see Chapter 1). Abdur Rahman imposed unity on his country and preserved its independence from hungry neighboring Great Powers through a combination of common sense, political wiliness, and unhesitating brutality. Amin sought to use these same qualities in carrying out his avowed intention of driving Afghanistan into twentieth-century socialism without delay: "If we had waited to follow the same class patterns [as in the West] or [hoped for] a working class revolution through a national democratic bourgeoisie, then we would have followed such a long and thorny road that [it would have] required not only years but even centuries."[29] His Khalqi colleagues apparently agreed: "They decided that if they wanted to wait until they had

public support it might take 30 years, so they decided to take power first and then build their base."[30]

Given native Afghan values, Amin was absolutely right: for generations to come, Afghans will not freely choose Marxism-Leninism under its own or any other label. Amin could not have watered down socialism far enough to suit the population without fatally corroding his own iron grip and (in all likelihood) enraging the Soviets with his revisionism. For all the talk of the "national democratic" nature of Babrak's Soviet-run regime, in 1979–1980 the USSR would not have tolerated anything but a firmly pro-Soviet, single-party, authoritarian state. Within that framework, it is not surprising that no answer was found to the probem of the DRA's unpopularity with its citizens.

Babrak's Palliative Programs

Babrak tried. From the outset of his rule he made an obvious effort to gain popularity by backing away from socialist formulations and priorities. In his first speech (preceded by an Islamic invocation), he passed along his congratulations to various segments of the Afghan population in a decidedly un-Marxist order:

> Muslims of Afghanistan, Sunnis or Shiites, pure and pious religious scholars and leaders of the country, heroic soldiers and officers of the homeland, national traders and national men of the capital [capitalists], patriotic landowners, hardworking artisans, brave clans and tribes of Afghanistan, fugitive shepherds and nomads of the homeland, government officials, vanguard intelligentsia and the youth

and only then

> working men and women, peasant men and women.[31]

It seemed clear that, at least in the short run, Parcham was prepared to set aside traditional Marxist class priorities in the interests of practical politics.

Babrak and the Soviets tried to curry favor with the population in other ways as well. The hated Soviet-style red flag was replaced with a more orthodox black, red, and green banner, whose only bow to Moscow was a small red star ("for good luck" according to the official line, avoiding all mention of the Soviet connotation).[32]

In April the "fundamental principles" of the DRA were published and hailed as an interim constitution that would provide guidelines until a real

constitution could be composed. Consisting of ten chapters and 68 articles that deal with all aspects of government and government philosophy, and running on for some six thousand words, the document is remarkable for its total avoidance of references to socialism.[33] The first sentence of Article 1 proclaims that the DRA is an "independent, democratic state belonging to all *Muslim* working people of Afghanistan [emphasis added]," and Article 5 guarantees that the DRA will ensure "respect, observance and preservation of Islam as a sacred religion" (albeit only so long as religion does not "threaten tranquility and security of society").[34] The principles also envisage support to capitalists, individual traders, and other bourgeois elements. Later DRA propaganda claimed that these principles were being realized in significant government aid to private industry and trade during 1981.[35] In many respects the principles paralleled Daoud's 1977 constitution. Nevertheless, there was no weakening of the PDPA's monopoly over political power. It was the only legal party, and the Revolutionary Council, as the "supreme state power," was clearly intended as a rubber-stamp body like the USSR's Supreme Soviet. As before, it was to convene briefly on a semiannual basis to approve all measures taken by the Presidium, which was composed mostly of Politburo members.[36]

Apparently to conceal the reversion from an avowedly socialist revolution to a national democratic one (a most unorthodox regression from the Soviet standpoint and one that might set dangerous precedents if made too explicit), the Babrak regime was termed a "new evolutionary phase of the great Saur Revolution."[37] No reference was made to socialist attributes previously claimed by Taraki's and Amin's administrations.

The rhetoric was matched by deeds that should have won popularity. Most political prisoners were released from the Pul-e-Charkhi jail within days of the new regime's coming to power, although the goodwill the regime hoped to gain was dissipated when relatives who came to fetch inmates found that some were still being held and others had been executed clandestinely during Amin's and Taraki's reigns. Later, a series of amnesty programs was instituted in order to persuade Afghan refugees in Pakistan to return and to draw the teeth of the resistance. (Similar programs under Taraki and Amin had been unsuccessful, despite propaganda claims to the contrary.)

Some previously confiscated property was returned to its original owners; even valuable land in Kabul previously leased to the United States' AID mission and then taken over by the government was returned to its private Afghan owners. *Pravda* reported that the DRA "fully recognized the farmers' rights to own land and to pass it on to their heirs."[38] When these measures failed to produce the desired effect, the regime began to retreat on the whole question of land reform. In summer 1981, the following categories

of citizens were allowed to own land in excess of legal maximums: military officers, tribal leaders supporting the DRA, "those who develop mechanized agriculture and sell their products to the DRA," and returnees under the amnesty program. The state would repay, in installments over a twenty-year period, beginning in 1986, any member of these groups who had already suffered confiscation of property. Peasants whose sons volunteered for military duty would have priority in receiving lands confiscated from others.[39]

As new government appointments were announced, DRA propaganda highlighted nonparty achievers: of 191 recipients of government positions between March and May 1980, 78 were pointedly identified as nonmembers of the PDPA.[40] Although statistics did not bear out the claim, the government stated that "in some cases . . . the number of non-party men has been much higher than those [*sic*] of party men."[41] In 1981 the DRA seemed to be trying to win adherents by expanding the number of responsible party jobs. The 28 Afghan provinces are traditionally administered by governors, but in May 1981 "secretaries to the provincial committee" were named and, by their order of listing in Afghan publications, seemed to outrank the governors. This would indeed be in line with Soviet practice, where a party position is more significant than its corresponding state office, but one might expect the two to be merged, especially when the party ranks were so thin already.

In an effort to placate the military (both because of the need to bolster morale in general and because pro-Khalqi sentiments there needed to be offset), Babrak issued numerous promotions and doubled all military salaries. By the beginning of 1981, he was resorting to such morale-building tactics as bestowing exaggerated decorations, starting with fourteen colonels and generals who were given medals for unspecified roles in the new "evolutionary" phase of the revolution.[42] No matter what measures were taken, however, the military was an unpopular profession. Press gangs roamed the streets of the larger towns, rounding up underage draftees, and by the middle of 1981 even citizens who had fulfilled their military obligations were being recalled for an extra year of service. The latter group was paid either 3,000 afghanis per month (about $65—far above most people's wages) or the equivalent of their civilian salary, whichever was higher. It was not a popular occupation even with this incentive, but in swift succession the regime exempted students and teachers, then truck and bus drivers, possibly in an effort to attract people to these even less popular occupations.[43]

Students, possibly in the belief that merely attending government schools signified submission to the regime, boycotted the educational program and joined the resistance; enrollment reportedly fell from 4,000 at Kabul University in 1980 to 700 in 1981.[44] Teachers, tasked by the govern-

ment with inculcating socialism in the nation's youth, were killed by the mujahideen if they obeyed or arrested by the police if they did not. Truck and bus drivers suffered heavier casualties than combat troops in the initial post-invasion period, falling victim to violent resistance ambuscades that destroyed men and machines indiscriminately. (Later, however, the risks of their profession became more apparent then real; the mujahideen relied largely on hijacking for resupply of staple goods and soon came to realize that these could be secured only if the rolling stock and its drivers were maintained in good operating condition.)

Whether Babrak's various mollifying gestures, if taken in the absence of a Soviet military occupation, could have won him enough popularity among Afghans to hold him in power must remain an academic question. It seems most unlikely, if only because Taraki and Amin had so aroused the population, that any doctrine even remotely associated with Soviet communism would have been unacceptable. The anti-DRA movement was already a serious problem before the Soviets invaded; after they arrived, the government could count on the support of only a small fraction of the population.

The details of the Afghan people's struggle against the DRA and the Soviet occupation are outside the scope of this book. Suffice it to say that the fight has reached all walks of Afghan life and found expression in all ways open to a subjugated people, most of them violent. Within a year it had led the Soviets to adopt classic occupation techniques: the country was divided into seven military districts, each with a Soviet military commander and Afghan political commissar.[45] At first there was no reflection of these in the Afghan press, but during fall 1981 various issues of the *Kabul New Times* mentioned seven Afghan "chiefs of zone," the euphemistic title of the commissars.

Although the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution appeared to have died with Amin, the Babrak regime in early 1980 issued calls for volunteers to join a militia later named "Defense of the Revolution battalions."[46] The battalions do not seem to have been any more successful than their predecessor in controlling the resistance.

The initial confidence displayed by the Soviet press regarding the new regime soon began to waver; in July 1980 *Pravda* acknowledged that a recent PDPA plenum had been devoted to "the tasks of the party and state in intensifying the struggle against counterrevolution."[47] In August the Soviet army relieved its Afghan allies of their antitank and antiaircraft weapons; too many were falling into the hands of the mujahideen.[48] In September the minister of tribal and frontier affairs, Faiz Mohammed, was ambushed and executed by villagers he had gone to bribe.[49] By the fall of 1980 Afghan papers were referring to "resistance groups" of party youths

leaving for combat duty at "the front," a most revealing choice of terminology, implying a regime under siege deploying its last reserves.[50]

Meanwhile the anti-DRA resistance was augmented by mass desertions from the army, whose numbers had shrunk from about 100,000 to perhaps 25,000 by the end of 1980.[51] By late 1981 Radio Moscow and the usually authoritative *Literaturnaya gazeta* both admitted that armed clashes were occurring on an ever wider scale. Stubborn strongholds of resistance like the Panjshir Valley and Paghman, to say nothing of more remote mountain gorges, continued to hold out against Soviet armor and helicopter gunships.

Despite bonuses and incentives for extending military tours of duty, plus the use of press gangs to round up underage recruits, Afghan army strength remained at the twenty to thirty thousand level. High-level civilian defections during October and November 1981 alone included the head of the Afghan textile board, the chief editor of Afghan television, a high court judge, the director general of the land reform administration, a professor of political science at Kabul University, and the director of the First Political Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[52]

Unresolved Parcham-Khalq Conflict

One might have assumed that the outpouring of Afghan hatred against the Soviets and their PDPA surrogates would at last have induced Parcham and Khalq to make up their differences, if only as a matter of survival. It had no such effect.

Although the Khalqi leadership had been all but wiped out when Amin fell, the lower and middle-level Khalqis remained in personal contact and maintained a sense of cohesion. They still outnumbered the Parchamis by a considerable margin, especially in the armed forces, and retained a fine contempt for what they viewed as Parchami revisionism. They were, of course, adamantly opposed to Parcham's usurpation of key positions, and they resented the inclusion in the Babrak government of non-PDPA figures as advisers and even ministers.[53] They also were infuriated by the treachery involved in Amin's downfall, and despite their uncompromising devotion to Marxism-Leninism, they resented the Soviet military invasion and occupation that had enabled Parcham to return to power.[54]

For its part Parcham had to accommodate itself to the twin political realities of Soviet insistence that the dispute with Khalq be suppressed and of their own numerical inadequacy to run the country without Khalqi aid. This did not mean, however, that the Parchamis had forgotten or forgiven the Khalqis for the persecutions suffered under Taraki and Amin. Even after preliminary vengeance had been visited on Khalqi leaders, there were

numerous other scores to settle at all levels of the party, including a few survivors at the top. Sarwari, for example, the torturer of Parchamis during his incumbency as Taraki's secret police chief, had escaped immediate retribution because he was a Soviet favorite and an enemy of Amin, but his former victims could not be expected to grant him absolution on those grounds. At lower party levels the Khalqi superiority in numbers was offset by the high-level protection given to Parchamis, but no matter how evenly these two factors balanced out, the enmity between the two groups was unaffected. Their capabilities might vary, but their intentions remained constant and implacable.

In the early stages of Babrak's regime, this conflict was largely suppressed, being reflected only indirectly in the warped mirror of party propaganda. In March 1980, for example, Babrak addressed a conference of Afghan army commanders in which he emphasized the "monolithic unity of the party," a fairly clear indication that nothing of the kind existed.[55] In April there was a report that activists in Kabul had met "to fight factionalism," and for the next month there were revealing appeals to democratic centralism, a reliable indicator that party discipline was breaking down.[56]

In May Babrak attempted to replace seven Khalqi army commanders in the field with Parchamis, but the incumbent officers simply sent the would-be replacements back to Kabul. So impotent was the regime that it took no disciplinary action against the rebellious Khalqis.[57] This act of defiance does, however, seem to have stimulated the Parchami leaders into taking action against those under their immediate control, and in June the government press announced the executions of thirteen Amin supporters.

The first list of ten included Amin's brother and nephew, the confessed murderers of Taraki, and the suspected murderer of Mir Akbar Khyber; soon after, a second list of three, all former cabinet ministers, was published.[58] Then came a report that the ranking Khalqi in the government, Assadullah Sarwari, had gone to Moscow for "medical treatment," which apparently lasted until he was posted to Mongolia as ambassador two months later.[59]

These announcements probably triggered the first of three Khalqi military coup attempts that reportedly occurred in June, July, and October 1980. Certainly the harder Parchami line appeared to move rank-and-file Khalqis from mere words to action, and the Parchamis replied in kind. Although it was hard to distinguish between casualties inflicted by the resistance and those suffered in the intraparty conflict, during June about ten PDPA officials of both persuasions were being killed per night in Kabul. In July the rate jumped to fifteen.[60] These figures are probably exaggerated—certainly, the party could not have sustained such casualties for long without evaporating completely—but that each faction was enthusiastically

settling scores with the other on a regular and murderous basis was too widely reported to be dismissed as rumor.

Also in July a wholesale Parchami purge of Khalqi officials virtually shut down the government, leaving its remaining functions more than ever in the hands of Soviet advisers. The purge may have been induced by the discovery of a coordinated Khalqi plot, involving military units throughout the country, which Soviet forces were able to detect and thwart only at the last moment.[61]

The only Soviet reference to these events was a statement that the PDPA had obliged all party groups "to close ranks, ensure the unity of party members, achieve the abolition of 'groupism' (*gruppovshchina*) and splitting activity . . . [and] ensure party discipline, right up to the removal of the guilty from the party, no matter how high their posts."[62] Babrak was to echo this again in November, when he warned party dissidents that they faced expulsion if they continued factional activities.[63]

Even with Soviet support, the regime must have been very close to collapse during the summer of 1980. By autumn it seemed to have regained a measure of shaky control, although there was another apparent Khalqi coup attempt in February 1981.[64] Meanwhile, reports of collaboration between DRA officials and the resistance multiplied,[65] which could only have heightened internal mistrust and insecurity among the dwindling ranks of loyal DRA functionaries.

In early 1981 there was a suggestion that the PDPA had fissioned again, with Parcham divided into pro-Babrak and pro-Khyber wings and Khalq split between pro-Taraki and pro-Amin groups.[66] Certainly the latter division would be a logical development. Whether or not the deceased Khyber continued to have any following, later reports indicated that there was bad blood of long standing in the Parchami leadership between Babrak and Kishtmand.[67]

In June 1981 the Revolutionary Council and Central Committee were expanded, with fifteen new members added to the former and seventeen members or alternates named to the latter. In communist practice this often heralds a purge of unreliable elements, and indeed a simultaneous shake-up in the Revolutionary Council Presidium resulted in the naming of six new members to that body and the dropping of three. Nur was appointed president of the Revolutionary Council in place of Babrak, and Arian became his deputy. Kishtmand took over the post of prime minister from Babrak. The vigor of the disputes over these personnel adjustments was indicated by reports of a gun battle on June 1 between Parcham and Khalq within the presidential palace.[68] The casualties, if any, were never made public.

Even by late 1982 the political significance of the DRA reorganization

was not clear. Perhaps it had none, or perhaps whatever plans had been laid were set aside for reasons the government thought best to conceal. In view of Soviet administrative domination of Afghanistan, perhaps questions of party unity and state reorganization are inconsequential. After two years of Soviet occupation, neither the DRA nor the PDPA had any independent viability. No matter what organizational changes or reforms they might introduce, the Afghan people would tolerate neither if they had the choice. Whatever measures Babrak might undertake, he could not remain in power without Soviet military support.

9

The Changing Face of the PDPA

From the outside of any political structure, only the personalities at its pinnacle are clearly discernible. Under regimes pledged to democratic centralism, with all power flowing from the top, subordinate personalities tend to blend into a faceless mass, transmission belts for party policy but scarcely its driving force. The PDPA is no exception to this rule, and information about its middle and lower levels is limited. Nevertheless, its rank and file as well as affiliated front groups merit some study if only to help determine how well that transmission belt functions. Also, tomorrow's PDPA leaders (assuming the party has a tomorrow) will be found among today's lesser lights. What is the size and composition of the pool from which these leaders will be drawn?

Party Size

Estimates of the PDPA's size have differed so widely that it is impossible to give even an approximate figure with complete confidence. The best one can do is to establish general parameters and identify probable trends. Not only has the membership fluctuated considerably as each new leader purged his rival's adherents from the party and added his own, but there

have been incentives for the PDPA and the Soviets to inflate membership statistics so as to improve the PDPA's claim to legitimacy.

Aside from a January 1979 claim of 50,000 members, the PDPA in its first years in power was reticent about its size. In March and April 1982, however, various Afghan official sources began giving seemingly precise (if slightly contradictory) figures for the party's strength: "over 70 thousand" (Babrak to a BBC correspondent);[1] "exactly" 62,000 (Dr. Najibullah to a Czechoslovak journalist);[2] "63,000 members and candidate members" (Nur in a domestic Radio Kabul broadcast);[3] and "62,820 full and candidate members . . . a gain of 21,700 since August 1980" (report of the credentials committee of the PDPA conference in March 1982).[4] These figures cannot be verified, however, and all seem high.

Some Western sources, particularly Agence France-Presse, have also consistently given what appear to be inflated estimates, ranging up to 100,000 in early 1982 (higher even than the Afghans' own official statistics, released shortly afterward).[5] Most noncommunist sources, however, have portrayed an initial party membership of around 5,000 at the time of the Saur Revolution, with a subsequent see-saw growth to a maximum of perhaps 11,000 in 1982. There have been some indirect indications from Afghan and Soviet sources that these figures come closer to reality than the official ones. In a speech in December 1981, Babrak stated that 10,000 new members had been recruited in the past ten months; in April 1982, he declared that "the youth and new members form more than half the party's strength."[6] If both statements were true, this would imply an upper limit of under 20,000 members.

In a speech in February 1982, Babrak referred to the "several thousand original and probationary members" of the Kabul city PDPA organization as constituting "the biggest part" of the party at large. Had the whole party numbered 60,000 or 70,000 members, he would have been more likely to refer to its Kabul majority as "tens of thousands."[7] Similarly, *Pravda*, which hardly ever understates a helpful propaganda statistic, referred in February to the "thousands-strong [not ten-thousands-strong] army of party and candidate members."[8]

Finally, Amin is alleged on the one hand to have purged up to 60 percent of the PDPA[9] and on the other to have jailed 4,000 (or, alternatively, to have shot 1,000 and jailed 2,000).[10] If those so persecuted constituted 60 percent of the party, then the membership at the time Amin took power would have been roughly 5,000–6,500, and by the time he was killed it would have fallen to 2,000–2,500. After Babrak's return, assuming the surviving 2,000–4,000 prisoners still retained enough interest in politics to rejoin the party's ranks, the membership could not have been much over 6,000; later party figures

given only as multiples of this unstated base ("two and a half times during the last two years" in February 1982)[11] translate into a membership of only 10,000 to 15,000 in 1982. If so, the lower end of the range would seem to be the more likely, in view of Khalqi casualties and defections during the invasion, which would have lowered the 1980 base even further.

Even accepting the most optimistic of the official statistics in 1982, the party would have represented no more than a half of one percent of the population; if the lowest figures were accurate, the proportion drops to less than a tenth of a percent. Furthermore, the official figures included both candidate and full members and never specified how many fell into each category. There may well have been an embarrassingly high ratio of candidate to full members, revealing the headlong pace of party expansion and a heavy dropout rate among candidates.

Although there are no statistics to verify various stages of the party's growth and retrenchment, one can deduce at least the probable shape of the membership curve from known factors.

April–June 1978. This was a time of enthusiasm and optimism, before the full significance of the revolution sank in and resistance began to build up. There was probably a steep growth in party membership during the DRA's first months, tempered only by the party's possible hesitation to accept new members en masse.

July–December 1978. With the defeat of the Parchami faction, the expulsion of its leaders, and the discovery of its coup plot, the PDPA's Khalqi leaders had reason to be cautious about taking in new members, but growth probably continued at a modified rate. Popular enthusiasm was wearing off, however, and the quality of candidates would have begun to decline.

January–September 1979. The buildup of resistance, rebellions in army units, and the massacre of Soviet civilians in Herat clearly demonstrated popular resentment against the regime. Party growth must have leveled off or even declined.

September–December 1979. Amin's administration saw a precipitous drop in party membership as he purged it unmercifully of Parchamis and Taraki supporters.

January–June 1980. Despite arrests, expulsions, and resignations of Khalqis following the Soviet invasion, the party probably registered some modest growth. In its drive for legitimacy and wider popular support, it appeared to welcome any new volunteers, and opportunists who believed the Soviet invasion could crush the resistance might have seen career opportunities opening up. How many of these succeeded in joining, and to what

extent they may have outnumbered those who quit in disgust over the invasion, is unknown. It is safe to assume that, regardless of their numbers, the quality of the new recruits again declined.

June 1980–June 1981. Little if any growth was likely during this period. The resistance was gathering strength, the Soviets had proven incapable of dealing with it, and party members, especially outside the larger towns, were vulnerable to assassination. The continuation of the Parcham-Khalq feud took its own toll, and the attractiveness of a party career must have been minimal.

June 1981–June 1982. A crash program to recruit new members seems to have been launched in the latter half of 1981. As with all official campaigns of this nature, there must have been a target plan and with it strong incentives to falsify recruitment statistics in order to demonstrate plan fulfillment. An exchange of party cards in the first months of 1982 gave an opportunity for expelling unrepentant Khalqis and other unreliable elements, but in purely numerical terms there was probably a moderate growth in party membership.

(Figure 1 shows the wide divergence of estimates of PDPA strength, together with a generalized growth curve inferred from the above factors. The minimum figure of about 5,000 in early 1982 is based on the reported existence of 1,656 primary party cells, each of which by statute had to have at least three members.)[12]

Rank and File

Even assuming that the recruitment drive of 1981–1982 was as numerically successful as the party claimed, the quality of its membership unquestionably deteriorated with the influx of the newcomers. At least until 1973, when Khalq began intensive recruitment in the military, the party was made up almost entirely of dedicated intellectuals, people who had willingly suffered degradation, exile, and imprisonment for their beliefs in the prerevolutionary period and were ready to make further sacrifices to see that their beliefs were translated into socioeconomic reality after the revolution succeeded. They were prepared to be unpopular in this endeavor, accepting the people's wrath as merely another sacrifice on the rough road to the progress their Marxism-Leninism both defined and promised.

But that very idealism also led them to try to attract people into the party who were very different from themselves, and the party's unpopularity guaranteed that those who heeded their call were not Afghanistan's brightest or best. In its 1981–1982 intensified membership drive, the party concentrated on workers and peasants and especially on soldiers with worker or

Figure 1

Changes in PDPA Membership, April 1978–August 1982



*Based on reports in the *New York Times*, *London Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *Far Eastern Economic Review* or deduced from fragmentary free world data.

†Includes candidate members (about 50 percent in 1982); some figures were extrapolated from percentage growth claims.

§Based on other free world periodicals.

peasant backgrounds. The requirements for their entry into the party were eased: only two (instead of three) full members' recommendations would be required; only two (instead of three) years' prior service would be required of the recommender; and the candidate himself needed to spend only six months (instead of one year) as a probationary member before attaining full membership.[13]

The focus on workers appeared to get results. From April 1980 to April 1981, 25–30 percent of the new party members were "workers, farmers, soldiers, and other toilers."[14] The figure for workers and peasants the

following year was 38 percent; in the army, 60 percent of new party recruits had worker or peasant backgrounds.[15] (Higher figures of 50 and 75 percent were also occasionally quoted, but they included elements from other classes, like artisans.)[16]

As a corollary, the party also became younger, for the recruiters directed their most intense efforts at servicemen, most of them draftees. The party statutes of March 1982 gave eighteen as the minimum age for party membership (twenty if the candidate had not been a member of the Democratic Organization of Afghan Youth [DOAY]), but the publicized statistics of party membership included candidate members (minimum age seventeen) and perhaps even candidates for candidate membership. The joining process, and hence one's inclusion in the party's statistics, might begin as early as age sixteen.[17]

The background of the rank and file of necessity was much more peasant and bourgeois than proletarian. In a country where the industrial working class is only about 40,000, the number of proletarian candidates is obviously limited. On the other hand, about 85 percent of Afghanistan's population live in some 22,800 villages, and it is from this pool, consisting largely of farmers, artisans, and small traders, that the party (or any other pan-Afghan institution) must replenish its ranks. The typical remote Afghan hamlet is not likely to generate spontaneous socialist enthusiasm, however, nor—given the pervasiveness of the armed resistance—is it safe in such places to reveal any pro-socialist opinions at all. Thus the recruitment drive seems to have been limited largely to city dwellers and to rural conscripts or volunteers for army, police, or security service duty.[18] Such new PDPA members may have satisfied the statistical demands for more "toilers" in the party, but they did not improve the overall quality of its cadres. Most recruits and even NCOs were functional illiterates, capable perhaps of learning proper Marxist responses by rote but with little grasp of—or interest in—applying the doctrine to solve national problems. Furthermore, they seemed to have absorbed, along with the requisite minimum of Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, the pro-Khalqi or pro-Parchami prejudices of their recruiters. Their predominantly rural backgrounds made them generally more receptive to Khalqi than Parchami blandishments, doubtless helping the Khalqis preserve their majority in the party at large.

It was not surprising, therefore, that calls soon began to be heard for eliminating "shortcomings" in new recruits, for strengthening "control, discipline, and party unity," for doing away with "fractionism and factionalism . . . the atmosphere of dispersion, convulsion, and distrust . . . illegal actions like chantage [extortion], blackmail, and . . . pressure."[19] There was little, however, that could be done to improve membership quality. As the resistance continued to gain strength and prestige, the government lost

correspondingly, and those who had been dragooned into its controlling party became ever less reliable. When fear of retribution by the resistance outweighs fear of the authorities, the timid quietly change sides; when a career in the opposition offers more prestige, authority, and glamor than one in government, the capable and ambitious defect. In the end only the least capable remain loyal. A political Darwinism leads to the survival of the fittest in the popular cause of the resistance and to survival of the generally least fit in the stultifying, unpopular government bureaucracy. Babrak's arch statement to a BBC interviewer that the PDPA was "not like your parties where a person can be a member even if he comes from the gutter" had a hollow ring.[20] Had any of the PDPA's founders been born a generation later, he almost surely would have chosen the resistance over the conformity of state service in the first years of the DRA's existence.

Front Groups

Perhaps in recognition of the party's tarnished image and the impossibility of attracting the country's best human resources to it, the DRA founded an all-encompassing National Fatherland Front (NFF) "to assimilate a large number of talented, experienced, and patriotic people who have not been member[s] of any party. Previously it was only the party men who were supposed to run the government and this fallacious concept proved wrong."[21] The NFF's real purposes were to demonstrate a nonexistent public enthusiasm for the regime, to establish pools from which future party cadres might be drawn, and to serve as an auxiliary element of party and state control over the rest of the population.

Taraki's administration had tried to take credit for manipulating various Afghan groups and for forming its own during Daoud's time and before. For example, it claimed pre-revolutionary infiltration of the Afghan boy and girl scouts, sports clubs, and other youth groups as a prelude to forming the DOAY. Similarly, a Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW) was supposed to have been set up in mid-1966, followed by organizations for workers and peasants. In Kabul alone, membership in the DOAY (temporarily named the People's Organization of Afghan Youth during Babrak's exile) was supposed to have numbered 1,800 in the pre-revolutionary period and 4,000 by June 1978. Its avowed mission was to train future PDPA cadres.[22] Despite the alleged long organizational background of all these groups, however, they appear to have played almost no role in supporting either Taraki's or Amin's regimes, and the glowing accounts of their activities and membership must be viewed with skepticism.

The concept of an all-encompassing NFF was not a new one but harked back to the Parchami plot of summer 1978 and to a Khalqi proposal a year

later. In its first version, described in Chapter 6, it was called the United National Front, a group allegedly proposed by Parcham as a means of uniting all progressive forces in Afghanistan and eliminating PDPA factionalism. It died aborning when the 1978 Parchami effort to unseat Taraki failed. The next incarnation had the same name and received brief publicity in July 1979 under Khalqi auspices. It looked suspiciously like a Soviet-sponsored endeavor, perhaps promoted by Safronchuk. In addition to the groups already mentioned, it included such tiresomely familiar Soviet clones as unions of writers, journalists, artists, peasant councils, and similar organizations, "to name just a few."[23] (The one exception was the inclusion of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, an organization with no known contemporary Soviet counterpart.)

Babrak first announced the 1980 Parchami umbrella group in his initial live speech to the nation on January 2, 1980, but despite ongoing propaganda on its behalf nearly eighteen months passed before a formal NFF founding congress was held in late June 1981.[24] The belated congress attracted 945 delegates and resulted in an organization encompassing the PDPA, trade unions, the DOAY, the DOAW, the Union of Journalists, the Union of [agricultural] Cooperatives, the Union of Writers, the Union of Artists, the Organization of Peace, Solidarity, and Friendship, the Economic Consultative Council of the DRA, the Council of Scholars and Clergy, the Jirgah of Tribal Representatives, and any other individuals from the age of fifteen who might be left over. It was an impressive list of contributing members, presided over by that jack-of-all-PDPA-trades, Saleh Mohammed Zeary, and including in its executive council some token noncommunist figures. These, however, did little more than provide unhappy, high-profile targets for resistance assassins, and in 1982 neither the NFF nor its constituent organizations were effective outside Kabul, despite their claims to large membership rolls.[25] Within a month of the front's founding one of its ranking noncommunist members on the Executive Committee, retired general Fateh Mohammed, was assassinated in Kabul; ten days later his counterpart in Kandahar was also killed.[26] Whatever genuine enthusiasm the state propaganda organs might have drummed up for joining the NFF must have flagged at this time.

In one sense, the failure of the NFF and its constituent subfronts to become true Afghan establishments can be laid to the murderous efficiency of the resistance in the countryside. In another, however, that very resistance domination was due to the DRA's own violation of firmly rooted Afghan political traditions and institutions as outlined in the discussion of the jirgah in Chapter 1. With its demand for unquestioning obedience to all decisions taken by the group, the jirgah philosophy bears superficial resemblance to the democratic centralism propounded by the CPSU and

fellow communist parties. It thus becomes extremely attractive as a potential means of economic, social, and political control, but its democratic essence is even more basic than its demand for discipline.

The Babrak regime's Fundamental Principles recognized the jirgah's importance, describing the loya jirgah as the eventual "highest organ of state power of the DRA"—but one that could not be instituted until "conditions are ripe for free and secure elections to it." Until then the Revolutionary Council was to run the country.[27] Late in 1981, the Revolutionary Council's "draft law on local organs" attempted to institute village, district, and city jirgahs modeled closely on local government institutions in the USSR.[28] Perhaps these organs were envisaged as a step toward the eventual convocation of a loya jirgah that would legitimize the Babrak regime. It appeared as if the Soviets and Babrak felt they had achieved enough control to make such a move feasible. If so, they miscalculated badly. As of fall 1982 there had been no known follow-up on the jirgah proposal.

At the root of the Communists' error lay a fundamental difference in political philosophy between true democracy and its perversion in a Leninist society. Essentially the Soviet concept of democracy involves merely mobilizing mass support for, and implementation of, decisions taken at a higher level. This philosophy emerges clearly in the Revolutionary Council's draft law on local organs, which for all its apparently democratic machinery for the election of delegates, provides for complete party and front group control over the nominating process (Article 20), leaves the choice of personnel for the local executive committee in the hands of higher state organs (Article 36), and stipulates that a high commission appointed by the Revolutionary Council must approve election results (Articles 23–25).[29]

Middle Ranks

The Soviet and Parchami belief that Afghan pride and independence could accommodate to such a rubber-stamp role must have been shaken by the undisciplined behavior of delegates to a party conference in Kabul in mid-March 1982 where, ironically, the draft law on local organs was approved in principle. The precise time and place of this gathering were not revealed until after it ended, no doubt to protect it from disruption by the resistance. The internal disruptive element, however—the continued Parcham-Khalq rivalry—was sufficient to make a shambles of the proceedings without any outside interference.

The meeting originally had been planned as a week-long party congress for some 1,800 representatives who would legitimize the Parchami hold on the party by dutifully electing the Politburo that had been acting since the Soviet invasion, two years before. Shortly before it convened, however, the

meeting's designation was downgraded to conference and its attendance halved when it became clear that Parchami efforts to rig the selection of delegates had failed, and a Khalqi majority might actually oust Babrak and his clique.[30]

The conference broke up unexpectedly after only two days' deliberations, and its results were inconclusive. It approved unanimously the party's Program of Action, but that document was still only a draft version that had to be sent back to the Politburo for further consideration. In the published summary of the program (consisting mostly of bland platitudes), two points seemed to reflect a trade-off of Khalqi and Parchami positions: the conference voted to press on with land reform (a persistent Khalqi objective that the Parchamis had pointedly de-emphasized when they came to power); and it approved preservation of the mixed economy of state-run and private enterprises (a typically Parchami equivocation scorned by the Khalqis).[31] Neither vote, however, had any practical significance. Resistance control of most of the country's territory and economy effectively removed any real decision making from the PDPA's hands.

Although a failure from the PDPA's standpoint, the conference did offer to outside observers a brief glimpse of the party's middle and upper ranks in 1982. On this subject the report of the conference's credentials committee was more detailed and revealing than any other public source since 1978.[32] In addition to giving seemingly exact (but probably inflated) figures on party membership as previously indicated, the report showed that of 841 delegates selected for the conference, 836 attended, the other 5 being absent "for good reason."[33] Of the 841 (the credentials committee included even those absent in its calculations), 60 (7 percent) claimed membership before 1966, 667 (80 percent) joined in the period 1966–1978, and 114 (13 percent) during 1978–1981. There were 64 representatives of the Revolutionary Council (probably its entire membership plus some alternates) and 78 "delegates representing state power" (not further defined but perhaps including the 64 plus some provincial governors). Front groups were represented by twelve trade unionists, seventeen DOAY members, and eleven DOAW members (out of 56 women in all). Workers and peasants were represented by 106 delegates, students by 27, and there were 40 "teachers, scholars, doctors, and [members of] the creative intelligentsia." The educational distribution showed 431 with higher education, 274 with secondary, 109 with "primary or private education," and 27 with no schooling. In age, 2 percent were 20 or under, 36.2 percent were 21–30 years old, 48.5 percent were 31–40, and 13.2 percent were 41–60. (The token grey panther, Comrade Khalqi, was over 100).[34]

To lend proper weight to the changes in the party that these statistics

represent, it is necessary to delete the 60 who claimed pre-1966 membership, leaving 781 as the base figure. It must also be recalled that the conference presumably represented the cream of the PDPA crop in 1982, and that the qualifications and age of the party rank and file would be lower than the conference average. (In 1979, Amin stated that 90 percent of the party were 40 or under,[35] compared to the 86.7 percent noted here.)

In spite of the efforts to bring more workers and peasants into the party, only about 13.6 percent of the post-1966 recruits at the conference fell into this category. Furthermore, the proportion of delegates to total members was far lower for the trade unions (twelve delegates out of a total claimed membership of 160,000–180,000) than for other front groups like the DOAW (eleven delegates for 50,000 claimed members) or the DOAY (seventeen for 65,000). The relatively high DOAY representation provided yet another indication of the party's emphasis on youth.

Unlike the earlier recruitment drive, however, the post-Saur focus seemed to be on youth for its own sake rather than on *educated* youth. It is not too unexpected, perhaps, that only 27 delegates were students, because as junior party members they would be less likely to be chosen for this honor. What is astonishing, however, is the low representation of teachers in 1982 (only an undisclosed fraction of the 40 representatives of the higher intelligentsia) compared with their dominance of the party before 1978 (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, those delegates with higher education (again discounting the 60 pre-1966 members) made up less than half the conference delegates, and a significant minority (17.4 percent) had had only primary education or none at all. The implication was that the party's drive on youth in 1982 involved luring the naive into joining rather than (as in 1965–1973) convincing the sophisticated.

Conclusion

Intriguing though the statistics were, perhaps the most significant aspects of the conference were its demonstration that Parcham-Khalq hostility extended at least down to the middle party levels and that party discipline would collapse whenever it came into conflict with factional loyalties. The conference could not even agree on the wording of a resolution extolling unity, and the freewheeling disrespect for Parchami authority reportedly shown by the Khalqis harked back to the undisciplined behavior of delegates to the national assemblies under the king. It must have been a shocking display of uncontrolled spontaneity to the regimented Soviet observers. Gulabzoy is even supposed to have interrupted a speech by Babrak himself in order to demand identification of individuals the secretary

general was accusing of factionalism and to ask why his Ministry of Interior was being called the "Ministry of Bandits." A chorus of delegates chanting "We are one, we are one" then allegedly shouted Gulabzoy down.[36]

After the conference's conclusion, the rivalry between Parcham and Khalq was papered over with more calls for unity and public criticism of factionalism, but the reality did not change. By the end of summer 1982 there were rumors in Kabul that Khalq had confronted Soviet representatives with a threat to walk out of the government unless their persecution at the hands of the Parchamis was halted.

Meantime, as the resistance controlled more and more of the countryside, persons with even remote connections with the PDPA began seeking sanctuary in the larger towns, first in provincial centers and later in Kabul alone. By fall 1982 the capital had become the only relatively secure refuge for pro-government civilians, and its population had swollen rapidly. Even Afghanistan's second largest city, Kandahar, had become unsafe for DRA officials by day; by night they retreated into a few ghettos ringed with protective troops and armor, leaving most of the city to the mujahideen. Paghman and the strategic Panjshir Valley, both targets on which the Soviet army of occupation had tacitly staked its prestige, remained in resistance hands despite saturation bombings and periodic takeovers by DRA and Soviet ground troops. It was abundantly clear to all Afghans that if Soviet military support were to be withdrawn from the DRA, no collaborator with the regime could count on surviving for 24 hours after the Soviets' departure.

Ironically, given the depth of fratricidal rivalry within the party, the last Khalqi casualty on that day might well succumb to a Parchami's bullet, the last Parchami to a Khalqi's.

10

Epilogue

Inasmuch as the DRA (and the PDPA) exist today only thanks to Soviet support, their future depends entirely on the Kremlin's perceptions of its own best interests. How reliable and durable is Moscow's backing for its Afghan allies?

It is conventional wisdom to assume that Moscow's commitment is permanent and irrevocable. This gloomy view is widely held and often expressed. The voices that during 1980 predicted that the resistance would be crushed "when the snows melt," "when the Olympics are over," "when the harvest is in," and finally "when the snows come" now, in 1982, concede that the Soviets can achieve no swift victory. They continue, however, to assert that Moscow cannot and will not retreat. No matter how long it takes or how much it costs, goes the argument, the USSR's vital defensive and offensive interests will dictate a pro-Soviet regime for Afghanistan.[1] This can be secured only by a Soviet occupation.

The argument is based on precedents and deserves close examination.

In Europe Soviet forces are still in Hungary more than 25 years after they put down Imre Nagy's abortive attempt to win independence. More remarkable, the man they put in Nagy's place, Janos Kadar, has managed to change his image from that of a hated puppet to a respectable chief of state, a

man who has guided Hungary into relative prosperity and even a measure of independence from the USSR. What opposition exists is very muted. Next door in Czechoslovakia, Gustav Husak is still held in apathetic contempt by most of his countrymen, but the resistance to Soviet domination is fitful and easily manageable without recourse to outside interference. Further north, Poland continues to seethe as of this writing, but so far the suffocating pressure of martial law appears to have succeeded in its goal of quashing organized opposition.

But Europe is not Asia. The tides of war that have ebbed and flowed over Central Europe for centuries have had a psychological impact that affects even the suicidal heroism of the Poles. By contrast, the last truly alien conqueror of Afghanistan was Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century. (Tamerlane, who followed a century later and who, after all, was a geographical, cultural, and linguistic neighbor, does not qualify. Still less do the British, whose two nineteenth-century occupations were repulsed so swiftly that the Afghans still properly regard them as British defeats.)

Nevertheless, in the east the Soviets were able to continue tsarist policies of gradually absorbing the Central Asian khanates and succeeded in achieving total domination over Mongolia. That it took them over fifteen years to quell the Basmachis' armed resistance, say the pessimists, is only proof of Soviet patience and ability to erode opposition by simply outwaiting it.

As noted at the start of this book, however, the Afghan temperament is molded by Afghan topography, and neither lends itself easily to alien conquest. Compared to Afghanistan's tumbled mountain ranges, the high, flat steppes of Central Asia and Mongolia are relatively easy to control. There is no cover or natural protection against large mobile forces, be they yesterday's cavalry or today's armored brigades. Afghanistan's defiles and gorges defy modern technology. In enough numbers, mountain-bred foot soldiers (of which the Soviets have few) might be effective, but even they are at a disadvantage for being strangers on their opponents' home territory.[2]

Perhaps the closest parallel to today's situation can be found in the Russian conquest of the Muslim tribes in the Caucasus mountains, which lasted the better part of a century during the 1700s and 1800s. Sandwiched on the north and south by Christian Russia and Georgia, hemmed in on the west by the Black Sea and on the east by the Caspian, the Caucasian tribes carried on a stubborn resistance long after they were officially pacified in the early nineteenth century. In fact Stalin's deportation of the entire north Caucasian Chechen nation in 1944 for its collaboration with the Germans was no caprice. It was not even, perhaps, an overreaction. The embers of rebellion, banked for a hundred years, needed only the brief fanning of hope

that the German invasion would succeed to burst into flame. Still, even in the Caucasus, Russian/Soviet arms eventually prevailed.

But the Afghans, unlike the Chechens, are not sandwiched between alien cultures; they have sanctuaries in the fellow Muslim states of Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Iran. Here there is a potential for rest, recuperation, and resupply, as well as safe haven for their dependents. As long as this situation remains, the fighting will continue and will remain at a relatively intense level. If anything, it appears likely to increase at least into 1983 and possibly beyond.[3]

To dispose of the resistance, the Soviets would have to take one or a combination of the following steps, all of which have serious drawbacks:

1. Patiently do good works, give gifts, and try to outwait the resistance. Some efforts along these lines have been made, including free distribution of cheap consumer goods to villagers and large numbers of scholarships to Afghans for study in the USSR and elsewhere in the bloc. Still, "the Pathan [Pashtun] waited a hundred years to take his vengeance—and cursed himself for his impatience" goes the saying, and with good reason. Soviet patience must be matched by Soviet willingness to face a continued drain of men, materiel, money, and prestige. And it is very uncertain whether any blandishments, even over the long term, would be effective.

2. Seal the Pakistan border. This is virtually impossible because of the terrain, unless the USSR committed far more troops than the 105,000 now engaged in Afghanistan.

3. Intimidate, woo, or subvert Pakistan to the point that safe haven there is denied the Afghan resistance. There can be no doubt that the Soviets are trying to exploit the political vulnerabilities of General Zia's regime. Paradoxically, the Soviets' move into Afghanistan and the immediacy of their threat to Pakistan probably helps to prop up Zia. With Soviet troops next door, the Pakistanis will tend to reconcile their differences in the face of a common danger.

4. Commit four to five times the number of troops already stationed in Afghanistan. By itself, this move would probably do no more than secure the major population centers and the land lines of communications between them. It would result in far higher Soviet casualties, vastly greater expense, and the weakening of Soviet forces elsewhere, to say nothing of increasing adverse reaction throughout the world.

5. Force the resisting population out of Afghanistan or into urban areas where they can be more easily controlled, and kill off any who remain unreconstructed. Although perhaps not couched in such absolute terms, this reputedly is part of the Soviet plan and has been in effect since 1980.[4]

Certainly terror has been employed deliberately by the invaders: saturation bombing and artillery destruction of villages suspected of supporting the resistance, random sowing of small plastic mines that look like toys, destruction of crops, and lethal chemical warfare agents ("yellow rain"), to name but a few.

6. Annex part or all of Afghanistan, and rule it directly from Moscow. During 1980–1981 some such move seemed to be in the offing for the Wakhan Corridor, the territorial finger pointing up to the northeast toward China. This was supposedly being administered directly from the Soviet Central Asian Military District rather than from Soviet headquarters in Kabul, and there were reports that indigenous Afghans were being forced out of the territory.[5]

Few if any of these gambits are cheap, most are damaging to Soviet prestige, none is either swift or sure. Moreover, if the price that Moscow had to pay for its aggression was heavy initially, it has continued to mount steadily in succeeding years. The pressures on the Kremlin to find some different solution to the Afghan problem have increased in step with the costs.

Not least of the costs was the effect of the invasion on the image of the USSR in the outside world. The West awoke from its somewhat idealistic vision of détente as a true armistice, the Third World was outraged, and Western communist parties either suffered massive defeats if they supported the Soviets (as did the French party, for example) or pointedly distanced themselves from Moscow's policies. The Soviet "excommunication" of the Italian party in early 1982, though ascribed to the Italians' refusal to accept the institution of martial law in Poland, can be traced to long-term hostilities that the Afghan invasion exacerbated as nothing had since the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia. Moscow probably reckoned with the possibility of these reactions (though not on the scale that in fact developed), but must have been shocked at the lack of support from some of its East European allies.

True, the East Germans, Czechs, and Bulgarians dutifully supported Moscow's line without question. Romania, which had refused to join in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, at first maintained a discreet silence, which was perhaps all Moscow could have hoped for. Before the end of the year, however, President Nicolae Ceausescu publicly called for the USSR to withdraw its troops.[6] Meanwhile, Poland and Hungary, though officially supporting Moscow, "left the Russians in no doubt that they [saw] the invasion as a serious and damaging mistake."[7] General Yepishev's threat in April 1980 that other Warsaw Pact countries stood ready to guarantee the security of Afghanistan is perhaps most significant

because the support did not materialize. After this one statement, nothing more was heard of the threat.[5] (In the light of later Polish developments, the USSR is probably fortunate that it did not try to force a reluctant Warsaw into taking part; one may picture Polish reaction to casualties suffered in Afghanistan.)

The international political costs have been high and have not slackened as the war drags on. Meanwhile, in purely economic terms such first-priority concerns as supporting East European and other clients, developing new arms, and paying for the USSR's own mismanaged economy have continued to become more acute and must vie with the demands of the Afghan occupation. At some point sheer economic necessity will probably force a reassessment of Soviet priorities, including the Afghan commitment. If so, the USSR will have to calculate the costs of retreat carefully.

Leaving aside the temptation for the USSR of Afghanistan as a route to further expansion, most Western analysts seem to feel that Moscow will judge the costs of retreat intolerable. The Soviets must believe, goes this reasoning, that permitting defeat of an ally by a Muslim national liberation force would destroy its credibility with the painfully constructed bulwark of socialist states around its periphery, to say nothing of those further afield in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Worse, Afghanistan might become a base for Islamic nationalist movements directed at the peoples of Soviet Central Asia, leading to subversion and perhaps even armed insurrection in the Soviet heartland.

How realistic are these fears, and, more important, how realistic does Moscow feel they are?

A "domino theory" of crumbling Soviet alliances is a very unlikely scenario. The East Europeans understand full well that Moscow's strategic interests would forbid surrendering their territory under almost any circumstances short of internal dissolution of the USSR. If anything, a Soviet pullout in Afghanistan (which has never been an invasion route into Russia) would be accompanied by even tighter control by Moscow over the well-beaten military paths heading east from Europe. Unlike the situation in Afghanistan, there is tacit Great Power agreement to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, as illustrated by the failure of the West to intervene when the Soviets have put down local rebellions there. Finally, the Soviets might also recall that in a parallel circumstance, the United States was able to retain its leadership of the West European alliance despite a retreat from Vietnam.

Nor should Soviet allies further afield like Cuba feel menaced by any Soviet decision to leave Afghanistan. Moscow's commitment to Havana is based on Cuba's role as a secure socialist outpost in the Western Hemisphere, as an example of the benefits to a Third World country of coopera-

tion with the USSR, and as a source of surrogate military forces for use in Africa and elsewhere. Moscow pays an enormous economic price in the subsidy needed to keep Cuba financially afloat, but receives a good return on its investment. (That no such political profits accrue in Afghanistan is obvious.) As long as Cuba can keep its side of the bargain—and the Soviet economy can stand the burden—Havana should have no fear of abandonment.

As for worries that Afghanistan might become a base for anti-Soviet subversion based on Islamic nationalism, history shows that once the Afghans have expelled an invader they do not exact vengeance even when clear opportunities present themselves. In 1857, fifteen years after the first Anglo-Afghan war, the Afghans refused to join the rebels in the Indian Mutiny, who with Afghan help might have succeeded in driving the British off the subcontinent. In 1915, less than a generation after the second Anglo-Afghan war, they declined Turko-German pleas to join the Central Powers in a jihad against Britain. And in early summer 1940, with Britain facing the Axis powers alone and apparently on the brink of defeat, Afghanistan turned down a Nazi offer to restore the country to its eighteenth-century borders, mostly at the expense of British India, in return for inciting rebellion against the British in the North West Frontier Territories. That the USSR was all but allied with Germany at that time must have made the offer especially tempting.

In the case of the USSR, no Afghan government could risk provoking a new invasion by fomenting insurrection in Soviet Central Asia; officially amicable relations, no matter what personal and national animosities might have been aroused, would be a keystone of Afghan foreign policy. Unlike the situation in the 1920s, the Soviet-Afghan border today is relatively easy to control and police from the Soviet side; for most of its length it is flat and open, and on the east, where mountains dominate, there are no longer any established tracks such as one finds across the Afghan-Pakistan border. Soviet forces have succeeded in sealing far more porous parts of their frontier.

None of these factors make the slightest difference if the USSR itself refuses to reckon with the possibility of retreat. Fortunately, it has been very careful not to shut the door on that option.

As noted in Chapter 7, the Soviet press referred to Afghanistan in mid-1979 as a member of the socialist family of nations. That terminology went out of fashion even before the invasion that followed six months later. It is probably significant that Boris Ponomarev and other members of his Central Committee International Department occasionally are in the news in connection with Afghan developments, but nothing is heard of Konstantin V. Rusakov or anyone else in his Department for Liaison with Commu-

nist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. Were the PDPA considered a ruling communist party, Rusakov should be involved in some way. Furthermore, after the May–June 1979 depiction of Afghanistan as socialist, there was a consistent and progressive ideological distancing of the CPSU from the PDPA, involving most noticeably an effort to emphasize the national democratic—not socialist—nature of the 1978 revolution. Granted, the Soviets repeatedly have pledged themselves to defend their Afghan friends against imperialist machinations and "bandit gangs," but there is no longer an ideological imperative based on the Brezhnev Doctrine of defending socialism "wherever in the world it is threatened." The distinction may seem minor, but it would allow the USSR to retreat without setting any precedent for East European or other states judged to have achieved socialism. Even the statements apparently extending the Brezhnev Doctrine to cover revolutions of the Afghan type (as noted in Chapter 8) have not been repeated, and they never were enunciated as official policy.

On the state level, Afghanistan is a member neither of the Warsaw Pact nor of the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance. The USSR claims that its military presence is based on Article 51 of the U.N. charter and the 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries. Both of these depend on explicit invitations by one of the signatories for assistance from the other, and such assistance could be terminated at will.

Periodically during 1980 and 1981 there were official and unofficial Soviet proposals for a political solution to the Afghan problem. When explored in depth, they all involved an end of Western aid to the Afghan resistance, Western recognition of the Babrak government, perhaps disguised as a coalition, and a Soviet promise to withdraw its armed forces when they were no longer needed to maintain the regime in power. These terms were acceptable neither to the international community nor (more importantly) to the resistance, and there was understandable Western skepticism that they were being floated only for the purposes of propaganda, to project a false impression that the USSR was seeking constructive alternatives to its military intervention. Nevertheless, the absence of a stonewall position bore important implications both on the international scene and especially within Afghanistan: no realistic PDPA official or career army officer could listen to talk of a possible Soviet departure without considering its significance for his personal security. That officials at all levels should attempt to take out a form of insurance against such a desertion by collaborating with the resistance was only to be expected. According to the estimate of one defector in early 1982, up to 40 percent of PDPA members had taken this step.[9] Thus, if Soviet gambits of a political solution were purely for propaganda, they were singularly ill-advised.

In short, the Soviet commitment in Afghanistan does not, in 1982,

appear to be as firm as commonly assumed. Whether it becomes so depends not only on the Afghan resistance but on the material aid that the resistance receives from the outside. Although there have been various public allegations, some on excellent authority, that the West has been feeding modern arms to the resistance,[10] defectors and refugees do not confirm that they are getting through in any significant quantities.

As this book goes to print, Brezhnev has just died and Yuriy Andropov is consolidating his position as the new Soviet leader. In 1982 there were rumors in Moscow that he had opposed the 1979 decision to invade, but these stories may well have been floated only to improve his image in the West in anticipation of the coming succession struggle.[11] His intimate involvement with both the Hungarian and Czech invasions indicates no aversion to using arms to project Soviet power, and his regrets, if any, probably came later. Furthermore, decisive a man as he is, Andropov must in fact contend with various Soviet parochial interests, and it may take time for him to secure enough power to act resolutely.

Nevertheless, it is in the nature of Soviet politics to put all blame for past mistakes on a departed leader, thus permitting policy changes without damaging the prestige of the CPSU or the Soviet state. The invasion of Afghanistan was unquestionably a serious mistake and by now should have been recognized as such in Moscow; withdrawal would not be, but at this writing is no doubt still in dispute. If by Western inaction the new Soviet regime is encouraged to support Brezhnev's Afghan adventure, the war will continue to exact a heavy price from the Afghans, from the Soviets, and, in the end, from all of us.

If, on the other hand, the new Soviet leadership can be induced to withdraw its forces and permit the Afghans to revert to their classic buffer state role, the world will get a badly needed breather from the threat of a Great Power confrontation in that area.

Appendixes

NOTE: The documents in Appendixes A, B, and C are reproductions of translations from the U.S. and British embassies in Kabul and correspond to the originals in capitalization, spelling of Afghan names, and punctuation. Misspellings of English words have been silently corrected, and editorial additions have been bracketed in as necessary to clarify obscure passages.

Appendix A

Platform of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

For the sake of the unlimited pains of the oppressed peoples of Afghanistan

Democratic Objective of the People

Our beloved country Afghanistan has a long history, honourable traditions, human resources, and immense natural wealth.

Afghanistan, during the 19th century and several decades of the 20th century, was a colony, semi-colony, and at present, is a country with a feudal economic and social system. The oppressed people of this nation have suffered from the most difficult and tyrannical kind of oppression and exploitation and illiteracy and poverty under the authority of feudal lords who have been the local rulers and from the British imperialist invaders.

The national uprising of 1919 of the peoples of Afghanistan, which took place with the participation of all the toiling classes of people, put an end to direct and classical imperialism. It broke one of the chains of international imperialism in this part of the world before any other Asian country did.

Since that time 47 years have passed. During this time, the deprived classes of the peoples and our national leaders, constitutional monarchists, and liberals have fought bravely to do away with feudalism and eliminate domestic oppression and reaction, to uproot colonialism and imperialism. But, unfortunately, due to lack of suitable national and international conditions they temporarily faced pathetic defeats. Thus the power of the feudal lords who were ruling in their localities, "ruling classes" and ruling circles remained in power as before. This increased the basic contradiction between farmers and feudal lords, between the people of our country and the imperialists.

History has entrusted the mission of solving these basic contradictions to the progressive and national energies for the realization of the democratic objective of the people.

Khalq, April 11, 1966. Forwarded in translation as Attachment 4 to Airgram A-250 (June 9, 1966) from the U.S. Embassy, Kabul, to the Department of State. The embassy apparently used a commercial translation service in Kabul, but its name is illegible. Footnotes by the translation service have been deleted.

International and National Conditions

The most outstanding subject of contemporary history is, according to international standards, class struggle and war between international socialism and world imperialism which began with the Great Socialist Revolution of October.

As a result of the war between these two international systems, the movement of workers in the capitalist countries is growing stronger and the national struggle movements of the Afro-Asian countries and Latin American nations are expanding.

After the end of World War Two the great and powerful national struggles did away with the imperialists' colonizing system. Fifty-three new independent countries came into existence, most of which, as well as Afghanistan, have exerted efforts to establish national states and adopt political neutrality for the sake of attaining economic independence and consolidating political freedom.

The modification in the international balance of power in the interest of peace, democracy, national independence, and social progress and the resultant weakening of imperialism have given a chance to newly independent countries to renew their national life and achieve economic independence. Through the establishment of a national democratic state and adoption of a system other than capitalism the uprooting and victory over imperialism is possible. This will also allow these nations to abandon the systems and remnants of feudalism and step into a new stage of social evolution.

The process of evolution of the newly independent Asian and African countries illustrates this truth that right at this moment some of these countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Burma, etc., have chosen socialism as their guideline; and, in accordance with the development of a method other than capitalism and creation of a kind of national democratic state have achieved within a short span of freedom bright results in respect to living standards of their peoples and have acquired social progress and comfort.

In a nutshell, with due attention to international affairs and expansion of a policy of peaceful coexistence and prevention of a nuclear war and preference for the forces of freedom and progress for a new world, the study of the world situation shows that current international affairs have completely changed in favour of the oppressed peoples of Asian, African, and Latin American countries. In particular for the oppressed peoples of the nation of Afghanistan it has created the possibilities of realizing freedom from the chains of reactionary feudal lords and influence of the causes of exploitation and imperialism. This condition from the point of view of nationalism particularly after the Loya Jirgah of 1334 [1955] which was held with the decision of the peoples of Afghanistan caused relative changes in the political and economic life of the country.

In accordance with the decision of the Loya Jirgah the peaceful campaigns of the peoples of Afghanistan entered a new stage in international relations, and the foreign policy of the country based on a policy of neutrality, peace and pursuance of a policy of coexistence and opposing old and new colonialism and imperialism, and non-alignment with military pacts met the approval and was accepted by the people of Afghanistan [as being?] their traditional wishes.

This new foreign policy of Afghanistan resulted in friendly and peaceloving countries of the world giving aid without strings and on the basis of equality of nations. This resulted in a start in engaging human energy and natural resources of the country in accordance with the development plans and strengthening of the state sector of the economy, and establishment of economic independence, and creating the possibilities and conditions necessary for the creation of a national democratic government by a method other than capitalism.

The main causes for the slow growth of productive forces and the pathetic condition of peoples of Afghanistan who are engulfed in poverty, ignorance, and disease [are] the political and economic rule of the feudal class, sections of big business, hoarders and compradors, corrupted bureaucrats and the agents of monopolists and international imperialism whose class interests clash with the interest of the peoples of Afghanistan.

In the present stage the main aim of the general democratic and national movement in Afghanistan is the solution of this basic contradiction.

The establishment of national democratic government as a strategic objective and as a weapon to solve the basic contradiction opens a bright and expansive future for the nation of Afghanistan, which is economically backward.

The political pillar of the national democratic government of Afghanistan consists of the united national front representing all the progressive, democratic and nationalist forces, that is *workers, farmers*, and enlightened progressives, craftsmen, small bourgeoisie, and "national capitalists" who wage a democratic and national struggle to attain national independence, popularize democracy in social life, and complete the fight against imperialism and feudalism.

Khalq periodical presents the following democratic objective which has been prepared in accordance with the scientific analysis of national and international conditions and which manifests the wishes of the toiling people of Afghanistan "who make up more than 95 per cent of the people of the country," meaning workers, farmers, and enlightened progressives, and which will campaign for its realisation.

Economic Affairs

Our country is endowed with plenty of natural resources and capable manpower which if we were to choose the right way to successful progress we could by using these resources rapidly, sufficiently raise the standard of living of the people as regards the provision of food, clothing, housing, health and education. But since Afghanistan from the point of view of economic and social organization is under the feudalistic system and the productive relations of the feudalists and those before them work against our interests. The feudalists, the big businessmen and the corrupt bureaucrats, the businessmen and the imperialistic monopolizing companies which have an absolute influence upon the poor political and economic life of the country contrive in keeping the standard of life of the people at the low level. They have created big obstacles to the rapid success of the productive forces and economic development which resulted in colonialistic oppression and cruelty towards the large masses of workers, peasants, and the rest of the people. So as to ensure economic development and social progress in the country this situation must change, and

instead of the old type of relations which were unjust, a new national economic system, that is a system with a new type of relation and which would be just, should be created and which would work towards the material improvements of the society, that is the hard-working people. Therefore, what in the long run is of historical importance towards the improvement of the material conditions of the people of Afghanistan is the pursuit of a system of economic progress which would rapidly improve the economy and the culture of the country and which would transform Afghanistan into an industrial country so as to eliminate rapidly the backwardness of past centuries within the lifespan of one generation. To achieve this it is necessary that in the name of primordial national and human duty all the progressive and democratic forces, the workers, the peasants, the craftsmen, the progressive intellectuals, the small- and medium-sized landlords, together with the national capitalists, all be united towards the achievement of a common national goal to set up a national democratic government and should strive towards the [success?] and the defense [of] a non-capitalist economy as outlined below.

1) The rapid growth of a national economy according to the governmental plan and the progress of the governmental sector of the economy. The creation of the material and technical structure of democracy; the development of the modern system of government planning and a progressive administration for the national economy; the main duty of this administration according to the government plan would be to regulate spending and production according to the needs of the people. It would control and prevent unjustifiable expenditures which would be uneconomical and also the governmental and private enterprises. It would also regulate the use of material and equipment needed for production and the manpower, and would ensure the proper use of financial resources and natural reserves of the country and this includes the people. The government sector of the economy, which should be characterized by its opposition to feudalism, imperialism and neo-colonialism is the main weapon for the preservation of economic independence and will be the base for the spread of democracy and the raising of the standard of living for the hard-working people. In Afghanistan, where the relations and the behavior of capitalism are still in their infancy, the strengthening of the government sector of the economy would be completely to the advantage of the people and the government should prevent the successful development of capitalism which would result in long-term suffering and cruelty for the people. In the field of industrial development the creation of a national industry, heavy and light, and the industrialization of the country through the use of new techniques is the key to the solution of all the economic and social problems of the country.

2) Heavy industry which is the means towards rapid economic development will strengthen national independence. The introduction of heavy industry, such as metal working, and iron smelting, petrol, gas and electricity, engineering industry and machine making, chemical industry, mining and so on, the creation of railways and the extension of the lines of communication through governmental capital investments and by channeling most of the foreign assistance to these projects and their centralization in the hands of the government is of great importance to the people of Afghanistan.

3) The creation of light industry and consumer goods industry should be encouraged to provide to the general needs of the people and to raise their standard of living. Private capital investment in the case of light industry through joint or separate governmental and private investments under the supervision of the government should be encouraged. The government is responsible for the protection of all national production, private and governmental, against competition from similar foreign products.

4) The government must ensure the protection of handicrafts and must provide assistance to the craftsmen by giving low-interest, long-term credits through the creation of cooperatives. In the field of agricultural and land development production, the government should take into consideration the following points: the population of Afghanistan is increasing every year, but the increase in agricultural production lags behind; there are permanent crises because of the lack of agricultural products and the low standard of living of the farmers and the exploitation of a large portion of the farmers. These are some of the pressing problems of today. The main and principal reason for this sad state of affairs of agricultural production is the maintenance of the old feudalistic system of production which cannot satisfy the consumer demand of the people of Afghanistan. Moreover, it creates increasing bad feeling between the landowners and the peasants. To achieve the social and economic progress of the country and the establishment of democracy and the development of the forces of production of agriculture, the old forms of agricultural production enforced today must give way to democratic changes. To effect these basic and democratic changes, the national democratic government must put into effect all the changes and measures listed below.

5) The execution of the basic and democratic improvements according to social justice with the participation of all the farmers and to the direct advantage of the small farmers of Afghanistan and those without any land of their own. The establishment of progressive democratic laws which would eliminate the feudal system and uproot the evil practices directed against the farmers and which would enable the increase in the agricultural production of the country.

6) The protection and the assistance to the small and medium landowners and the establishment of their rights of ownership so that they can properly and fully utilize their land and raise their economical and cultural standards.

7) So as to free immediately the small and medium farmers the leases of land and the farmers who work on land that they do not own, the laws must be changed so that they can be released from mortgages, creditors, unemployment and other difficulties created by the feudal landlords and the city usurers [?], and these laws should be applied as soon as possible. These laws and regulations, by changing the conditions of land lease and employment, would result in immediate advantages for the landless farmers and small holders and would uproot the feudalistic conditions now in force.

8) The unused lands must be developed through government capital investments and foreign assistance. Large governmental farms must be created on those lands or they can be distributed to the farmers without enough land or the nomads through agricultural cooperatives.

9) The execution of the democratic changes requires urgently the creation and setting up of selling, buying and agricultural production cooperatives throughout the country, through the leadership and democratic control of the government so that the farmers can be encouraged and woken up. In this way it will be possible to provide all the necessary material, such as agricultural equipment and machinery. It will also be possible to mechanize and modernize the agricultural system so as to raise the level of production. Also the use of chemical fertilizers will be increased. A proper and just pricing system must be set up for agricultural products and for marketing. Seeds must be improved and disease fought against. Practical and technical help must be provided through cooperation between the cooperatives, the farmers and the government. These initiatives will require the backing of a strong agricultural bank set up by the government which will provide low-interest, long-term credits with easy terms.

10) The improvement of the networks and of the development of irrigation of lands without enough water and the underdeveloped lands by digging underground canals, deep wells, canals and constructing dams are among the foremost tasks for the development of the agriculture of the country. As regards animal husbandry and the nomads, the following steps should be taken.

11) In accordance with the democratic changes to be brought about so as to eliminate the old feudal system, it will be necessary to introduce measures that will safeguard the borders against the abuse of the large herd owners. To improve the animal production of the country, pastures must be provided and developed. The strains must be improved and disease fought against. This can be accomplished by setting up special cooperatives.

12) To solve the urgent problems of the nomads and tribal life in a democratic and humane way and to guide and direct them towards agricultural and industrial activities and to remedy their social ills, it is a necessary condition for economic development, the progress of society and the independence of the country. In the field of commerce and finance, we notice that one of the weak points of the country's economy and which allows for the infiltration of neo-colonialism and imperialism is that our foreign trade is in the hands of a small group of representatives of foreign monopolies and [glib?] local and foreign traders. These people, in return for exporting raw material import goods which are not necessary and uneconomical, so as to increase their own private earnings and profits selfishly and this results in the disappearance of the capital and the foreign currency of the country, and it also gravely handicaps the sources of national industry and the maintenance of economic independence. To remedy these ills, the national democratic government must enforce the following commercial policy.

13) Channeling the commercial capital in the field of industry and the import of machinery to set up and strengthen national industry and the encouragement of the export of national products. The control of commerce through a protective customs policy. The encouragement of the barter system of trade. This should be the essence of our foreign trade.

14) The development of internal commerce so as to find the proper outlets. The development and increase of home products and the regulation of the price of

[products?] in the internal markets. The protection of the small and medium-sized traders against the large traders.

15) The financial and budgetary problems of the government should be solved according to progressive and democratic principles that will improve the situation of the poor people of the country so as to provide economic development and social progress. The heavy burden of indirect taxes should be lifted from the shoulders of the people and primary consideration should be given to direct taxation and taxes should be levied according to social justice from the rich classes of the people and of the economical section.

Political Affairs

There are important programs which at this historical time face the people of Afghanistan; and which, by being solved, would free them from the shackles of feudalism and the influences of imperialism which handicap the emergence of a truly democratic system which would come into being if the principles listed below were followed.

1) To protect the political independence of Afghanistan. To realize its economic independence from foreign influences are some of the most important national and democratic duties of the people.

2) Decentralization of all the governmental forces in the hands of the people. Organizing the power of the people requires a creation of a national democratic government. A national democratic government should draw upon the progressive, democratic and nationalistic elements of the country, such as the workers, the farmers, the progressive intellectuals, the small and medium-sized landlords in the city and in the country, together with the nationalistic capitalists, all in the form of a national united group, and should strive toward the improvement of the lives of the people.

3) A national democracy. The best organ for making laws and administrating people rests in the Parliament and which the representatives of all the various strata of the people of Afghanistan chosen by them through free, secret elections without any handicapping interference are elected. The life of the government in a free national democratic system determined by the Parliament which keeps a close and accurate check on its activities.

4) Action should be taken to insure the independence of the judiciary forces and to organize the legal activities of the courts according to democratic principles, also to insure the protection and freedom of the people of the country.

5) The realization of national democracy is possible when the conditions are such that the people are assured of the four [*sic*] encompassing political and social freedoms: freedom of thought and belief; freedom of speech; freedom of pen and press; social freedom; freedom of forming political parties; freedom of organizing unions; freedom to strike; freedom to demonstrate; freedom to travel; freedom to choose one's work or occupation; protection of the rights of the individual; freedom to establish residence; freedom to communicate and the right to defend oneself in court; the right to vote for nationals of the country who have reached the age of 18;

the right to be elected in any of the democratic organs, ranging from the village councils to the Parliament; equality before the law, the courts, and the opportunity to enter any of the governmental departments; the entire protection of all of the democratic rights and freedoms, political and social, of the individuals is a duty without any discrimination without sex, male or female, race, tribe, region, religion and degree of culture, occupation or wealth.

6) When the actual pattern of the country is taken into consideration, it is found that Afghanistan is a country composed of hard-working people who are endowed with different regional cultures which have together over the centuries resulted in giving the country its national character and which have united the people because of common griefs in their struggles against feudalism and colonialism. But in the final analysis, because of the mistakes in administration of the feudalists and the political aims of the imperialists and the presence of injustice and discrimination, not only [were] all the people and the various tribes of Afghanistan deprived of their rights and freedoms, but also all of these reactionary policies prevented the people from achieving greatness in the quest for national unity and the progress of society. Therefore, the struggle for achieving unity for all of the hard-working tribes of Afghanistan to bring advantages to the oppressed factions and brotherly equality and the fight of all sections of the population against national oppression and the removal of the causes of ethnic, racial, tribal and local differences which result in national disaffections is the national and progressive duty of the national people's democratic party.

7) So as to bring into being and organize a real and practical unity among the people of Afghanistan, we must try by legal means which would be in keeping with the principles of democracy to revise our attitudes towards the basic organization of the country as regards economic, linguistic and cultural relations and to give sufficient authority to the local councils and the other democratic organs of the country which would have come into being through democratic elections to solve the linguistic problems of Afghanistan according to the principles of a democracy.

8) In 1893, the imperialist colonizers of Great Britain forced the political acceptance of the colonialists' borderline by the name of Durand upon Afghanistan against the wishes of its people. As a result, a part of the territory of the country was detached from it. From that date up to the present nationalistic struggles against colonialism and imperialism have constantly been waged by the people of Pushtunistan. The aim of the progressive and democratic elements of the people of Afghanistan, in accordance with their belief in the right of national self-determination, is to support the struggles of the people of Pushtunistan.

9) In the field of international relations, the democratic forces of the people defend the following foreign policy: adherence to an independent and peaceful foreign policy and the maintenance of a positive, neutral policy with free judgement, the defense of world peace and the support of the policy of peaceful coexistence; the maintenance of friendly relations with all peace-loving nations and those nations without political or economic interests and without colonialistic motives provide Afghanistan with assistance and cooperation on the basis of equality in the fields of economic, technical and cultural development; the reinforcement and the extension of close relations with those leading countries and those progressive international

forces that defend peace, national independence, democracy and social progress, and which are against imperialism. Close relations should also be sought with those Asian, African, and Latin American nations that are struggling for the achievement of their national independence; the making of efforts towards the maintenance of stable, international relations and opposition towards all disturbing military blocs; economic, commercial and political unions which could be a cause of unrest which have colonialistic interests; the struggle towards the prevention of world wars; opposition to those actions and practices of nations, groups and disturbance, warmongering elements which are a danger to world peace and which would suppress the independence of all other nations; the support of the United Nations and total disarmanent under complete international control; the struggle against old and new colonialism and imperialism and support of all [in]dependence seeking and progressive movements in the world.

Social Affairs

The free[dom]-loving people of Afghanistan obtained their political independence 47 years ago, but those elements in the country that strived toward the establishment of social progress and the maintenance of the democratic liberties were defeated in their purpose and had to offer many sacrifices. This was due to the actions of the egotistical elements in the country and the intrigues of the international imperialists. From that date up to now, the hard-working people of the country, that is, the workers, the farmers and the progressive intellectuals, have been oppressed and badly treated socially and economically by the higher classes, such as the feudalists, the businessmen and the bureaucrats. Also, they live in the most abject conditions. The standard of living of the talented people of Afghanistan is the lowest in the world and because of the egotistical and profiteering policies of the _____, the workers and the farmers have been deprived from the right to set up organs of publication, unions, political parties and strikes, which are the weapons for the defense of their rights and their class social and cultural advantages. The laws of social progress and achievement require the immediate change of this situation and the implementation of new conditions and the adherence to the improvement program as set up below.

1) So as to insure the right to work for all able individuals with regulations concerning minimum pay and salaries to enable the workers to provide sufficiently for their material and spiritual needs. The maintenance for the right to work and the elimination of unemployment can be insured only through changing the old production system to a new one which would rapidly increase the forces of production of the country.

2) To guarantee the protection of the workers and proper working conditions and to ensure the general rights, the enacting and the execution of the following laws is essential. The right to rest through regulating the working hours to 42 per week for various kinds of workers and the reduction of even these norms for workers in especially difficult conditions which are taxing on the spirit and the body. So as to implement the right to rest and yearly holidays, laws must be passed to insure payment of their salaries during those holidays. The creation for all hard-working

people when they get old or ill or incapacitated through work accidents of health and social insurance on the part of the government paid by the government or the respective institutions. Children under the age of 15 must be prohibited from working and for the workers between the ages of 15 and 18 their daily working hours should be reduced to four. Efforts should be made to recognize officially the rights and to implement the laws which establish the right of the workers to defend their privileges and their rights and their spiritual culture as well as the awakening of their class consciousness to defend their right to unite in industrial and workers unions and their right to strike and sign solidarity pacts. So as to solve the differences between the workers and the employers and to insure the correct implementation of the labor laws, impartial courts must be set up in which representatives of the workers would participate.

3) The construction of cheap hygienic houses for all the classes and the poor people of the cities and the villages is imperative. Also action must be taken to lower the cruel rates of rent of houses and shops.

4) In the new democratic life of Afghanistan, the Afghan woman should be able to participate in all the aspects of the life whether economic, political, social or cultural in an equal footing with men. To achieve this right and freedom of women, democratic unions should be set up by the women and discrimination between men and women should be eliminated in the fields of work as regards equal salaries and pay for equal work, social security, a right to rest and 30 days of paid vacation before and after childbirth and the protection of the health of children and mothers should be accomplished through the building of maternity hospitals, milk centers, and kindergartens. The right to schooling and other rights can also be guaranteed for women.

5) To insure that the administrative organs of the government do not favor the one or two minority classes to the disadvantage of the large classes of people in the cities and the villages, it is necessary that these administrative organs be improved accordingly. It is a duty to fight immediately trouble-making, arbitrariness and lawlessness, lack of discipline, paperwork and the needless wasting of time of the people. Efforts should be made so as to provide a decent life for the teachers, the civil servants, the contract employees and the servants on the government payroll and the payroll of institutions.

6) Efforts should be made toward the establishment of national courts which would prosecute and punish the individuals and the high-ranking officials who have acted contrary to the rights and individual and social freedoms of the people of the country and who have unjustly accumulated great wealth belonging rightly to the government and the people.

7) Efforts should be made to establish proper and unbiased political courts and also to improve the political prisons with all their political rights and also to improve the common prisons.

8) Legal efforts should be made to change and improve all the laws and regulations which are against the interests of the people and against democracy.

9) The maintenance and the protection of all the people on a free basis should be the responsibility of the government. To achieve this the government is bound to set up practical health programs for the people against disease and the elimination of

diseases caused by germs and which are contagious. To provide for the needs of the city dwellers and the villagers, the nomads and the tribesmen of the country, the government should provide health services through the training of medical workers in sufficient quantities and the provision of modern material and equipment and the encouragement of free and general institutes, the setting up of health institutes, such as polyclinics, hospitals, sanitoriums, and maternity hospitals and health propaganda in the countryside are important.

10) Efforts should be made to fight against immoral publications, narcotics, and alcohol, prostitution and other ills that handicap the social and economic life of the country.

Cultural Affairs

The transition from backward stage of feudalism to a new progressive and social state means progressive and modern education and culture for all the people. The profiteering feudalist classes who command together with the colonialistic and imperialistic factions have tried by their actions to handicap the spread and the progress of education that the people wanted and the spread of modern culture and knowledge from the rest of the world to further their own ends and have prevented the completion of the economic and social progress of the people. Solving this problem will result in the realization of the new education and culture of Afghanistan on the national and people democratic planes. The following improvement program must be achieved; so as to realize the change in the cultural life of the country and the revolution of its culture.

1) The establishment of compulsory and free primary education in the mother language of the children in all parts of the country from the age of seven for boys and girls without discrimination.

2) Putting into practice compulsory and free middle education in the manner that students will pursue their studies and also follow practical courses in handicrafts, agriculture and the technique of production.

3) To the students of all parts of the country and from hard-working people, the possibilities must be made available for vocational, secondary and higher education, and also for specialization through providing salaries and boarding facilities. In the field of development of universities, institutions, and scientific research and help to scientists, writers, and artists, the safeguard of historical treasures, steps must be taken. Archeological research must be developed as well as museums. Libraries must be established and international cultural relations inaugurated with the peace-loving and progressive nations of the world.

4) General war against illiteracy all over the country must be established.

5) To educate the bodies and the minds of the young generation, sports fields and sports clubs must be established as well as conference rooms and the right to establish student unions and young men's unions. Moral and spiritual responsibility must be established, such as loyalty to the leaders of peace, national democracy, national independence, the improvement and progress of society and love and respect for the hard-working people of the country. Non-compromising with the reactionary movements, injustice, profiteering, colonialism and imperialism, and

also with those who seek war and also the enemies of the people and the enemies of the progressive principles of the nation and the world. This must affect the apprentices, the students, and the young people who are the most important capital and who are the people of the country.

6) Efforts should be made to develop the languages and the cultures of the various people and tribes of the country and the national cultural heritage of Afghanistan. The economic and social conditions of the people of those provinces which are the most backward must be improved. To educate the people to the social concepts, steps must be taken to reach them through the democratic press and publications and the freedom of information, cinemas, theatres, progressive radio programs in various parts of the country must be insured. Whenever some of the reactionary elements or other bad elements would want to use the communication facilities intended for the education of the people to further national disagreement, support feudalism and imperialism, they should be stopped immediately.

In conclusion, as we are striving to safeguard the democratic principles of the constitution and in this historical period we are trying to establish a democratic national government and following a road to progress that is non-capitalistic according to progressive ideologies existent in the world which insure peace and progress, we will never forget our great responsibilities toward our wonderful and hard-working people of our dear Afghanistan. We will never relinquish our aim to realize a complete society which can be accomplished through socialism. From all the progressive and democratic elements, from all the patriots and true children of this country who want to help the oppressed and poor people of the country, we ask that they should join the democratic ranks of the people and join the noble struggle for the achievements of these ideals.

Appendix B

Constitution of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the party of the Working Class of Afghanistan)

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

Article 1: The PDPA is the highest political organ and the vanguard of the working class and all laborers in Afghanistan. The PDPA, whose ideology is the practical experience of Marxism-Leninism, is founded on the voluntary union of the progressive and informed people of Afghanistan: the workers, peasants, artisans, and intellectuals of the country.

Membership

Conditions of Membership

Article 2: Any Afghan subject who has reached the age of 18 and has not acted against the interests and freedom of the people; who accepts the ideological objectives and constitution of the Party and struggles for its realization; who participates and works in one of the active party organizations; who observes and executes the resolutions and decisions of the party and accepts the terms of membership can become a member of the party.

Acceptance of Membership in the Party

Article 3: The conditions of acceptance for membership in the Party are as follows:

(a) Acceptance of membership can only take place on an individual basis through the constituency (i.e. cell) The Central Committee in exceptional cases can accept the group membership of candidates.

Adopted at the PDPA's founding congress, January 1, 1965. Translated by H. A. P. Tesoriere, British Embassy, Kabul, and L. C. Thompson, Economic Section, U.S. Embassy, Kabul. Forwarded as Enclosure 1 to Airgram A-60 (July 3, 1978) from the U.S. Embassy, Kabul, to the Department of State.

(b) Confirmation of membership is granted by the Central Committee or an official authorized by it (to do so).

(c) A candidate for membership must be introduced by two full members of the Party who have served a minimum of one year in the party. The sponsors must be thoroughly acquainted with the candidate's former political, social, and moral connections and (be able to) guarantee his character, competence and performance to the Party.

(d) the candidate must present his own written application to the relevant party organization.

(e) the candidate will spend a probationary period furthering his party education, raising the level of political and ideological awareness and broadening his outlook of the Party's objectives and constitution. The candidate, depending on his own social background (lit. class attachment) will spend between 4 months and 1 year on probation and after completing his probation, can be accepted as a full member of the Party.

(f) Party probationers, with the exception of the right to be elected and electing, have equal rights and duties with full members of the Party, and in party sessions are given a consultative vote.

(g) the necessity of a probationer participating in a constituency (i.e. cell) and his role in the Party (lit. occupational use) is subject to the view of the relevant Party organization.

(h) The party record of a member is held in abeyance until the competent authority approves his full membership. (?)

(i) if a probationer during his probationary period does not show his worth to the full membership, the official or relevant organization shall either reject his application for membership or extend his period of probation.

(j) the procedure of acceptance for probationers and full-members shall be the same.

Membership Cards

Article 4: The regulation and distribution of membership cards is the responsibility of a member of the Central Committee or an official authorized by them to do so. The distribution of membership cards is subject to conditions and circumstances.

Duties of Party Members

Article 5: Every Party member is responsible for:

(a) raising his own ideological awareness and learning the political theories of Marxism-Leninism; endeavoring to strengthen ideological solidarity, party organization and unity (lit. correlation and harmony); combatting any action that, either within or outside the Party, harms the interests of the Party; rejecting enemies of the workers, the People's Party, and the nation; and struggling against colonialism and all social and national difficulties.

(b) observing the Party constitution, regulations, and discipline; disseminating

and propagating the general and current party objectives and policies among the people and striving for their realization.

(c) participating regularly in the activities of the relevant organizations; acting sincerely, decisively, forcefully, and without deviation for the party's aims, objectives, goals, and (in accord with) instructions; paying the membership fees regularly; holding comradely party functions among members; and creating within the Party a spirit of comradeship, cooperation, and brotherhood.

(d) propagating the thoughts of scientific socialism, the ideas of proletarian rationalism and internationalism among the masses.

(e) struggling to strengthen the unity of the masses, toilers, and brothers resident in our unique country of Afghanistan in the cause of complete equality of rights, the brotherly cooperation of all the people, tribes, and ethnic groups of Afghanistan, both large and small, and for their solidarity within the organizations of the laborers, both political organizations (the party of the entire proletariat of Afghanistan) and workers[' and] peasants['] cooperatives [and] cultural, women's, youth, and student's unions.

(f) expanding and strengthening the friendly relations between Afghans and the Soviets (lit. Afghan/Soviet friendly relations) and such relations between Afghanistan and the socialist fraternity, international workers' movements, people's liberation movements of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and fulfilling Afghanistan's nationalist and internationalist duties.

(g) setting an example in encounters with people of being sincere, humble, diligent, and accomplished, and in one's own personal and social life of being progressive in speech and deed; knowing the wishes of the people and striving for the influence and esteem of the party among the people.

(h) Attracting the informed and active elements of all classes and the laborers to the party and giving them instruction about the Party structure and organization.

(i) protecting the Party's secrets stringently and at all times being vigilant and firm against infiltrators; and defending the party against the influence of anti-populist elements and deviationists.

(j) Developing and expanding criticism (in general) and self-criticism and correcting and pursuing mistakes that veer from the path of true criticism.

(k) combatting from within the party all manifestations and inclinations toward factionalism, splinter groups, regionalism, chauvinism, local nationalism, revisionism, demagogy, any kind of rightist or leftist opportunism, liberalism, and subjectivism. Giving priority to the interests of the Party and the people. Being honest and correct toward the party and people. In choosing an individual for party duties and responsibilities, taking into consideration their ability, honesty, quality, awareness, and class background (lit. character).

Rights of Party Members

Article 6: Every Party Member has the right to:

(a) participate in elections of party officials as an elector or electee.

(b) (participate) in debates and resolution of problems concerning the policies

and scientific activities of the Party, in party sessions and publications. Until the relevant Party organizations and officials take a decision on a matter under discussion active participation and free expression will be allowed.

(c) have their suggestions, criticisms, and questions passed to Party authorities including the Central Committee. Inside the sessions of the organizations a member, whatever his position, may criticize the actions of party officials.

(d) Participate in all sessions where actions or deeds or methods are under scrutiny. Whenever the aims of the Party authorities are not deemed wise or methodical and are subject to protest, a member can present his complaints to the higher Party authorities including the Congress.

Note (1): Under certain conditions it is possible for a party member to investigate actions or deeds.

Note (2): Under certain conditions it is possible for a Party member to be denied permission to attend a meeting at which his own actions are being investigated.

The Structure of Party Organization (Organs)

Article 7: The main principle and guideline of the structure of the PDPA is democratic centralism whose basic features are as follows:

(a) Party leaders from the highest to the lowest levels are elected through an open ballot or a closed ballot when necessary.

(b) The presentation of a report by party officials to relevant organizations and to a higher Party authority. (unclear, perhaps incomplete)

(c) Adherence of the minority to the majority on party decisions and instructions and the strict observance of Party discipline by all individuals in all positions.

(d) Adherence of lower officials to the decisions of higher officials.

(e) Enforcement of collective basic leadership and individual responsibility.

Article 8: Party leaders from the highest to the lowest level must avoid individualistic and bureacratic methods. A logical proportion between Party centralism and democracy is to be preserved based on the difficulty of party activities and the spread of criticism against the party. Incorrect methods of action are to be eliminated. In the performance of duties, initiative, creativity, and informed discipline are to be shown among party members. Any manifestation of liberalism, troublemaking, personality cults, splinter groups, or internal party factions that in any shape or form appear within the party are to be prevented and centralism, linked to democracy, is to be established and strengthened.

Article 9: The competence and responsibility of the Party leadership may be expanded as required by the necessity of furthering the Party's affairs and protecting Party organizations. The appointment to a position of senior officials or individuals at all levels who, in principle, have been elected, can be made. The relevant authorities may take the following points into consideration:

(a) the correct method of procedure on utilizing the cadres and party officials should be based on basic performance, ability, and awareness in relevant matters and political reliance on these—not on personal considerations and inclinations.

(b) the organization responsible for Party vigilance can in no way permit destructive elements to influence the party.

(c) complete precision in regard to the views and suggestions of party members.

(d) Precise and correct implementation of the decisions of Party authorities.

Article 10: The organizational divisions of the Party are as follows:

Provincial, urban (lit. city), woluswali [district] and [sub]district organizations. Under certain circumstances, on the recommendation of the Provincial committee and the agreement of the Central Committee, other organizations can also be established. Any one of these organizations can take decisions on local problems provided that they do not defy general party policies and the decisions of their superior authorities. The limits of the actions of any one of these groups is set by higher authorities.

The Highest Party Authority

The Party Congress

Article 11: The highest Party authority of the PDPA is the Party Congress which is comprised of representatives elected by provincial conferences. In normal circumstances, the Party Congress will meet once every four years. If necessary or in unusual circumstances, it is possible for the Central Committee to decide to invite the Congress to assemble earlier or later than the appointed time. An Extraordinary Party Congress may take place on the decision of the Central Committee or on the basis of a proposal by two-thirds of the Party members. The Congress is officially competent only when a majority of elected members, that is to say more than one-half of the party representatives, are present at a session. A number of Congress representatives, proportional to the number of Party members and relevant organizations, are appointed to the Central Committee.

Article 12: The duties and jurisdiction of the Party Congress consist of:

(a) hearing the report of the Central Committee and the Central Supervisory Commission, debating and assessing their findings, and ratifying them.

(b) Revising, reforming, changing, and ratifying the Party's objectives and constitution.

(c) setting party policy.

(d) electing full and alternate members to the Central Committee and Central Supervisory Commission.

(e) establishing the number of full and alternate members of the Central Committee and Central Supervisory Commission.

The Central Committee

Article 14 [i.e., 13]: The Central Committee of the Party is the highest authority after the Party Congress.

The Central Committee during the period between two Congress meetings is

responsible for relations with other parties and political organizations. The Central Committee, while accountable to the Congress, leads and administers the political establishment and activity and organization of the Party; and is responsible for the financial administration, overseeing the publication of Party organs' publications, and Parliamentary party (participation?) in the Parliament (?).

Article 14: The Central Committee is responsible for organizing subordinate organizations, party committees, and party members in setting up relevant organizations, that is mass organizations such as workers unions, peasants[' and] artisans['] cooperatives, unions for low-ranking officials, teachers, lecturers, doctors, students, youth and women, cultural and sports clubs, etc. If any such organizations are founded by other organizations, it is essentially in line with Party policy to actively participate in the former.

Article 15: If for any reason the place of some full member of the Central Committee is vacated or if it becomes necessary for the number of Central Committee members to be increased by a fixed number, then the Central Committee can by a two-thirds majority vote appoint to full membership any of its substitute members.

However, if necessary or in extraordinary cases the Central Committee is empowered to appoint outstanding individuals in the Party Membership to full membership in the Central Committee or alternate membership. The basic condition in appointing or electing full or alternate members of the Central Committee is that they have at least two years of previous Party service.

Article 16: The Central Committee can choose from its own members the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the General Secretary of the Central Committee, who is also a member of the Political Bureau.

Article 17: The Plenum of the Central Committee in order to form the Second Congress of the PDPA and to elect the Central Supervisory Commission elects from the Congress as full and alternate members, the Supervisory and Control Commission, and its officials.

Article 18: The Central Committee as necessary sets up branch organizations for propaganda, theory and education, finance, international affairs, and mass organizations. The Central Committee can also as necessary set up other branches and commissions, either permanent or temporary. The officials of these commissions elect the political bureau from the full members of the Central Committee.

Article 19: The Plenum of the Central Committee will, under normal circumstances, meet at least three times a year. Alternate members will participate in the Plenum of the Central Committee and will have the right to a consultative vote.

Article 20: The Central Committee can raise for free discussion and party advice some of the Party's problems.

Article 21: The Political Bureau in the period between Central Committee meetings administers and heads the Party's activities and affairs, and is responsible to the Central Committee.

Article 22: The Central Committee Secretariat during the period between the meetings of the Political Bureau undertakes the current affairs of the Central Committee.

The Secretariat prepares the ways and means of carrying out the decisions of the supreme authorities of the Party leadership and supervises and researches their precise execution. The Secretariat is responsible to the Political Bureau. The Commissions and Departments of the Central Committee operate, execute, and serve under the supervision of the Secretariat.

The Central Supervisory and Control Commission

Article 23: The Central Supervisory and Control Commission has the following duties:

(a) Supervision of the current affairs of the Central organs.

(b) Supervision over the Central Committee's financial affairs.

(c) ensuring the observance of full party members and probationary members to party discipline and unity and correct execution of Central Committee decisions; and taking action against those party members who infringe the Party's objectives, constitution, regulations or code.

(d) Investigation into the general complaints of party members from party organizations sentenced to be punished and seeking litigation.

Party Conferences

Article 24: During the period between two Congresses, the Central Committee can invite Party conferences formed of representatives of the committees of Provincial, Urban, woluswali, and [sub]district organizations, to debate and discuss problems relating to the practical policies and other essential problems. The Central Committee appoints a number of its representatives.

Provincial, Urban, Woluswali, and [Sub]district Organizations

Article 25: Provincial, Urban, woluswali, and [sub]district organizations are to be guided in their actions by the objectives and constitution of the Party. They are to propagate party policies and execute all decisions and instructions of the Central Committee and their own superior authorities, be it provincial, urban, woluswali, or [sub]district. The basic duties of the Provincial, urban, woluswali, and [sub]district organizations and their leading officials consist of:

(a) organizational and political work among the masses.

(b) striving to realize the objectives and goals of the party and raising the level of political and class awareness of the workers and actively participating in the organization of the masses.

(c) regulating ideological work, propagating practical socialism and distributing party publications and pamphlets.

(d) Conforming to the constitution, selecting and spotting outstanding individuals and adjusting them to progressive, honest and true thoughts and beliefs, and feelings of loyalty and responsibility to the people's nation and party.

(e) the circulation and propagation of the Party's objectives, publications, and pamphlets in the language of the people of the region.

The Supreme Authorities of the Provincial, Urban, Woluswali, and [Sub]district Organizations

Conferences

Article 26: The highest authority of the Provincial, Urban, woluswali, and [Sub]district organizations is the conference. Provincial conferences under favorable conditions are invited by their respective committees to take place once every two years, and Urban, woluswali, and sub[district] conferences, under favorable conditions, are held annually. Extraordinary conferences are formed on the decision of the superior committee or the majority of members of the relevant organization.

Article 27: The conferences of the Provincial, Urban, woluswali, and [sub]district organizations invite the elected representatives of every organization based on a proportion of those who have been appointed or the recommendation of the organization's committee and the approval of the superior authorities.

Article 28: (lit. 27, a misprint): The competence and duties of the provincial, urban, woluswali, and [sub]district conferences consist of:

(a) Hearing, discussing, assessing, and ratifying the report of the relevant committee or supervisory commission.

(b) adopting a decision on the problem and the affairs of the relevant organization and its future course of action.

(c) electing representatives for the conferences of superior organizations and electing members to the relevant organization's committees and Supervisory Commission.

Note: A provincial conference elects a representative to the Party Congress.

Committees

Article 29: Provincial, urban, woluswali, and [sub]district committees are the highest authority of the relevant organizations during the period between the two conferences.

Article 30: The provincial, urban, woluswali, and [sub]district committees elect their secretaries and assistant secretaries from among their own members.

Article 31: The provincial, urban, woluswali, and [sub]district committees establish branches for organization, propaganda, theory, and financial instruction and any other necessary branches. The officials of these branches are appointed by the members of the Committee. The Secretaries and assistant secretaries of the Committee supervise these branches.

Article 32: The Provincial, urban, woluswali, and [sub]district committees form their subordinate organizations, leadership, and new organizations. The committees carry out the decisions of the Conference according to the instructions of superior authorities, and they are responsible to the latter.

Article 33: The Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries undertake the duties of carrying out the current business of the relevant committees and are responsible to the

Committee. They investigate and supervise the ways and means of executing the decisions of the leadership as well as preparing and correctly putting into practice such decisions.

Provincial, Urban, woluswali, and [sub]district committees assemble at least once a month.

Supervisory and Control Commission

Article 34: Members of the Supervisory and Control Commission are elected at general meetings of the relevant organizations at the provincial, urban, woluswali, and [sub]district levels to form a relevant conference from the members of the appropriate Committees. The Supervisory and Control Commissions carry out the duties of the Central Supervisory and Control Commission with, of course, the difference that every Supervisory and Control Commission has competence and responsibility for its own organization's and committee's activities.

Primary Organization of the Party (Constituency or cell)

Article 35: The primary organization of the Party consists of the constituency which is to be considered the essential foundation of the Party. Constituencies are founded by local action and local residence. A Party constituency is formed with the approval of the provincial, urban, woluswali, or [sub]district committee or of higher authorities. Depending on the circumstances the maximum number of individuals in a constituency will be determined by higher authorities.

Article 36: Whenever the number of constituencies is increased as a result of local action or residence at the [sub]district level, subsidiary committees for local action and residence can, with the agreement of superior authorities, be formed and are subject to the [sub]district organization. Members of these committees are elected in public meetings of the constituencies or in meetings of the [sub]district representatives.

Article 37: The constituency will meet at least twice a month. At the constituency session, the Secretary and Assistant Secretary will be appointed for a term of one year.

Article 38: The constituency organization will be guided in its work by the Party objectives and constitution, will propagate the Party's policies and execute all the decisions and instructions of the superior authorities. The constituency organization forges the link between the leadership and party members, the party with the people, and establishes close relations with the masses. The constituency, mindful of Article 26, has responsibility for:

(a) recruiting new members to the party and party membership and investigating all aspects of the background of party members. Strengthening party discipline among all constituency members, distributing party publications and pamphlets, and regulating the education of constituency members.

(b) paying constant attention to the feelings and wishes of the people and reporting them to the superior Party authorities. Paying complete attention to the

economic, social, political, and cultural living conditions of the masses and relating them to the Party instructions or struggling for the people's desires.

Destiny and Punishment

Destiny

Article 39: Party members through their actions, testimony, loyalty, and sacrifice are destined to complete (achieve) observance of the regulations, discipline, original action, the ethics and the objectives and policies of the Party, and the decisions of the superior Party organizations and Central Committee for the sake of the goals of the Party.

Punishment

Article 40: Party organizations from top to bottom can, according to circumstances and conditions, take the following legal decisions concerning an infringement of the decisions of superior Party authorities, the aims of the Central Committee, a violation of the objectives and constitution or discipline of the party, a transgression of the party regulations, or not carrying out one's Party duties. Punishments may be the following: Private verbal reprimand or public written reprimand; demotion by one or several ranks of a responsible Party member; change a full member into a probationary member; suspension of Party Membership or expel the member from the party.

Article 41: If a full or probationary member of the Party does not pay his membership dues for three months without presenting an acceptable excuse or does not attend Party meetings on three successive occasions without a reasonable excuse and after a reprimand and warning does not heed Party regulations, he can be expelled from the Party on the recommendation of relevant authorities.

Article 42: Any Party Organization at any level or position can, bearing in mind the difficulty of the struggle, act under Article 41 against any member violating Party regulations and report him to higher authorities. The higher authorities are entitled to specify the punishment appropriate to the infringement. They may also acquit, reduce, or increase the punishment.

Article 43: In cases where a violation of a Party member has seriously damaged the unity, independence, prestige, or existence of the Party, the guilty individual will be expelled from the Party. Every Party entity is entitled to expel a particular party member, although the ultimate competence lies with the Central Committee or the authorities that are given such discretion by the Central Committee.

Article 44: Expulsion from the Party is considered the maximum and most severe judgement of the Party. All Party organizations when adopting a decision to approve an expulsion will take careful note of all brotherly remarks and observations; witnesses and relevant documents will be carefully studied and investigated. The accused's complaints will be given careful attention and his mental inclinations, personal motives, and misabuse of position will be seriously studied.

Article 45: A convicted member must be informed of the reasons for conviction and if he thinks the sentence unjust, he may protest and demand a retrial of the relevant authorities or complain to higher authorities.

Article 46: In expelling a full or alternate member of the Central Committee from the Central Committee or the Party, the Plenum of the Central Committee must take the decision, and this decision must be reached by a two-thirds vote of the full membership of the Central Committee.

Resignation of Party Membership

Article 47: Whenever a full or probationary member of the Party wishes to resign, he must tender his resignation letter to the relevant organization. Whenever a Party member is the perpetrator of a clear violation of the Party's constitution, regulations, or discipline and wishes to resign, acceptance of his resignation equates to expulsion from the Party.

Financial Matters of the Party

Article 48: The Party's funds will come from membership dues, the sale of Party publications and pamphlets, and the contributions of Party members or the people.

Article 49: The extent of full and probationary membership and the inclusion of members in the Party will be determined by the Central Committee.

Article 50: The Central Committee has the right to determine how the Party's funds will be used.

Relations of the Party and the Electoral Organizations of the Country

Article 51: Participation in the elections for organizations and electoral organizations is subject to the agreement of Provincial, Urban, Woluswali, and [Sub]district committees. The activities of Party members in electoral organizations is subject to the practical (scientific) policies of the Party.

Appendix C

The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party in Afghanistan

The Great October Socialist Revolution launched a new era in the history of the world. As a result of the epic-making [i.e., epoch-making] October Socialist Revolution, the world movement of the working class entered its Lenin[ist] phase. One of the characteristics of this era was the emergence of communist parties in many countries, for example, in the developing countries. The main effect produced by the October Revolution in Afghanistan was the burnishing of the liberation movement of our people, and this was reflected in the armed liberation uprising of our people for the sake of freeing the country from the yoke of British imperialism and alerting it to the oppression of feudalism. The young Soviet Government was the first country to officially recognize our independence.

It is perfectly clear that, because of the domination of the feudal system and the influence of colonialism and imperialism, our developing country, in spite of all of its abundant natural resources and its valiant and ambitious manpower, had been kept at the lowest level of social-economic life until the beginning of the Second World War.

After the Second World War, by virtue of the intensification of the struggle between the farmers and the feudalists, the struggle between the people and the absolute monarchy, and the struggle between the Afghan people and imperialism and as a result of the brilliant victory of the Soviet people in the battle against Hitler's fascism, the intensification of the public investment crisis, the emergence of the socialist camp and the rising respect for that, the rapid escalation of the national liberation movements of the peoples of Asia and Africa and, among them, the growth of the National Pushtunistan and Baluchistan movement, the movement [tr. note: one word indistinct] people and nation, the Democratic Student Movement and the Seventh Term National Council [i.e., Seventh National Assembly (1946–1952)] sprouted in our country and to some extent spread.

As a result of the relative growth of the creative and supportive forces of the friendly relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union and the gratuitous [i.e.,

---

This document, translated from Dari by an unidentified U.S. government employee, was provided by the Department of State. From the contents, it is clear that it was written by a Khalqi in 1976, probably as part of the Parcham-Khalq competition in lining up support among foreign pro-Soviet parties.

free] economic and technical assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in dozens of useful economic and cultural projects, the appearance of the old, feudal, backward Afghanistan changed perceptibly and the country's working class grew rapidly.

All of these factors profoundly affected the composition of the classes, legal and political views, learning, culture, and beliefs and, in general, the social consciousness of the people of Afghanistan, and the country's international position. As a result of the availability of all these relatively favorable national and international conditions, Marxist-Leninist thought influenced Afghanistan's intelligentsia, and Marxist-Leninist circles appeared in the country during the 1950s and early 1960s.

These circles coalesced on 1 January 1965 in the First Congress (the founding congress), and they established our Marxist-Leninist Party in Afghanistan. The First Congress named the party the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. It selected seven people as principal members of the Central Committee and four people as alternates. The principal members of the Central Committee were: Comrade Nur Mohammed Taraki, Comrade Dastegir Panjshiri, Comrade Dr. Saleh Mohammed Ziri, Shahrollah Shahpar, Babrak (later he adopted the pen name "Karmal"), Sultanali Keshtmand, and Taher Badakhshi.

The alternate members of the Central Committee selected by the First Congress were: Comrade Dr. Shah Wali, Comrade Karim Misaq, Dr. Mohammed Taher, and Abdalwahab Safi. The Central Committee, in the presence of the members of the congress, unanimously selected the long-standing communist and revolutionary and prominent writer, Comrade Nur Mohammed Taraki, as General Secretary of the P.D.P.A.'s Central Committee.

The congress set forth the goals of the party as the building of a socialist society in Afghanistan based on adapting the morals of general truths and the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary principles to conditions in Afghanistan. The congress endorsed the general policy of the party, and gave guidance to the Central Committee so that it could draft the party's constitution and aims in accordance with the guidance given.

Thus, the First Congress of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the vanguard of the Country's worker class) established the Communist Party of Afghanistan.

Since its establishment, the P.D.P.A. has held high the banner of class struggle and has fought to guarantee the democratic rights of the people and for the victory of the democratic revolution against feudalism and imperialism in the country. The victory of this revolution is the strategic goal of the party in this stage of the revolutionary struggle of the Afghan people.

The Publication of the Newspaper KHALQ *and the P.D.P.A.'s Struggle to Continue Legal Publications.*

On 11 April 1966, the P.D.P.A. legally published the newspaper KHALQ, its propaganda organ, the editor-in-chief of which was Comrade Taraki. In the first and second editions of that newspaper, which had come off the presses together, the

"Democratic Aim of KHALQ" which had been approved by the vast Plenum of the P.D.P.A.'s Central Committee were published in the Pushtu and Dari languages [see Appendix A]. The "Aim" specified the strategic objective of the party in the present stage of promoting the national democratic revolution. In accordance with the aim, the P.D.P.A. is faithfully struggling to create a united national front, the backbone of which will be formed by the union of the workers and peasants. The "Aim" explains that a national democratic government can be realized by virtue of such a united movement. The other main components of the P.D.P.A.'s program were: non-capitalistic growth and turning toward socialism, democratic land reforms, nationalization of foreign trade, a cultural revolution, a democratic solution to national problems, a progressive foreign policy, support of the principle of peace and of the world-wide national liberation movement against imperialist aggression, and friendly relations with the socialist countries, primarily with the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries.

Although the P.D.P.A. is struggling, based on "KHALQ's Democratic Aim," to establish a national democratic government and to pursue non-capitalistic growth, it is not losing sight of its ultimate objective, which is the building of a socialist society in Afghanistan based on scientific socialism. The P.D.P.A. believes that the working class' leadership in the national democratic revolution will guarantee its evolution into a socialist revolution.

The publication of KHALQ produced a reaction among both friends and enemies. The working class and its allies found in KHALQ a reflection of their own patriotic ideals and applauded it. The enemies of KHALQ, however, both outside and within the parliament (the Lower House and the Senate) were enraged against the newspaper. Contrary to all legal precepts, Zahir Shah's cabinet banned the newspaper KHALQ on 2 Jowza 1345 [tr. note: 22 May 1966] following the publication of its sixth issue.

The newspaper KHALQ played a prominent role in awakening the political consciousness of the people and enhanced the prestige of the P.D.P.A. The P.D.P.A. became recognized as the party championing the cause of rescuing the toilers. From that date on, members of the P.D.P.A. were called Khalqists (allied to the people) by the people.

After KHALQ was banned, the party's campaign to obtain permission to legally publish news continued. The party's Secretary General, Nur Mohammed Taraki, submitted the first petition to the Minister of Culture and Information in the fall of 1967. Some time later, in response to that petition, the Minister of Information and Culture wrote:

"Mr. Nur Mohammed Taraki,

"Since your newspaper KHALQ previously had been banned and since the tenor, aim, and objectives of the newspaper you wish to publish are exactly the same, after consulting with the Office of the Inspector General the Ministry of Culture and Information cannot permit you to publish the new newspaper under the same name or under any other name. You may request a copy of the letter from the Inspector General.

"Respectfully,

"Minister of Culture and Information"

Regarding the underlined words, the stress is ours. A photocopy of the letter exists.

At the exact same time, the Minister of Culture and Information granted a license to "Babrak Washraka" to publish the newspaper PARCHAM at a time when they were pretending to be the promoters of the cause of the newspaper KHALQ and claimed that they would carry forward in the "exact same manner and way" the "tenor, aim, and objectives" of the newspaper KHALQ.

The second application for a license for a legal newspaper, to be called KARGAR and to be managed by Comrade Karim Misaq, was submitted to the Ministry of Culture and Information by Comrade Dr. Saleh Mohammed Ziri on 9/2/1347 [tr. note: 28 April 1968]. On this application, too, the Minister of Culture and Information wrote his negative response. In the very same way, several other applications for licenses to publish legal newspapers entitled PEYAM-E KHALQ, 'ASR-E NOVIN, MASH'AL-E KHALQ, JONBESH, etc. were submitted by other comrades and they were rejected by the Ministry of Culture and Information. The group supporting Maoism, however, was permitted to publish the newspaper SHA'ALEH JAVID [Sholay-e-Jaweid].

The royal regime intentionally gave these two masked groups, which, under the guise of anti-communism [*sic*], created division and dissension in the ranks of the progressive, democratic movement in the country, the opportunity to play divisive and antagonistic roles on the stage of the political battle. Naturally, this proved to be advantageous to the ruling classes and the aristocratic leadership of Afghanistan.

As a result of the experience which the regime gained from the publication of the newspaper KHALQ and the huge reaction to that among patriotic layers [i.e., strata] and classes of society, the regime always blocked the struggle of the real forces of patriotism and devotion to the high ideals of the people; but, these forces did not surrender, regardless of the conditions.

The P.D.P.A.'s several years experience and those of other fighters in making use of legal publications and in sending a deputy to the Council [i.e., parliament] confirmed this reality.

When it was not possible to publish newspapers legally, the P.D.P.A. clandestinely published the newspaper JONBESH and RAHNEMA.

****

THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN'S STRUGGLE TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN AND TO EXPOSE THE UNPRINCIPLED POSITION TAKEN BY THE DEVIATIONIST GROUP OF "BABRAK KARMAL"*

In the history of the communist and worker parties of the world, there are examples which show that the ruling classes, in order to undermine genuine Marxist-Leninist parties, have planted sham parties in the field more or less to play the role of parallel parties on the stage of the class struggle.

In a backward country like Afghanistan, the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist party is a difficult task, and its evolution is a lengthy and complicated process. To maintain the purity of our Marxist-Leninist party, not only is it necessary to struggle diligently against the party's obvious enemies; but, it is also necessary to wage an unrelenting battle against the party's internal deviationists and the enemies who hypocritically pretend to be friends.

Under the present conditions, the treacherous position taken by the domestic Maoists and the international Maoists, in particular, has increased the difficulties of this battle.

Since its establishment, the P.D.P.A. has waged and is still waging such a broad and comprehensive struggle throughout the world. Feudal reactionism, the brokers of imperialism, and international reactionism, under the leadership of American imperialism, tried to prevent the establishment of the P.D.P.A. prior to its formation. The convening of the First Party Congress was an enormous victory for the working class and for the brave people of Afghanistan. With the establishment of the party, the enemies of communism in Afghanistan were extremely awed and puzzled because their baseless prediction when they said, "The likelihood of the advancement of Marxist-Leninist ideas and the grounds for the establishment of a communist party do not exist in Afghanistan because of the strength of religious beliefs, medieval superstitions, and the royal regime's domination over the thoughts of the people," proved wrong.

After the establishment of the P.D.P.A., the ideas of scientific socialism made rapid progress in Afghanistan, and the ranks of the party swelled. Therefore, imperialist and feudalist reactionism mobilized all of their power and took advantage of all means, both inside and outside the party, to eliminate the vanguard of the country's working class or, at least, to slow its progress. Therefore, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's victories in various arenas were not won easily. The P.D.P.A., relying on the revolutionary spirit of its brave cadres and ranks, cleared the abundant difficulties from its path, bearing aloft the bright Marxist-Leninist torch. Although abundant problems still lies ahead, hope in final victory is firmly rooted in the hearts of all Khalqists.

After the newspaper KHALQ was banned, an extensive plan for combatting the P.D.P.A. was launched by the reactionary forces and the royal regime. For example, in a secret meeting of the Senate, one of the senators affiliated with the royal court

---

*Mistranslated ". . . by the deviationist group, by 'Babrak Karmal'" in the original; there is no doubt that Babrak is not the author of this article, but its target.

said regarding the newspaper KHALQ, "The problem will not be solved just by banning the newspaper KHALQ. The powerful organization of the Khalq Party remains. We must do something to uproot this party."

One of the plans of reactionism and the royal regime was to split the party from within. They embarked on efforts to establish a faction within the party. Therefore, they began a campaign against the principal members of the party and, for example, against the sincere members of the Central Committee. After the illegal banning of the newspaper KHALQ, "Babrak Washrak" embarked on factionalism. In one of the Central Committee's plenums, Babrak said, "In publishing the newspaper KHALQ, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan became involved in 'leftism.' We flaunted our 'red coloration,' and we should convince the King that we are not communists." Babrak's statements were rejected by a majority of the members of the Central Committee's plenum, and the party continued its revolutionary policy.

In order to check the unprincipled and divisive activities in the party, they decided to enlarge the Central Committee. Therefore Comrade Mohammed Esma'il Danesh, Comrade Hafizollah Amin, Comrade Abdulhakim Sha'rai, Mohammed Zahir Ofagh, Dr. Abdul Mohammed, Mohammed Hassan Baraq Shafi'i, Nur Mohammed Panjwai, and Gholam Mojadad Sliman Laiq [Suleiman Layeq], were unanimously selected from among the party's worthy and active cadre and alternate members of the Central Committee. Babrak, however, did not cease his factiousness.

"Babrak Washraka" outwardly displayed loyalty to the party and to the Central Committee, but secretly he was working skillfully against the policies and decisions of the Central Committee. Until, finally, Babrak, in order to prove his loyalty to the King, made his famous reactionary speech during the 12th term of the Lower House. The pro-monarchist speech was shocking to even the most reactionary deputies, because, fearing public opinion, they would not dare to express their pro-monarchy sentiments so explicitly. This statement was printed in the 18th issue of the newspaper WOLSI JERGEH [*Wolesi Jirgah*], dated 17 Asad 1345 [tr. note: 7 August 1966] and we will quote a portion of its text below:

> "Mr. Chairman and respected members of the assembly.
> There is no doubt that by virtue of Article 15 the King is? not an official? and is worthy of respect. It is the duty of each and every Afghan subject to pay his most heartfelt respect to such a king who, I dare say, is considered the most progressive of all of the kings in the monarchist countries of Asia. This is a right which we sincerely believe in and revere, and no one can deprive us of this right to respect such a progressive King. . . . From the standpoint of the Ministry of Court's budget, throughout the world, the government's budget is based on a rational balance. We, too, from the days of the first orthodox Caliphs of Islam up to now, have granted to the high authorities of government a budget which is based on balance and justice and, therefore, we can certainly place the Ministry of Court's budget at the disposal of our great King. If we must convince ourselves, then the Ministry of Court and Ministry of Finance will be responsible for doing so in order that H.M. the King of Afghanistan will not waste his precious time on such matters."

Regarding some of the archaic terms of the royal court, he said, "These terms have all become archaic. It would be well to entrust the honored assembly, in contact with the Ministry of Court and Ministry of Finance, to render new terms so that the authority and prestige of our King will be established and preserved." (We have a photocopy of this speech. The underlining is ours.)

This speech and other deviations committed by Babrak, including his insistence on the proposal that Mir Akbar Kheybar, a Royal Police officer who certainly was not a party member, be selected as a member of the Central Committee. Later, Babrak made extensive use of these Royal Police functionaries and of Mirman Anahayta [Anahita Ratebzad] to strengthen his faction.

Babrak, the other [i.e., second] son of General Mohammed Hossein Khan, Commander of all of the Armed Forces in the southern sector and Governor of Paktia during the royal regime; Anahayta, the wife of Dr. Karameddin, the King's personal physician; and Mir Akbar Kheybar, the Royal Police Officer, were the three principal faces in Babrak's faction. These people, through various means, tried to attract the party members to Babrak's faction.

Meetings of Babrak's faction were held in the home of Jilani Bakhtari, Babrak's cousin (a high-ranking official of the royal regime and, later, Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation), on the pretext of the teaching of the Pushtu language by Gholam Mojadad Sliman Laiq, father-in-law [*sic*, probably son-in-law was intended] of Barah Sebghatollah Mojadadi, the famous Afghan anti-communist and prominent leader of the Moslem Brotherhood.

Babrak perceived the Central Committee members' distrust of him. Therefore, he intensified his anti-party activities and, consequently, the members of the Central Committee supported his expulsion from the party. Babrak tried to procrastinate with the help of his cohorts, and he came up with another trick. On 2 Mizan 1345 [tr. note: 24 September 1966], he submitted his resignation from membership in the Central Committee and the Secretariat. He thought that, by resigning from the Central Committee and taking his place in the party's ranks, he would regain the trust of the Central Committee. In his letter of resignation, among other things, Babrak wrote, "I hereby submit my resignation and withdrawal from membership in the Central Committee and from the post of Deputy Secretary General of the Central Committee." (We have a photocopy of the letter of resignation.)

Since the constitution of communist parties considers the struggle a voluntary matter and, in particular, in order to prevent a party split, a Central Committee Plenum was held and Babrak's resignation was accepted by a majority vote of the principal [i.e., full] members of the Central Committee. Those principal members of the Central Committee who endorsed Babrak's resignation were: Comrade Nur Mohammed Taraki, Secretary General of the Party; Comrade Dastegir Panjshiri; and Comrade Dr. Salah Ziri. Because Babrak had officially submitted his resignation, his vote was counted as being for his resignation. Shapar, Tahir Badakhshi, and Keshtemand were three of the principal members of the Central Committee who voted against accepting Babrak's resignation.

By using the ploy of his resignation, Babrak was able to prevent his expulsion from the party.

Later, the deceitful scene-playing began with the beating of Babrak in the

House of Representatives on 9 Qus [tr. note: 30 November] and his confinement in Ibn Sina Hospital. [In late 1966, after a particularly acrimonious debate in parliament, both Babrak and Anahita were set upon by fellow delegates, resulting in hospitalization of the former. Although Babrak tried to make political capital by exaggerating the extent of his injuries, the incident itself was genuine, not staged as alleged here.] When the Central Committee Plenum was held and this affair was discussed, Babrak's supporters, without getting a decision from the Central Committee and under the prior guidance of Babrak himself, ordered, in the name of the Central Committee, party comrades at Kabul University to begin a pro-Babrak demonstration at the university. The party ranks at Kabul University, who were completely unwitting, launched the demonstration and, thus, the Central Committee Plenum was faced with a fait accompli. By taking advantage of this incident, Babrak tried to restore his lost prestige. He tried to get the Central Committee to announce in a communique its complete confidence in him; but, the committee did not comply. A number of the party members and some of the Central Committee members who had not grasped the true nature of the Babrak "beating" incident in the House of Representatives, because of naivete or lack of adequate political experience, gathered around him and, finally, taking advantage of this staged incident, Babrak separated from the party in the month of Sowr 1346 [tr. note: 20 April to 20 May 1967].

In the split, among the Central Committee principal members elected by the Congress, Comrades Dastegir Panjshiri, Shahpar, and Keshtemand resigned with Babrak. Comrade Nur Mohammed Taraki, Comrade Dr. Salah Mohammed Ziri, and Tahir Badakhshi remained in the party. Of the two members co-opted as principal members of the Central Committee selected by the Congress, Comrade Dr. Shah Wali took the party's side and Nur Ahmad Panjwa'i sided with Babrak; but, a decisive majority of the alternate members of the Central Committee sided with the Secretary General of the Party and with the principal wing. These members were: Comrade Karim Misaq, Comrade Mohammed Esma'il Danesh, Comrade Hafizollah Amin, Dr. Mohammed Zahir, Dr. 'Eyd-ol-Mohammed, and Mohammed Zaher Ofagh. Those alternate members of the Central Committee who sided with Babrak were: Comrade Abdulhakim Shara'i, Gholan Mojadad Sliman Laiq, Hassan Baraq Shafi'i, and Abdul Wahab Safi.

After the split in 1967, the government gave "Babrak Washraka" a license to publish the newspaper PARCHAM in 1967; but, it illegally and undemocratically refused to give a license to the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to publish a legal newspaper in spite of repeated applications. (In this regard, valid qualifications had been submitted under the title "Publication of the Newspaper KHALQ.")

After a while, another group of comrades also perceived Babrak's nature and, with communist moral integrity, they rose up against his unprincipled and hypocritical actions. Comrade Dastegir Panjshiri, Comrade Abdulhakim Shara'i, and Shahrollah Shahpar, perceiving the fact that the separation of "Babrak Washraka" from the party was not based on any principles and that his split was harmful to the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and to the country's communist movement, intensified with all their strength the campaign against "Babrak Washraka" for the purpose of joining with the P.D.P.A.

As a result of these persistent campaigns of the sincere and principled comrades, "Babrak Washraka" had no alternative but to enter into discussions with the P.D.P.A.'s Central Committee. These talks continued for one week in the home of Comrade Nur Mohammed Taraki, Secretary General of the Party, with comrades Dr. Shah Wali and Karim Misaq participating on behalf of the P.D.P.A. and with comrades Dastegir Panjshiri and 'Eid-ol-hakim Shara'i participating on behalf of Babrak. At the end of the discussions, agreement was reached to provide for unity of action as a first step and, gradually, to pave the way for full unity. Because this agreement did not conform to the separatist aims of Babrak Washraka, he rudely vetoed that agreement.

In order to strengthen his separatist position, "Babrak Washraka" tried to have Akbar Kheybar, the Royal Police officer, and Mrs. Anahayta, wife of Dr. Karameddin, the King's personal physician, neither of whom were members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, appointed as members of his "Central Committee." But Babrak Washraka's unprincipled plan was strongly opposed by the sincere comrades and was categorically rejected.

Comrade Dastegir Panjshiri, Comrade Abdulhakim Shara'i, and Sharollah Shapar, with a number of the cadres, considered any further removal from the party and siding with Babrak treason against Afghanistan's communist movement. Therefore, with communist heroism and integrity, they guaranteed full unity with the P.D.P.A. and joined with the party along with a large number of comrades.

Thus, with the joining of these comrades to the party, a definite majority of the Central Committee members who had been elected by the First Congress and those members who had been appointed to the Central Committee by the Central Committee elected by the First Congress (comrades Nur Mohammed Taraki, Secretary General of the Party; Dastegir Panjshiri; Dr. Salah Mohammed Ziri; Dr. Shah Wali; and Sharollah Shahpar) held office in the P.D.P.A.'s Central Committee. Keshtemand and Nur Ahmad Panjwa'i, however, remained with Babrak as resigned members of the Central Committee. It is necessary to add that Tahir Badakhshi previously had resigned from the party.

With the uniting of a decisive majority of the members of the Central Committee selected by the First Congress around the Secretary General of the Party, Nur Mohammed Taraki, the P.D.P.A. entered its new phase of evolution. Its membership increased, and its influence among the people rose. In order to better organize party affairs and to further strengthen the party's leadership, the Central Committee decided to appoint a number of trained, militant comrades to the Central Committee. The first four alternate members of the Central Committee, comrades Karim Misaq, Hafizollah Amin, Mohammed 'Esmai'il Danesh, and Abdulhakim Shara'i were selected by unanimous vote of the Central Committee as principal members of the Central Committee, and comrades Mansur Hashemi, Abdulahad Wolsi, Rashid Arian, Mahmud Soma, Hassan Peyman, Mohammed Yasin Bonyadi, and Abdul Karim Zarghun were selected from among the active cadres of the party as alternate members of the Central Committee. Thus, the principal members of the Central Committee now consist of: the Secretary General of the Party, Comrade Nur Mohammed Taraki; Comrade Dastegir Panjshiri; Comrade Dr. Salah Mohammed Ziri; Comrade Akbar Shah Wali; Comrade Karim Misaq; Comrade Abdulhakim

Shara'i: Comrade Hafizollah Amin; and Comrade Engineer Mohammed Esma'il Danesh. Alternate members of the P.D.P.A.'s Central Committee consist of: Comrade Mansur Hashemi, Comrade Abdulahad Wolsi, Comrade Mahmud Soma, Comrade Arian, Comrade Hassan Peyman, and Mohammed Yasin Bonyadi. Recently, Sharollah Shahpar submitted written notification that he had severed his ties with the party, and Dr. Abdulkarim Zarghun was expelled from the party for his unprincipled actions.

One party's struggles against "Babrak Washraka" were reflected in the country's press prior to announcement of the Republican Regime. After the publication of the newspaper PARCHAM, the P.D.P.A.'s Central Committee announced in issue 50 of the newspaper AFGHAN MELLAT, dated 27 Hut 1347 [tr. note: 17 March 1968], that Parcham had no organizational connection with KHALQ. When Babrak was invited to India by Chaya Purkash Narayan, he thanked him as a representative of the P.D.P.A. in issue 48 of the newspaper RUZKAR, dated Sonbaleh 1350 [tr. note: 22 August to 22 September 1971]. The P.D.P.A.'s Central Committee responded to Babrak in the First Issue of the second year of the newspaper RUZKAR, dated 7 Mizan 1350 [tr. note: 29 September 1971], stating that there is only one People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in Afghanistan and that Babrak does not have the honor of membership on its leadership council. Moreover, it presented the policy of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan regarding basic unity and the formation of a united front as follows:

—All individuals and groups which believe in the aims of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and its organizational and ideological principles must join with the P.D.P.A. based on the decisions of the First Congress and the Central Committee elected by that congress.

—Parties and forces which are combatting Feudalism and Imperialism and do not agree wholeheartedly with ideological and organizational principles of the P.D.P.A., while maintaining an independent name and identity and preserving their ideology, may unite with the P.D.P.A. in a united National Democratic Front.

But "Babrak Washraka" did not give a positive answer to this basic proposal and in order to check any further exposure regarding him, he cut-off any followup debate in RUZKAR. (For detailed studies of this subject, please refer to the issue of 31 Sonbaleh 1350 [tr. note: 21 September 1971]; the First Issue of Mizan 1350 [23 September–22 October 1971]; the Sixth Issue, dated 19 'Aqrab 1350 [10 November 1971]; the Seventh Issue of 26 'Aqrab 1350 [17 November 1971]; and the Eighth Issue of 3 Qus 1350 [24 November 1971].

After the proclamation of the Republican Regime in Afghanistan, the P.D.P.A., by virtue of its basic policy, campaigned and is still campaigning for the establishment of a basic united front against Imperialism and Feudalism composed of all parties, groups, and individuals who are active in the present stage in supporting the application of a National Democratic Program. From the date of the proclamation of the Republican Regime up to now, the P.D.P.A. has explained its clear policy in various communiques, reports, and publications, and has conducted and is still conducting a comprehensive campaign against the disbandment-seeking spirit; but, as our fellow countrymen witnessed the scene, "Babrak Washraka" (the Parchamists), after the proclamation of the Republican Regime, occupied the profitable

governmental seats and, pursuing the policy of disbandment-seeking, they preached that now there is no need for the party because the republican government itself is carrying out all of the tasks and the continuation of party activities is treason against the Republic, and such statements as these. Although under pressure, the P.D.P.A. not only continued its party activities after the proclamation of the Republican Regime, but it expanded them. The publication of dozens of Marxist-Leninist communiques and works by the party is living proof of this fact. It is not a coincidence that the Parchamists are beginning, once again, activities as a parallel party opposite the P.D.P.A. to weaken the communist movement in the country. The P.D.P.A.'s Central Committee, which always supports unity and the union of forces and considers the formation of a parallel party treason against the working class and the matter of democratic unity of patriotic forces, has paved the way for talks and mutual understanding with all groups. Based on this same basic policy, in the month of Asad 1354 [tr. note: 22 July–21 August 1975], our party was willing to hold talks once again with the Parchamist leadership on the subject of unity and the formation of a United Front. It was mutually agreed that the talks would continue in secret until their final conclusion in order to prevent the Khalq enemies from sabotaging the talks. The Parchamists, however, effectively violated the conditions agreed upon by publishing a communique in the name of the Central Committee of the P.D.P.A. without informing the P.D.P.A.'s Central Committee. After the proclamation of the republic, this was the first communique to be published by "Babrak Washraka" after a two-year conspiracy of silence, and, once again, he embarked on sowing discord and dissension. By exposing these talks and starting a political uproar, the Parchamists were trying to hide their disbandment-seeking position and their undesirable utilization of the important government posts. The talks regarding unity proved useless as a result of the sabotage and unprincipled position of the "Parcham" group, and the final outcome of the talks was reported to the interested parties in a communique.

Organizational Activities of the P.D.P.A.

The P.D.P.A. performs its political, ideological, and organizational work among the workers, peasants, tradesmen, and intellectuals. For the purpose of scientifically regulating organizational activities, the constitution of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was drafted on the basis of guidance provided by the First Congress (the founding congress) and, after approval by the Central Committee Plenum, it was made available to the party comrades and sympathizers. The constitution of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan regulates party organizational activities on the basis of the Leninist golden organizational rule, i.e., the principle of democratic centralism.

The P.D.P.A., which is unswervingly loyal to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, combats opportunism of the "left" and right in the movement and, based on its scientifically organized constitution, it always purges the party ranks of foreign elements. As a result of the untiring activities of the party's brave cadres and members, party organizations now have developed in even the most remote parts of the country, and the party has grown

from the quantitative and qualitative standpoint. As a result of the party's valiant campaigns against the decrepit feudalist order and the royal regime, many of the party cadres, among them three members of the Central Committee: comrades Dr. Salah Mohammed Ziri, Dastegir Panjshiri,and Karim Misaq, were thrown into prison. For example, Comrade Dastegir Panjshiri and Comrade Salah Mohammed Ziri served more than four years in prison, and they were released from prison after the Republic was proclaimed.

Khalqist Demonstrations and Meetings

It is clear to all that Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world and the percentage of illiterates in Afghanistan is deplorably high. In such a poverty-stricken country, the campaign to awaken the political consciousness of the people and to organize them is a very difficult task. In this regard, direct contact and verbal propaganda plays a suitable role. The people of our country traditionally have been accustomed to verbal propaganda and learning through hearing. Bearing these conditions in mind, from 1973 to 1975 (the last years of the monarchy) [*sic*—presumably 1971 to 1973 intended], the P.D.P.A. organized and led approximately 2,000 meetings and street demonstrations throughout the country and, in addition to defending the democratic rights and freedoms of the workers, peasants, students, teachers, and women, by making speeches, it raised the level of political consciousness and organizational spirit of the people. These campaigns earned the party enormous prestige among the masses and isolated opportunist groups of the "Left" and the Right.

Every year, the P.D.P.A. celebrates the First of May with country-wide demonstrations and meetings of the masses. For example, in 1973, our friends celebrated this day in 30 different places in the country by holding huge meetings and street demonstrations, and reports on these events were published in the press at the time. Although, with the proclamation of the Republican Regime, celebration of this day by holding meetings and street demonstrations has been prohibited, our party still celebrates May Day with the distribution of congratulatory messages and other means.

The Third of Aqrab (25 October) is another day which is commemorated every year by the P.D.P.A. and other patriotic political groups. On 25 October 1965, the Royal Police fired upon a peaceful demonstration of the people and killed several youngsters. In 1973, the P.D.P.A., as in previous years, commemorated this day throughout the country with meetings and demonstrations. The P.D.P.A. demonstration in the city of Herat was attacked by supporters of "Sha'aleh Javid," partisans of Maoism, and, as a result, several young party members were wounded and a brave young Khalqist named 'Abdul Qadir was martyred. This brave, 20-year old youth, with revolutionary courage, kept the banner of his party aloft until the last moment of his life. According to some of the witnesses, there are indications that Iran's homicidal SAVAK organization was also involved in this killing and incident. During the same year, in Paktia, a young party member named Pajazadin was assassinated by reactionary forces.

The reactionary, right-wing, extremist religious band called the "Moslem Youth," like the "Moslem Brotherhood," persists in its attacks on the P.D.P.A. from the right flank. This group was clandestinely led by the royal court and American Imperialism.

Parliamentary Campaigns of Our Party

Since the very beginning of its establishment, the P.D.P.A. has had a Leninist attitude toward Parliament and parliamentary campaigns. While it rejects bourgeois parliamentarianism, it supports the revolutionary use of parliament's tribunal and parliamentary campaigns on behalf of advancing party goals, and it has organized this form of campaign for non-parliamentary problems. Based on this policy, numerous candidates, including the Secretary General of the Party, participated in the 1965 Elections. Among the candidates, only three people (Babrak, Nur Ahmad Panjwa'i and Feizan Alhaq) were able to go to the House of Representatives; but, after Babrak failed to implement the party's policy in the council [i.e., parliament] and emerged as the watchdog of the monarchy and resigned from the Central Committee and, later, split from the party, the party actually lacked a representative in Parliament during the twelfth term of the House of Representatives.

During 1348 [tr. note: 1969], the P.D.P.A. also presented several candidates from various districts for election to the House of Representatives, among them Dr. Salah Mohammed Ziri, the Central Committee member. Because the feudalists had a very free hand in the elections and the government supported them, the party was able to send only one representative, Comrade Hafizollah Amin, to the House of Representatives. This representative made use of the Council's tribunal to communicate the party's stand on various issues.

Solidarity with the World Revolutionary Forces and the Campaign Against Imperialism and Maoism

The P.D.P.A., which overflows with the lofty ideas of proletarian internationalism and has patriotic thoughts running through its warp and woof, struggles against Imperialism, and particularly aggressive American Imperialism and its open ally Maoism, and is fighting alongside our brother parties, foremost among them the Leninist Party of the Soviet Union, for the unity of the World Communist Movement and the union of the revolutionary forces of the world in order to strengthen peace, democracy, and socialism.

Since its foundation, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has struggled to strengthen the friendship between the people of Afghanistan and the people of the Soviet Union and the close ties between the two governments of Afghanistan and of the Soviet Union. Approximately 90 useful economic, technical, and cultural projects, which so far have been completed or are under way in Afghanistan with the gratuitous [i.e., free] assistance of the Soviet Union, are an eternal reminder of this valuable friendship. The modern Salang Koshk–Herat-Qandahar public road; the Nangarhar Canal; the Naghlu hydroelectric apparatus; the housing construction

plant; the Mazar silos, fertilizer plant, and thermal electric plant; the Jangalak Factory; the Kabul Polytechnic Institute; technicians; and dozens of other projects which have played a suitable role in strengthening the political independence and in guaranteeing the full economic independence of our country and have been successfully completed with the help of the Soviet Union, have delighted each Afghan and patriot. It is for this reason that the P.D.P.A. and other sincere patriotic forces defend Afghanistan's friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The P.D.P.A. defends the right of nations to determine their own fate and the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence among various social-political orders. It has declared its unstinting support of the just struggles of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to gain political and economic independence against the open, neo-colonialist aggressions of Imperialism, particularly American Imperialism, and its new ally, i.e. Maoism. On numerous occasions, the Khalqists have condemned Israel's aggression and the occupation of the Arab lands, and have supported the legal rights of the Palestinian people.

In its various meetings and demonstrations, the P.D.P.A. has joined with the international movement for solidarity with the brave people of Vietnam and other peoples of Indochina and has made the subject of peace and freedom for the people of Indochina its slogan. When the heroic people of Vietnam, with the people of Laos and Cambodia, achieved victory, the joy and happiness of us Afghan Communists knew no bounds. We were well aware that the sacrifices of the Indochina Wars were made for our sake and for the sake of all oppressed peoples of the world. The lesson which the brave people of Vietnam taught to the [tr. note: one word obscure] of American Imperialism has deprived her to a great extent of the boldness to commit open military aggression. For example, American Imperialism could not embark on an adventure in Angola like its brutal intervention in Vietnam. In this case, Maoism, with the hasty and open assistance of Imperialism and hand in hand with the South African racists, intervened in Angola against the legitimate government of the people. History, however, issued its verdict and the people of Angola, with the comprehensive support of the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, heroic Cuba, and other peace-loving countries of the world, achieved a stunning victory.

When the military regime in Pakistan embarked on wholesale slaughter of the innocent people of Bangla Desh, the P.D.P.A. raised its cry of protest in Afghanistan in defense of the people of Bangla Desh and, during various meetings and demonstrations and in issuing resolutions, it defended the rights of the people of Bangla Desh. When the struggles of the Bangla Desh liberationists achieved victory and the new Republic was created in the sub-continent, the P.D.P.A. earnestly asked the Afghan Government of the time to officially recognize that government as soon as possible.

The P.D.P.A. has always supported the daily-increasing expansion of friendly ties and relations between Afghanistan and the socialist countries and peace-loving governments. For example, in its numerous communiques and resolutions, it has petitioned the Afghan Government of the time to officially recognize the Democratic Government of Vietnam, the Democratic Government of Germany, the Democratic Government of Korea, and the People's Republic of Cuba and to establish diplomatic relations with these governments at the earliest possible time.

The P.D.P.A. has continually supported the right of the people of Pushtunistan and Baluchistan to determine their own fate. In the course of dozens of meetings and demonstrations, it exposed the policies of the Afghan monarchy which traded politically on this question. When the reactionary Government of Pakistan, under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, dissolved the governments of the states of Baluchistan and Pushtunistan contrary to the will of the Baluch and Pushtun peoples and tyranically threw the Baluch and Pushtun leaders into prison and proclaimed the illegal [*sic*—illegal the?] National Awami Party, the P.D.P.A. strongly condemned these oppressive actions with the publication of a communique, demanded the immediate release of the Pushtun and Baluch national leaders, and called this action of the Government of Pakistan, a member of the CENTO Pact, nothing more than the intrigues of Imperialism and Maoism by means of the imperialist military pact, CENTO.

The P.D.P.A. supports the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's peace program, which was approved by the 24th Congress, and, in the international arena, it fully supports the reduction of tension and the strengthening of detente.

We strongly condemned in a communique the crimes of the American CIA in Chile, which resulted in the tragic killing of that Son of the People, President Allende, and other Chilean patriots and brought to power the bloodthirsty Pinochet regime, and we demanded the immediate release of that brave champion and son of the people of Chile, Comrade Luis Carvalan [Corvalan], Secretary General of Chile's Communist Party, and other Chilean patriots and the restoration of Democracy in that country.

The P.D.P.A.'s Struggle After the Proclamation of the Republic

On 17 July 1973, the despotic regime of Zaher Shah was overthrown by means of a coup d'etat led by Mr. Mohammed Daud, and Afghanistan was proclaimed a republic. The P.D.P.A., which had made conditions favorable for the fall of the aristocratic, feudal monarchy with its continual massive campaigns against feudalism and its supporter, Imperialism, considered the proclamation of the republic a positive step. The P.D.P.A. published a communique on the very first day of the announcement of the new regime and it alerted its members to defend the Republic against the reactionary forces and the intrigues of Imperialism.

When Mr. Mohammed Daud, the president and prime minister, published the program of his government under the title "Address to the People of Afghanistan," the P.D.P.A. assessed this program as a positive step at this stage in the country's history. In the opinion of the P.D.P.A., this program by a verified government could be based on a united front, including the P.D.P.A. and other national and democratic forces. Up to now, however, no practical steps have been taken in this direction. As long as the government apparatus is not purged of all of the reactionaries and corrupt bureaucrats, the majority of whom also held lucrative posts in the royal regime, and as long as a basic national united front is not formed, no important step towards the best interests of the people will be taken.

The P.D.P.A. desires the union of the national democratic forces into a basic united front composed of the parties and groups opposed to Feudalism and Imperialism, and it supports a democratic republic.

The Khalqists reject the one-party system in Afghanistan in the present specific situation and they do not consider that system beneficial to the peaceful evolution of republicanism in the interests of the hard-working people of the country. We support non-capitalist growth, taking a socialist direction, democracy beneficial to the people, and the application of revolutionary iron discipline against enemies of the people and adventurers who betray the best interests of the people and the nation. The experience of the world's popular revolutionary struggle and the experience of the liberation struggles of the people of Afghanistan prove that all patriots and republicans, while preserving their independent organization identity, will rally around one another and work and struggle to build a new Afghanistan, the bright future of which is, without doubt, Socialism.

Publications of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

During its more than eleven years of existence, the P.D.P.A. has taken long strides toward spreading the epic-making [i.e., epoch-making] Marxist-Leninist ideology and it has made use of all means, including teaching in cells and party courses given by the experienced cadres, for this purpose.

Since the banning of the newspaper KHALQ, the party's struggle to obtain a license to publish a legal organ has so far been unsuccessful.

The P.D.P.A., insofar as it was able, took advantage of the governmental and non-governmental press to publish progressive literature. For example, it has published dozens of articles in the non-government newspaper PEYAM-E WAJDAN, among which one can cite: "Scientific Socialism" (historical materialism) in the Pushtu and Dari languages; "The Life of Lenin" (a relatively detailed biography) in the Dari language; the stories entitled "Qalincheh" (on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Great Lenin's birth) in the Dari language; and so forth.

The P.D.P.A. has published and distributed, openly and clandestinely, at home and abroad, through various channels, the following books, treatises, and newspapers:

1. The newspaper KHALQ—publisher of the democratic thoughts of the people (the party's central organ).
2. The book "New Way of Life"—three parts and three Marxist-Leninist sources; published in the Dari language.
3. The book "Dabank Mosaferi"—printed in the Pushtu language.
4. The book "Khasreh"—stories in the Pushtu language.
5. The book "Sepin"—stories in the Pushtu language.
6. The book "New Philosophy"—the first translation of a Marxist work into the Pushtu language—compiled by [one word unknown].

7. The book "The Economic-Political Foundations of Marxism" in the Dari language—translation from the work of Leontov.
8. The book "An Ideological Analysis of the Sha'aleh Javid" which was published in the Dari language to expose the Maoists of Afghanistan.
9. "The Communist Party Manifesto"—published for the first time in the Pushtu language.
10. "Daster Lenin Salmeh Kalizeh"—published in the Pushtu language and includes brief biographies of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.
11. The clandestine newspaper JONBESH.
12. The clandestine newspaper RAHNEMA.
13. The treatise "Da Democratico Qotono Div Wali Peh Bareh Keshi da Sha'aleh Javid da Band Mowzegiri"—published in the Pushtu language.
14. The book "Dekagari Tebqi Kunad" published in the Pushtu language.
15. "The Constitution of the P.D.P.A."—published in the Dari and Pushtu languages.
16. "Polar"—a translation into Pushtu of the stories "Qalincheh".
17. "Seven Fables"—a collection of short stories in the Dari language.
18. "The Mother's Smile"—a collection of short stories in the Dari language.
19. "Melody of the Lake"—stories in the Dari language.
20. "Da Bazgar Lor"—stories in the Pushtu language.
21. [tr. note: Text too obscure.]
22. "The Source and Principles of Scientific Socialism"—Dari translation of the work of L. Menaev.
23. "Questions and Answers"—a treatise in the Dari language.
24. The book "The Science of Socialism"—compiled in the Pushtu language.
25. "Da Vietnam Da Zahmatkeshano Da Konad Tarikh"—translation into Pushtu.
26. "Pushtuni O Khabuneh"—treatise in the Pushtu language.
27. "Land Reform—What Does it Mean?"—treatise in the Dari language.
28. "Lar."
29. "We Are Combatting Dissidence Within the Party"—a treatise in the Dari language.
30. "Our Path"—(an analysis of the economic and social situation in Afghanistan) a treatise in the Dari language.
31. "Dorus Da Social Democratico Wazifi"—a translation into Pushtu of Lenin's work.
32. "Da Marxism Peh Bareh Keshi"—a Pushtu translation of "Three Sources and Three Parts of Marxism" by Lenin.
33. The duplication and distribution of thousands of copies of various Marxist-Leninist works and of typewritten and handwritten party documents.

It is because of the party's continual struggle to spread the ideology that, right now, in all parts of the country, the epic-making [i.e., epoch-making] Marxist-Leninist ideology has made inroads among the workers, the peasants, and other toilers and intellectuals and has been propagated extensively.

* * * * * * * * *

In conclusion, since the basic unity and union of the progressive, democratic, and national forces of our country under the peculiar present conditions to combat Feudalism and Imperialism, to preserve the national interests, and to strengthen peace in the area stands as an urgent and vital necessity on the agenda of the day, the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the vanguard of the country's working class), once again, is submitting hereunder its basic, specific proposal regarding the unity and union of the progressive, democratic, and national forces:

—All individuals and groups which believe in the aim of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and its organizational principles and ideology should join with the P.D.P.A. on the basis of the decisions of the First Congress and the Central Committee elected by that Congress.

—Parties and groups which are combatting Feudalism and Imperialism and do not fully agree with the ideological and organizational principles of the P.D.P.A. may unite with the P.D.P.A. in a National United Democratic Front while maintaining their own name, identity, and ideology.

The Central Committee of the P.D.P.A., while submitting this basic plan, cordially invites all of the progressive, democratic, and national forces and all of the country's patriots to take some practical steps toward basic unity and union to guarantee the best interests of the people and the country.

Appendix D

Selected Biographic Sketches

(Dip. Engg.) Mohammed Siddiq Alemyar. Born in 1944, he graduated with a degree in geology from Kabul Polytechnic Institute and worked for three years as a geologist in the Ministry of Mines and Industry. He then won a scholarship to the USSR, where he received an engineering diploma. After brief service in the DRA in Kabul, he was appointed governor of Balkh in July 1978 and in April 1979 was named minister of planning. Evidently a Khalqi, under Amin he was appointed a secretary of the Central Committee and was a member of the organizational committee for the National Organization for the Defense of the Revolution. He and his younger brother Mohammed Aref Alemyar were suspected of assassinating Khyber on Amin's orders. Both brothers were executed in June 1980.

Hafizullah Amin. *See* Chapter 7.

(Dr.) Anahita. *See* (Dr.) Anahita Ratebzad.

Abdur Rashid Arian. Born in 1941 in Kandahar, where he started his PDPA activities in 1964, he became an alternate member of the Khalq Central Committee in 1967 and a full member in 1977. In 1978 he became a member of the Revolutionary Council, and after five months as deputy minister of information and culture, he was named ambassador to Pakistan. Under Babrak he remained on the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council and was made minister of justice, president of the High Judiciary Council, and attorney general. In August 1980 he was elected deputy prime minister as well. In the June 1981 reorganization he lost his ministerial and judicial positions and was elected to the Revolutionary Council Presidium. He appeared to be playing the role of a token Khalqi in the Parcham-dominated DRA and PDPA apparats in 1982.

Babrak. *See* Chapter 2.

Mahmoud Baryalai. Born in 1944, he is a half-brother of Babrak and son-in-law of Dr. Anahita. He graduated from Habibia High School and in 1966 from Kabul University's economics faculty. He was a member of the PDPA from its founding, and wrote for *Parcham*. He joined the Ministry of Planning, but was fired and jailed (1966?). In 1973 he rejoined the Ministry of Planning, where he worked until he went to the USSR for graduate study, obtaining an M.A. in political economy from Moscow State University in 1977. In 1975 he became an alternate member of the Parcham Central Committee and in 1977 a full member. Named as one of the anti-Khalqi conspirators, he was exiled as ambassador to Pakistan in June 1978. In 1980 he was elected to the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council, named

president of the International Relations Commission of the Central Committee, and editor of the Central Committee publication *Haqiqat-i-Enqilabe Saur*. In 1981 he was made a secretary of the Central Committee and an alternate member of the Politburo.

(Dip. Engg.) Mohammed Ismail Danesh. Danesh is the only man to keep the same ministerial post (mines and industry) under Taraki, Amin, and Babrak. He studied coal mining at the University of Virginia from 1960 to 1964, earning a B.S., and also studied in the USSR. In 1973 he was a teacher at Kabul Polytechnic.

Danesh was appointed an alternate member of the Central Committee in 1966. He sided with Khalq when Babrak split and was made a member of the Central Committee in 1967. In August 1979 he was described as secretary of the Theory, Education, and Publicity Commission of the Kabul Provincial Committee of the PDPA. He continued as a member of the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council and in June 1981 was made an alternate member of the expanded Politburo. Explanations of his remarkable political longevity range from his Qizilbash minority nationality and weak, inoffensive manner to Soviet pressure on Babrak to include several Khalqi leaders in his government.

(Maj.) Sayed Mohammed Gulabzoy. Evidence suggests that Gulabzoy's career has been directed more by the Soviet Union than by Khalq or Parcham. (See Chapter 8.) Born about 1945 in Paktia, he studied at the Air Force College, although there is some question whether he graduated; two émigrés regard him as barely literate. He participated in Daoud's coup and was appointed aide to the air force commander. In 1976 he went to the USSR for a course in radar technology. In April 1978 he was the first person Amin contacted to trigger Taraki's coup. He was appointed aide-de-camp for Taraki and in July 1978 was named minister of communications. He became a member of the Central Committee, probably in October 1978. Fired in September 1979 by Amin, who had learned of his complicity in the plot to remove Amin, he took refuge in the Soviet Embassy. In January 1980 he was named minister of interior and elected to the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council.

(Pohanmal [Professor]) Guldad. An educator who has worked for both Khalq and Parcham, in 1962–1963 he studied literacy in India on an AID grant and was a teacher in 1973. In May 1978 he was appointed governor of Baghlan and in July 1978 was named president of the Nangarhar Valley Development Authority (a Soviet development project). He was appointed a member of Amin's Central Committee in October 1979 and was one of the very few who retained his seat when Babrak came to power. In 1980 he became minister of higher and vocational education, vice-president of the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Society, and a member of the Revolutionary Council. In June 1981 he was also named deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. In September 1982 he was relieved of his ministerial post, but reportedly kept his deputy chairman title.

Mohammed Khan Jalalar. Although not a PDPA member, he is described by several Afghan sources as a communist agent, either a secret Parchami or a KGB collaborator. He is a first-generation Afghan whose father's uncle was a Soviet

general. Born in Andkhoi in 1935, he earned a B.A. in economics at Kabul University, then worked in the Ministry of Planning before becoming minister of finance in 1972. Daoud then appointed him minister of commerce and in 1977 minister of planning as well. In January 1980 he joined Babrak's cabinet as minister of commerce and a member of the Revolutionary Council. With no overt party membership, he was ineligible for Central Committee membership.

Abdul Hakim Sharayee Jauzjani. Often referred to as Sharayee or Sharai. Born in 1935 in Shiberghan, he earned a B.A. from the faculty of theology at Kabul University, then studied journalism. In 1963 he went to the USSR for further study. He worked for Radio Afghanistan, *Encyclopedia Ariana*, and the journal *Anis* and ran unsuccessfully for election to the National Assembly in 1965 and 1969. He was appointed an alternate member of the Central Committee in the summer of 1966. He sided with Babrak when the latter left the PDPA in 1967, but soon changed his mind, returned to the Khalq faction, and was elected to the Central Committee. After the Saur coup he was made minister of justice and attorney general and under Amin was appointed chairman of the National Organization for Defense of the Revolution and a member of the Politburo. He vanished when Babrak came to power.

Babrak Karmal. *See* Chapter 2.

(Engr.) Najmuddin Akhgar Kaweyani. Except for the fact that he had been jailed under Amin, nothing is known of this young Parchami's background before he was appointed to the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council in January 1980. Despite his obscurity he was able to take control of the key PDPA Central Committee Organizational Commission, in charge of all party personnel appointments. In June 1981 he was elected to the Revolutionary Council Presidium and also named vice-chairman of the new National Fatherland Front.

Mir Akbar Khyber (Khaibar). Born in 1925, he was a leading Parchami theoretician, propagandist, and member of its Central Committee. His assassination on April 17, 1978, sparked a major demonstration. Daoud reacted by arresting PDPA members, which precipitated Taraki's coup. Taraki blamed Daoud for the killing, but there are numerous allegations (including hints by Babrak and Dr. Anahita) that on Amin's orders Khyber was killed by the Alemyar brothers (see under Mohammed Siddiq Alemyar).

Born in 1925, Khyber graduated from the military high school in 1947. Already a revolutionary, in 1950 he was sentenced to six years in jail. After his release he worked on educational matters in the Ministry of Interior for ten years before being banished to Paktia for his part in the Aqrab riots of 1965. After ten years there he returned to Kabul, resigned his job, became editor of *Parcham*, and resumed his revolutionary activities, taking charge of Parcham's recruitment program in the Afghan military.

Sultan Ali Kishtmand. One of the top Parchamis, Kishtmand has a double minority status, being a Hazara and the only Shia Muslim in the DRA hierarchy. Born in 1936 near Kabul to a petty trader's family, he took a degree in economics at Kabul University and has written several books on political economy and

sociology. In 1965 he ran unsuccessfully for a seat in the National Assembly. From 1960 to 1972 he worked in the Ministry of Mines and Industry.

He was elected to the PDPA Central Committee at its founding congress but left the party with Babrak in 1967. In 1977 he became a member of the reunited PDPA's Politburo and after the Saur coup served briefly as minister of planning. Implicated as one of the Parchami plotters against Taraki, he was arrested in August 1978 and sentenced to death, but this was commuted to fifteen years' imprisonment by Amin in October 1979. In January 1980 he became minister of planning, a deputy prime minister, member of the Central Committee Politburo, and vice-president of the Revolutionary Council. (The latter three titles were also held by his archenemy Assadullah Sarwari [q.v.], the former Khalqi security chief who is alleged to have tortured Kishtmand personally as well as having wounded him in a shootout in February 1980; Kishtmand's flight to Moscow on February 7 for treatment of a "stomach ulcer" may have been connected with this incident.) In the reorganization of June 1981 he was promoted from deputy to prime minister, retaining his other titles as well. In April 1982 he gave up his responsibility for planning. His wife, Karima Kishtmand, is politically active also, serving as secretary of the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women.

Suleiman Layeq. Born in 1930, he was a member of the Mojadidi family of religious leaders but broke with them when he became radicalized. He initially studied Islamic law but graduated in 1957 from the faculty of letters at Kabul University and became active in the media, including *Heywad*, Radio Afghanistan, and the Ministry of Information. He published poems in the periodical press in the late 1950s and a collection of poems, *Chungar*, in 1962. He was a founding member of the PDPA and was appointed an alternate member of the Central Committee in 1966. He sided with Babrak, however, and left the Central Committee to become editor and publisher of *Parcham* in 1968. As a PDPA candidate from Pul-e-Khumri, he ran unsuccessfully for the National Assembly in 1965 and 1969.

Under Taraki he was named minister of radio and television. Charged with complicity in the Parchami plot, he was removed from the Politburo in November 1978 but permitted to remain on the Central Committee for a year before being expelled by Amin. Under Babrak he started as an alternate member of the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council. He survived this trial period and was made president of the Academy of Sciences and member of the Revolutionary Council. In June 1981 he was promoted to member of the Central Committee, minister of tribes and nationalities, and vice-chairman of the National Fatherland Front.

(Lt. Col.) Sher Jan Mazdooryar. Born in 1945, he graduated from the Kabul Military Academy. During his rise in the 4th Armored Division, he took part in both the 1973 and the 1978 coups. After the Saur Revolution, he first was named commander of the Central Garrison and the 4th Armored Division. He probably was among those elected to the Central Committee in October 1978. In March 1979 he was named minister of interior and in July 1979 was shifted to minister of frontier and tribal affairs. Fired in September 1979 for plotting to assassinate

Amin, he took refuge in the Soviet Embassy. He emerged in January 1980 to become minister of transportation and tourism, as well as member of the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council. Mazdooryar has been described as a principled communist who believes that the USSR is the motherland of socialism, and his support of and by the Soviets may well explain his ability to stay on top, first under Khalq and then under Parcham.

(Dr.) Najib (or Najibullah). Born in 1947, he graduated from Habibia High School, joined the PDPA, and then entered Kabul University's Medical School. He wrote many articles for *Parcham* during this period (late 1960s). Twice jailed for political activities, he finally got his degree in 1975. He became a member of the Central Committee in 1977 and the Revolutionary Council in 1978. He served briefly as ambassador to Iran before being fired and expelled from the PDPA for plotting against Khalq. Under Babrak he was named to the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council and made head of KHAD, the security service. In June 1981 he joined the Politburo. A Pashtun of the Ahmadzai Ghilzai tribe from Paktia, he is said to head the Tribal Department of the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities.

Nur Ahmad Nur. Born in 1937 in Kandahar, he studied at Habibia High School in Kabul and earned a B.A. in international relations from Kabul University in 1961 before joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He claims membership in the PDPA even before its founding congress, was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee in the summer of 1966, and by the spring of 1967 was a full member. He sided with Babrak in the split, however, resigned from the committee, and joined Parcham. In the 1965 elections to the National Assembly, he was one of three PDPA members to win a seat in the lower house. He served until 1969, when he was defeated for re-election and thereafter had no government job until 1978. He remained active in the PDPA and, after the 1977 Parcham-Khalq reconciliation, was a member of the Central Committee's Politburo and Secretariat. He was named minister of interior and member of the Revolutionary Council in Taraki's government, but was soon sent into ambassadorial exile and then expelled from party and state positions for anti-Khalqi plotting. Under Babrak's government he has no ministerial post, but is again a member of the Politburo and Secretariat, as well as being on the Revolutionary Council's Presidium.

Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri. Born in 1933 in Panjshir, he studied at Kabul Teachers' College and the faculty of letters at Kabul University. After working for the journal *Anis* and teaching literature at Kabul Teachers College, he worked for the Ministry of Information and Culture in various capacities. He became a member of the Central Committee at the 1965 PDPA founding congress. When Babrak split from the PDPA in the spring of 1967, Panjsheri first went with him but soon returned to his position on Khalq's Central Committee. He then tried unsuccessfully to launch his own splinter communist party. He was in prison from 1969 to 1972, presumably for political activities, and it is not known what job he held in the Daoud era. Under Taraki he was made minister of education and later minister of public works (August 1978). He remained in the latter position until August 1979 and probably through the Amin era, though his name was not

mentioned in the Afghan press after his departure in September for medical treatment in the USSR.

Under Babrak, Panjsheri was named to the Central Committee's Politburo. Although regarded by a number of sources as a Khalqi, he was given a key party position as chairman of the Party Control Commission, lending weight to the allegation of a former classmate that his real allegiance is to the Soviets.

Nematullah Maruf Pazhwak. Born in Kabul in 1928, he is a former educator and a Parchami supporter who studied at Habibia High School and Kabul University. He then earned an M.A. in educational administration in 1959 and a Ph.D. in literature and philosophy in 1965, both from Columbia University. He was head of the Kabul Teachers Training School and of Habibia and in 1966 was in charge of the Ministry of Education's Secondary Education Department. In 1970 he was cultural attaché at the Afghan embassy in Moscow. After serving briefly as governor of Bamian and then Kabul, he became minister of interior in the Shafiq cabinet. Here he was probably responsible for the infiltration of young Parchamis into the police and participated in the coup conspiracy that brought Daoud to power in 1973. Daoud shunted him to minister of education in order to remove him from power. Although never an acknowledged PDPA member, his pro-Parchami sympathies were never a secret. In January 1981, after many years of political eclipse, he was made an adviser to the Prime Ministry.

(Lt. Gen.) Abdul Qader. An air force officer and Parchami who was born in 1944 in Ghor, he received his pilot training and attended staff college in the USSR. As a major, he led the air force contingents that helped Daoud seize power in 1973. He served as commander of the air defense forces (1973) and chief of staff of air defense (1977). (Between these two postings he spent some time as head of slaughterhouses, in disgrace for having publicly criticized Daoud's slow pace to socialism.) As a colonel, he led the air forces in the coup that toppled Daoud. Taraki appointed him minister of defense. Accused of having participated in the anti-Khalqi plot of 1978, he was arrested and sentenced to death, only to be reprieved and given a fifteen-year jail sentence by Amin in October 1979. When Babrak came to power, Qader became a member of the Central Committee and was head of its defense and judicial sections, as well as being named to the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council. In April 1980 he was promoted from major general to lieutenant general. In June 1980 he left for medical treatment in the USSR, returning ten weeks later. In June 1981 he became a vice-president of the Presidium. While the defense minister (Gen. Rafiee) was in the USSR on a long-term military training course, Qader was appointed acting minister of defense in January 1982. In September 1982 he was appointed minister of defense and simultaneously relieved of his responsibility as vice-president of the Presidium.

Although regarded by some as more of a nationalist and less of a Soviet stooge than other military figures, he probably owes his life to quiet Soviet intervention on his behalf when he was under sentence of death. He reputedly was on very close terms with Col. Vadim Pechenenko, the head of Soviet military intelligence in Kabul, and with Alexander Novokreshchnikov, deputy to Ambassador Puzanov.

(Maj. Gen.) Mohammed Rafiee. A Soviet-trained tank officer, he is a Pashtun from Paghman, born about 1946. Under Babrak he was appointed minister of defense and member of both the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council. Listed as a lieutenant colonel in January 1980, by March he was a major general. He took part in the 1978 coup and was appointed minister of public works, only to be ousted in August 1978 for plotting against Taraki. His twenty-year jail sentence was commuted to twelve years by Amin in 1979, and he was freed by the Soviet invasion. He was named as a new member of the Politburo in June 1981, and in September of that year was one of four top-ranking Afghan officers who left to attend a six-month military training course in Moscow. Rafiee came back briefly to Kabul in March 1982 to attend the national party conference and then returned to the USSR to continue his studies. After a year's absence his ministerial post was given to Abdul Qader in September 1982. Although no longer a minister, Rafiee was named a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

(Dr.) Anahita Ratebzad. Afghanistan's top woman politician (most commonly called Dr. Anahita), she was born about 1930 in Guldara, Kabul province. She inherited her revolutionary credentials from her father, Ahmed Rateb, who published a short-lived newspaper that exposed corruption among high officials in Kabul and was promptly shut down. Rateb later was jailed for distributing leaflets that described King Nader Shah as "Britain's jackal."

After Anahita completed her primary education and a year of nursing school, she went back to teach at her elementary alma mater, Malalai School. In 1950 she graduated from a nursing school in Chicago, and by 1953 was a teacher and director of nursing at Kabul's hospital for women. In 1957 she entered Kabul University's Medical School and graduated in 1963, Afghanistan's first woman doctor. As a PDPA candidate, she won a seat in the 1965 parliament, where she became known as a brilliant speaker. That same year, at the instigation of the PDPA, she founded the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women and was elected its first president, a position she still held in 1981.

Anahita became estranged from her husband, Prof. Kiramuddin Kakar, and for many years was rumored to be Babrak's mistress. Apparently following Afghan traditions of cementing political alliances with matrimonial bonds, she is supposed to have married one of her daughters to Nur Ahmad Nur and another to Mahmoud Baryalai.

Dr. Anahita remained politically active, writing articles for *Parcham* and being elected to that party's Central Committee in 1976 and the reunited PDPA Central Committee in 1977. The majority of demonstrators at Khyber's funeral allegedly were women because of her agitational efforts. When the party came to power she was briefly minister of social affairs and tourism and a member of the Revolutionary Council before being exiled as ambassador to Belgrade in July 1978. She returned to Kabul with the Babrak regime to become a member of the Politburo, the Revolutionary Council, and minister of education. Her other responsibilities included the presidencies of the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Society, the Peace, Solidarity, and Friendship Organization of Afghanistan, and the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women. In November 1980 she was given overall respon-

sibility for guidance of the Ministries of Information and Culture, Higher and Vocational Education and Public Health, in addition to her own Ministry of Education. In June 1981, however, she relinquished her ministerial responsibilities and joined the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council.

Observers have commented on Dr. Anahita's popularity among women for her feminist stand. One claimed that she was strongly nationalistic and not entirely trusted by the Soviets despite the surface appearance of good relations.

Assadullah Sarwari. A cold, brutal, hard-line Khalqi born in the 1930s, he reportedly was trained in the USSR both as a helicopter pilot and in a KGB course. He was Taraki's secret police chief and allegedly took a personal part in the torturing of Kishtmand. Although never mentioned as a member of Taraki's Central Committee, Sarwari's position indicates he probably was among those added to the Central Committee in October 1978. After the 1979 plot to ambush Amin failed, Sarwari is said to have joined Watanjar, Gulabzoy, and Mazdooryar in the Soviet Embassy. When Babrak came to power, the Soviets forced him to accept a certain number of Khalqis in the government, including Sarwari. Sarwari was given the posts of deputy prime minister, member of the Politburo, and vice-president of the Revolutionary Council. In June 1980 he went to the USSR, ostensibly for medical treatment but possibly as a face-saving way of removing him from the PDPA political scene. He apparently was posted directly from the Soviet medical center to Ulan Bator, where he became Afghanistan's ambassador to Mongolia. (Arian, a less offensive Khalqi, took over his position of deputy prime minister.) Sarwari allegedly identifies so thoroughly with the USSR that he wants Afghanistan to become fully sovietized. These sentiments, plus the hearty antagonism of his former Parchami victims, would indicate a limited life expectancy if he were to return to Kabul.

Mohammed Hassan Bareq Shafiee. A political chameleon and writer, he was born about 1932 in Kabul. His first collection of poems, *Sitak* (Twigs), was published in 1962. He was editor of *Zuandun* and *Pashtun Jad* magazines before becoming editor of *Khalq* in 1966. He was appointed an alternate member of the Central Committee at that time, but sided with Babrak in 1967 and left with him. He was probably on the Parcham Central Committee during the 1967–1977 Parcham-Khalq split. In 1970 he published in *Parcham* a centenary ode to Lenin ("Shaypurai Inqilab"—Call of the Revolution) that was similar in tone to Layeq's poem (on the same occasion) that unleashed religious riots in Kabul. Under Taraki and Amin he became minister of information and culture (1978) and of transportation and tourism (1979). Probably at the 1977 Parcham-Khalq reconciliation and certainly by the summer of 1978, he was a Politburo member. Although tarred by his previous association with Babrak, he repudiated Parcham and was able to retain his Central Committee status until the Soviet invasion. He also served on Amin's constitution-drafting commission in 1979.

Under Babrak he started out as only an alternate member of the Revolutionary Council but by May 1980 was a full member of that body and an alternate on the Central Committee. He became acting governor of Herat, and in June 1981 a full

member of the Central Committee. In September 1981 he was political officer in charge of the northwest zone, and in 1982 Shafiee was first vice-president of the central council of the National Fatherland Front (NFF).

Nur Mohammed Taraki. *See* Chapter 2.

(Dr.) Akbar Shah Wali. In 1979 the Soviet *New Times* featured just two Afghans: Hafizullah Amin and Akbar Shah Wali. Born in Kabul in 1939, Wali became a doctor and held various positions in the Ministry of Public Health. Already active in politics during his student days, he was elected an alternate Central Committee member at the PDPA founding congress and a full member in 1967. In 1977 he became a secretary of the Central Committee and joined its Politburo. A Khalqi, he was arrested for political activity against the Daoud regime. In 1978 he was named minister of public health and later, in the fall, minister of planning as well. In March 1979 he became a deputy prime minister, retaining his minister of public health position. Later, under Amin, he became minister of foreign affairs and deputy prime minister. In October 1979 he is reported to have criticized Soviet involvement in the anti-Amin plot, particularly the involvement of Ambassador Puzanov; not surprisingly, he has not been seen since the Soviet invasion.

(Col.) Mohammed Aslam Watanjar. Born in Paktia province in 1946, Watanjar is a Soviet-trained tank officer who took part in the overthrow of the king (1973), Daoud (1978), and Amin (1979). He is a graduate of a military school and went to the USSR for advanced training about 1970. He commanded a tank battalion under Daoud, and Amin appointed him commander of all ground forces for the Saur coup of 1978. He was then named Taraki's deputy prime minister and minister of communications. Watanjar probably was one of those added to the Central Committee in October 1978. In the following months he served successively as minister of interior, defense, and again interior before being purged for plotting to ambush Amin. Like his coconspirators Gulabzoy, Mazdooryar, and Sarwari, Watanjar took refuge in the Soviet Embassy when the plot failed and stayed there until the Soviet invasion. He is said to have persuaded the Afghan garrisons at Kargha and Pul-e-Charki not to resist Soviet troops because Amin's removal was for the good of the country. He emerged to become a Central Committee and Revolutionary Council member as well as minister of communications; in June 1981 he was added to the Politburo.

Watanjar has held top posts under both Khalq and Parcham. The explanation may well be that his primary allegiance is to the USSR. One observer commented that he was the only Afghan the Russians trust, and another considered him a principled communist who considers the USSR the motherland of socialism. Originally well liked by his troops, his image has been tarnished by his subservience to the Soviets, who may, nevertheless, see him as a possible future leader of the country.

(Dr.) Saleh Mohammed Zeary. Known even in his school days as "Quicksilver" for his adroit evasion of ideological commitments, Zeary (a Kandahar Pashtun born in 1937) was the top Khalqi activist during the Taraki and Amin administrations. Bright and well informed, he has been on the PDPA Central Committee since its founding. A graduate of Kabul University's Medical School after leading

his class for seven years, in 1969 he was a candidate for the National Assembly but was arrested and jailed for six years. In May 1978 he was appointed minister of agriculture and land reform and put in charge of "people's organizations." He was also a member of the Politburo. He objected to Amin's favoritism in distributing land to Khalqis and relatives and in July 1979 was shifted to minister of public health.

Unlike all other members of Amin's Politburo, Zeary kept his position when the Soviets brought Babrak back to power, holding on to his Revolutionary Council membership as well. He was named to the three-man Secretariat under Babrak and in April 1980 was elected to the Presidium. By September 1980 he was president of the organizational committee for "DRA creative unions of intelligentsia." He has come out consistently in favor of PDPA unity, against factionalism, and against Amin. In June 1981 he was elected chairman of the new National Fatherland Front.

Appendix E

PDPA Central Committee Members





LEGEND: The lines under the names indicate approximate duration of each status.

————	full membership	********** member of Parcham Central Committee during 1967–1977
- - - - - - - - -	alternate membership	xxxxxxxxxx expelled
. . . . .	status unclear	± executed or assassinated


Early Years (1965–1967)
Schism (1967–1977)
Taraki Era (1977–1979)
Amin Era (1979)
First Babrak Years (1980–1981)
Central Committee Expansion (June 1981)
Abdul Quddud Ghorbandi[8]
Maj. Sayed Mohammed Gulabzoy
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx?)
Prof. Guldad
Mir Ahmad Gurbuz
(secretary)
Prof. Mohammed Mansour Hashemi
Lt. Col. Mohammed Hashim
Imtiaz Hassan
Dr. (Ph.D.) Abdur Rashid Jalili[8] (Politburo)
(Politburo)
Abdul Hakim Sharayee Jauzjani[1]


Babrak Karmal[1,3] (secretary)
(Politburo, secretary)
(secretary general, Politburo)
Dr. Mirsaheb Karwal
Khayal Mohammed Katawazi
Engr. Najmuddin Akhgar Kaweyani
Maj. Khalil (ullah)
Mir Akbar Khyber
±
Sultan Ali Kishtmand[1]
(Politburo)
(Politburo)
(Politburo)
Suleiman Layeq[1,6]
(Politburo)
(?)
Shahzar Lewal
Dr. Habib Mangal
Mohammed Salem Masoodi[1,3]


Early Years (1965–1967)
Schism (1967–1977)
Taraki Era (1977–1979)
Amin Era (1979)
First Babrak Years (1980–1981)
Central Committee Expansion (June 1981)
Lt. Col. Sher Jan Mazdooryar[8]
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx?)
Abdul Karim Misaq[1]
(Politburo)
Faiz Mohammed[3]
±
Engr. Nazar Mohammed[3]
Lt. Col. Nazar Mohammed
Dr. Niaz Mohammed Momand
(secretary)
Dr. Najib(ullah)[3]
(Politburo)
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Dip. Engg. Gul Nawaz (secretary)
Abdul Qayeum Noorzai[8]


Nur Ahmad Nur[1,3]
(Politburo, secretary)
(Politburo, secretary)
(Politburo, secretary)
Mohammed Hassan Paiman
Dr. (Ph.D.) Raz Mohammed Pakteen[3]
Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri[1]
(Politburo)
(Politburo)
Dip. Engg. Saleh Mohammed Peroz
Gen. Abdul Qader
Lt. Col. Mohammed Rafiee
(Politburo)
Dr. Anahita Ratebzad[3]
(Politburo)
(Politburo)
Engr. Abdul Zahoor Razmjo
Dip. Engg. Mohammed Yasin Sadeqi


Early Years (1965–1967)
Schism (1967–1977)
Taraki Era (1977–1979)
Amin Era (1979)
First Babrak Years (1980–1981)
Central Committee Expansion (June 1981)
Dr. (Ph.D.) Zamir Safi[4]
Mohammed Omar Saghari
Sahib Jan Sahrayee[8]
±
Abdul Majid Sarbiland
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Assadullah Sarwari[8]
(Politburo)
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx?)
Mohammed Hassan Bareq Shafiee[1,6]
(Politburo)
(**********?)
Ahmad Shah
Shahrullah Shahpur[1,5]
xxx
Prof. Mahmud Alamgul Suma
(Politburo)


Nezamuddin Tahzib
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Nur Mohammed Taraki[1]
(secretary general)
(secretary general, Politburo)
±
Dip. Engg., Maj. Sayed Daoud Taroon[8]
±
Abdul Wakil[1,3]
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Dr. Akbar Shah Wali[1]
(Politburo, secretary)
(Politburo, secretary)
Lt. Col. Mohammed Aslam Watanjar[8]
(Politburo)
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx?)
Lt. Mohammed Iqbal Waziri
±
Abdul Ahad Wolesi[8]
Lt. Col. Mohammed Yaqub
Ghulam Sarwar Yuresh[7]
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Early Years (1965–1967)	*Schism (1967–1977)*	*Taraki Era (1977–1979)*	*Amin Era (1979)*	*First Babrak Years (1980–1981)*	*Central Committee Expansion (June 1981)*
			Engr. Mohammed Zarif	±	
Dr. Saleh Mohammed Zeary[1]		(*Politburo*)	(*Politburo*)	(*Politburo, secretary*)	(*Politburo, secretary*)

Known alternate Central Committee members in 1980–1981 included Abdus Samad Azhar, Khoday Nur Bawar, Mohammed Anwar Farzam, Hunar Ghairat, Lt. Gen. Baba Jan, Hashmatullah Kaihani, Abdul Ghaffar Lakanwal, Maj. Dost Mohammed, Sayed Akram Paigir, Sayed Tahir Shah Paikargar, Jamila Palwasha (a woman), Abdus Sattar Purdeli, Mohammedullah Safi, Nourul Haq Ulomi, Abdur Rashid Waziri, and Dr. Sayed Amir Shah Zara. Earlier alternate Central Committee members who did not succeed in becoming full members are not included.

Notes to Appendix E

1. Reported or believed to have attended founding congress. In addition, a Fezanul Haq Fezan and Zaher Ofaq were reported to have attended.
2. Resigned to form Settam-e-Melli.
3. Ambassador during Taraki era.
4. Mentioned as a member in *New Times* (Moscow) of June 26, 1978; never listed in Afghan literature.
5. Left Khalq temporarily in 1967 to side with Babrak, returned, then resigned permanently before 1976.
6. Expelled from the Politburo in summer or fall 1978, but allowed to retain Central Committee membership.
7. Although holding a series of important state positions (member of the Revolutionary Council, governor of Nangarhar Province, head of the Eastern Zone) in the Babrak regime, Yuresh appears not to have regained any corresponding rank in the party since his expulsion in 1978.
8. May have become a Central Committee member around October 1978.

Appendix F

Cabinets of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 1978–1982

	Taraki May 1978	*Taraki October 1978*	*Taraki and Amin March 1979*
Nur Mohammed Taraki (K)	(President) Prime Minister	(President) Prime Minister Defense	(President)
Babrak Karmal (P)	First Deputy P.M.	—	—
Hafizullah Amin (K)	Deputy P.M. Foreign Affairs	Deputy P.M. Foreign Affairs	Prime Minister Foreign Affairs
Col. Mohammed Aslam Watanjar* (K)	Deputy P.M. Communi-cations	Interior	Defense
Lt. Gen. Abdul Qader* (P)	Defense	—	—
Nur Ahmad Nur* (P)	Interior	—	—
Akbar Shah Wali* (K)	Public Health	Public Health Planning	Deputy P.M. Public Health
Saleh Mohammed Zeary* (K)	Agriculture and Land Reform	Agriculture and Land Reform	Agriculture and Land Reform
Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri* (?)	Education	Public Works	Public Works
Sultan Ali Kishtmand* (P)	Planning	—	—
Abdul Karim Misaq (K)	Finance	Finance	Finance
Mohammed Hassan Bareq Shafiee* (?)	Information and Culture	Information and Culture	Transportation and Tourism
Suleiman Layeq* (P)	Radio and Television	—	—
Anahita Ratebzad* (P)	Social Affairs and Tourism	—	—

Amin and Taraki July 1979	*Amin October 1979*	*Babrak January 1980*	*Babrak June 1981*	*Babrak April–Sept. 1982*
(President)	±			
—	—	(President) Prime Minister	(President)	(President)
Prime Minister Defense	(President) Prime Minister Defense	±		
Interior	—	Communications	Communications	Communications
—	—	(Presidium)	(Presidium)	Defense
—	—	(Presidium, Politburo)	(Presidium, Politburo)	(Presidium, Politburo)
Deputy P.M. Foreign Affairs	Deputy P.M. Foreign Affairs	+	—	—
Public Health	Public Health	(Politburo)	(Politburo)	(Presidium, Politburo)
Public Works	Public Works(?)	(Politburo)	(Politburo)	(Politburo)
—	—	Deputy P.M. Planning	Prime Minister Planning	Prime Minister
Finance	Finance	+	—	—
Transportation and Tourism	Transportation and Tourism	—	—	—
—	—	(Politburo)	Tribes and Nationalities	Tribes and Nationalities
—	—	Education	(Politburo, Presidium)	(Politburo, Presidium)

	Taraki May 1978	*Taraki October 1978*	*Taraki and Amin March 1979*
Abdul Hakim Sharayee Jauzjani* (K)	Justice and Atty. Gen.	Justice and Atty. Gen.	Justice and Atty. Gen.
Mohammed Ismail Danesh* (K)	Mines and Industry	Mines and Industry	Mines and Industry
Nezamuddin Tahzib (P)	Frontier and Tribal Affairs	—	—
Mohammed Mansour Hashemi (K)	Water and Power	Water and Power	Water and Power
Abdul Quddud Ghorbandi (K)	Commerce	(Commerce?)	Commerce
Mahmud Alamgul Suma (K)	Higher Education	Higher Education	Higher Education
Maj. Gen. Mohammed Rafiee* (P)	Public Works	—	—
Maj. Sayed Mohammed Gulabzoy* (K)	—	Communications	Communications
Abdur Rashid Jalili (K)	—	Education	Education
Sahib Jan Sahrayee (K)	—	Frontier and Tribal Affairs	Frontier and Tribal Affairs
Mohammed Siddiq Alemyar* (K)	—	—	Planning
Khayal Mohammed Katawazi (K)	—	—	Information and Culture
Lt. Col. Sher Jan Mazdooryar* (K)	—	—	Interior
Mohammed Salem Masoodi (K)	—	—	—
Mohammed Zarif	—	—	—
Faqir Mohammed Faqir (K)	—	—	—
Assadullah Sarwari* (K)	—	—	—
Abdul Wakil (P)	—	—	—

Amin and Taraki July 1979	*Amin October 1979*	*Babrak January 1980*	*Babrak June 1981*	*Babrak April–Sept. 1982*
Justice and Atty. Gen.	Justice	+	—	—
Mines and Industry	Mines and Industry	Mines and Industry	Mines and Industry	Mines and Industry
—	—	(President of Supreme Court)	(President of Supreme Court)	(President of Supreme Court)
Water and Power	Water and Power	+	—	—
Commerce	Commerce	+	—	—
Higher Education	Higher Education	+	—	—
—	—	Defense	Defense	Vice-chairman, Council of Ministers
Communications	—	Interior	Interior	Interior
Agriculture and Land Reform	Agriculture and Land Reform	+	—	—
Minister without portfolio	Frontier and Tribal Affairs	±		
Planning	Planning	±		
Information and Culture	Information and Culture	+	—	—
Frontier and Tribal Affairs	—	Transportation and Tourism	Transportation and Tourism	Transportation and Tourism
Education	Education	+	—	—
—	Communications	±		
—	Interior	+	—	—
—	—	Deputy P.M.	—	—
—	—	Finance	Finance	Finance

	Taraki May 1978	*Taraki October 1978*	*Taraki and Amin March 1979*
Faiz Mohammed	—	—	—
Abdur Rashid Arian* (K)	—	—	—
Raz Mohammed Pakteen (P)	—	—	—
Prof. Guldad* (?)	—	—	—
Engr. Nazar Mohammed (P)	—	—	—
Fazel Rahim Momand†	—	—	—
Mohammed Ibrahim Azim†	—	—	—
Mohammed Khan Jalalar*†	—	—	—
Shah Mohammed Dost (P)	—	—	—
Abdul Majid Sarbiland (P)	—	—	—
Faqir Mohammed Yaqubi (†?)	—	—	—
Abdul Wahab Safi (P?)	—	—	—
Abdul Ghaffar Lakanwal (P)	—	—	—
Mehrabuddin Paktiawal (P)	—	—	—

Amin and Taraki July 1979	*Amin October 1979*	*Babrak January 1980*	*Babrak June 1981*	*Babrak April–Sept. 1982*
—	—	Frontier and Tribal Affairs	±	
—	—	Deputy P.M. Justice and Atty. Gen.	(Presidium)	(Presidium)
—	—	Water and Power	Water and Power	Electric Energy
—	—	Higher and Vocational Education	Vice-chairman, Council of Ministers Higher and Vocational Education	Vice-chairman, Council of Ministers
—	—	Public Works	Public Works	Public Works
—	—	Agriculture and Land Reform	Agriculture and Land Reform	—
—	—	Public Health	Public Health	—
—	—	Commerce	Commerce	Commerce
—	—	Foreign Affairs	Foreign Affairs	Foreign Affairs
—	—	Information and Culture	Vice-chairman, Council of Ministers Information and Culture	Vice-chairman, Council of Ministers
—	—	—	Education and Training	Education and Training
—	—	—	Justice	Justice
—	—	—	(Presidium)	Agriculture and Land Reform
—	—	—	—	President, Central Bank (new ministerial post)

	Taraki *May 1978*	*Taraki* *October 1978*	*Taraki and Amin* *March 1979*
Khalil Ahmad Abawi (P)	—	—	—
Mohammed Nabi Kamyar (P?)	—	—	—
Ahmad Shah Sorkhabi (?)	—	—	—
Sarwar Mangal (P)	—	—	—

NOTE: Noncabinet posts given in parentheses. Horizontal lines set off new administrations.

LEGEND:

(K)	Original affiliation was to Khalq.	±	Executed or assassinated.
(P)	Original affiliation was to Parcham.	+	Vanished after Babrak took over.
*	Biography in Appendix D.	†	Not a PDPA member.

Amin and Taraki *July 1979*	*Amin* *October 1979*	*Babrak* *January 1980*	*Babrak* *June 1981*	*Babrak* *April–Sept. 1982*
—	—	—	—	Vice-chairman, Council of Ministers State Planning Committee
—	—	—	—	Public Health
—	—	—	—	Irrigation
—	—	—	—	Higher Education

Notes

In compiling data for this book, I met and interviewed a number of Afghan émigrés, about twelve of them at length. Those chosen had backgrounds that gave them unique insights on developments in their homeland, but with few exceptions none wished to be cited by name. Most still had family in Afghanistan and were understandably concerned lest their contributions to this book result in hardship for those they left behind. Accordingly, I am respecting their wishes not to be identified more specifically than by profession.

Wherever possible, a written source that provided the same (or nearly the same) information has been cited to back the information supplied by these individuals. At the same time, where a written source for one reason or another did not seem entirely trustworthy, confirmation by one or more émigrés helped me decide in favor of including information that otherwise might have been discarded as questionable.

The reader will frequently encounter the distinctly un-Afghan name Thomas Gouttierre in these notes, without further amplification. For those who know Afghanistan he needs no introduction; for others his qualifications are described in the Acknowledgments.

Chapter 1

1. Nancy Peabody Newell and Richard S. Newell, *The Struggle for Afghanistan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 11.

2. No census has ever been taken in Afghanistan, so all figures in this discussion are approximate. They are based on standard references, including Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), and Harvey H. Smith et al., eds., *Area Handbook for Afghanistan*, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973). The conclusions and analysis in the paragraphs that follow are my own.
3. For more information on the jirgah, see Christine F. Rideout, "Authority Patterns and the Afghan Coup of 1973," *Middle East Journal* 29, no. 2 (Spring 1975): 165–78.
4. These are admittedly subjective, perhaps overly idealistic judgments, but they are based on personal observations. Others have detected class divisions and animosities. Perhaps the basic question is whether resentment or acceptance is the more typical attitude. If so, acceptance would seem to win hands down.
5. *On the Saur Revolution* (Kabul: People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, Political Department, May 22, 1978), p. 2.
6. Guenther Nollau and Hans Juergen Wiehe, *Russia's South Flank* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 112–13.
7. Richard F. Staar, ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1981* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), pp. 4, 134, 233, 267, 285, 374, 431; and François Fejtö, *Dictionnaire des partis communistes et des mouvements revolutionnaires* (Paris: Casterman, 1971), pp. 71, 129.
8. Nollau and Wiehe, *Russia's South Flank*, pp. 96–98.
9. Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), pp. 5–7.
10. Interview with émigré political scientist.
11. Leon B. Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. xv.
12. Ibid., pp. 160–95.
13. Interview with émigré political scientist.
14. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 458.
15. Interview with émigré political scientist.
16. Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 338; Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 475; and interview with Thomas Gouttierre.
17. Louis Dupree and Linette Albert, eds., *Afghanistan in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 30.
18. *Kabul Times*, May 20 and 21, 1978.
19. Gregorian, *Modern Afghanistan*, pp. 323–30.
20. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 481.
21. *Asiaweek*, August 3, 1979, p. 30.
22. *Kabul Times*, July 25, 1978.

23. Louis Dupree, *Red Flag over the Hindu Kush, Part I, Leftist Movements in Afghanistan*, American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Report, Asia 1979, no. 44 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, September 1979), LD-2–79, p. 4.
24. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 472.
25. Interview with émigré political scientist. The source disputes the Dupree conclusion that Zabuli was in favor of laissez-faire economics in principle.
26. Klaus Jäkel, "Nur Mohammed Taraki," *Afghanistan Journal* 5, no. 3 (1978): 105–8; Smith et al., *Area Handbook for Afghanistan*, p. 208; and interview with émigré political scientist.
27. A. Gerasimova and G. Girs, *Literatura Afganistana: Kratkiy ocherk* [Afghanistan's Literature: A Brief Essay] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo vostochnoy literatury, 1963), pp. 103–4.
28. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 485–90.
29. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, May 17, 1978, p. 9; Jäkel, "Taraki," p. 106; and interview with émigré political scientist.
30. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 496–97.
31. Jäkel, "Taraki," p. 106.
32. Dupree, *Red Flag, Part I*, pp. 4–5.
33. Peter Franck, *Afghanistan Between East and West* (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1960), pp. 73–74.
34. Ibid., pp. 12–13.
35. A discussion of this controversial policy decision lies outside the framework of the present volume. I am indebted to Professor Leon B. Poullada for his commentary on my *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, where I repeat what has become conventional wisdom on this subject: that the United States turned down the Afghan request because the Afghans demanded, in addition to arms, security assurances of protection against possible Soviet encroachments. For a telling rejoinder to this argument, see Leon B. Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years," *Middle East Journal* 35, no. 2 (Spring 1981): 178–90.
36. Interview with émigré political scientist.
37. Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United States," p. 189.
38. V. M. Vinogradov et al., eds., *Sovetsko-afganskiye otnosheniya, 1919–1969* [Soviet-Afghan Relations, 1919–1969] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971), pp. 129, 143, 174, 178, 179, 182, 189, 194, 196, 205.
39. Arnold, *Afghanistan*, pp. 42–43.
40. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Soviet Violation of Helsinki Final Act: Invasion of Afghanistan. Hearings*, July 22, 1981 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 56.
41. Among the major Soviet works published on Afghanistan during this era were M. T. Pikulin, *Razvitiye ekonomii i kultury Afganistana, 1955–60* [Development of the Economy and Culture of Afghanistan, 1955–1960] (Tashkent: Akademiya

nauk uzbekskoy SSR, 1961); E. Nukhovich, *Vneshnyaya politika Afganistana* [Afghanistan's Foreign Policy] (Moscow: Institut mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy, 1962); L. B. Tellinskiy, *Sovetsko-afganskiye otnosheniya, 1919–1960* [Soviet-Afghan Relations, 1919–1960] (Moscow: Sotsialno-ekonomicheskaya literatura, 1964); Roman Timofeyevich Akhramovich, *Outline History of Afghanistan After the Second World War* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo vostochnoy literatury, 1966); idem, *Afganistan v 1961–66 gg.* [Afghanistan, 1961–1966] (Moscow: Nauka, 1967); and idem, *Sovetsko-afganskiye otnosheniya* [Soviet-Afghan Relations] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971).

42. Jäkel, "Taraki," p. 107.
43. Interviews with émigré political scientist and social democrat.

Chapter 2

1. Klaus Jäkel, "Nur Mohammed Taraki," *Afghanistan Journal* 5, no. 3 (1978): 105–8. This excellently documented sketch is the best biography available in the West.
2. Ibid., pp. 105–6; and Louis Dupree, *Red Flag over the Hindu Kush, Part I, Leftist Movements in Afghanistan*, American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Report, Asia 1979, no. 44 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, September 1979), LD-2–79, p. 6.
3. Interviews with émigré political scientist and Ghulam Ali Ayeen, research assistant at the Center for Afghan Studies, University of Nebraska.
4. *A Short Biography of Noor Mohammad Taraki* (Kabul?, August 23, 1978), p. 3. This is the official DRA biography. It also appeared in *Kabul Times*, October 30, 1978.
5. Jiri Becka, "Young Afghan Prose in Dari," *Afghanistan Journal* 5, no. 3 (1978): 102–4.
6. A. M. Prokhorov, ed., *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Moscow: Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1976), 25: 273; and A. Gerasimova and G. Girs, *Literatura Afganistana: Kratkiy ocherk* [Literature of Afghanistan: A Brief Essay] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo vostochnoy literatury, 1963), pp. 103, 137, 153–55, 157–60.
7. *A Short Biography*, p. 6.
8. Interviews with émigré political scientist, former ranking Foreign Office official, and prominent social democrat of the era in question.
9. M. R. Arunova et al., eds., *Demokraticheskaya respublika Afganistana* [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), p. 132.
10. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, May 17, 1978, p. 9.
11. *New York Times*, November 12, 1953, p. 9, and December 17, 1953, p. 6.
12. Dupree, *Red Flag, Part I*, p. 6. It is unlikely that Taraki was so hounded by Daoud's police at this time, if only because his official biography (which misses no other opportunity to report persecution of him by Daoud or the Afghan government) ignores this period of his career. Also, in view of Daoud's usually

forthright methods of dealing with those who defied his orders, a protracted stay in jail would have been a far more likely punishment than simple police harassment.

13. Wolfgang Berner, "Der Kampf um Kabul: Lehren und Perspektiven," in Heinrich Vogel, ed., *Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1980), p. 348. The date given for this trip is 1957, but it could well have occurred earlier. Afghans habitually perceive time in larger units than impatient Westeners and have a correspondingly relaxed attitude toward pinpoint dating. In any case, Taraki's known full-time employment in 1957 probably precluded any long trips at that time.
14. Dupree, *Red Flag, Part I*, pp. 6–7.
15. Interviews with émigré political scientist, Foreign Office official, and social democrat.
16. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, May 17, 1978, p. 9.
17. Gerasimova and Girs, *Literatura Afganistana*, p. 153.
18. *Afghan Realities* (Paris: Association for Information and Documentation on Afghanistan), no. 4 (October 1981): 7; Winfried F. Wiegandt, *Afghanistan: Nicht aus heiterem Himmel* (Zurich: Orell Füssli Verlag, 1980), p. 293; *Kabul Times*, July 5, 1978; and conversation with Thomas Gouttierre.
19. Last-minute conversation and correspondence from Hashmad Gobar (Ghubar), son of Mir Mohammed Ghubar, for whose other valuable insights there was no space as this book went to press.
20. Conversation with Thomas Gouttierre.
21. *New Times*, no. 4 (January 1980), p. 13.
22. Interviews with émigré political scientist and Foreign Office official; and *Los Angeles Times*, January 6, 1980, p. V-1.
23. Interview with former Mikrorayon School teacher.
24. Interviews with émigré political scientist and social democrat; see also Appendix C.
25. Interview with émigré Foreign Office official.
26. *A Short Information About People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan* (Kabul, 1978), p. 1. This Khalqi description refers to representatives of "different Marxist circles" gathering at Taraki's house for the founding congress.

Chapter 3

1. Interview with a former ranking Foreign Office official.
2. Conversation with Thomas Gouttierre.
3. Louis Dupree, *The Decade of Daoud Ends: Implications of Afghanistan's Change of Government*. American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Report, South Asia Series 7, no. 7 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, May 1963), LD-7-63, pp. 9–10.

4. M. R. Arunova et al., eds., *Demokraticheskaya respublika Afganistana* [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), p. 40; and Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 649–50, 753–54.
5. *A Short Biography of Noor Mohammad Taraki* (Kabul?, August 23, 1978), p. 11.
6. Interview with émigré political scientist.
7. *Kabul Times*, July 5, 6, and 26, 1978, and June 21, 1979.
8. Arunova, *Demokraticheskaya respublika Afganistana*, p. 60; and "The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party in Afghanistan," (Kabul?, 1976), p. 2 (see Appendix C).
9. Alfred Halliday, "The Revolution in Afghanistan," *New Left Review*, no. 112 (November–December 1978): 12.
10. Arthur Paul, "Constraints on Afghanistan's Economic Development and Prospects for Future Progress," March 1973 address to the Asia Society's Afghanistan Council (New York: Asia Society, 1973), pp. 14–15.
11. Interview with émigré political scientist.
12. Ibid.
13. Harvey Smith et al., eds., *Area Handbook for Afghanistan*, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. xxvii.
14. Arthur Paul, "Afghanistan's Economic Development," pp. 14–15.
15. Guenther Nollau and Hans Juergen Wiehe, *Russia's South Flank* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 141; and interview with former Afghan academic.
16. "The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party," p. 3.
17. Jaan Pennar, *The USSR and the Arabs: The Ideological Dimension* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973), pp. 160–62.
18. Consensus of émigrés consulted.
19. U.S., Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Kabul, "The Afghan Left," Airgram A-33 (May 22, 1973), pp. 4, 5.
20. *Kabul New Times*, March 16, 1980; and Louis Dupree, *Red Flag over the Hindu Kush, Part II, The Accidental Coup, or Taraki in Blunderland*, American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Report, Asia 1979, no. 45 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, September 1979), LD-3–79, p. 5.
21. Several émigrés emphasized this aspect, as did Thomas Gouttierre. Babrak himself felt that his father and stepmother favored only the children she bore. Another example from a prominent family was Dr. Mohammed Akram Osman. Osman suffered from a number of other disadvantages: not only was his mother a second wife but she was a Hazara as well, i.e., from the lowest level of the Afghan ethnic pecking order; in addition, Osman was a stunted cripple, an unusual and pitiable phenomenon in a society whose high infant mortality (up to 50 percent) usually rules out survival of those with congenital defects.
22. Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan," p. 25.

23. Wolfgang Berner, "Der Kampf um Kabul: Lehren und Perspektiven" (citing Richard Newell), in Heinrich Vogel, ed., *Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1980), p. 344.
24. Biographical information has been drawn from Ludwig Adamec's invaluable *Who's Who of Afghanistan* (Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1975), and its *Supplement*, (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1979); compilations in the University of Nebraska collection of USAID trainee program participants; and brief biographies of some ambassadorial appointees in the *Kabul Times*. It undoubtedly is incomplete even for high-ranking officials.
25. Conversation with Thomas Gouttierre.
26. Interviews with an émigré political scientist and three high-ranking bureaucrats under Daoud.
27. Interview with a former teacher at Kabul University.
28. Interview with another teacher.
29. Louis Dupree, *Constitutional Development and Cultural Change, Part VIII, The Future of Constitutional Law in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, American Universities Field Staff (AUFS), Report 9, no. 10 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, December 1965), LD-10–65, p. 18.
30. Abdul Hakim Sharayee Jauzjani was active in radio and press; Babrak Karmal wrote for *Parcham*; Suleiman Layeq worked for Radio Afghanistan and edited *Parcham*; Abdul Qayeum Noorzai edited *Khalq*; Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri held various posts in the Ministry of Information; Mohammed Hassan Bareq Shafiee wrote for *Khalq* and worked in the Ministry of Information.
31. Interviews with knowledgeable émigrés.
32. This is the opinion of several émigrés, and is logical: already an elite, the military officer corps would have been more socially attuned to Parcham than to Khalq in the 1960s and early 1970s. Not until Daoud democratized the armed services after his return to power in 1973 would the Khalqis have had a more receptive audience.
33. Arunova, *Demokraticheskaya respublika Afganistana*, p. 46.
34. Hannah Negaran (pseud.), "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security," *Orbis* 23, no. 1 (Spring 1979): 98.
35. Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), pp. 71, 86, 116.
36. Conversation with Thomas Gouttierre.
37. "The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party," p. 13; Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan," p. 23; Louis Dupree, *Red Flag over the Hindu Kush, Part I, Leftist Movements in Afghanistan*, American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Report, Asia 1979, no. 44 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, September 1979), LD-2–79, p. 7; Adamec, *Supplement*, pp. 9, 10, 28; and Smith et al., *Area Handbook*, p. 217.

38. Arunova, *Demokraticheskaya respublika Afganistana*, pp. 131–32; and "The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party," pp. 3, 44.
39. "The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party," p. 13.
40. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 590–97. This is the famous "6th of Aqrab" event.
41. Arnold, *Afghanistan*, p. 50; and conversation with Thomas Gouttierre, who was told by students in advance of the demonstration that they had chosen Germans as being a less obvious and less popular target than Americans.
42. Dupree, *Constitutional Development*, p. 18.
43. Conversation with Thomas Gouttierre.
44. Interviews with two former Kabul University teachers and émigré political scientist.
45. "The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party," p. 6.
46. Ibid.
47. *A Short Biography*, pp. 13–14.
48. Arunova, *Demokraticheskaya respublika Afganistana*, pp. 42–43; see also pp. 60–61.

Chapter 4

1. Harvey Smith et al., eds., *Area Handbook for Afghanistan*, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 216.
2. Ibid., p. xi.
3. Ibid., p. xix.
4. Interviews with two former teachers who were aware of Parcham's activities among their students.
5. Alfred Halliday, "The Revolution in Afghanistan," *New Left Review*, no. 112 (November–December 1978): 27.
6. U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs," (Eliza van Hollen), "Soviet Dilemmas in Afghanistan," Special Report no. 72 (Washington, D.C., June 1980), p. 2; and conversation with Thomas Gouttierre.
7. Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 615–17.
8. Interview with émigré political scientist.
9. M. R. Arunova et al., eds., *Demokraticheskaya respublika Afganistana* [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), p. 43.
10. Conversation with Thomas Gouttierre.
11. Interview with émigré political scientist.
12. "The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party in Afghanistan" (Kabul?, 1976), pp. 2, 8 (see Appendix C); and Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan," p. 28.

13. Such at least was the judgment at the time of the U.S. embassy. Information on the subject was vague and contradictory. There were even bazaar rumors that the West was behind the uprising, based on the coincidental presence of the U.S. and British ambassadors with some of their staff and families on a camping trip in the area at the time. This version was certainly not true.
14. Interview with émigré political scientist.
15. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 616.
16. Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan, 1968, Part III, Problems of a Free Press*, American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Report, South Asia Series 12, no. 6 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, August 1968), LD-6–68, p. 6.
17. Interview with émigré political scientist.
18. Ibid. This source claims that the same procedure was being followed in 1981: leaflets printed in West Germany were being smuggled into the country for use in underground discussion groups. The tone of these materials, unlike the previous ones, was anticommunist, of course. The fact that they were being reproduced on mimeograph machines and photocopiers indicated that Afghan officials (the only ones with access to such machines) were involved.
19. *A Short Information About People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan* (Kabul, 1978), p. 4.
20. Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan, 1968, Part IV, Strikes and Demonstrations*, American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Report, South Asia Series 12, no. 7 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, August 1968), LD-7–68, p. 4.
21. *A Short Information*, p. 5; and Arunova, *Demokraticheskaya respublika Afganistana*, pp. 44–45, 61.
22. Interviews with émigré political scientist, ranking Foreign Office official, and former social democrat.
23. "The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party," p. 13.
24. Babrak Karmal, "On the Strategy and Tactics of the PDPA," *Parcham*, no. 9 (1969). This quote was translated into German from the original Dari and was published in Ghafur Attar, "Das Volk an der Macht," *Antiimperialistische Informationsbulletin* (Marburg, West Germany), no. 7/8 (July–August 1978): 49. For an official U.S. view that Parcham took part in these activities, see U.S., Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Kabul, "The Afghan Left," Airgram A-33 (May 22, 1973).
25. Dupree, *Afghanistan, 1968, Part IV*, p. 4.
26. Conversation with Thomas Gouttierre.
27. Wolfgang Berner, "Der Kampf um Kabul: Lehren und Perspektiven," in Heinrich Vogel, ed., *Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1980), pp. 338–39.
28. Smith, *Area Handbook*, p. xii.
29. Leon Poullada, "Afghanistan Searches for Unity," unpublished ms., University of Nebraska at Omaha library, n.d. [1973?].

30. "The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party," p. 12. The publication in an April 1970 underground edition of *Parcham* of Suleiman Layeq's ode to Lenin, which used terms customarily reserved for the Prophet, was a notable exception, causing a rash of demonstrations by outraged mullahs and counterdemonstrations by outraged liberals. This may well have been a simple Parchami miscalculation, however; it does not seem to be part of any pattern.
31. Conversation with Thomas Gouttiere; and Louis Dupree, *Red Flag over the Hindu Kush, Part I, Leftist Movements in Afghanistan*, American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Report, Asia 1979, no. 44 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, September 1979), LD-2–79, p. 9. According to Dupree, some pro-Khalqi military officers also took part in these discussions. They were probably in the minority, however, since Parcham was more influential in the military during this era.
32. Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), pp. 55–67.
33. Interview with émigré political scientist. There is an interesting parallel here to events in Burma in the early 1960s. When General Ne Win took over the country, he jailed all politicians but soon found that his military subordinates were incapable of managing the country. His offer of amnesty to political prisoners in return for their help in running the bureaucracy was spurned by all but the pro-Moscow Communists, who accepted it with alacrity.
34. Smith et al., *Area Handbook*, pp. xix–xxi.
35. Arnold, *Afghanistan*, p. 59.
36. A. V. Ignatov, *Revolyutsiya, rozhdennaya v aprele* [The Revolution Born in April] (Moscow: Politicheskaya literatura, 1980), pp. 8–9.
37. U.S., Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Kabul, "The 'Left' in Afghanistan," Airgram A-24 (April 29, 1975), pp. 4–5.
38. Ibid., p. 3.
39. Conversation with Thomas Gouttierre.
40. Ibid.; Arnold, *Afghanistan*, p. 60.
41. Georges Agabekov, *OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror*, tr. from the French by W. Bunn (New York: Brentano's, 1931), pp. 86–93.
42. Hannah Negaran (pseud.), "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security," *Orbis* 23, no. 1 (Spring 1979): 107; and Richard F. Staar, ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1981* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), p. 359.
43. Negaran, "Afghan Coup," p. 99.
44. Louis Dupree, *Toward Representative Government in Afghanistan, Part I, The First Five Steps*, American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Report, Asia 1978, no. 1 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, February 1978), LD-1–78, pp. 8–9.
45. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 11, 1980, p. 12.
46. Interview with émigré political scientist.
47. Arnold, *Afghanistan*, p. 64.

48. Selig S. Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit through Finland?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 41 (Winter 1980–81): 166; and conversation with Thomas Gouttierre.
49. Negaran, "Afghan Coup," p. 99.
50. Arnold, *Afghanistan*, pp. 57–67.
51. U.S. Embassy, Kabul, "The 'Left' in Afghanistan," p. 3.
52. Conversation with Thomas Gouttierre.
53. *On the Saur Revolution* (Kabul: People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, Political Department (May 22, 1978), pp. 2–5, 9.
54. *A Short Biography of Noor Mohammad Taraki* (Kabul?, August 23, 1978), p. 17. Other official Afghan documents of this time also emphasize the importance of Khalqi recruiting in the military.
55. Berner, "Der Kampf um Kabul," p. 332.
56. Interview with former Foreign Office official.
57. Interview with émigré political scientist.
58. Ibid.
59. Saleh Mohammed Zeary, "Afghanistan: The Beginning of a New Era," *World Marxist Review* 22, no. 1 (January 1979): 75.
60. *On the Saur Revolution*, p. 11; and *A Short History*, p. 17.
61. Thomas Gouttierre was told this by Daoud's highest-ranking foreign affairs adviser, Wahid Abdullah.
62. U.S. Embassy, Kabul, "The 'Left' in Afghanistan," pp. 1, 7–8.
63. "The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party," p. 11.
64. Louis Dupree, *Toward Representative Government in Afghanistan, Part III, Steps Six Through Nine—and Beyond?* American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Report, Asia 1978, no. 14 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, February 1978), LD-2–78, p. 1.
65. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 763–64.
66. Interview with émigré social democrat.
67. "The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party," p. 16.

Chapter 5

1. Astrid von Borcke, "Die Intervention in Afghanistan: Das Ende der sowjetischen Koexistenzpolitik?" *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, no. 6 (1980): 8. This is confirmed by conversations with various Afghan émigrés, including a former ranking Foreign Office official. When I served in Kabul, Novokreshchnikov, with one withered arm that he maneuvered with his other, was known without much affection among his noncommunist diplomatic colleagues as Dr. Strangelove.
2. Interview with former middle-level Foreign Office official, who had had connections with the left since university days.

3. Interview with former ranking Foreign Office official. See also James Phillips, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," *Backgrounder* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation), January 9, 1980, p. 9; and Wolfgang Berner, "Der Kampf um Kabul: Lehren und Perspektiven," in Heinrich Vogel, ed., *Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1980), pp. 337, 351.
4. *Kabul New Times*, January 4, 1980.
5. Interview with émigré political scientist.
6. *Wall Street Journal*, March 2, 1979, p. 12; and interview with former ranking Foreign Office official.
7. N. K. Krishnan, "Prospects of Democratic Advance in Afghanistan," *Party Life* (New Delhi), May 26, 1976, pp. 7–8.
8. Selig S. Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 41 (Winter 1980–81): 166.
9. *Socialist* (Sydney), November 24, 1976, p. 6.
10. Only a very thorough examination of Russian-language literature on Afghanistan would have revealed at least one author whose enthusiastic description of Khalq in 1967 could have led to a suspicion that this was an embryonic communist party (Roman Timofeyevich Akhramovich, *Afganistan v 1961–66 gg.* [Afghanistan, 1961–1966] [Moscow: Nauka, 1967], pp. 112–18). The same author, writing in English a year earlier, implied that Afghanistan had a long road to travel before completing the "transition from pre-capitalist to bourgeois class relations" (*Outline History of Afghanistan After the Second World War* [Moscow: Izdatelstvo vostochnoy literatury, 1966], p. 4).
11. Berner, "Der Kampf um Kabul," p. 337; Nancy Peabody Newell and Richard S. Newell, *The Struggle for Afghanistan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 52; and interviews with Afghan émigrés.
12. *World Marxist Review* 23, no. 4 (April 1980): 53.
13. Robert G. Weinland, *An (The?) Explanation of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, Professional Paper 309 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analyses, May 1981), p. 11; and interview with former ranking Foreign Office official.
14. *A Short Biography of Noor Mohammed Taraki* (Kabul?, August 23, 1978), pp. 19–20; and *A Short Information About People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan* (Kabul, 1978), p. 11.
15. U.S., Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Kabul, "The Afghan Left," Airgram A-33 (May 22, 1973), p. 4; Thomas Gouttierre heard of Layeq's funding activities from two different Afghan sources.
16. Ibid., pp. 3–5.
17. *A Short Biography*, pp. 21–22.
18. *On the Saur Revolution* (Kabul: People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, Political Department (May 22, 1978), pp. 11, 12. This is the most detailed description of preparations for the coup. It was also printed in the *Kabul Times*, October 30 and 31, 1978.

19. *Kabul Times*, May 24 and September 6, 1979.
20. Ibid., May 3, 1979.
21. *Kabul New Times*, January 8, 1980.
22. Interview with former ranking Foreign Office official; and conversation with Thomas Gouttierre, who believed that the USSR would also have learned of Daoud's intentions from an Afghan secretary, Abdul Ahad Nasser Zeary, who accompanied the Afghan delegation and who in 1982 was Afghan ambassador to Egypt. A May 1982 edition of *Arabia: The Islamic World Review* (precise reference not available) avers that one Rahim Rafat, an interpreter for Daoud, furnished the Soviets with a transcript of the president's remarks.
23. *New Times*, no. 35 (August 1978): 29.
24. Interview with former Afghan teacher who had close contacts with PDPA members.
25. Winfried F. Wiegandt, *Afghanistan: Nicht aus heiterem Himmel* (Zurich: Orell Füssli Verlag, 1980), p. 55.
26. *Kabul New Times*, June 9 and 15, 1980.
27. Ibid., January 2, 1980.
28. *Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties of Government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan* (Kabul, 1978), p. 15.
29. *A Short Biography*, p. 25; *A Short Information*, pp. 12–13; and *On the Saur Revolution*, p. 12.
30. *Kabul Times*, February 15, 1979.
31. Interview with former minister who served in the Daoud cabinet in 1977.
32. Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), pp. 71, 83–84; and Sri Prakash Sinha, *Afghanistan im Aufruhr* (Freiburg and Zurich: Hecht Verlag, 1980), pp. 125–27.
33. *Events*, no. 75 (June 16, 1978): 28.
34. Sinha, *Afghanistan in Aufruhr*, p. 23.
35. Interview with former ranking Foreign Office official.
36. *New Delhi* 3, no. 24 (April 27–May 10, 1981): 10.
37. Louis Dupree, *Red Flag over the Hindu Kush, Part II, The Accidental Coup, or Taraki in Blunderland*, American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Report, Asia 1979, no. 45 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, September 1979), LD-3–79; *On the Saur Revolution*; and Arnold, *Afghanistan*, pp. 70–72. Although based on the same materials, each of these works has a different perspective.
38. Sinha, *Afghanistan im Aufruhr*, pp. 35–36.
39. *A Short Biography*, pp. 27–28.
40. *International Herald Tribune*, April 28, 1978, p. 1.
41. Ibid., May 2, 1978, p. 2.
42. Ibid., April 29–30, 1978, p. 2; and *The Observer*, April 30, 1978, p. 6.
43. *International Herald Tribune*, May 2, 1978, p. 2; and *The Times* (London), May 4, 1978, p. 6.

44. *New Age* (New Delhi) 27, no. 19 (May 7, 1978): 1.
45. *International Herald Tribune*, May 5, 1978, p. 2.
46. *New York Times*, May 2, 1978, p. 5; May 3, 1978, p. 1; May 4, 1978, p. 11; May 5, 1978, p. 5; May 6, 1978, p. 5; and May 7, 1978, p. 1.
47. Ibid., May 29, 1978, p. 18.
48. *The Guardian*, May 8, 1978, p. 19.
49. "The Establishment of the Marxist-Leninist Party in Afghanistan" (Kabul?, 1976), pp. 6–7 (see Appendix C).
50. *The Guardian*, May 4, 1978, p. 7; and Dupree, *Red Flag, Part II*, p. 13.
51. Interview with a former prisoner who talked with some surviving members of the guards before they were executed.
52. Alfred L. Monks, *The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), p. 14.
53. *Financial Times*, October 16, 1978, p. 2.
54. Jaan Pennar, *The USSR and the Arabs: The Ideological Dimension* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973). This excellent study of the "noncapitalist path of development" examines Soviet views during the 1960s on countries that the USSR was trying to enlist in the socialist camp without taking ideological responsibility for them.
55. *Financial Times*, October 31, 1978, p. 31. The figure seems high; my own estimate is about two hundred.

Chapter 6

1. *Kabul Times*, May 4, 1978.
2. Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), *Epilogue 1980*, note 11 (the epilogue is unpaginated).
3. *On the Saur Revolution* (Kabul: People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, Political Department, May 22, 1978), p. 29.
4. Ibid., pp. 6, 25, 29, 31.
5. *New Age*, January 20, 1980, p. 9. The source of the information was Kishtmand, who gave an interview to a reporter from this paper.
6. *Report by Noor Mohammad Taraki* [,] *General Secretary of the PDPA CC* [,] *Presented to the Historical Plenum of the Central Committee of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan Held on the 6th of Qaus 1357* [November 28, 1978] (Kabul: Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Central Committee, Political Bureau, November 1978), p. 5.
7. *Report of the Five Months' Performance of the D.R.A.* (Kabul: Afghanistan Publicity Bureau, October 1978), pp. 5–6.
8. Sri Prakash Sinha, *Afghanistan im Aufruhr* (Freiburg and Zurich: Hecht Verlag, 1980), p. 44.
9. *Kabul Times*, July 9, 1978.

10. Ibid., July 16, 1978.
11. Ibid., October 3, 1978.
12. Sinha, *Afghanistan im Aufruhr*, p. 44; and *Report by Noor Mohammad Taraki*, pp. 14–15.
13. *Kabul Times*, September 23, 1978.
14. Ibid. One detects in this statement a certain malevolent satisfaction on the part of the male chauvinist Khalqis, who must have delighted in exposing the same prejudices in their supposedly more liberal Parchami rivals.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid; and *Report by Noor Mohammad Taraki*, p. 5.
17. *Report by Noor Mohammad Taraki*, pp. 14–15. The death sentences were not mentioned at this time but came to light a year later.
18. A. Avtorkhanov, *Zagadka smerti Stalina (zagovor Beriya)* [The Mystery of Stalin's Death (Beria's Plot)] (Frankfurt: Possev Verlag, 1976).
19. *Guardian Weekly*, November 5, 1978, p. 13.
20. Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan Under the Khalq," *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1979, pp. 41–42.
21. Alfred Halliday, "Afghanistan: Severe Problems for the New Rulers," *New Statesman* 99, no. 2546 (January 4, 1980): 4.
22. *Kabul New Times*, March 9, 1980, and August 17, 1981.
23. *Report by Noor Mohammad Taraki*, p. 7.
24. *Kabul Times*, September 24 and 25, 1978, for example; many other examples were to follow.
25. Ibid., December 2, 5, and 7, 1978.
26. Ibid., December 8, 1978.
27. Interview with former ranking Afghan Foreign Office official.
28. *International Herald Tribune*, March 13, 1979, p. 2.
29. *Kabul Times*, May 4, 1978.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., May 15, 1978.
32. Ibid., June 14, 1978.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., July 17, 1978.
35. "Afghanistan: Agrarian Policy," *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Background Brief* (July 1981).
36. *Kabul Times*, October 17 and 18, 1978.
37. Ibid., November 28, 1978.
38. Ibid., Joshua Kunitz, *Dawn over Samarkand: The Rebirth of Central Asia* (New York: Covici Friede, 1935), p. 188.
39. "Afghanistan: Agrarian Policy."

40. *New York Times*, May 4, 1981, p. 13.
41. *Daily Telegraph*, August 7, 1978, p. 12; and *Los Angeles Times*, January 6, 1980, p. V-1; and Hannah Negaran (pseud.), "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security," *Orbis* 23, no. 1 (Spring 1979): 102.
42. Arnold, *Afghanistan*, pp. 72–73.
43. Negaran, "Afghan Coup of April 1978," p. 102.
44. Kunitz, *Dawn over Samarkand*, pp. 154–55.
45. *Daily Telegraph*, June 5, 1978, p. 5.
46. *New York Times*, July 1, 1978, p. 4.
47. *The Observer*, October 8, 1978, p. 8.
48. Selig S. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan," *Foreign Policy*, no. 32 (Fall 1978): 136–59.
49. *Financial Times*, July 5, 1978, p. 3.
50. Arnold, *Afghanistan*, p. 78.
51. *Financial Times*, October 31, 1978, p. 31.
52. Yu. A. Polyakov and A. I. Chugunov, *Konets basmachestva* [The End of the Basmachi Movement] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), pp. 115–16.
53. *Kabul Times*, October 8, 1978.
54. Ibid., December 19 and 20, 1978, and March 18, 1979.
55. *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 18, 1980, p. 16.

Chapter 7

1. *New York Times*, July 23, 1981, p. 4.
2. "Afghanistan Report," *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Background Brief* (December 1981), p. 1.
3. *Kabul Times*, March 28, 1979.
4. Interview with émigré teacher; Louis Dupree, *Red Flag over the Hindu Kush, Part II, The Accidental Coup, or Taraki in Blunderland*, American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Report, Asia 1979, no. 45 (Hanover, N.H.: AUFS, September 1979), LD-3–79, p. 5.
5. Interview with émigré teacher.
6. Dupree, *Red Flag, Part II*, p. 5.
7. Sri Prakash Sinha, *Afghanistan im Aufruhr* (Freiburg and Zurich: Hecht Verlag, 1980), p. 65; and interviews with émigré and social democrat, political scientist, and teacher. See also Appendix C.
8. *On the Saur Revolution* (Kabul, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, Political Department, May 22, 1978), p. 6.
9. *Kabul Times*, March 28, 1979; and Wolfgang Berner, "Der Kampf um Kabul: Lehren und Perspektiven," in Heinrich Vogel, ed., *Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan* (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1980, p. 348*n*.

10. *The Economist*, January 13, 1979, p. 50; and *Daily Telegraph*, January 22, 1979, p. 4, and January 25, 1979, p. 5.
11. *New York Times*, February 18, 1979, p. 2; *Kabul Times*, March 10, 1979; and *Kabul New Times*, March 31, 1980.
12. François Missen, *Le Syndrome de Kaboul* (Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1980), p. 168.
13. *International Herald Tribune*, June 15, 1979, p. 7; and interview conversation with émigré.
14. *International Herald Tribune*, April 14–15, 1979, p. 1.
15. Ibid., March 29, 1979, p. 1.
16. *Kabul Times*, March 29, 1979.
17. Ibid., April 14, 1979. The other members of the HHDC were Mohammed Iqbal Waziri, chief of the Political Affairs Department of the armed forces; Lt. Col. Mohammed Yaqub, chief of the general staff; Col. Ghulam Sakhi, commander of air defense; and Col. Nazar Mohammed, commander of the air force.
18. *New York Times*, March 24, 1979, p. 4.
19. *Daily Telegraph*, April 24, 1979, p. 5.
20. Ibid., May 31, 1979, p. 6.
21. *New York Times*, June 2, 1979, p. 4; and *New Times*, no. 25 (June 1979): p. 13.
22. *Kabul Times*, May 26, 1979.
23. *New Age*, February 3, 1980, p. 10 (the story was based on an interview with Kishtmand); and *New York Times*, June 24, 1979, p. 1.
24. *Kabul Times*, May 6, 1979.
25. *New York Times*, August 2, 1979, p. 10.
26. Ibid., September 6, 1979, p. 2.
27. Ibid., July 6, 1979, p. 1, August 6, 1979, p. 1, and September 3, 1979, p. 2; and *Daily Telegraph*, June 20, 1979, p. 4, and August 15, 1979, p. 15.
28. *Kabul Times*, October 2, 1979; and *Kabul New Times*, January 3, 1980.
29. *New York Times*, June 28, 1979, p. 3, and July 24, 1979, p. 1; and *Kabul Times*, August 18, 1979.
30. *Kabul Times*, July 28, 1979.
31. Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), pp. 81–82. The ultimate source for this information is unknown, but its appearance in such authoritative publications as the *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, no. 6 (February 1980), and the *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 125, no. 3 (September 8, 1980), indicates a high level of probability. See also Alfred L. Monks, *The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), p. 27*n*.
32. Selig S. Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 41 (Winter 1980–81): 172.
33. *Kabul New Times*, January 31, February 2, and March 30, 1980.

34. Berner, "Der Kampf um Kabul," p. 336.
35. *New York Times*, September 6, 1979, p. 2.
36. *Le Monde diplomatique*, no. 311 (February 1980): 6–7; and "Hafizullah Amin's Account of the Events Leading to Taraki's Elimination," *Afghan Realities*, no. 6 (July 1982): 9–10.
37. *Kabul Times*, September 12, 1979.
38. *Le Monde diplomatique*, no. 311 (February 1980): 6–7; and *Kabul Times*, September 15, 1979.
39. *Kabul Times*, September 16, 1979.
40. Arnold, *Afghanistan*, p. 87.
41. *Kabul Times*, October 4, 1979.
42. Ibid., October 10, 1979; and *Kabul New Times*, January 21, 23, 27, and 28, 1980.
43. *Kabul Times*, October 7, 1979. The very fact that the death sentence on Qader had been delayed for over a year is indicative of Soviet pressure on his behalf and belies his Islamic nationalist reputation. Capital punishment is usually dispensed more summarily in Afghanistan.
44. Ibid., October 29, 1979.
45. The organizing committee included Jauzjani (vanished), M. S. Alemyar (executed), Khayal Mohammed Katawazi (vanished), Assadullah Amin (executed), and Saleh Mohammed Peroz (vanished).
46. Interview with Thomas Gouttierre, University of Nebraska. See also Thomas Tulenko, "Two Invasions of Afghanistan," *History Today* 30 (June 1980): 112. One can picture the affronted reaction of the Soviet General Staff to a suggestion that Soviet troops be ordered about by Afghan commanders.
47. Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan," p. 173.
48. Monks, *Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan*, pp. 15–16. Monks says that convincing Amin to accept these terms was the mission of Lt. Gen. Viktor Semenovich Paputin, who failed in his task and appears to have died in the violence attendant on unseating Amin. More probably, Paputin's task was to convince Amin that he must tender a blanket invitation and be prepared to step gracefully aside to permit a less controversial leader to take over. (See Arnold, *Afghanistan*, pp. 92–94.) Either way, he failed and appears to have died by his own hand or Amin's in the process.)
49. David Rees, "Afghanistan's Role in Soviet Strategy," *Conflict Studies*, no. 118 (May 1980): 3.
50. Interview with a former minister under Daoud, who was a prisoner at the jail at that time.
51. Arnold, *Afghanistan*, pp. 94–96. The extreme importance of securing control over communications facilities is shown by the Soviet willingness to risk the life of their own minister of communications, Nikolai Vladimirovich Talyzin (who arrived in Kabul for a "friendly" visit on December 24), to ensure success. (Talyzin was made a deputy prime minister in 1980—perhaps as a reward for services rendered.)

52. "A Fatal Thirty Minute Error: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan as Seen from the Precincts of Kabul Radio," *Afghan Realities*, no. 6 (July 1982): 10–11.
53. *New York Times*, July 14, 1979, p. 19.

Chapter 8

1. *Washington Post*, January 22, 1980, p. 1.
2. Robert G. Weinland, *An (The?) Explanation of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, Professional Paper 309 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analyses, May 1981), p. 18; *New York Times*, December 11, 1979, p. 4; and *Sunday Times* (London), January 20, 1980, p. 1.
3. *Oakland Tribune*, October 29, 1980, p. A–13; and interview with émigré social democrat.
4. *The Economist*, June 14, 1980, p. 43.
5. *Los Angeles Times*, October 1, 1980, p. 1.
6. This commonly accepted figure does not mean that the other 20 percent were Parchamis; there were still some nonaligned officers in the service.
7. *New York Times*, March 30, 1980, p. 7.
8. A. G. Noorani, "Afghanistan and the Rule of Law," *The Review* (New York: American Association for the International Commission of Jurists), no. 24 (June 1980): 45–47.
9. Ibid., p. 44; *Kabul New Times*, January 2, 1980; *San Francisco Examiner*, December 31, 1979, p. 18; and "A Fatal Thirty Minute Error: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan as Seen from the Precincts of Kabul Radio" (interview with Sayyed Fazl Akbar, president of Radio Kabul at the time, who later defected), *Afghan Realities*, no. 6 (July 1982): 10–11.
10. *Kabul New Times*, January 14, 1980.
11. *World Marxist Review* 23, no. 4 (April 1980): 56; *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 12, 1980, p. 6; and Noorani, "Afghanistan and the Rule of Law," pp. 45–47.
12. *Novoye vremya* 1980, no. 12 (March 21): 8–9.
13. *Kabul New Times*, January 22, 1980.
14. *Kabul Times*, December 23, 1979. Amin earlier had expressed interest in meeting Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq, as well as its foreign minister.
15. Noorani, "Afghanistan and the Rule of Law," pp. 37–52. This is the best source on the legal aspects of the Soviet intervention and Babrak's seizure of power.
16. *New Delhi* 3, no. 24 (April 27–May 10, 1981): 12.
17. Nancy Peabody Newell and Richard S. Newell, *The Struggle for Afghanistan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 120.
18. Pakteen was appointed ambassador to Moscow in early July 1978; Faiz Mohammed to Baghdad in early August; and Nazar Mohammed to Bonn on September 23, the same day that the confessions of the plotters were published in Kabul.

19. Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), p. 62.
20. *New Age*, January 20, 1980, p. 9.
21. *India Today*, April 16–30, 1980, p. 54.
22. *Le Monde diplomatique*, no. 311 (February 1980): 6; and *Washington Post*, June 15, 1980, p. D-1.
23. *New Times*, 1980, no. 3 (January 18): 9.
24. *New York Times*, February 10, 1980, p. 10.
25. *Daily Telegraph*, July 15, 1981, p. 1.
26. *Times Literary Supplement*, July 3, 1981, p. 753.
27. Ibid.
28. *New York Times*, September 6, 1979, p. 2.
29. *Kabul Times*, May 15, 1979.
30. *International Herald Tribune*, March 13, 1979, p. 2.
31. *Kabul New Times*, January 2, 1980.
32. Ibid., April 20–21, 1980. The initial decree rescinding the old flag was on January 19, but the later reference gives a complete description of the new flag as well as the symbolic significance of its colors—including the fact that the black is supposed to represent opposition to foreign domination!
33. See ibid. for the complete text of the Fundamental Principles. In the interests of strict accuracy the word "socialist" does appear—once. Article 11 refers to Afghanistan's relations with members of the "socialist alliance."
34. Ibid. Article 5 departs from the norm of Soviet-style constitutions in not adhering to the formula of freedom to practice religion and freedom to propagandize atheism.
35. Ibid., June 6 and July 5, 1981.
36. *Kabul Times*, March 31, 1979; and *Kabul New Times*, April 20, 1980.
37. *Kabul New Times*, January 3, 1981.
38. *Pravda*, February 18, 1980, p. 6.
39. *Kabul New Times*, August 12, 1981.
40. Ibid., March 5 and 31, April 14, and May 12, 1981.
41. Ibid., April 16, 1980.
42. Ibid., January 3, 1981.
43. Ibid., September 8, 10, and 12, 1981.
44. *Afghanistan Council Newsletter* 9, no. 3 (June 1981): 4.
45. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 5, 1980, p. 36.
46. *Kabul New Times*, February 19 and March 10, 1980; and U.S., Department of State (Eliza van Hollen), "Afghanistan: A Year of Occupation," Special Report no. 79 (Washington, D.C., February 1981), p. 3.

47. *Pravda*, July 24, 1980, p. 4.
48. U.S., Department of State, "Afghanistan: A Year of Occupation," p. 4.
49. *New York Times*, September 15, 1980, p. 9.
50. *Kabul New Times*, September 21 and 24 and October 13, 1980.
51. U.S., Department of State, "Afghanistan: A Year of Occupation," p. 3.
52. "Afghanistan Report," *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Background Brief* (December 1981), p. 1.
53. Interview with émigré social democrat.
54. U.S., Department of State, "Soviet Dilemmas in Afghanistan," Special Report no. 72 (Washington, D.C., June 1980), p. 2.
55. *Kabul New Times*, March 11, 1980.
56. Ibid., April 8, 26, and 27 and May 11, 1980.
57. *The Economist*, June 14, 1980, p. 43; U.S., Department of State, "Afghanistan: A Year of Occupation," p. 3.
58. *Kabul New Times*, June 9 and 15, 1980. In addition to the five Central Committee members noted in Appendix E, the following were executed: Abdullah Amin, president of the Afghan Textile Company; Ali Shah Paiman, "chief of the security forces"; Jan Dad, Hafizullah Amin's aide-de-camp; Abdul Wodood, chief of communications in the Ministry of Defense; Mohammed Aref Alemyar, brother of Mohammed Siddiq Alemyar and president of the state-run Overland Transport Company; Mohammed Omar, "KAM [secret police] director for persecution"; Sayed Abdullah Samander, chief warden at Pul-e-Charkhi prison; and Wazir Mohammed Zirak, another aide-de-camp of Amin.
59. Ibid., June 21 and August 18, 1980.
60. U.S., Department of State, "Afghanistan: A Year of Occupation," pp. 3, 5; *The Economist*, June 21, 1980, p. 40; *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 18, 1980, p. 16; and *New York Times*, August 4, 1980, p. 2.
61. *Washington Post*, July 24, 1980, p. A-26, and July 29, 1980, p. 1; *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 1, 1980, p. 18; and *New York Times*, August 4, 1980, p. 1.
62. *Pravda*, July 27, 1980, p. 5.
63. "Afghanistan: Chronology of Events, September–December, 1980," *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Background Brief*, January 1981, p. 2.
64. U.S., Department of State, "Afghanistan: A Year of Occupation," p. 3.
65. Ibid.; *Los Angeles Times*, October 1, 1980, p. 1; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 5, 1980, p. 37; *Christian Science Monitor*, September 24, 1981, p. 6; and *New York Times*, November 1, 1980, p. 4.
66. *Times of India*, March 21, 1981, p. 8.
67. U.S., Department of State, "Soviet Dilemmas in Afghanistan," p. 2.
68. *Kabul New Times*, June 13, 1981; and *The Economist*, June 20, 1981, p. 36.

Chapter 9

1. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (*FBIS*), VIII, March 31, 1982, p. C-5 (Kabul domestic service in Pashtu).
2. Ibid., April 30, 1982, p. C-1 (*Pravda*, Bratislava, in Slovak, April 27, 1982, p. 6).
3. Ibid., March 30, 1982, p. C-6 (Kabul domestic service in Dari).
4. *Afghanistan Newsletter* 10, no. 4 (October 1982): 25–27.
5. *FBIS*, VIII, February 3, 1982, p. C-2 (Agence France Presse dispatch, Hong Kong, in English).
6. Ibid., December 21, 1981, p. C-1 (Kabul domestic service in Dari), and April 8, 1982, p. C-13 (*Kabul New Times* in English, March 16–18, 1982).
7. Ibid., February 26, 1982, p. C-3 (*Bakhtar*, Kabul, in English).
8. *FBIS*, III, (February 24, 1982, p. D-2 (*Pravda*, Moscow, in Russian, February 21, 1982, p. 4).
9. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 8, 1980, p. 28.
10. *New Statesman*, January 4, 1980, p. 4.
11. *FBIS*, VIII, February 3, 1982, p. C-2.
12. *Afghanistan Newsletter*, p. 31; *FBIS*, III, March 17, 1982, p. D-4 (*Pravda*, Moscow, March 15, 1982, p. 4).
13. *Afghanistan Newsletter* 10, no. 4 (October 1982): 25.
14. *Kabul New Times*, April 29, 1981.
15. *FBIS*, VIII, March 30, 1982, pp. C-28, C-19.
16. Ibid., December 21, 1981, p. C-2 (Kabul domestic service in Dari).
17. *Afghanistan Newsletter* 10, no. 4 (October 1982): 25–34. This gives the complete text of the PDPA rules.
18. *FBIS*, VIII, February 3, 1982, p. C-2.
19. Ibid., February 26, 1982, p. C-5, and February 23, 1982, p. C-1 (Kabul domestic service in Dari).
20. Ibid., March 31, 1982, p. C-5 (Kabul domestic service in Pashtu).
21. *Kabul New Times*, April 24, 1980.
22. *Kabul Times*, June 12 and July 16, 1978. Like most PDPA-generated statistics on membership, this figure could be up to a tenfold exaggeration.
23. Ibid., July 1, 1979; and *Afghanistan Council Newsletter* 9, no. 3 (September 1979): p. 49.
24. *Kabul New Times*, June 20, 1981.
25. By late April 1982, Dr. Najibullah was claiming 65,000 members for the DOAY, 50,000 for the DOAW. (*FBIS*, VIII, April 30, 1982, p. C-1). In view of other statistics cited in this same speech (63,000 party members and 180,000 "trade unionists in industrial plants" in a country whose total industrial worker strength is only about 40,000), these numbers must be treated with some skepticism.

26. "Afghanistan: Chronology of Events, July–September 1981," *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Background Brief*, October 1981, pp. 1, 2.
27. *Kabul New Times*, April 20–21, 1980.
28. *Afghanistan Council Newsletter* 10, no. 1 (January 1982): 35–40. The draft law on local organs was originally published in the *Kabul New Times*, October 3, 4, and 6, 1981.
29. *Afghanistan Council Newsletter* 10, no. 1 (January 1982): 36, 38.
30. "Afghanistan Report," *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Background Brief*, April 1982, pp. 1–3; *New York Times*, March 17, 1982, p. 4; and *FBIS*, VIII, March 16, 1982, p. C-1 (Agence France Presse dispatch, Hong Kong, in English). A hint of the pre-conference maneuvering was revealed in Radio Kabul's announcement on February 18 that 178 of 632 conference delegates originally selected by Kabul city party organizations for participation had now been chosen to attend. There was no explanation for the unusual two-tier election system.
31. The other program points were expansion of the energy industry, transportation, and communications; strengthening cooperation with the intelligentsia; respect for historical, cultural, and religious traditions of the nationalities and tribes; the raising of the workers' level of consciousness; and an expansion of the literacy campaign. ("Afghanistan Report," p. 2.)
32. *Afghanistan Council Newsletter* 10, no. 1 (January 1982): 25–27.
33. A report that five party members had perished at the hands of party rivals (*New York Times*, March 17, 1982, p. 4) may testify to the validity of the absentees' excuse.
34. *Afghanistan Council Newsletter* 10, no. 1 (January 1982): 25-27.
35. *Kabul Times*, September 13, 1979.
36. *FBIS*, VIII, March 25, 1982, p. C-1 (Agence France Presse dispatch, Hong Kong, in English). Whether this incident actually took place cannot be confirmed, but the official Afghan coverage of Babrak's speech reveals that there was an otherwise unexplained "short break" immediately after one of his exhortations for party unity. (*FBIS*, VIII, March 15, 1982, p. C-3 [Kabul domestic service in Pashtu]).

Chapter 10

1. *The Times* (London), December 24, 1980, p. 10, and December 28, 1981, p. 8; and *New York Times*, December 21, 1981, p. A-2.
2. Pierre Allan and Albert A. Stahel, "Who Can Win in Afghanistan? Analyzing Policies with a Mathematical Model" (unpublished draft paper).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. *The Economist*, August 9, 1980, p. 32; *Los Angeles Times*, November 5, 1980, p. I-8; and *Christian Science Monitor*, March 4, 1981, p. 3.

6. *New York Times*, November 6, 1980, p. 5.
7. *Christian Science Monitor*, June 4, 1980, p. 1.
8. *New York Times*, April 12, 1980, p. 12.
9. *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 31, 1982, p. 15.
10. *San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle*, August 23, 1981, pp. A-1, 7; and *San Francisco Examiner*, September 23, 1981, p. A-4.
11. Before Brezhnev's death, Andropov's quietly efficient public relations apparat was already burnishing his image. It has been traditional since Khrushchev's day for the KGB to plant stories painting Soviet leaders as reluctantly succumbing to various pressure groups when unpopular decisions have been taken. For example, Brezhnev himself was also rumored to have opposed both the Czech and Afghan invasions. Andropov, however, is apparently the first leader to receive this treatment before taking power.

Bibliography

Adamec, Ludwig W. *Afghanistan, 1900–23: A Diplomatic History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

———. *Who's Who of Afghanistan*. Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1975.

———. *Supplement to Who's Who of Afghanistan: The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan*. Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1979.

Afghan Realities. Paris: Afghan Information and Documentation Centre.

Afghanistan Council Newsletter. New York: Asia Society (succeeded in June 1982 by *Afghanistan Newsletter*).

Afghanistan: Moscow's *Drang nach Osten*?" *Ukrainian Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 5–13.

Afghanistan Newsletter. New York: Afghanistan Forum (successor to *Afghanistan Council Newsletter*).

Agabekov, Georges. *OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror*. Translated from the French by W. Bunn. New York: Brentano's, 1931.

Ahmed, Akbar S. *Pukhtun Economy and Society*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.

Akhramovich, Roman Timofeyevich. *Afganistan v 1961–66 gg* [Afghanistan, 1961–1966]. Moscow: Nauka, 1967.

———. *Outline History of Afghanistan After the Second World War.* Moscow: Izdatelstvo vostochnoy literatury, 1966.

———. *Sovetsko-afganskiye otnosheniya* [Soviet-Afghan Relations]. Moscow: Politizdat, 1971.

Arnold, Anthony. *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective.* Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981.

Arunova, M. R.; Girs, G. F.; Dolenko, S. P.; Korgun, V. G.; Polyakov, G. A.; and Trinich, F. A., eds. *Demokraticheskaya respublika Afganistana* [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]. Moscow: Nauka, 1981.

Atkinson, James David. *The Politics of Struggle.* Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1966.

Attar, Ghafur. "Das Volk an der Macht." *Antiimperialistische Informationsbulletin* (Marburg, West Germany), no. 7/8 (July–August 1978): 42–49.

Avtorkhanov, Abdurakhman. *Zagadka smerti Stalina (zagovor Beriya)* [The Mystery of Stalin's Death (Beria's Plot)]. Frankfurt: Possev Verlag, 1976.

Background Briefs. London: United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (ad hoc publications on matters of international interest; numerous issues on Afghanistan).

Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties of Government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Kabul, 1978.

Becka, Jiri. "Young Afghan Prose in Dari." *Afghanistan Journal* 5, no. 3 (1978): 102–4.

Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Quelquejay, Chantal. *Les Mouvements nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie.* Paris: Mouton & Cie, 1960.

Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Wimbush, S. Enders. *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.

Berner, Wolfgang. "Der Kampf um Kabul: Lehren und Perspektiven." In Heinrich Vogel, ed., *Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan.* Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1980, pp. 319–66.

Borcke, Astrid von. "Die Intervention in Afghanistan: Das Ende der sowjetischen Koexistenzpolitik?" *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, no. 6 (1980).

Burks, R. V. *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène. *L'Empire éclaté: La Revolte des nations en U.R.S.S.* Paris: Flammarion, 1978.

Chaliand, Gerard. *Rapport sur la résistance afghane.* Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1981.

Charters, David. "Resistance to Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan: Problems and Prospects." *Conflict Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Summer 1980): 8–15.

Critchlow, James. "Minarets and Marx." *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1980, pp. 47–57.

Dupree, Louis. *Afghanistan.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. (An insert, *Epilogue 1980*, is available for current volumes.)

———. "Afghanistan Under the Khalq." *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1979, pp. 34–50.

———. American Universities Field Staff (AUFS) Reports, South Asia and Asia Series, 1959–1980. Hanover, N.H.: AUFS. (Dupree has been the AUFS referent for Afghanistan in this series of monographs.)

Dupree, Louis, and Albert, Linette, eds. *Afghanistan in the 1970s*. New York: Praeger, 1974.

Eudin, Xenia J., and North, Robert C. *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920–1927: A Documentary Survey*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957.

Fischer, Louis. *The Soviets in World Affairs*. London: J. Cape, 1930.

Franck, Peter. *Afghanistan Between East and West*. Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1960.

Garrity, Patrick J. "The Soviet Military Stake in Afghanistan, 1956–79." *RUSI: Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, no. 125 (September 1980): 31–36.

Gerasimova, A., and Girs, G. *Literatura Afganistana: Kratkiy ocherk* [The Literature of Afghanistan: A Brief Essay]. Moscow: Izdatelstvo vostochnoy literatury, 1963.

Golovin, Oleg, *see under New Times*.

Grassmuck, G. L.; Adamec, L. W.; and Irwin, F. H., eds. *Afghanistan: Some New Approaches*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Near East and North African Studies, 1969.

Gregorian, Vartan. *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969.

Halliday, Alfred. "The Revolution in Afghanistan." *New Left Review*, no. 112 (November–December 1978): 3–44.

Harrison, Selig S. "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 41 (Winter 1980–81): 163–87.

———. "Nightmare in Baluchistan." *Foreign Policy*, no. 32 (Fall 1978): 136–59.

Hussain, S. S.; Alvi, A. H.; and Rizvi, A. H. *Afghanistan Under Soviet Occupation*. Islamabad: World Affairs Publications, 1980.

Ignatov, A. V. *Revolyutsiya, rozhdennaya v aprele* [The Revolution Born in April]. Moscow: Politicheskaya literatura, 1980.

Jäkel, Klaus. "Nur Mohammed Taraki." *Afghanistan Journal* 5, no. 3 (1978): 105–8.

Kazemzadeh, Firuz. "Afghanistan: The Imperial Dream." *New York Review of Books* 27, no. 2 (February 21, 1980): 10–14.

Khalilzad, Zalmay. *The Return of the Great Game*. Discussion Paper no. 88. Santa Monica, Calif.: California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, September 1980.

Klass, R. T. "The Great Game Revisited." *National Review*, October 26, 1979, pp. 1366–368.

Korgun, V. G. *Afganistan v 20–30-e gody XX v.* [Afghanistan in the Twenties and Thirties of the Twentieth Century]. Moscow: Nauka, 1979.

Krishnan, N. K. "Prospects of Democratic Advance in Afghanistan." *Party Life* (New Delhi), May 26, 1976, pp. 7–8.

Kunitz, Joshua, *Dawn over Samarkand: The Rebirth of Central Asia.* New York: Covici Friede, 1935.

Luttwak, Edward N. "After Afghanistan, What?" *Commentary* no. 69 (April 1980): 40–49.

Missen, François. *Le Syndrome de Kaboul.* Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1980.

Monks, Alfred L. *The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981.

Negaran, Hannah (pseud.). "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security." *Orbis* 23, no. 1 (Spring 1979): 93–113.

———. Afghanistan: A Marxist Regime in a Muslim Society." *Current History* 76 (1979): 172–74.

Newell, Nancy Peabody, and Newell, Richard S. *The Struggle for Afghanistan.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981.

Newell, Richard S. *The Politics of Afghanistan.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981.

New Times. 1980, no. 3 (January): 8–10. "World Communist Solidarity with the Afghan Revolution."

———. 1980, no. 12 (March); 7–9. "Of the Friends and the Enemies of Independent Revolutionary Afghanistan," by Oleg Golovin.

———. 1980, no. 17 (May): 18–25. "Two Years of the Afghan Revolution," by Victor Sidenko.

Nollau, Guenther, and Wiehe, Hans Juergen. *Russia's South Flank.* New York: Praeger, 1963.

Noorani, A. G. "Afghanistan and the Rule of Law." *The Review* (New York: American Association for the International Commission of Jurists), no. 24 (June 1980): 37–52.

Nukhovich, E. *Vneshnyaya politika Afganistana* [Afghanistan's Foreign Policy]. Moscow: Institut mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy, 1962.

Ochildiyev, D. Ya. *Obshchestvenno-politicheskaya mysl Afganistana nakanune zavoyevaniya nezavisimosti* [Sociopolitical Thought of Afghanistan on the Eve of Achieving Independence]. Tashkent: Akademiya nauk uzbekskoy SSR, 1972.

On the Saur Revolution. Kabul: People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, Political Department, May 22, 1978.

Paul, Arthur. "Constraints on Afghanistan's Development and Prospects for Future Progress." March 1973 address to the Asia Society's Afghanistan Council. New York: Asia Society, 1973.

Pennar, Jaan. *The USSR and the Arabs: The Ideological Dimension.* New York: Crane, Russak, 1973.

Phillips, James. "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan." *Backgrounder* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation), January 9, 1980.

Pikulin, M. T. *Razvitiye ekonomii i kultury Afganistana, 1955–60* [Development of the Economy and Culture of Afghanistan, 1955–1960]. Tashkent: Akademiya nauk uzbekskoy SSR, 1961.

Polyakov, Yu. A., and Chugunov, A. I. *Konets Basmachestva* [The End of the Basmachi Movement]. Moscow: Nauka, 1976.

Poullada, Leon B. "Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years." *Middle East Journal* 35, no. 2 (Spring 1981): 178–90.

———. "Afghanistan Searches for Unity." Unpublished manuscript at the University of Nebraska at Omaha library, n.d. [late 1973?].

———. *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973.

Ratnam, Perala. *Afghanistan's Uncertain Future*. New Delhi: Tulsi Publishing House, 1981.

Rees, David. "Afghanistan's Role in Soviet Strategy." *Conflict Studies*, no. 118 (May 1980).

Report by Noor Mohammad Taraki[,] General Secretary of the PDPA CC [,] Presented to the Historical Plenum of the Central Committee of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan Held on the 6th of Qaus 1357 [November 28, 1978]. Kabul: Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Central Committee, Political Bureau, November 1978.

Report of the Five Months' Performance of the D.R.A. Kabul: Afghanistan Publicity Bureau, October 1978.

Rideout, Christine F. "Authority Patterns and the Afghan Coup of 1973." *Middle East Journal* 29, no. 2 (Spring 1975): 165–78.

Rodinson, Maxime. *Marxism and the Muslim World*. Translated by Michael Pallis. London: Zed Press, 1979.

A Short Biography of Noor Mohammad Taraki. Kabul?, August 23, 1978.

A Short Information About People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Kabul, 1978.

Sidenko, Victor, *see under New Times*.

Sinha, Sri Prakash. *Afghanistan in Aufruhr*. Freiburg and Zurich: Hecht Verlag, 1980.

Smith, Harvey H., et al., eds. *Area Handbook for Afghanistan*. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973.

Staar, Richard F., ed. *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1981*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981.

Taraki, Nur Mohammed. *Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties of Government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan* (text of radio address on May 9, 1978). Kabul, 1978.

Tellinskiy, L. B. *Sovetsko-afganskiye otnosheniya, 1919–1960* [Soviet-Afghan Relations, 1919–1960]. Moscow: Sotsialno-ekonomicheskaya literatura, 1964.

The Truth About Afghanistan: Documents, Facts, Eyewitness Reports. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1980.

Tulenko, Thomas. "Two Invasions of Afghanistan." *History Today* 30 (June 1980): 7–12.

U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Soviet Violation of Helsinki Final Act: Invasion of Afghanistan. Hearings.* July 22, 1981. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981.

U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs (Eliza van Hollen). "Afghanistan: 18 Months of Occupation." Special Report no. 86. Washington, D.C., August 1981.

———. "Afghanistan: A Year of Occupation." Special Report no. 79. Washington, D.C., February 1981.

———. "Soviet Dilemmas in Afghanistan." Special Report no. 72. Washington, D.C., June 1980.

U.S. Department of State. U.S. Embassy, Kabul. "The Afghan Left." Airgram A-33. May 22, 1973.

———. "The 'Left' in Afghanistan." Airgram A-24. April 29, 1975.

Valenta, Jiri. "From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion." *International Security* (Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs), no. 630 (Fall 1980): 114–41.

Vinogradov, V. M., et al., eds. *Sovetsko-afganskiye otnosheniya, 1919–1969* [Soviet-Afghan Relations, 1919–1969]. Moscow: Politizdat, 1971.

Warhurst, Geoffrey. "Afghanistan: A Dissenting Appraisal." *RUSI: Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, no. 125 (September 1980): 26–29.

Wiegandt, Winfried F. *Afghanistan: Nicht aus heiterem Himmel.* Zurich: Orell Füssli Verlag, 1980.

Weinland, Robert G. *An (The?) Explanation of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.* Professional Paper 309. Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analysis, May 1981.

Zeary, Saleh M. "Afghanistan: The Beginning of a New Era." *World Marxist Review* 22, no. 1 (January 1979): 73–78.

Index

Abawi, Khalil Ahmad, 204–5
Abdur Rahman Khan, 1–2, 12, 98, 106
Advisers, Soviet, 62, 76, 82–87 *passim*, 99–100
Afghan Interests Protection Service, *see* AGSA
Afghanistan Through History, 41
Afghan Mellat, 94
Afghan studies, Soviet, 13, 209–10
Afghan traits, 2–5, 128, 129
Agricultural cooperatives, 75, 95
Agriculture, 3, 75–76, 141–42. *See also* Land reform
AGSA (security service), 84, 94. *See also* KAM
Ahmad Shah Durrani, 3
Ahmadzai, Shahpur Khan, 69, 70, 71
Aid, foreign: military, 6, 7, 12, 13, 23, 46, 48, 84, 95; economic, 12–13, 23, 27, 43, 46, 62–63, 172–73
Aimaqs, 3, 4
Akbar, Mir Ali, 69, 70, 71
Akbar, Sayyed Fazl, 97
Akbari, Aziz Ahmad, 94
Alemyar, Mohammed Aref, 58, 227
Alemyar, Mohammed Siddiq, 58, 178, 188, 200–201, 224
Alhaq, *see under* Fezan, Fezanul Haq
Amanullah, 2, 6, 7, 80, 98
Amin, Abdullah, 80, 112, 227
Amin, Assadullah, 94, 112, 188, 224
Amin, Hafizullah, 28; recruiting by, 29, 30, 34, 47; parliamentary campaigns, 32, 42; Saur coup role, 58–59; early DRA role, 65–72 *passim*, 77, 78; biography, 79–98; death of, 98; PDPA, DRA posts, 188, 198–99
Amnesties, 94, 108, 109
Anahayta, Mirman, *see* Anahita Ratebzad
Anahita (Anahayta) Ratebzad, 21–22, 32, 41, 42, 44, 58, 68; head of DOAW, 69; ideological position, 104, 105; biography, 184–85; PDPA, DRA posts, 193, 198–99
Andropov, Yuriy, 99, 134, 230
Angar, 11, 17, 20
Aqa, Gul, 188
Arian, Abdur Rashid, 25, 103, 113, 168, 169, 178, 188, 202–3

Army, *see* Military
Association for the Liberation of the East, 6
Attar, Ghaffur, 215
Awakened Youth, 10, 11, 43
Azhar, Abdus Samad, 196
Azim, Mohammed Ibrahim, 103–4, 202–3

Babrak Karmal ("Washraka"), 25, 33, 34–35, 41, 57; biography, 19–22; in parliament, 31, 42, 165–66; relations with Khalq, 35, 66, 69–73, 168–70 *passim*; relations with Daoud, 44, 169–70; diplomatic exile, 67–68; PDPA, DRA posts, 65, 74, 110–14 *passim*, 191, 198–99
Bacha-e-Saqao, 6, 7, 8
Badakhshi, Taher, 39, 70, 161, 166, 167, 168, 188
Bakhtari, Ghulam Jailani, 104, 166
Bala Hissar revolt, 86–87
Baluch, 4, 29
Baluchistan, 45, 77, 160, 174
Baluch People's Liberation Army, 45
Baryalai, Mahmoud, 67, 69, 103, 178, 188
Basmachi, 76, 77, 78, 128
Bawar, Khodar Nur, 196
Benawa, Abdur Rauf, 10, 104
Bhutto, Ali, 39, 46, 174
Bonyadi, *see* Bunyadi
Brezhnev, Leonid, 67, 92, 99
Brezhnev Doctrine, 84–85, 105, 133
British-Soviet Trade Agreement, 6
Bukhara, 80
Bunyadi, Mohammed Yasin, 168, 169, 189

Cabinets, 65–66, 103–4, 198–205
Central Asia, 4, 7, 71, 76–77, 128, 132
Central committees, 34, 102–3; expansions, 35, 68–69, 113, 168; rules, 102, 153–55; 168–69; membership chart, 188–96
Central Treaty Organization, 12, 174
Charkhi, Ghulam Nabi, 7, 8, 101
Chechens, 128–29
Chiefs of zone, 110
China, 4, 39, 45, 130. *See also* Maoism
Columbia University, 29, 80, 81
Comintern, 6
Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, 77, 94, 95, 110, 122. *See also* National Organization for Defense of the Revolution
Communications, 65, 224
Communist parties, foreign, 6, 53–54
Communist Party of India (CPI), 6, 16–17, 53, 54
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 56, 99, 105, 132–33, 172
Congress of Eastern Peoples, 6
Constituencies and membership (PDPA), 21–22, 25, 26–29, 33–34 *passim*, 50, 56–74 *passim*; party size, 115–18; composition, 118–21, 123–25. *See also* Recruitment
Constitutions: national, 7, 24–27 *passim*, 37, 44, 45, 50–51, 52, 74, 94–95; PDPA, 25, 101–2, 149–59; "Fundamental Principles," 107–8
Coups d'état, 2, 43–44, 56–60, 69–73, 86, 94, 112–13
Cuba, 131–32

Dad, Jan, 227
Danesh, Ismail, 102, 103, 165, 167, 168, 179, 189, 200–201
Daoud, Mohammed, 3, 11, 17, 23–24, 98, 216; relations with PDPA, 31, 35, 42; second administration, 43–51, 60, 73–74
Decrees (DRA), 74–76
Defections, desertions, mutinies, 84, 86–87, 91, 94
Defense of the Revolution battalions, 110
Dehnishin, Feda Mohammed, 69, 189
Democratic centralism, 112, 115, 122–23, 152, 170
Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW), 69, 121–25 *passim*, 228
Democratic Organization of Afghan Youth (DOAY), 69, 120–25 *passim*, 228
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), 61–65 *passim*, 82–96 *passim*, 104–11, 113–14
Desertions, *see* Defections
Dost, Shah Mohammed, 103, 189, 202–3
Dubs, Adolph, 82–83
Durand Line, 10, 144
Durrani tribe, 3, 15, 16, 60

Economy, 9, 26, 27, 124, 139–43
Elections, 31–33, 42
Enterprise Group, 10
Etemadi, Nur Ahmad, 40
Executions, 87, 108, 112

Faqir, Faqir Mohammed, 189, 200–201
Farangi, 85
Farhang, Mir Mohammed Siddiq, 104
Farouq, Ghulam, 189
Farsiwans, 3
Farzan, Mohammed Anwar, 196

Fezan, Fezanul Haq (Alhaq, Fezanul), 32, 172
Flag, changes in, 62, 74, 75, 107, 226
Foreign policy: of Daoud, 11–12, 23–24, 45, 46, 57; of Taraki, 62–63, 72–73, 77, 85; of Amanullah, 80; of Amin, 92–93; of PDPA, 138–39, 144–45, 151, 173–74
Foreign trade, 9, 23, 142
Front groups, 121–23
"Fundamental Principles," 107–8, 123. *See also* Constitutions

Ghairat, Hunar, 196
Ghayour, Khanmir, 189
Ghilzai tribe, 3, 15, 16, 80
Ghiyasi, Burhan, 189
Ghorbandi, Abdul Quddud, 65, 190, 200–201
Ghubar, Mir Ghulam Mohammed, 19, 41
Glavnoye razvedyvatelnoye upravleniye (GRU), *see* Soviet intelligence activities
Gromyko, Andrei, 93
Gulabzoy, Sayed Mohammed, 59, 69, 87–91 *passim*, 103, 125–26; biography, 179; PDPA, DRA posts, 190, 200–201
Guldad, 102, 179, 190, 202–3
Gurbuz, Mir Ahmad, 190

Habibi, Abdulhai, 104
Habibullah, 2, 6
Hashemi, Mohammed Mansour, 168, 190, 200–201
Hashim, Mohammed (Khan), 9, 23
Hashim, Mohammed (lt. col.), 190
Hassan, Imtiaz, 190
Hazaras, 3, 4, 38, 39
Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 101
Helmand River, 77
Herat massacre, 83
Homeland High Defense Council, 84
Hoquqi, Abdul Walid, 70, 104
Hussain, Mohammed, 19, 166

Identity cards, 87
Ideology, 34–36, 104–8, 172. *See also* Marxism-Leninism; National democracy; Noncapitalist path; Socialism
Ikhwan-al-Muslimin, *see* Muslim Brotherhood
Iran, 4, 45, 46, 53, 62, 77, 171
Iraqi Communist Party, 53
Islamic nationalism, 132

Jalalar, Mohammed Khan, 102, 103, 179, 202–3
Jalili, Abdur Rashid, 190, 200–201
Jan, Baba, 196
Jauzjani (Sharai), Abdul Hakim Sharayee, 32, 42, 57, 102, 165–68 *passim*, 224; biography, 180; PDPA, DRA posts, 190, 200–201
Jirgah, 4–5, 122–23
Jonbesh, 32, 163

Kaihani, Hashmattullah, 196
KAM (Kargari astekhbarati muassessa), 94, 227. *See also* AGSA
Kamyar, Mohammed Nabi, 204–5
Karameddin (Dr.), 166, 168, 184
Karmal, Babrak, *see* Babrak Karmal
Karwal, Mirsaheb, 191
Katawazi, Khayal Mohammed, 102, 191, 200–201, 224
Kaweyani, Najmuddin Akhgar, 180, 191
Keshtemand, *see* Kishtmand
KGB, *see* Soviet intelligence activities
Khalil(ullah) (maj.), 191
Khalq, *see individual headings*
Khalq, 25, 32, 34, 40, 161–63, 164–69 *passim*
Khalq Kargah, 40
Khan, Abdur Rahman, *see* Abdur Rahman Khan
Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar, 9, 16
Khattak, Ajmal, 54
Kheybar, *see* Khyber
Khudai Khidmatgaran, 9
Khyber (Kheybar), Mir Akbar, 30, 44, 166, 168, 191; murder of, 57–59, 112; biography, 180
Kirghiz, 3, 4
Kishtmand (Keshtemand), Sultan Ali, 32, 69–71 *passim*, 93, 96, 103, 166, 167; PDPA, DRA posts, 113, 161, 191, 198–99; biography, 180–81
Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopastnosti (KGB), *see* Soviet intelligence activities

Laiq, *see* Layeq
Lakanwal, Abdul Ghaffar, 196, 202–3
Land reform, 75–76, 86, 105, 108–9
Layeq (Laiq), Sulciman, 30, 44, 55, 69, 70, 165, 166, 167; biography, 181; PDPA, DRA posts, 191, 198–99
Lewal, Shahzar, 191
Literacy, 18, 29, 38, 120, 125
Literature, communist, 5–6, 30, 41, 47, 48, 175–76; other dissenting, 40–41, 215
Literaturnaya gazeta, 18, 111
Loya Jirgah, 5, 51, 74, 123

Mahmoud, Shah, 9, 11, 23, 24
Mahmudi, Abdur Rahman, 19, 20, 38
Mahmudi, Hadi, 38, 40
Mahmudi, Rahim, 38, 40
Maiwandwal, Mohammed Hashim, 33–34, 44, 45
Mangal, Sarwar Habib, 191, 204–5
Maoism, 38, 39, 40, 164, 171, 172. *See also* Sholay-e-Jaweid
Marxism-Leninism, 38, 53, 86, 111, 149, 161, 164; PDPA disavowal of, 34–35, 61, 107. *See also* Ideology
Masoodi, Mohammed Salem, 25, 191, 200–201
Mazdooryar, Sher Jan, 84, 90, 91, 103; biography, 181–82; PDPA, DRA posts, 192, 200–201
Media, PDPA focus on, 30–31, 213
Meli Jirgah, 51
Membership (PDPA), *see* Constituencies and membership
Meshrano Jirgah, 31
Military: PDPA recruitment of, 30–31, 38, 47–49, 55, 63, 118, 213; desertions from, 91, 111; DRA incentives to, 109
Military Revolutionary Council, 60
Minorities, 3–4
Misaq, Abdul Karim, 102, 161, 163, 167, 168, 171; PDPA, DRA posts, 192, 198–99
Mohammed, Abdul ('Eyd-ol), 165, 167
Mohammed, Dost (maj.), 196
Mohammed, Faiz, 47, 68, 102, 103, 110, 225; PDPA, DRA posts, 192, 202–3
Mohammed, Fateh, 122
Mohammed, Nazar (engr.), 68, 103, 192, 202–3, 225
Mohammed, Nazar (lt. col.), 192, 223
Mohammedzai family, 21, 26–27, 41, 75
Mohtat, Abdul Hamid, 47
Momand, Fazel Rahim, 103, 202–3
Mujahideen, *see* Resistance
Muslim Brotherhood, 39–40, 58, 166, 172
Mutinies, *see* Defections

Nader Shah, 7–8, 15
Najib(ullah), 67, 69, 103, 182, 192
National Assembly, 7, 11, 24, 160. *See also* Parliament
National Awami Party, 45, 53, 54, 174
National democracy/democratic: in party platform, 25, 133, 143–45, 162; retreat from socialism, 105–6, 133; Khalqi view of, 169, 175, 177. *See also* United National Front
National Fatherland Front (NFF), 121–23
National Organization for Defense of the Revolution (NODR), 95–96. *See also* Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
National Rescue Front, 77
National Revolutionary Party, 51
National United Democratic Front, *see* United National Front
Natural gas agreement, 93
Nawaz, Gul, 192
Nepotism, 27, 33, 49
Neutrality, nonalignment, 24, 46, 61, 62, 93
Newspapers, noncommunist opposition, 11, 163
"Night letters," 40–41
Nonaligned movement, 63, 67
Noncapitalist path of development, 27–28, 140–43, 148, 162, 220. *See also* National democracy
Nonparty DRA figures, 104, 109, 111
Noorzai, Abdul Qayeum, 102, 192
Northwest Frontier Province, 4, 8, 77, 132
Novokreshchnikov, Alexander A., 52, 56, 217
Nur (Panjwai), Nur Mohammed, 25, 32, 42, 65–69 *passim*, 113, 165–68 *passim*, 172, 184; biography, 182; PDPA, DRA posts, 193, 198–99
Nur Translation Agency, 17–18

Ofagh, Mohammed Zahir, 165, 167
Omar, Mohammed, 227
Oppositions, noncommunist: to monarchy, 7–20 *passim*, 39–40; to DRA, 73–77, 94, 110. *See also* Resistance
Osman, Mohammed Akram, 212

Paghman, 29, 42, 79–80, 81, 98, 111, 126
Paigir, Sayed Akram, 196
Paikargar, Sayed Tahir Shah, 196
Paiman (Peyman), Mohammed Hassan, 168, 169, 193, 227
Pakistan, 10–12 *passim*, 45–46, 77, 85, 101; border closures, 4, 23, 129. *See also* Foreign policy
Pakteen, Raz Mohammed, 68, 103, 193, 202–3, 225
Paktiawal, Mehrabuddin, 202–3
Palwasha, Jamila, 196
Panjsheri, Dastagir, 40, 57, 92, 103, 161, 166–171 *passim*; biography, 182–83; PDPA, DRA posts, 193, 198–99
Panjshir Valley, 3, 39, 40, 111, 126
Panjwai, *see* Nur, Nur Mohammed
Paputin, Viktor Semenovich, 224

Parcham, *see individual headings*
Parcham, 40, 42, 67, 163, 167, 216
Parliament, 7, 31–33, 37–38, 44, 45
Party cards, 94, 118
Party conference, 123–26, 155
Party congress, 153, 161
Pashtunistan, 10–12 *passim*, 23, 24, 45–46, 77, 144, 160, 174
Pashtuns, 2–3, 4, 18, 29, 39
Pashtun Trading Company, 16
Pashtunwali, 3
Pavlovskiy, Ivan G., 87, 88, 89, 93
Pazhwak, Nehmatullah, 44, 183
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan: founding, 25; semantics of name, 26; platform, 137–48; constitution, 149–59. *See also individual headings*
People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 70
People's Organization of Afghan Youth, 69. *See also* Democratic Organization of Afghan Youth
Peroz, Saleh Mohammed, 193, 224
Personality cults, 85, 91, 94
Peyman, *see* Paiman
Political Parties Act, 24, 38
Political parties and processes, 5, 24–25, 27, 31, 32, 37–38, 44, 49–50, 123. *See also* Jirgah
Political prisoners, 63, 87, 97, 108
Ponomarev, Boris, 99, 132
Popal, Ali Ahmad, 81
Popular Front for Armed Resistance, 45
Population distribution, 2–4, 21
Press laws, 11, 32
Program of Action, 124, 229
Proletarian internationalism, 151, 170
Pul-e-Charkhi prison, 108
Purdeli, Abdus Sattar, 196
Purges, 63, 70, 102–3, 104, 113, 116
Puzanov, Alexander M., 72, 91–94 *passim*

Qader, Abdul, 47, 60, 61, 65–72 *passim*, 93, 224; biography, 183; PDPA, DRA posts, 193, 198–99
Qizilbash, 39, 179

Rafat, Rahim, 219
Rafiee, Mohammed, 65, 69–71 *passim*, 93, 184, 193, 200–201
Rahnema, 32, 163
Ratebzad, Anahita, *see* Anahita
Rauf, Attaullah, 30
Razmjo, Abdul Zahoor, 193
Recruitment (PDPA), 29–31, 35, 38, 47–49, 118–21. *See also* Constituencies and membership
Red Shirts, 9, 16
Reforms, 23, 31, 73, 75, 105, 106
Republican Guards, 60
Resistance, 73–78 *passim*, 82–97 *passim*, 101, 109–13 *passim*, 122, 126, 133
Revolutionary Council, 60–62, 68, 101, 102, 113
Rusakov, Konstantin V., 132–33

Sadeqi, Mohammed Yasin, 193
Safi, Abdul Wahab, 161, 167, 202–3
Safi, Mohammedullah, 196
Safi, Zamir, 57, 194
Safronchuk, Vassiliy, 86, 99, 122
Saghari, Mohammed Omar, 194
Sahrayee, Sahib Jan, 87, 194, 200–201
Sakhi, Ghulam, 223
Samander, Abdullah, 227
Sarandoy (security service), 84
Sarbaz, Pacha, 59
Sarbiland, Abdul Majid, 69, 194, 202–3
Sarwari, Assadullah, 84, 90, 91, 94, 103, 112, 185; PDPA, DRA posts, 194, 200–201
Saudi Arabia, 46, 62
Saur Revolution, 54, 93, 105, 108
Schools, 8, 19, 29–34 *passim*, 41–42, 68, 80–81. *See also* Students
Security services, *see* AGSA; KAM; Sarandoy
"Servants of God," 9
Settam-e-Melli, 39, 70, 72
Shabnamah, 40–41
Shafiee, Mohammed Hassan Bareq, 69, 70, 92, 165, 167, 185–86; PDPA, DRA posts, 194, 198–99
Shah, Ahmad, 194
Shah, Nader, *see* Nader Shah
Shahpur, Shahrullah, 161, 166–69 *passim*, 194
Sharai, *see* Jauzjani
Shariat, 4–5
Sharq, Hassan, 44–45
Shias, 3, 38, 39
Sholay-e-Jaweid, 38–42 *passim*. *See also* Maoism
Shore, Abdullah Bashir, 8
Sibling rivalry, 28–29, 212
Socialism, 27–28, 105–8, 133, 161, 162, 175; scientific, 28, 48, 53, 151, 162
Socialist Party of Australia, 53
Soma, *see* Suma

Sorkhabi, Ahmad Shah, 204–5
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 12
Soviet-Afghan Friendship Society, 93
Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 73, 133
Soviet intelligence activities, 18–19, 31, 48, 55–56, 88
Soviet invasion, 96–98, 99–102, 106, 130–31
Soviet perceptions and policies: royal Afghanistan, 6, 7–9, 13, 33; Daoud regime, 46, 50, 53–54; Parcham-Khalq split, 53–55, 111, 113; PDPA coup, 59–63 *passim*; DRA, 62, 72–73, 82–107 *passim*; possible withdrawal, 127–34
Strikes, 41
Students, 7–8, 11, 19, 26–37 *passim*, 41–42, 44, 109
Suma, Mahmoud Alamgul, 168, 169, 194, 200–201
Sunnis, 4, 38

Taher, Mohammed, 161
Tahzib, Nezamuddin, 65, 69, 195, 200–201
Tajiks, 3, 4, 39
Talyzin, Nikolai Vladimirovich, 224
Taraki, Nur Mohammed, 20–21, 25, 32, 42, 161; biography, 15–19; dispute with Babrak, 35, 65, 164–70; Saur coup role, 48, 57, 60, 61; PDPA, DRA posts, 64, 195, 198–99; DRA role, 64–78 *passim*, 83–88 *passim*; anti-Amin plot, 88, 90–91; death, 93
Taroon, Sayed Daoud, 84, 90, 92, 195
Teacher education, 29, 42
Teachers, 29–31, 74, 109–10, 125
Tribal independence, 1–3, 6, 7
Tudeh Party, 53, 54
Turkomans, 3, 4

Ulomi, Nourul Haq, 196
United National Front, 70, 72, 122, 162, 177. *See also* National democracy
United States, 12, 13, 17, 27, 83, 209
Ustinov, Dmitri, 99
Uzbeks, 3, 4

Wafadar, Pacha Gul, 47, 68
Wakhan Corridor, 130
Wakil, Abdul, 25, 68, 69, 103, 195, 200–201
Wali, Akbar Shah (Dr.), 57, 87, 92, 102, 161, 167, 168; biography, 186; PDPA, DRA posts, 195, 198–99
Wali, Shah, 23, 44
Ward, Angus, 12
Warsaw Pact, 130–31, 133
Washraka, Babrak, *see* Babrak
Watan, 11, 19–20
Watanjar, Mohammed Aslam, 65–69 *passim*, 84–94 *passim*, 103, 186, 195, 198–99
Waziri, Abdur Rashid, 196
Waziri, Mohammed Iqbal, 102, 195, 223
Wikh-e-Zalmayan, 10
Wisconsin, University of, 81
Wodood, Abdul, 227
Wolesi, Abdul Ahad, 168, 169, 195
Wolesi Jirgah, 31–32, 33
Women, 21–22, 23, 69, 75, 185, 221
World communist movement, 172

Yaqub, Mohammed, 195, 202–3, 223
Yepishev, Aleksey Alekseyevich, 84, 88, 89, 130
Young Afghans, 7, 8, 15
Yuresh, Ghulam Sarwar, 69, 195, 196
Yussuf, Mohammed, 33, 44

Zabuli, Abdul Majid, 9, 10, 16, 17, 25, 50, 209
Zahir, Mohammed (Dr.), 167
Zahir Shah, 9, 21, 23–24, 44
Zara, Sayed Amir Shah, 196
Zarghun, Abdul Karim, 168, 169
Zarif, Mohammed, 196, 200–201
Zeary, Abdul Ahad Nasser, 219
Zeary (Ziri), Saleh Mohammed, 87, 103, 122, 161–71 *passim*, 186–87; PDPA, DRA posts, 196, 198–99
Zia, Zia Mohammedzai, 44
Zirak, Wasir Mohammed, 227
Ziri, *see* Zeary

Histories of Ruling Communist Parties

Korean Workers Party: A Short History
Chong-Sik Lee

History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1976
Douglas Pike

Lenin's Legacy: The Story of the CPSU
Robert G. Wesson

The Communists of Poland
Jan de Weydenthal

How Mongolia Is Really Ruled
Robert Rupen

Communism in Hungary: From Kun to Kádár
Bennett Kovrig

Zealots and Rebels:
A History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
Zdenek Suda

A History of the Romanian Communist Party
Robert R. King